Distribution by Region

Distribution by Organisation Type, Document Type, Region and Year

Acceptance occurs mostly in documents published in Europe, followed by Asia, North America, Africa and MENA with comparatively smaller contributions. Overall, the top five contributors in terms of occurrences are RC, NGO, IGO, C/B and NGO_Fed organisations.

RC, NGO and NGO_Fed documents provide the greatest number of occurrences, primarily from activity reports published in Europe. Occurrences from NGO were mostly obtained from general documents published in North America.

C/B documents mostly generated occurrences in general documents published in Europe.

Acceptance of the organization involves parties to the conflict and other key stakeholders recognizing and accepting the neutral, impartial, and independent nature of the ICRC and its specific mandate under IHL and the Statutes of the Movement to protect and assist those affected by armed conflict and other situations of violence. The ICRC's reputation and the extent to which the organization is accepted directly influence its ability to gain access to victims and to attract qualified staff and funding.

Acceptance here means that MSF seeks a social contract whereby its presence is respected by all parties to a conflict, including civilians, who all understand and accept that MSF's humanitarian identity is central to its operations, and that MSF is there to assist those in need of emergency medical care.

Most NGOs today claim acceptance as a foundation of their security strategy. How each NGO implements acceptance, however, differs substantially.

Acceptance: acceptance as a strategy is at the heart of the work of NGOs, ICRC and (in theory) the UN humanitarian agencies. It plays an important role when security problems are caused by the recipients of aid themselves (or by groups closely linked to them). Ac- ceptance is less relevant as a strategy when security problems are caused by others, who are not directly part of the affected population, and are not recipients of aid (security problems such as organised banditry, kidnapping, hostage-trafficking, etc.).

Gaining such acceptance, however, requires a determined and long-term use of practices such as continuous outreach and confidence-building with local leaders, communities and authorities; direct and constant engagement with all parties to a conflict; clear disassociation from political and military goals; transparency regarding programmes and motivations; and careful analyses of the operating environment and the actors present in it.

Experience by humanitarian organizations operating in the “deep field” shows that long-standing engagement — before, during and after an emergency — is key in fostering acceptance among the communities being helped as well as among the parties to conflict, and in building up knowledge of the operating environment and effective networks with relevant stakeholders. Ingredients for successfully increasing acceptance also include delivering services that make a difference to communities, adapting to the operating environment in terms of visibility and footprint (use of emblems, marking of vehicles), using national and local capacities, and adhering to established codes of conduct.

A thorough understanding of the environment and how an organisation's programming and mode of operation interact with local dynamics is critical to the establishment effective security management systems that enable implementation and reduce risk to staff, especially in high-threat environments. In these environments, a long-term presence and essential activities, or those that are of most relevance to the affected communities, help to build acceptance of operational partners and thus to enhance the security stance of humanitarian players.

In 2016, Geneva Call reached more than 10 million people in Iraq and over 1 million in Syria through its Fighter not Killer campaign on TV and Facebook. In the DRC, the same campaign reached thousands of people via radio and Facebook. These campaigns boosted acceptance of Geneva Call's engagement in these contexts and reinforced knowledge of IHL among the population.

The delegation then reinforced its dialogue with the authorities and weapon bearers, regularly reminding them of their obligations under IHL and taking up with the relevant parties allegations of abuses committed against people who were not or no longer taking part in the hostilities. It also explained the ICRC's mandate and strict principles of independence and neutrality in order to gain acceptance and thus ensure that its workers had safe access to people in need. As the security situation deteriorated, the ICRC was one of the few organizations left operating in the volatile Chad-Sudan border region.

Developing contacts with armed groups remained a priority for the ICRC. These contacts were important in gaining acceptance of the work of the ICRC and the National Society, in ensuring the safety of their staff and in improving access to conflict victims.

Four operational communication workshops held with 93 field staff in India, Iraq and Israel and the occupied territories focused on ways of reinforcing acceptance of the ICRC, staff security and access.

A subsequent review confirmed that the workshops helped enhance understanding of the action required to improve acceptance, security and access, strengthen operational partnerships, and reinforce Movement coordination on organizational development and capacity-building.

Humanitarian actors wishing to secure access to conflict areas and serve communities should apply an inclusive and transparent approach to generate trust and acceptance among key stakeholders. Such an approach would contribute to peacebuilding at all levels.

Access has to be earned through acceptance. Acceptance in turn is earned through the relevance of the humanitarian action, the difference it makes and ultimately the utility (or at least absence of threat or detrimental effect) of the humanitarian action for all stakeholders.

Some Yemeni employees perceive MSF to be over-reliant on traditional tribal reconciliation mechanisms when dealing with the aftermath of an incident. While this approach has resulted in a low prevalence of life-threatening incidents, it has not led to a significant reduction in exposure to risk. Identifying with a culture and achieving acceptance also means having to adopt its visible codes – in this case tolerating violence and focusing on crisis resolution rather than prevention.

Furthermore, leaders are often the visible faces of a Community Empowerment Centre, interacting with local communities, formal and informal authorities and potential partners. Effective leadership is crucial to create acceptance and attract local resources, and relationships with the civil society of the host country are essential for integration.

the ICRC’s key success factors: these are the elements critical to the organization and its work. In each area, the ICRC encounters risks and opportunities; by influencing these areas, the ICRC can reduce its vulnerability to the risks and take better advantage of the opportunities, thus improving its response to the needs of people affected by armed conflict and other situations of violence and positioning itself as a main player in this respect:

• three factors that are related mainly to the “external environment” (external key success factors): access (to victims), reputation/acceptance and positioning

The ICRC’s key success factors/areas of risk constitute a common reading grid for analysis in quarterly and other reviews by the Directorate. Such reviews include the results achieved, an assessment of risks, and the definition or updating of management objectives and action plans to mitigate the main risks and reinforce the key success factors. These aim to ensure the organization’s efficient management according to available resources and priorities, enable it to continue to demonstrate its added value, and thus preserve its reputation.

The first edition of GPR8 identified three broad security approaches shaping an organisation's security management strategy, namely 'acceptance', 'protection' and 'deterrence'. These concepts were presented as a so-called security 'triangle'. The triangle model was not meant to imply that an aid agency simply decides, at an institutional level, which approach is preferable (or where the agency 'sits' on the triangle) and conducts its operations accordingly. The reality is much more fluid.

There is considerable variation in indicators used to define those categories and differences in security level terminology. Sixteen of the organisations in the review refer to acceptance, protection and deterrence as the three main security management strategies or approaches. The definitions provided for these terms are similar across organisations, and most point to acceptance as the preferred approach. However, there is variation in the detail provided about what acceptance means and how to implement it as a security management approach.

Both donors and partners recognized that risk management is a fundamental element of good programme management. Donors and operational partners increasingly recognized that effective security management involves a careful balance and blending of acceptance, protection and deterrence methodologies based on an organisation-specific contextual analysis.

Security: acceptance vs deterrence

During the last few years the community of International NGO's has been asking itself, as a result of increasing awareness and the results of new studies, on the best security strategy to use, knowing that it must necessarily be integrated into programmes underway.

The Security and Stress Unit focused on monitoring develop- ments in the security environment in contexts where the ICRC is operational, conducting missions in support of headquarters and field activities, providing staff training and issuing comprehensive documents on security and stress management. It reaffirmed the principle of decentralized security management based on seven pillars (acceptance, identification, information, staff, rules, telecommunications and protection).

The chart below represents the distribution of acceptance between 2005 and 2019 in terms of the number of occurrences and relative frequency of occurrences. It also allows you to view the distribution across Regions, Organisations and Document types.

• lack of understanding

  • poor understanding of history, culture and politics

  • pursuing human rights over shared values

  • little evidence to verify outcomes

• poor implementation

  • unclear operationalisation

  • multiple threat types undermine a one-size-fits-all approach

  • uneven application of GPR8 guidelines

• shared consequences

  • one organisation's actions can undermine acceptance for everyone

• inaction

  • negotiation with local actors is overlooked

  • interaction with armed groups is avoided

  • little negotiation with actors at high levels

• unnecessary/displaced risk

  • field staff exposed to risks, with poor support/leadership

  • local community taking the brunt of risk

• unmet needs

  • greater funding needed to enact a comprehensive approach

Many [organizations] take a ‘passive’ approach, assuming that doing good programming will win the consent of the local population and acceptance will automatically follow. Others take a more ‘active’ approach, deliberately working to gain and sustain consent from all stakeholders. The continuum of implementation, from passive to active, is evidence of the diverse ways in which NGOs apply acceptance.

While an individual organisation may well have established an effective acceptance-based approach, this hard-won acceptance can be undone by the behaviour, affiliation or other attributes of another, unrelated organisation.

Much of the recent critique of the acceptance approach seems to assume that a security management strategy that is neither deterrence-based nor protection-based by default implies an acceptance-based approach. We suggest that, in many cases, what is being critiqued is not the acceptance approach per se, but overall substandard security management.

Despite the extensive literature devoted to acceptance strategies, and the widely held belief that acceptance is essential for humanitarian agencies to maintain presence, field research in Afghanistan and Somalia indicated that ‘acceptance’ remains inconsistently understood and implemented. Few agencies in either country had a clearly articulated acceptance strategy, implemented consistently throughout the organisation; acceptance appeared to be assumed more than actively cultivated through engagement with belligerents.

An established internal policy, adhered to up and down an aid agency’s hierarchy and supplemented with substantial training and support, should guide this engagement. Few agencies examined in the research in Afghanistan and Somalia, with the notable exception of the ICRC and MSF, consistently pursue a structured approach to engagement – or, at least, few are willing to talk publicly about it if they do.

This kind of engagement also requires significant resources and time. After the bombing of its headquarters in Baghdad in 2003, the ICRC deployed a team of three to five full-time staff dedicated to relationship-building and regaining acceptance.7 The challenge lies in convincing donors that such costs are a sound investment.

As humanitarians, we lament the fact that some dislike our presence, and spend much time and energy debating why this is so. Gauging perceptions and determining how to gain acceptance at local level, however, often means doing a lot less talking, and much more active listening.

Any attempt to address perception and acceptance problems needs to include a thorough analysis and understanding of the political and historical context. Agencies also need to cast a critical eye over the humanitarian principles and laws that inform their work. This involves understanding how humanitarian organisations fit into a specific community’s worldview, and considering how local perceptions of humanitarian organisations feed into a global perception of humanitarian action, and vice-versa.

Many humanitarian organizations faced threats and rejection by armed groups. Indeed, studies indicated that more aid workers were killed, injured or kidnapped in 2011 than ever before – a reality that undoubtedly had an impact on many agencies' operational decisions. Some struggled or were unable to sufficiently and clearly distinguish themselves from political or military actors, for example by using armed escorts to reach affected populations and thus blurring the line separating political and military agendas from the humanitarian imperative.

MSF faces numerous challenges when trying to access populations, including insufficient acceptance of its presence, identity and actions by authorities, the populations themselves or other key stakeholders; political obstacles; and, in extreme cases, even targeted attacks against MSF staff and infrastructure.