||18.48||
सहजं सह जन्मनैव उत्पन्नम् । किं तत् ? कर्म कौन्तेय सदोषमपि त्रिगुणात्मकत्वात् न त्यजेत् । सर्वारम्भाः आरभ्यन्त इति आरम्भाः, सर्वकर्माणि इत्येतत् ; प्रकरणात् ये केचित् आरम्भाः स्वधर्माः परधर्माश्च, ते सर्वे हि यस्मात् — त्रिगुणात्मकत्वम् अत्र हेतुः — त्रिगुणात्मकत्वात् दोषेण धूमेन सहजेन अग्निरिव, आवृताः । सहजस्य कर्मणः स्वधर्माख्यस्य परित्यागेन परधर्मानुष्ठानेऽपि दोषात् नैव मुच्यते ; भयावहश्च परधर्मः । न च शक्यते अशेषतः त्यक्तुम् अज्ञेन कर्म यतः, तस्मात् न त्यजेत् इत्यर्थः ॥
किम् अशेषतः त्यक्तुम् अशक्यं कर्म इति न त्यजेत् ? किं वा सहजस्य कर्मणः त्यागे दोषो भवतीति ? किं च अतः ? यदि तावत् अशेषतः त्यक्तुम् अशक्यम् इति न त्याज्यं सहजं कर्म, एवं तर्हि अशेषतः त्यागे गुण एव स्यादिति सिद्धं भवति । सत्यम् एवम् ; अशेषतः त्याग एव न उपपद्यते इति चेत् , किं नित्यप्रचलितात्मकः पुरुषः, यथा साङ्ख्यानां गुणाः ? किं वा क्रियैव कारकम् , यथा बौद्धानां स्कन्धाः क्षणप्रध्वंसिनः ? उभयथापि कर्मणः अशेषतः त्यागः न सम्भवति । अथ तृतीयोऽपि पक्षः — यदा करोति तदा सक्रियं वस्तु । यदा न करोति, तदा निष्क्रियं तदेव । तत्र एवं सति शक्यं कर्म अशेषतः त्यक्तुम् । अयं तु अस्मिन् तृतीये पक्षे विशेषः — न नित्यप्रचलितं वस्तु, नापि क्रियैव कारकम् । किं तर्हि ? व्यवस्थिते द्रव्ये अविद्यमाना क्रिया उत्पद्यते, विद्यमाना च विनश्यति । शुद्धं तत् द्रव्यं शक्तिमत् अवतिष्ठते । इति एवम् आहुः काणादाः । तदेव च कारकम् इति । अस्मिन् पक्षे को दोषः इति । अयमेव तु दोषः — यतस्तु अभागवतं मतम् इदम् । कथं ज्ञायते ? यतः आह भगवान् ‘नासतो विद्यते भावः’ (भ. गी. २ । १६) इत्यादि । काणादानां हि असतः भावः, सतश्च अभावः, इति इदं मतम् अभागवतम् । अभागवतमपि न्यायवच्चेत् को दोषः इति चेत् , उच्यते — दोषवत्तु इदम् , सर्वप्रमाणविरोधात् । कथम् ? यदि तावत् द्व्यणुकादि द्रव्यं प्राक् उत्पत्तेः अत्यन्तमेव असत् , उत्पन्नं च स्थितं कञ्चित् कालं पुनः अत्यन्तमेव असत्त्वम् आपद्यते, तथा च सति असदेव सत् जायते, सदेव असत्त्वम् आपद्यते, अभावः भावो भवति, भावश्च अभावो भवति ; तत्र अभावः जायमानः प्राक् उत्पत्तेः शशविषाणकल्पः समवाय्यसमवायिनिमित्ताख्यं कारणम् अपेक्ष्य जायते इति । न च एवम् अभावः उत्पद्यते, कारणं च अपेक्षते इति शक्यं वक्तुम् , असतां शशविषाणादीनाम् अदर्शनात् । भावात्मकाश्चेत् घटादयः उत्पद्यमानाः, किञ्चित् अभिव्यक्तिमात्रे कारणम् अपेक्ष्य उत्पद्यन्ते इति शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुम् । किञ्च, असतश्च सतश्च सद्भावे असद्भावे न क्वचित् प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारेषु विश्वासः कस्यचित् स्यात् , ‘सत् सदेव असत् असदेव’ इति निश्चयानुपपत्तेः ॥
किञ्च, उत्पद्यते इति द्व्यणुकादेः द्रव्यस्य स्वकारणसत्तासम्बन्धम् आहुः । प्राक् उत्पत्तेश्च असत् , पश्चात् कारणव्यापारम् अपेक्ष्य स्वकारणैः परमाणुभिः सत्तया च समवायलक्षणेन सम्बन्धेन सम्बध्यते । सम्बद्धं सत् कारणसमवेतं सत् भवति । तत्र वक्तव्यं कथम् असतः स्वं कारणं भवेत् सम्बन्धो वा केनचित् स्यात् ? न हि वन्ध्यापुत्रस्य स्वं कारणं सम्बन्धो वा केनचित् प्रमाणतः कल्पयितुं शक्यते ॥
ननु नैवं वैशेषिकैः अभावस्य सम्बन्धः कल्प्यते । द्व्यणुकादीनां हि द्रव्याणां स्वकारणसमवायलक्षणः सम्बन्धः सतामेव उच्यते इति । न ; सम्बन्धात् प्राक् सत्त्वानभ्युपगमात् । न हि वैशेषिकैः कुलालदण्डचक्रादिव्यापारात् प्राक् घटादीनाम् अस्तित्वम् इष्यते । न च मृद एव घटाद्याकारप्राप्तिम् इच्छन्ति । ततश्च असत एव सम्बन्धः पारिशेष्यात् इष्टो भवति ॥
ननु असतोऽपि समवायलक्षणः सम्बन्धः न विरुद्धः । न ; वन्ध्यापुत्रादीनाम् अदर्शनात् । घटादेरेव प्रागभावस्य स्वकारणसम्बन्धो भवति न वन्ध्यापुत्रादेः, अभावस्य तुल्यत्वेऽपि इति विशेषः अभावस्य वक्तव्यः । एकस्य अभावः, द्वयोः अभावः, सर्वस्य अभावः, प्रागभावः, प्रध्वंसाभावः, इतरेतराभावः, अत्यन्ताभावः इति लक्षणतो न केनचित् विशेषो दर्शयितुं शक्यः । असति च विशेषे घटस्य प्रागभावः एव कुलालादिभिः घटभावम् आपद्यते सम्बध्यते च भावेन कपालाख्येन, सम्बद्धश्च सर्वव्यवहारयोग्यश्च भवति, न तु घटस्यैव प्रध्वंसाभावः अभावत्वे सत्यपि, इति प्रध्वंसाद्यभावानां न क्वचित् व्यवहारयोग्यत्वम् , प्रागभावस्यैव द्व्यणुकादिद्रव्याख्यस्य उत्पत्त्यादिव्यवहारार्हत्वम् इत्येतत् असमञ्जसम् ; अभावत्वाविशेषात् अत्यन्तप्रध्वंसाभावयोरिव ॥
ननु नैव अस्माभिः प्रागभावस्य भावापत्तिः उच्यते । भावस्यैव तर्हि भावापत्तिः ; यथा घटस्य घटापत्तिः, पटस्य वा पटापत्तिः । एतदपि अभावस्य भावापत्तिवदेव प्रमाणविरुद्धम् । साङ्ख्यस्यापि यः परिणामपक्षः सोऽपि अपूर्वधर्मोत्पत्तिविनाशाङ्गीकरणात् वैशेषिकपक्षात् न विशिष्यते । अभिव्यक्तितिरोभावाङ्गीकरणेऽपि अभिव्यक्तितिरोभावयोः विद्यमानत्वाविद्यमानत्वनिरूपणे पूर्ववदेव प्रमाणविरोधः । एतेन कारणस्यैव संस्थानम् उत्पत्त्यादि इत्येतदपि प्रत्युक्तम् ॥
पारिशेष्यात् सत् एकमेव वस्तु अविद्यया उत्पत्तिविनाशादिधर्मैः अनेकधा नटवत् विकल्प्यते इति । इदं भागवतं मतम् उक्तम् ‘नासतो विद्यते भावः’ (भ. गी. २ । १६) इत्यस्मिन् श्लोके, सत्प्रत्ययस्य अव्यभिचारात् , व्यभिचाराच्च इतरेषामिति ॥
कथं तर्हि आत्मनः अविक्रियत्वे अशेषतः कर्मणः त्यागः न उपपद्यते इति ? यदि वस्तुभूताः गुणाः, यदि वा अविद्याकल्पिताः, तद्धर्मः कर्म, तदा आत्मनि अविद्याध्यारोपितमेव इति अविद्वान् ‘न हि कश्चित् क्षणमपि अशेषतः त्यक्तुं शक्नोति’ (भ. गी. ३ । ५) इति उक्तम् । विद्वांस्तु पुनः विद्यया अविद्यायां निवृत्तायां शक्नोत्येव अशेषतः कर्म परित्यक्तुम् , अविद्याध्यारोपितस्य शेषानुपपत्तेः । न हि तैमिरिकदृष्ट्या अध्यारोपितस्य द्विचन्द्रादेः तिमिरापगमेऽपि शेषः अवतिष्ठते । एवं च सति इदं वचनम् उपपन्नम् ‘सर्वकर्माणि मनसा’ (भ. गी. ५ । १३) इत्यादि, ‘स्वे स्वे कर्मण्यभिरतः संसिद्धिं लभते नरः’ (भ. गी. १८ । ४५) ‘स्वकर्मणा तमभ्यर्च्य सिद्धिं विन्दति मानवः’ (भ. गी. १८ । ४६) इति च ॥ ४८ ॥
या कर्मजा सिद्धिः उक्ता ज्ञाननिष्ठायोग्यतालक्षणा, तस्याः फलभूता नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धिः ज्ञाननिष्ठालक्षणा च वक्तव्येति श्लोकः आरभ्यते —
18.48 Kaunteya, O son of Kunti; na tyajet, one should not give up;-what?-the karma, duty; sahajam, to which one is born, which devolves from the very birth; api, even though; it be sadosam, faulty, consisting as it is of the three gunas. Hi, for; sarva-arambhah, all undertakings (-whatever are begun are arambhah, i.e. 'all actions', according to the context-), being constituted by the three gunas (-here, the fact of being constituted by the three gunas is the cause-); are avrtah, surrounded; dosena, with evil; iva, as;; agnih, fire; is dhumena, with smoke, which comes into being concurrently. One does not get freed from evil by giving up the duty to which one is born-called one's own duty-, even though (he may be) fulfilling somody else's duty. Another's duty, too, is fraught with fear. The meaning is: Since action cannot be totally given up by an unelightened person, therefore he should not relinish it. Opponent: Well, is it that one should not abandon action because it cannot be given up completely, or is it because evil [Evil resulting from discarding daily obligatory duties.] follows from the giving up of the duty to which one is born? Counter-objection: What follows from this? Opponent: If it be that the duty to which one is born should not be renounced because it is impossible to relinish it totally, then the conclusion that can be arrived at is that complete renunciation (of duty) is surely meritorious! Counter-objection: Truly so. But, may it not be that total relinishment is itself an impossibility? Is a person ever-changeful like the gunas of the Sankhyas, or is it that action itself is the agent, as it is in the case of the momentary five [Rupa (from), vedana (feeling), vijnana (momentary consciousness), sanjna (notion), samskara (mental impressions)-these have only momentary existence. In their case there can be no distinction between action and agent, simply due to the fact of their being momentary.] forms of mundane consciousness propounded by the Buddhists? In either case there can be no complete renunciation of action. Then there is also a third standpoint (as held by the Vaisesikas): When a thing acts it is active, and inactive when that very thing does not act. If this be the case here, it is possible to entirely give up actions. But the speciality of the third point of view is that a thing is not ever-changing, nor is action itself the agent. What then? A nonexistent action originates in an existing thing, and an existing action gets destroyed. The thing-in-itself continues to exist along with its power (to act), and that itself is the agent. This is what the followers of Kanada say. [Their view is that agentship consists in 'possessing the power to act', not in being the substratum of action.] What is wrong with this point of view. Vedantin: The defect indeed lies in this that, this veiw is not in accord with the Lord's view. Objection: How is this known? Vedantin: Since the Lord as said, 'Of the unreal there is no being৷৷.,' etc. (2.16). The view of the followers of Kanada is, indeed, this that the non-existent becomes existent, and the existent becomes nonexistent. Objection: What defect can there be if it be that this view, even though not the view of the Lord, yet conforms to reason? Vedantin: The answer is: This is surely faulty since it contradicts all valid evidence. Objection: How? Vedantin: As to this, if things like a dvyanuka (dyad of two anus, atoms) be absolutely nonexistent before origination, and after origination continue for a little while, and again become absolutely non-existent, then, in that acase, the existent which was verily nonexistent comes into being, [Here Ast. adds, 'sadeva asattvam apadyate, that which is verily existent becomes nonexistent'.-Tr.] a non-entity becomes an entity, and an entity becomes a non-entity! If this be the view, then the non-enity that is to take birth is comparable to the horns of a hare before it is born, and it comes into being with the help of what are called material (inherent), non-mateial (non-inherent) and efficient causes. But it cannot be said that nonexistence has origination in this way, or that it depends on some cause, since this is not seen in the case of nonexistent things like horns of a hare, etc. If such things as pot etc. which are being produced be of the nature of (potentially) existing things, then it can be accepted that they originate by depending on some cause which merely manifests them. [According to Vedanta, before origination a thing, e.g. a pot, remains latent in its material cause, clay for instance, with its name and form unexpressed, and it depends on other causes for the manifestation of name and form.] Moreover, if the nonexistent becomes existent, and the existent becomes non-existent, then nobody will have any faith while dealing with any of the means of valid knowledge objects of such knowledge, because the conviction will be lacking that the existent is existent and the nonexistent is nonexistent! Further, when they speak of origination, they (the Viasesikas) hold that such a thing as a dvyanuka (dyad) comes to have relationship with its own (material) causes (the two atoms) and existence, and that it is nonexistent before origination; but later on, depending on the operation of its own causes, it becomes connected with its own causes, viz the atoms, as also with existence, through the inherent (or inseparable) relationship called samavaya. After becoming connected, it becomes an existent thing by its inherent relationship with its causes. [The effect (dyad) has inherent relationship with existence after its material causes (the two atoms) come into association.] It has to be stated in this regard as to how the nonexistent can have an existent as its cuase, or have relationship with anything. For nobody can establish through any valid means of knowledge that a son of a barren woman can have any existence or relationship or cause. Vaisesika: Is it not that relationship of a non-existent thing is not at all established by the Vaisesikas? Indeed, what is said by them is that only existent entities like dvyanuka etc. have the relationship in the form of samavaya with their own causes. Vedantin: No, for it is not admitted (by them) that anything has existence before the (samavaya) relationship (occurs). It is surely not held by the Vaisesikas that a pot etc. have any existence before the potter, (his) stick, wheel, etc. start functioning. Nor do they admit that clay itself takes the shape of a pot etc. As a result, it has to be admitted (by them) as the last aternative that nonexistence itself has some relationship! Vaisesika: Well, it is not contradictory even for a nonexistent thing to have the relationship in the form of inherence. Vedantin: No, because this is not seen in the case of a son of a barren woman etc. If the antecedent nonexistence (prag-abhava) of the pot etc. alone comes into a relationship with its own (material) cause, but not so the nonexistence of the son of a barren woman etc. though as nonexistence both are the same, then the distinction between the (two) nonexistences has to be explained. Through such descriptions ( of abhava, nonexistence) as nonexistence of one, nonexistence of two, nonexistence of all, antecedent nonexistence, nonexistence after destruction, mutual nonexistence and absolute non-existence, nobody can show any distinction (as regards nonexistence itself)! There being no distinction, (therefore, to say that:) 'it is only the "antecedent nonexistence" of the pot which takes the form of the pot through the (action of) the potter and others, and comes into a relationship with the existing pot-halves which are its own (material) causes and becomes fit for all empirical processes [Such as production, destruction, etc.] but the "nonexistence after destruction" of that very pot does not do so, though it, too, is nonexistence. Hence, the "nonexistence after destruction", etc. [Etc. stands for 'mutual nonexistence (anyonya-abhava)' and 'absolute nonexistence (atyanta-abhava)'.] are not fit for any empirical processes, whereas only the "antecedent nonexistence" of things called dvyanuka etc. is fit for such empirical processes as origination etc.'-all this is incongruous, since as nonexistence it is indistinguishable, as are 'absolute nonexistence' and 'nonexistence after destruction'. Vaisesika: Well, it is not at all said by us that the 'antecedent nonexistence' becomes existent. Vedantin: In that case, the existent itself becomes existent , as for instance, a pot's becoming a pot, or a cloth's becoming a cloth. This, too, like nonexistence becoming existent, goes against valid evidence. Even the theory of transformation held by the Sankhyas does not differ from the standpoint of the Vaisesikas, since they believe in the origination of some new attribute [i.e. in the origination of a transformation that did not exist before.] and its destruction. Even if manifestation and disappearance of anything be accepted, yet there will be contradiction with valid means of knowledge as before in the explanation of existence or nonexistence of manifestation and disappearance. Hery is also refuted the idea that origination etc. (of an effect) are merely particular states of its cuase. As thelast alternative, it is only the one entity called Existence that is imagined variously through ignorance to be possessed of the states of origination, destruction, etc. like an actor (on a stage). This veiw of the Lord has been stated in the verse, 'Of the unreal there is no being৷৷.' (2.16). For, the idea of existence is constant, while the others are inconstant. Objection: If the Self be immutable, then how does the 'renunciation of all actions' become illogical? Vedantin: If the adjuncts (i.e. body and organs) be real or imagined through ignorance, in either case, action, which is their attribute, is surely superimposed on the Self through ignorance. From this point of view it has been said that an unenlightened person is incapable of totally renouncing actions even for a moment (cf. 3.5). The enlightened person, on the other hand, can indeed totally renounce actions when ignorance has been dispelled through Illumination; for it is illogical that there can (then) remain any trace of what has been superimposed through ignorance. Indeed, no trace remains of the two moons, etc. superimposed by the vision affected by (the disease called) Timira when the desease is cured. This being so, the utterance, 'having given up all actions mentally' (5.13), etc. as also, 'Being devoted to his own duty' (45) and 'A human being achieves 'success by adoring Him through his own duties (46), becomes justifiable. What was verily spoken of as the success arising from Karma (-yoga), characterized as the fitness for steadfastness in Knowledge,-the fruit of that (fitness), characterized as 'steadfastness in Knowledge' consisting in the perfection in the form of the state of one (i.e. a monk) free from duties, has to be stated. Hence the (following) verse is begun:
