The Battle of the Sambre would prove to be the last battle fought by the BEF in of the Great War. It was almost unique on the western front in that it was one of the few battles after 1914  fought in open country, there were no belts of barbed wire, trenches or dugouts to protect the German defenders (TV and film producers and fiction writers please note).

This doesn’t mean the Germans were defenceless however, natural obstacles would potentially hinder the British advance.

Opposite the southern part of the line ran the Sambre and Oise Canal.

The centre of the advance was dominated by the great Forest de Mormal and just to its north the old fortress town of Le Quesnay.

Lastly the whole area was dotted with small villages around which were hedge lined fields and orchards which were bisected by streams of varying widths and irrigation ditches with the occasional patch of marshy ground near these.

Whilst the Germans had not dug any trenches or laid any belts of barbed wire they had demolished almost all the bridges, fortified buildings and dug rifle pits and MG nests in the railway embankments and hedges.

The attack started at 5.30am in darkness, just before dawn a heavy mist descended over much of the front, this persisted until about 9.30. Whilst it helped screen the attackers from enemy view it also made it difficult for them to keep their direction.

The BEF was able to overcome all these difficulties, advancing behind the now usual creeping barrage and at times using infiltration style tactics to bypass and envelope points of enemy resistance the BEF won a great victory, advancing five miles on the 4th November and captured 19,000 prisoners and more than 450 guns. (S13 p 268f).

The tanks played a minor role in these operations. Less than a hundred machines were available. Whilst some tanks stayed in reserve with 1st Tank Brigade most were concentrated in 2nd Tank Brigade and committed, mostly piecemeal, across the front with eight of the thirteen divisions involved in the initial attack. The tanks were to help capture the first objective, with a paltry four heavies and twelve whippets held back to form a reserve for operations on the 5th November and beyond.

With such small numbers dispersed so widely the tanks fortunes were mixed, some helped secure vital river crossings or dealt with enemy strongpoints, others failed to arrive or broke down soon after starting. Their presence was not critical, at least six divisions managed to attack successfully without them, but some of the Divisions with which they fought were fulsome in their praise.

Orders General

 The warning order for this attack was issued by GHQ on the 29th October, the intention being to break the enemies resistance south of the Condre canal and advancie in the general direction of Avesnes-Mauberge-Mons, the French first army would co-operate on the right and advance in the general direction of LA Capelle. The actual frontage extended over forty miles from Guise to Conde.

The start date eventually set for the offensive was the 4th November, Zero varied between divisions from 05.30 to 06.30. Four allied armies, the British First, Third and Fourth armies and the French First Army would participate.

Tanks

The Tank Corps was now almost at the end of its endurance. 3rd, 4th and 5th Brigades had been withdrawn into winter quarters for refitting and training, 6th Brigade was still forming. On the 31st October there were at least eighty five heavy fighting tanks and ten Whippets available. These were in 1st and 2nd Tank Brigades:

1st Tank Brigade, 11th and 12th battalions, 31 heavy tanks.

2nd Tank Brigade, 54 Heavy tanks and twelve whippets,

6th Battalion (Whippets): 10 tanks

9th Battalion (Mk V): 14 tanks and two crews without tanks

10th Battalion (Mk V and Mk V*): 11 tanks, and eleven crews without tanks

14th Battalion (Mk V and Mk V*): 22 tanks, and one crew without a tank

301st Battalion (Mk V and Mk V*): 7 tanks, and twenty-nine crews without tanks

TankCorps PRO-WO-94-94-5 p118, tank types from W2tb P63

Notes:

9th Tank Battalion’s War Diary indicates they had 20 tanks available on the 31st October, fourteen in A and B Companies and six with C Company, the discrepancy may be explained if C Company was still training on its tanks. This number also excludes two A / B Company tanks left at Premont (W9t).

Another two whippets appear to have been made available by the 4th November.

Orders

 1st Tank Brigade was not committed [in GHQ reserve ?].

2nd Tank Brigade was ordered to support the attack, initially just with Fourth Army they were later ordered to commit some tanks to Third Army as well.

301st USA Tank battalion was to be left in GHQ reserve

Thus 47 Heavy tanks were available for use on the first day of the attack:

Distribution

The tanks were eventually distributed as follows: (W2tb PRO-WO-95-102-3 p54)

1st Army                                       No tanks

3RD Army

XVII Corps                                        No tanks         

VI Corps                                       12 Whippets, 6th Tank Battalion                        

IV Corps           NZ Division      No tanks

                             37 Division      5 tanks, 14th Tank Battalion

V Corps            17 Division      3 tanks, 9th Tank Battalion

                             38 Division      3 tanks, 9th Tank Battalion

4th Army

XIII Corps         18 Division      10 tanks, 14th Tank Battalion, 1 supply tank from 2TSC

                             50 Division      10 tanks, 9th Tank Battalion, 1 supply tank from 2TSC

                             25 Division      4 tanks, 9th Tank Battalion, 4 supply tanks from 2TSC

IX Corps           32 Division      3 tanks, 10th Tank Battalion, 1 supply tank from 2TSC

                             1 Division         3 tanks, 10th Tank Battalion, 1 supply tank from 2TSC

Corps reserve    4 tanks, 10th Tank Battalion

In addition 1 supply tank from 2TSC was allocated to 9th, 14th Tank Battalion and two to 10th Tank Battalion. .

Note: 25th Division was originally only allocated four tanks, seven others being in XIII corps reserve. Also 38th Division was originally allocated five not three tanks.  (WTankCorps PRO-WO-102-3 5 p59)

Tactics

There was no bombardment prior to the attack, though some counter battery shoots had been fired in the days prior to the attack (S103.p190).

The Infantry would follow a creeping barrage which was to advance 100 yards every 4 or 6 minutes (One mph or two thirds Mph), the actual pace varying between Divisions and objectives. The barrages consisted of a mix of HE and Shrapnel with some smoke and thermite, though HE was not to used over villages and the linier barrage was to change to just drop on the rides (paths) when it moved through the forest.  (S103).  

To overcome the hedges and the thick barned wire in them some infantry units were issued with bill hooks and extra wire cutters. As the attack was to start and finish in darkness some infantry units also acquired torches.

Whilst this may have been the usual frontal assault, infantry advancing close behind the creeping barrage, individual units were ordered to bypass strongpoints and press on to their objectives, the bypassed enemy would be mopped up be the succeeding waves. This wasn’t just an ad hoc local arrangement, Preux aux Bois was to be outflanked then then attacked from north and south by 18th and 50th Divisions, the artillery plan was adapted to support this attack with standing barrages to protect the open flanks changing into north or southwards moving creeping barrages as the flank attacks were delivered. Le Quesnay was to be bypassed and isolated by the New Zealanders. Jolmietze was to be bypassed by the first wave and mopped up by the second. Catillon was to be attacked from the south not the west.

6th Tank Battalion’s twelve 12 Whippet tanks of were held in VI Corps reserve and were to form a screen along with Cavalry from the Brown line to Mauberrg on 5th November.

The heavy tanks operating with 37th and 17th, 18th, 50th and 25th Divisions were to operate in the early stages of the attack to assist the infantry by making paths through hedges, and in clearing opposition from the orchard country and villages before the forest. They were not to enter the forest proper. Most of the tanks were to start 300 yards behind the infantry and come forward when called upon, some were to advance alongside the infantry. 

The three tanks with the 32nd Division were to assist in clearing the north bank of the Sambre at Happenberg on the 2nd and then rally with a view to operating later with the 97th Brigade.

The other three tanks with 1st Division were to assist in the mopping up of Catillon and then in the establishment of a bridgehead there.

The four tanks in IX Corp reserve were to await the completion of the tank bridges at R61.0.2 and S1d and then cross to the east side of the canal and operate as requested by the infantry.

The supply tanks with 18th, 50th, 32nd and 1st Divisions were to carry SAA etc. Supply tanks with the Tank Battalions were to carry tank fills, except for one of those with 10th Battalion that was to carry a wireless. The four supply tanks operating with the 25th Division were to carry bridging equipment.

(W2tb p 64)

Overview of operations

A ground mist came up at dawn and covered almost the whole of the first part of the advance, this didn’t clear until about 9.30. The mist helped cover the advance but also meant units had difficulty keeping their way. The infantry were aided in their direction keeping by the thermite shells in the creeping barrages and sometimes by the tanks, who were able to keep direction using their own compasses.

Only two of the five tanks with 37th Division were of use. Both operated to the north of Ghissigny and one advanced over the railway line and helped mop up strongpoints up to and including Joilimetz. Neither tank appears to have assisted with the advance proper as both were employed in mopping up operations.

17th Division attacked without tank support, as only one arrived and that was hit and KO soon after starting.

Only two of the three tanks with 38th Division arrived, both did excellent work, making paths through the hedges, clearing enemy MG nests,  and thus enabled the infantry’s advance to the forest. One tank eventually broke down and the other ditched. The third tank failed to arrive but the infantry (2SWB) were supported by a 14th Battalion tank that had drifted north in the mist and thus lost contact with 18th Divisions units. Having assisted the SWB the tank then turned south and returned to assisting 18th Division.

Only four of the ten tanks ordered to support 18th Division engaged the enemy, they did good work however and assisted in the infantry’s initial advance and the assault on Preux aux Bois.

Four of the five tanks allotted to 50th Division engaged the enemy and did good work, one of these was crewed by a scratch crew of infantrymen form the 2 Dublin Fusiliers the original crew having been gassed.

25th Division managed to secure the crossing at Landrecies with the assistance of two supply tanks, the German Machine Gunners who were holding the far side of the canal assumed they were fighting vehicles and surrendered.

One of the three tanks which supported 32nd Division’s attack on Happenberg on the 2nd was lost as it ditched not long after starting and was subsequently stranded behind German lines when they counterattacked and recapture all the ground liberated that day. The Infantry tried again on the 3rd and the 4th, tank records indicate the attack on the 4th was supported by the remaining two tanks, the infantry records don’t mention these on the 4th. The infantry attack at this point secured the north bank of the Sambre but almost all the attempts to secure a crossing failed. Fortunately, the infantry were able to secure a crossing at Ors further west and thus took the defenders on the south bank of the Ors in the flank.

Only two tanks assisted the 1st Division at Catillon, both helped mop up the town and one greatly assisted in enabling the infantry to cross the canal.

Overall the attack as very successful, the final objective was reached almost everywhere and exceeded in some places, by 7am on the 5th the 38th (Welsh) Division had managed to advance some eleven and a half miles, four miles further than the Divisions on their flanks.

On the 5th the advance continued often against minimal opposition. Some heavy tanks were sent forward but were not needed. Six of 6th Tank Battalion’s Whippet tanks did come into action with the Guards Division west of the Brown line at Bermieres. They assisted with the Guard’s advance, two became ditched, one behind German lines where it was evacuated and blown up at midnight the crew becoming prisoners.

6th Battalion’s action was to be the last fought by the tank Corp in WW1, though some of the supply tanks of 2 Tank Supply company continued to work, one remained with 14th Tank Battalion until at least the 10th November.

Sources

The battle has been shamefully neglected by historians, only one book having been published, and that 100 years after the battle was fought.

Decisive Victory: The Battle of the Sambre: 4 November 1918 (2018) Derek Clayton

(based on his excellent 2015 PHd thesis:https://etheses.bham.ac.uk/id/eprint/6799/9/Clayton16PhD.pdf  )S103 on this website.

The best tank centered source is Clough Williams-Ellis 

S13 - The Tank Corps (1919), Clough Williams-Ellis 

three pages p266 to 269, with an aerial photograph of Mormal Forest,

S72 - Tanks in the Great War (1919) Brevet Colonel JFC Fuller DSO

two pages, p285 to 286

S100 - The Tanks (1959). Capt BH Liddell Hart –

one paragraph, p194

Most histories either don't mention the battle at all or give it a line or two, for example: 

(See Mr Claytons' work for a more scholarly discussion) .

The First World War (1998) John Keegan has one line on p446: “Wilfred Owen killed during the crossing of the Sambre on 4th November“. 

None of the following mention the battle at all.

The First World War (2003) Hew Strachan

Forgotten Victory (2001) Gary Sheffield

How the War Was Won (1992) Tim Travers

The Last Act (1962) Barrie Pitt

1918 The Year of Victories (2014) Martin Marix Evans