Tanks at 3rd Ypres - Overview

3^rd Ypres overview - Very much a work in progress.

3^rd Ypres was the British Army’s main offensive in 1917. It’s initial goal was to break through the German lines and liberate the channel ports thus reducing the U boat threat which was beginning to seriously affect imports to Britain. It developed into a long slow additional battle, prolonged by the need to draw German attention away from the mutinous French.

The battle is chiefly and unfairly remembered for the mud and rain that dogged much of the offensive. As several authors, including the Official History have pointed out the weather did break on occasion and several attacks were carried out in clouds of dust.

Forces

The tanks

3^rd Ypres was the first battle in which the British committed a large number of tanks. With one or two exceptions they were almost always committed in small numbers and / or to secondary roles. They performed so poorly when committed in numbers on the first day of the battle there was supposedly talk of dissolving the entire Tank Corps as a failed experiment. The Corps was supposedly saved by the superbly executed Cockroft action when the tanks were able to prove their value. Three days after the Cockcroft action another attempt was made to commit a large number of tanks but the ground again proved mostly impassable. Thereafter most of the tanks were withdrawn from the salient and the remainder were only committed in small penny packets. Some experiments were tried, road fighting tactics were evolved, wireless tanks were successfully used and one tank was even adopted for pioneer duties. Overall through the tank commitment at Ypres was a failure, the pulverised ground being too much for them to overcome.

Tank Tactics

On 31^st July the tactics mirrored those used at Arras and Messines, the artillery was to blast the infantry onto the first objective, some tanks being committed after the first wave of infantry to assist them in mopping up. More tanks would pass through to help the infantry onto the second and third objectives. The tanks were not to use the roads as it was believed the Germans would have mined them. Whilst some useful work was done, most of the tanks broke down or ditched on the appalling ground.

On the 16^th August all of the 16 tanks intended to support the attack ditched before they even reached the British front line.

On the 19^th August it was decided to use the roads and the result was the highly successful Cockroft action when the tanks used a road to outflank several enemy bunkers and then engage them from the rear.

Sources

Secondary

Numerous books have been written about 3^rd Ypres, most deal with the tanks only superficially, mentioning the initial involvement on 31^st July, the successful Cockroft action and the disaster at Poelcapple. Even .... only prefers to brush over the other actions...... The best secondary account by a modern author is contained in Martin Marix Evans book, though, as is to be expected in a book about the whole campaign, this lacks detail.

Primary

The PRO and Bovington hold numerous primary documents that enable us to identify most of the tanks that fought at 3^rd Ypres and describe their actions. The Battalion and Brigade Histories contain some useful information but are usually lacking in detail. The War Diaries and their appendixes fill in most of the gaps, Tanks lists and battle-graphs ............. The salvage records of ... salvage Coy have also proved valuable in identifying vehicles whose serial numbers are not given in the war diaries. Additional information can be gleaned from the numerous photographs which were taken of the tanks whilst they were moving into action and afterwards when they were lying derelict.

3rd Ypres Narratives - by Date