Independence: Humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.

We seek to have an open and transparent dialogue with all parties, so as to secure our ability to access those most needing our assistance. Independence: We are not dependent on any government or political power, nor do we seek to further any political agenda.

Independence: Commitment to professional standards away from personal or political affiliations.

Independence - not to rely on or be controlled by others; self-subsistence or maintenance; direction of one's own affairs without interference, that is, self-governing.

Independence : our principles are maintained through self-determination.

This was part of a concerted effort by the ENN to secure longer term funding and establish sustainability for ENN activities. One of the review outcomes was the decision to apply for charitable status in the UK in order to access other potential funding sources and to increase the ENN's transparency and external accountability. An external fundraising consultancy, recommended by a number of the NGOs consulted during the review, has supported ENN to develop a new fundraising strategy. In order to retain independence, the ENN are keen to maintain, if not increase, the current level of INGO/NGO support.

Second, as mentioned above, the diversity among NGOs clearly makes a coordinated approach very difficult. The fundamental concept of independence plays a vital role in the relationship that each NGO has with all stakeholders – including their fellow organisations. Therefore, each NGO most often speaks with its own voice and according to internal priorities. If furthermore no firm and clear reaction is given by the NGO directly concerned with the violence (in this case SCUK), it is even more unlikely that the other members of the humanitarian community will have the capacity to coordinate a strong response.

In Germany, civil protection is organised on a federal and inter-organisational basis, so collaboration among the different stakeholders is crucial. This is especially the case in mass casualty incidents, where a huge amount of information must be managed and data sharing is key for optimised disaster management. This is, however, not only a technical challenge. Protecting data, especially personal data, must be treated cautiously, respecting the independence of partners and realising that the end does not justify the means. Technology – or new concepts of data sharing possibilities – will only be considered as a change for the better, if the humanitarian mission and its execution are not impaired. And technological solutions will survive and prosper only if there is a direct impact in practice. The mutual dependency creates a good environment for cooperative work.

The Ministry of Justice in Tajikistan agreed to hold a public hearing on the draft amendments to the Law on public associations. If amended, the legislation could undermine the financial independence of NGOs.

Reaffirming humanitarian principles is central to mitigating a broader trend in many conflicts, whereby established providers of humanitarian assistance are increasingly seen as agents of Western governments. Rigid and over-zealous application of counter-terrorism laws to humanitarian action in Somalia and other conflicts undermines the independence and neutrality of humanitarian organisations in general, and could become an additional factor in the unravelling of the legitimacy and acceptance of humanitarian response in many of the world's worst humanitarian crises.

Unfortunately, circumstances forced us to abandon our project in North Iraq in September of 2015. In an effort to show the government that the collaborating humanitarian agencies of the DRA could manage and share the available funds among themselves, the alliance had set up its own internal rules. Following these rules, the DRA concluded HealthNet could no longer be a member of the alliance because of its financial position. Subsequently, all proposed HealthNet activities in the two refugee camps were removed from the DRA's programme as none of the other agencies in the alliance would take over. In these circumstances we were forced to abandon our project and leave the beneficiaries without a proper exit-strategy or follow-up in place. This experience made us think about the humanitarian value of ' independence '. The usual explanation is that 'agencies must formulate and implement their own policies independently of government policies or actions. ' The problem is often defined in terms of confusion in the field between humanitarian agencies and the government who may be involved in hostilities. HealthNet has experienced that particular challenge since the beginning, in our government sponsored projects in Afghanistan, South Sudan, and many other countries. A strong bond with the local population has always been enough to counter this confusion, and we were never forced to leave any country because it was found too dangerous to operate. People in fragile states are no fools, and openness about funds as separate from policies can be discussed and understood. It seems that dependence or independence nowadays has more to do with the type of accountability an agency is willing to accept and apply. Is an agency accountable to the population it serves, or to its donors? And is accountability to a governmental donor different from accountability to the public at large, or other funding mechanisms? Not all government donors demand total obedience in values. Not all parties in a conflict are incapable of humanitarian values. It all depends on transparency and willingness to account for ones actions. It seems that these complex issues are replaced by one type of independence only: Financial independence has become more and more essential to be a reliable partner in humanitarian work.

MSF's approach to accountability is based on several principles. An important driver was the desire of governmental donor agencies to better account for their funds, and to bring order to a sector seen as largely unregulated (it effectively remains so). The drive for greater accountability was also shaped by a desire to exert greater governmental control over aid delivery to ensure that aid contributed to the greater goal of coherence in terms of humanitarian assistance to countries in need. This integrated approach requires that all sectors act in synergy to promote for example the peace-building priorities of the donor community in a given country. They consider humanitarianism more as a technical action rather than as a principles-based political challenge. Being an aid organisation firmly attached to principles such as impartiality and independence MSF has been cautious in approaching the accountability issue as framed in the humanitarian sector. There is a need for appropriate, innovative and adaptable tools to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of aid deployed, to avoid the development of bureaucratic mechanisms that will not improve our standards or relevance.

Humanitarian aid agencies identify a lack of respect for principles on the part of warring parties, but also on the part of donor governments and their militaries, as a result of comprehensive and 'whole of government' approaches (integrating humanitarian action with broader foreign policy goals) on the part of Western governments. Aid agencies also noted, however, that collectively they themselves were not doing enough to maintain principled approaches or to advocate effectively for respect for humanitarian principles and IHL vis-à-vis governments. Integrated missions continue to cause concern for some agencies, regarding the challenge they pose to humanitarian independence , although there is a more nuanced perspective on their role and impact as compared with previous years, and in some contexts integration is seen to present real opportunities. Overall, the role of UN integrated missions and UN peacekeeping forces was considered to be significantly less threatening than the growing involvement of Western militaries in providing aid in conflicts in which they are involved. Recent years have seen an increased focus on the issue of protection within the humanitarian system. Guidelines and policies have been developed, and unprecedented numbers of humanitarian organisations now undertake protection activities. However, confusion over what protection is and which actors have responsibility for it continues to be an issue. There has been criticism of the quality of protection work, including the deployment of inexperienced staff, breaches of confidentiality of affected populations and inconsistent knowledge and application of relevant laws.

Humanitarian partnerships: what do they really mean? Partnerships are about relationships. The purpose of partnership is 'to achieve together what we could not achieve alone', and working in partnership requires those involved to practice a set of principles that create trust, equity and mutual accountability. In this way, partnership becomes a framework for 'how we do business together'; it is less determined by the structure of the relationship than by the practice of certain behaviours. What is important is that risks and benefits are shared, and that the partnership is co-created.1 When organisations work successfully together, change can occur at a faster pace and be more effective as trust is generated, expertise and resources are pooled, learning is fostered, common issues are tackled collectively and duplication is more easily avoided. This takes time and commitment. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that working in partnership in emergency contexts is challenging, particularly as values such as speed and independence are prized. Yet as the scale, frequency and complexity of emergencies increase, so too does the need to deploy a much broader range of skills, knowledge and approaches. This is compounded by recent tendencies to 'stretch' humanitarianism to include preparedness, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and recovery. All of this implies that multi-stakeholder/multi-sector responses will be increasingly necessary; indeed, efforts to work in these kinds of partnerships are already growing. This has been influenced by the humanitarian reform agenda (see following article by Christine Knudsen) and by associated challenges such as the economic crisis and climate change. However, progress with humanitarian reform has been slow, including in regard to humanitarian organisations' ability to work together. Despite the development of the Principles of Partnership, questions are often raised about how to operationalise them.

In addition to these external factors, a number of internal factors, within or between humanitarian organisations, can lead to humanitarian negotiations being undertaken in a manner that is not consistent with the core humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. These include inadequate or inappropriate internal policies and strategies on negotiations and the lack of adequate organisational capacity to conduct effective humanitarian negotiations. A number of these factors were at play in Afghanistan in 2008, when the government banned all contact by international organisations with 'Anti-Government elements', even for humanitarian purposes. With this limitation on their independence and a lack of willingness to challenge the government, several humanitarian organisations were unable to work directly in certain areas (as this necessitated negotiation with non-state armed groups), reducing humanitarian assistance to civilian populations living in those areas. A handful of organisations undertook negotiations with non-state armed groups through intermediaries as a means of (indirectly) reaching agreement on the implementation of critical humanitarian programmes. However, this practice raised additional risks, not least the prospect of exposing intermediaries to security threats (especially in cases where the intermediaries were community leaders or tribal elders). In addition, there was a risk that intermediaries would not communicate the objectives and intended outcomes of the negotiations as humanitarian organisations intended them.

UNMISS health clinics had provided medical care to 19,986 sick civilians, including treating 2,682 injured civilians for gunshot wounds. Humanitarian actors had some misgivings about operating on UNMISS bases, given the negative impact doing so could have had on their perceived neutrality and independence . Prior to the crisis, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) had drafted Guidelines for Coordination between Humanitarian Actors and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan. In view of the unusual circumstances these guidelines had to be implemented with a degree of pragmatism, and the humanitarian imperative was so great and the security situation so unpredictable that working in and staying on UNMISS bases became unavoidable for many humanitarian actors, including Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).