ミクロ経済分析 1 | Microeconomic Analysis 1
時間： 月曜 10:30-12:00
教室： 演習室2
講師： 安田洋祐（yosuke.yasuda<at>gmail.com）
オフィスアワー：月曜日 12:30 - 13:30（およびメールでのアポイントメント） 場所：文法経本館338号室
講義サイト： https://sites.google.com/site/yosukeyasuda2/home/lectures/osaka2025_matching
最終更新日: 2025年7月30日
[2025/7/28] --- 課題レポートの提出締め切りは7月31日（木）です。
[2025/6/8] --- 6月23日（月）の講義は休講とします。Lecture 10のスライド資料を独習しておいてください。
[2025/2/27] --- 講義は原則として日本語で行います。ただし、質問・ディスカッションは英語で行っても構いません。
近年、理論と実践の両面において発展が著しいマッチング理論とマーケットデザインについて学びます。
優れた中〜上級の教科書である小島・河田 (2024) および Haringer (2017) を中心に、関連する文献を輪読します。
この分野の研究スタイルに慣れ、関連論文を読みこなす力を身につけるのが目的です。
学部中級レベルのミクロ経済学の知識を前提とします。やや抽象的な数理モデルの記述や定理の証明なども行います。この手の思考や作業が苦手な受講生は、しっかり予習・復習をして毎回の講義にのぞんでください。
クラス内での発表と期末レポートで評価します。
発表について
発表でスライド資料を使う場合は、使用言語は英語または日本語でお願いします。
一人につき、報告25〜30分（＋質疑応答10〜15分程度）の長さを目安に準備してください。
聴講のみの学生にも一回は発表してもらいます。
期末レポートについて
次のいずれかを2〜5ページ程度にまとめてe-mailに添付して提出してください。
マッチングやメカニズムデザインに関する研究アイデアや論文（の原型）
講義で直接カバーしなかった関連論文・書籍などに関する詳細なコメント
講義内容に関連した特定のトピックに関する複数の関連論文のサーベイ
注： 2および3で扱う論文について、Lecture 13-15でみなさんが報告する論文を含めても構いません ← New!
使用言語は、日本語・英語どちらでも構いません。
聴講のみの学生は提出しなくて構いません。
提出期限は7月31日（木）とします。
教科書 | Main Textbooks
参考図書 | Related Books
[RS] Roth and Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, 1990. Amazon (Kindle)
This is the “bible” of the matching theory; it covers most of the important theoretical research on matching up to the 1980s.
The relevant parts will be posted in CLE, so you need NOT purchase this book.
[HB] Vulkan, N., Roth, A. E. and Neeman, Z. (Eds.), The Handbook of Market Design, 2013. Amazon
A reference handbook on market design, both on theory and applications.
（Lecture 1, 2, 3, 9は講師による授業の予定です。残りのすべての回は受講生の報告になります）
Lecture 1. イントロダクション 4/14
スライド資料（pdf）
Surveys
Roth, A. (2008), What Have We Learned from Marked Design?, Economic Journal, 118: 285-310.
References
Gale, D. and Shapley, L. (1962), College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage, American Mathematical Monthly, 69: 9-15.
Lecture 2. マッチングの基本モデル（1章） + α 4/21
スライド資料（pdf）
Surveys
Roth, A. (2002), The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics, Econometrica, 70: 1341-1378.
References
Roth, A. (1984), The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory, Journal of Political Economy, 92: 991–1016.
Lecture 3. 研究報告 4/28
スライド資料（CLEで公開）
References
Shapley, L., & Scarf, H. (1974). On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1(1), 23-37.
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (1999). House allocation with existing tenants. Journal of Economic Theory, 88(2), 233-260.
Miyagawa, E. (2001). House allocation with transfers. Journal of Economic Theory, 100(2), 329-355.
Lecture 4. 安定マッチングについて深堀りする（2章） 5/12
[KK] 2章
報告者1 --- 戸田
報告者2 --- WANG, Chenyun
References
Roth, A. (1985), The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem, Journal of Economic Theory, 36: 277–288.
Klaus, B., & Klijn, F. (2005). Stable matchings and preferences of couples. Journal of Economic Theory, 121(1), 75-106.
Bulow, J., & Levin, J. (2006). Matching and Price Competition. American Economic Review, 96(3), 652-668.
Lecture 5. 古典的マッチング理論の限界をいかに克服するか（3章） 5/19
[KK] 3章
報告者1 --- 松村
報告者2 --- WEI
Surveys
Roth, A. (2008), Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions, International Journal of Game Theory, 36: 537-569.
References
Roth, A. and Peranson, E. (1999), The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: some engineering aspects of economic design, American Economic Review, 89: 748–780.
Kojima, F. and Pathak, P. (2009), Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets, American Economic Review, 99: 608-627.
Kojima, F., Pathak, P., and Roth, A. (2013), Stability and Incentives in Matching with Couples, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128: 1585-1632.
Lecture 6. 制約付きマッチング（4章） 5/26
[KK] 4章
報告者1 --- 坂口
報告者2 --- 長谷川
Surveys
Kamada, Y., & Kojima, F. (2020). Accommodating various policy goals in matching with constraints. Japanese Economic Review, 71, 101-133.
References
Kamada, Y., & Kojima, F. (2015). Efficient matching under distributional constraints: Theory and applications. American Economic Review, 105(1), 67-99.
Roth, A. (1986), On the Allocation of Residents to Rural Hospitals: A General Property of Two-Sided Matching Markets, Econometrica, 54: 425-427.
Goto, M., Iwasaki, A., Kawasaki, Y., Kurata, R., Yasuda, Y., & Yokoo, M. (2016). Strategyproof matching with regional minimum and maximum quotas. Artificial Intelligence, 235, 40-57.
Lecture 7. 制約付きマッチングモデルにおける“正しい”安定性を考える（5章） 6/2
[KK] 5章
報告者1 --- WANG, Yisen
報告者2 --- 角田
Surveys
田村明久（2009）『離散凸解析とゲーム理論』朝倉書店 Amazon
References
Balinski M and Sonmez, T. (1999), A tale of two mechanisms: student placement, Journal of Economic Theory, 84: 73–94.
Kamada, Y., & Kojima, F. (2017). Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints. Journal of Economic Theory, 168, 107-142.
Kamada, Y., & Kojima, F. (2018). Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition. Theoretical Economics, 13(2), 761-793.
Lecture 8. 割当問題｜The Assignment Problems 6/9
[MD] Ch11: The Assignment Problems (slides)
報告者1 --- 陳
報告者2 --- WANG, Chenyun
Surveys
[MD] Ch12: Probabilistic Assignments (slides)
Sönmez, T. and Unver, U. (2011), Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources, in Handbook of Social Economics, Vol. 1A, edited by J. Benhabib, A. Bisin, and M. Jackson.
References
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (1998). Random serial dictatorship and the core from random endowments in house allocation problems. Econometrica, 66(3), 689-701.
Roth, A. and Postlewaite, A. (1977), Weak Versus Strong Domination in a Market with Indivisible Goods, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 4: 131-137.
Ergin, H. I. (2002). Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities. Econometrica, 70(6), 2489-2497.
Ma, J. (1994), Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities, International Journal of Game Theory, 23: 75-83.
Lecture 9. 学校選択の基本モデル｜School Choice: Basic Model 6/16
[MD] Ch13: School Choice (slides)
報告者1 --- 坂口
報告者2 --- 長谷川
Surveys
[MD] Ch14: School Choice: Further Developments (slides)
[HB] Ch5: School Choice
References
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach. American Economic Review, 93(3), 729-747.
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2009). Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in matching with indifferences: Redesigning the NYC high school match. American Economic Review, 99(5), 1954-78.
Kesten, O. (2010). School choice with consent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(3), 1297-1348.
Erdil, A. and Ergin, H. (2008), What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice, American Economic Review, 98: 669-689.
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Che, Y.-K. and Yasuda, Y. (2011), Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: the "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered, American Economic Review, 101: 399-410.
Calsamiglia, C., Haeringer, G., and Klijn, F. (2010). Constrained school choice: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 1860-1874.
Lecture 10. 束理論とマッチング｜Lattice Theory and Matching 休講（スライドなどで独習）
スライド資料（pdf）
Surveys
References
Adachi, H. (2000). On a characterization of stable matchings. Economics Letters, 68(1), 43-49.
Echenique, F. (2005), A Short And Constructive Proof of Tarski's Fixed-Point Theorem, International Journal of Game Theory, 33: 215-218.
Echenique, F. and Oviedo, J. (2004), Core many-to-one matchings by fixed point methods, Journal of Economic Theory, 115: 358–376.
Kandori, M., Kojima, F., and Yasuda, Y. (2008), Understanding Stable Matchings: A Non-Cooperative Approach, mimeo.
Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. (1988). Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets. Journal of Economic Theory, 45(1), 85-101.
Tarski, A. (1955), A lattice theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications, Pacific Journal of Mathematics, 5: 285-309.
Keywords
partial order, supremum and infimum, complete lattice, fixed point, Tarski's fixed point theorem, pre-matching.
Lecture 11. 腎臓交換｜Kidney Exchange 6/30
[HB] Ch4: Market Design for Kidney Exchange
報告者1 --- WEI
報告者2 --- 松村
Surveys
[MD] Ch16: Kidney Exchange
References
Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Ünver, M. U. (2004). Kidney Exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2), 457-488.
Roth, A. E., Sönmez, T., & Ünver, M. U. (2007). Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of wants in markets with compatibility-based preferences. American Economic Review, 97(3), 828-851.
Ünver, M. U. (2010). Dynamic kidney exchange. Review of Economic Studies, 77(1), 372-414.
Lecture 12. 複雑な制約のもとで公平なマッチングを考える（6章） 7/7
[KK] 6章
報告者1 --- WANG, Yisen
報告者2 --- 戸田
References
Abdulkadiroğlu, A. (2005). College admissions with affirmative action. International Journal of Game Theory, 33(4), 535-549.
Kamada, Y., & Kojima, F. (2024). Fair matching under constraints: Theory and applications. Review of Economic Studies, 91(2), 1162-1199.
Ehlers, L., Hafalir, I. E., Yenmez, M. B., & Yildirim, M. A. (2014). School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds. Journal of Economic Theory, 153, 648-683.
Nguyen, T., & Vohra, R. (2019). Stable matching with proportionality constraints. Operations Research, 67(6), 1503-1519.
Lecture 13-15. 最近の発展｜Recent Developments 7/14, 7/24, 7/28
Presentations (You can choose any paper that has been written or published since 2010.)
7月14日
報告者1 --- 陳
Ashlagi, I., Nikzad, A., & Strack, P. (2023). Matching in dynamic imbalanced markets. Review of Economic Studies, 90(3), 1084-1124.
報告者2 --- 角田
松八重泰輔 (2024). 結婚安定マッチングの一意性の必要条件に対する反例, Doctoral dissertation, Chuo University.
報告者3 --- 坂口
Agarwal, N. (2015). An empirical model of the medical match. American Economic Review, 105(7), 1939-1978.
7月24日（12時30分まで）
報告者1 --- WEI
Stroh-Maraun, N. (2024). Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism. Mathematical Social Sciences, 132, 49-56.
報告者2 --- 松村
Hong, M., & Park, J. (2022). Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 100, 102627.
報告者3 --- WANG, Chenyun
Rees-Jones, A., & Skowronek, S. (2018). An experimental investigation of preference misrepresentation in the residency match. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 115(45), 11471-11476.
報告者4 --- 長谷川
Arteaga, F., Kapor, A. J., Neilson, C. A., & Zimmerman, S. D. (2022). Smart matching platforms and heterogeneous beliefs in centralized school choice. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 137(3), 1791-1848.
7月28日（12時30分まで）
報告者1 --- WANG, Yisen
Antler, Y. (2015). Two-sided matching with endogenous preferences. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3), 241-258.
報告者2 --- 戸田
Okumura, Y. (2019). School choice with general constraints: a market design approach for the nursery school waiting list problem in Japan. The Japanese Economic Review, 70(4), 497-516.
報告者3 --- 陳
栗野盛光. (2023). 定員調整可能なマッチングメカニズムのデザイン. 現代経済学の潮流, 2023, 221-238.
報告者4 --- 角田
松八重泰輔 (2021). 学生の評価を上げる努力と安定マッチング, Doctoral dissertation, Chuo University.
References
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Che, Y. K., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., & Tercieux, O. (2017). Minimizing justified envy in school choice: the design of New Orleans' OneApp. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Che, Y.-K. and Yasuda, Y. (2015), Expanding "Choice" in School Choice, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7: 1-42.
Combe, J., Tercieux, O., & Terrier, C. (2022). The design of teacher assignment: Theory and evidence. The Review of Economic Studies, 89(6), 3154-3222.
Dur, U., Pathak, P. A., & Sönmez, T. (2020). Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: Theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools. Journal of Economic Theory, 187, 104996.
Echenique, F. (2012), Contracts vs. Salaries in Matching, American Economic Review, 102: 594-601.
Kojima, F., Sun, N., & Yu, N. N. (2020). Job matching under constraints. American Economic Review, 110(9), 2935-2947.
Kominers, S. D. (2012). On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching. Games and Economic Behavior, 75(2), 984-989.
Reny, P. J. (2022). Efficient matching in the school choice problem, American Economic Review, 112(6), 2025-2043.
Yamanaka, S. (2022), Combining Boston Mechanism with Deferred Acceptance algorithm, mimeo. Link
栗野盛光 (2023), 定員調整可能なマッチングメカニズムのデザイン, 『現代経済学の潮流2023』（第8章） Link
Survey
Kojima, F. (2015), Recent Developments in Matching Theory and its Practical Applications, working paper (prepared for Advances in Economics and Econometrics; 11th World Congress of Econometric Society)
Kojima, F. and Troyan, P. (2011), Matching and Market Design: An Introduction to Selected Topics, Japanese Economic Review, 62: 82–98.
Roth, A. E. (2018). Marketplaces, markets, and market design. American Economic Review, 108(7), 1609-58.
Roth, A. E., & Wilson, R. B. (2019). How market design emerged from game theory: A mutual interview. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(3), 118-43.
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＜倉庫＞
Lecture. 学校選択の拡張｜School Choice: Extensions
[MD] Ch14: School Choice: Further Developments (slides)
Presenter ---
Chen, Y., & Kesten, O. (2017)
Presenter ---
References
Chen, Y., & Kesten, O. (2017). Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 125(1), 99-139.
Erdil, A. and Ergin, H. (2008), What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice, American Economic Review, 98: 669-689.
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2005). The new york city high school match. American Economic Review, 95(2), 364-367.
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Pathak, P. A., Roth, A. E., & Sönmez, T. (2005). The Boston public school match. American Economic Review, 95(2), 368-371.
Abdulkadiroglu, A., Che, Y.-K. and Yasuda, Y. (2015), Expanding "Choice" in School Choice, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7: 1-42.
Haeringer, G., and Klijn, F. (2009). Constrained school choice. Journal of Economic Theory, 144(5), 1921-1947.
Pathak, P. and Sönmez, T. (2008), Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism, American Economic Review, 98: 1636-1652.
Pathak, P. and Sönmez, T. (2013), School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation, American Economic Review, 103: 80-106.
安田洋祐, 学校選択問題のマッチング理論分析, 現代経済学の潮流2014（第4章, pp.95-122）, 東洋経済新報社, 2014.
安田洋祐（編著）, 学校選択制のデザイン：ゲーム理論アプローチ（編著）, NTT出版, 2010. Amazon
<Survey>
Pathak, P. A. (2011). The mechanism design approach to student assignment. Annu. Rev. Econ., 3(1), 513-536.
Lectures. 契約付きマッチング｜Matching with Contracts
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005)
Presenter ---
References
Hatfield, J. and Milgrom, P. (2005), Matching with Contracts, American Economic Review, 95: 913-935.
Aygun, O. and Sonmez, T. (2013), Matching with Contracts: Comment, American Economic Review, 103: 2050-2051.
Ostrovsky, M. (2007), Stability in Supply-Chain Networks, American Economic Review, 98: 897-923.
Sonmez, T. and Switzer, T. (2014), Matching with (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy, Econometrica, 81: 451-488.
Echenique, F. (2012), Contracts vs. Salaries in Matching, American Economic Review, 102: 594-601.
Hatfield, J. W., and Kojima, F. (2008). Matching with contracts: Comment. The American Economic Review, 98(3), 1189-1194.
Hatfield, J. W., and Kojima, F. (2009). Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts. Games and Economic Behavior, 67(2), 745-749.
Hatfield, J. W., and Kojima, F. (2010). Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(5), 1704-1723.
Kominers, S. D. (2012). On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching. Games and Economic Behavior, 75(2), 984-989.
Westkamp, A. (2010), Market structure and matching with contracts, Journal of Economic Theory Volume, 145: 1724–1738.
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