オークション理論 | ミクロ経済分析2
Auction Theory | Microeconomic Analysis 2
2学期：木曜2限：第1演習室
オフィスアワー：水曜日 12:30 - 13:30
最終更新日: 2017年2月12日
お知らせ | Announcement
[16/10/27] --- 11月17日の講義冒頭で、Bulow & Roberts (1989) について復習します。
[16/10/3] --- 受講希望者の方は（聴講のみで単位が不要でも）、こちらのフォームに記入してください。講義資料の送付や連絡に使います。 ←重要！
[16/9/25] --- 海外出張のため、11月10日は休講とします（予定）。
[16/6/5] --- 初回の講義は10月6日（木）です。
[15/11/8] --- 講義は日本語で行います。 | Lectures will be given in JAPANESE.
講義概要・目的 | Course Objective and Content
近年、理論と実践の両面において発展が著しいオークション研究について学びます。
単一財モデルに焦点を当て、主要文献（原典論文）を丹念に読み込んでいきます。
ベンチマークとなる理論だけでなく、応用・拡張・実践に関する文献も取り上げ、バランスよく分野を展望していきます。
この分野の研究スタイルに慣れ、関連論文を読みこなす力を身につけるのが目的です。
授業のスタイルは、事前に指定した関連論文の輪読＆報告形式です。最初の数回は安田による講義となりますが、以降は参加学生の発表が中心となります。
自分の担当回でなくても、きちんと論文を読んでくること！
大学院レベルのミクロ経済学の知識を前提とします。
特に、不完備情報ゲームについて、Gibbons (1992) や Tadelis (2013) といった学部テキストの内容が理解できない／不十分な学生は、講義が始まる前に独習してしっかり理解しておくこと！
【注意】KOAN掲載の講義スケジュール（ページ一番下を参照）のままだと消化不良になりそうなので、単一財のケースについてのみ扱うことにしました。
複数財については、来年度にまた別の科目「オークション・マーケットデザイン」として開講を予定しています。
成績評価 | Grading Policy
クラス内での発表と期末レポートで評価します。
発表について
発表でスライド資料を使う場合は、英語で書く事を推奨します（絶対要件ではありません）。
一人当たりの報告時間は（参加人数や担当箇所の難易度を考慮して）後でお知らせします。
報告の際は、日本語・英語どちらで話しても構いません。
聴講のみの学生にも発表してもらいます。
レポートについて
次のいずれかを2〜5ページ程度にまとめてe-mailに添付して提出してください。
講義で扱ったオークション研究に関連する研究アイデア
講義で直接カバーしなかった関連論文やテキストの章に関するコメント
関連するトピックに関するサーベイ
使用言語は、日本語・英語どちらでも構いません。
提出期限は2月12日（日）とします。
講義テキスト | Textbooks
テキスト （講義で必要な箇所は配布しますので、どちらも購入する必要はありません）
関連図書 （上の本ほど難易度が高めです）
Paul Milgrom, Putting Auction Theory to Work, 2004. Amazon 日本語訳
実務への応用にも詳しい大著です。類書に無い記述で、複数財のケースが非常に参考になります。
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J., Game Theory, 1991. Amazon
7章「ベイジアンゲームとメカニズムデザイン」の解説が優れています。
Bolton. P. and Dewatripont, M., Contract Theory, 2004. Amazon
2章「スクリーニング」、7章「オークション」、12章「遂行理論」が参考になります。
Cramton, P. C., Shoham, Y., & Steinberg, R. (Eds.). (2006). Combinatorial auctions (Vol. 475). Cambridge: MIT press. Amazon
組み合わせオークションに関するサーベイ論文集。
Paul Klemperer, Auctions: Theory and Practice, 2004. Amazon
著者のウェブサイトから草稿版をダウンロードできます。
ケン・スティグリッツ, オークションの人間行動学, 日経BP社, 2008. Amazon
日本語で書かれたオークション理論の解説の中では最も詳しく丁寧だと思います。
Timothy P. Hubbard and Harry J. Paarsch, Auctions, 2016. Amazon
数式を使わずに様々なオークションに関するトピックを紹介する優れた入門書。
展望論文
*McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1987). Auctions and bidding. Journal of economic literature, 25(2), 699-738.
Athey, S., & Haile, P. A. (2007). Nonparametric approaches to auctions.Handbook of econometrics, 6, 3847-3965.
Dasgupta, S., & Hansen, R. (2008). Auctions in corporate finance. handbook of Corporate Finance, 87-143.
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015). A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. Experimental Economics, 18(4), 609-669.
*Klemperer, P. (1999). Auction theory: A guide to the literature. Journal of economic surveys, 13(3), 227-286.
Lucking‐Reiley, D. (2000). Auctions on the Internet: What’s being auctioned, and how?. The journal of industrial economics, 48(3), 227-252.
Maskin, E. (2004). The unity of auction theory: Milgrom's masterclass. Journal of Economic Literature, 42(4), 1102-1115.
Milgrom, P. (1989). Auctions and bidding: A primer. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(3), 3-22.
Wolfstetter, E. (1996). Auctions: an introduction. Journal of economic surveys,10(4), 367-420.
講義日程（改訂版） | Course Schedule - Concise (Updated Version)
＜最初の2〜3週は安田による講義、それ以降はすべて学生による発表の予定です＞
講義日程（旧版）はこちら
Single-Object Auctions: Basic Theory Slide1(pdf) Slide2
1. - Overview 10/6
Introduction
Krishna: Ch1
Private Value Auctions
Krishna: Ch2
<References>
*Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982)
2. - Screening 10/13
Single Indivisible Good
Borgers: Ch2.2
Nonlinear Pricing
Borgers: Ch2.3
Bundling
Borgers: Ch2.4
<References>
Adams, W. J., & Yellen, J. L. (1976)
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978)
3. - Single Unit Auctions 10/20
The Revenue Equivalence Principle
Krishna: Ch3
Borgers: Ch3.2
<References>
*Vickrey, W. (1961)
Mookherjee, D., & Reichelstein, S. (1992)
4. - Mechanism Design (1) 10/27
Optimal Auctions
Krishna: Ch5
Borgers: Ch6.2, Ch6.3
Riley, J. G., & Samuelson, W. F. (1981) --- 川中
Economic Intuition
Bulow, J., & Roberts, J. (1989) --- 謝 12/1
<References>
*Myerson, R. B. (1981)
5. - Mechanism Design (2) 11/17
Public Goods
Borgers: Ch3.3
d'Aspremont, C., & Gérard-Varet, L. A. (1979) --- 小田 11/24
Bilateral Trade
Borgers: Ch3.4
*Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983) --- Petra Rkman
<References>
Chatterjee, K., & Samuelson, W. (1983)
6. - Interdependent Values (1) Skip
Affiliated Values
Krishna: Ch6
Wilson, R. (1977)
The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle
Krishna: Ch7
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982)
<References>
Perry, M., & Reny, P. J. (1999)
7. - Interdependent Values (2)
Winner's Curse
Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (1986) --- 趙 夢丹 12/8
Optimal Mechanism
Borgers: Ch6.4
Cremer, J., & McLean, R. P. (1988) --- 陳 偉業 12/1
<References>
Laffont, J. J., & Martimort, D. (2000)
Single-Object Auctions: Extension
8. - Bidding Rings (1) 12/8
Weak and Strong Cartels
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1992) --- 王 躍
Marshall, R. C., & Marx, L. M. (2007)
<References>
Krishna: Ch11 "Bidding Rings"
Bajari, P., & Ye, L. (2003)
Graham, D. A., & Marshall, R. C. (1987)
Pesendorfer, M. (2000)
Porter, R. H., & Zona, J. D. (1993)
Robinson, M. S. (1985)
9. - Bidding Rings (2) 12/15
Collusion-Proof Mechanism
Che, Y. K., & Kim, J. (2006)
Winner's Curse
Hendricks, K., Porter, R., & Tan, G. (2008) --- 李 銀玲
<References>
Krishna: Ch11 "Bidding Rings"
Che, Y. K., & Kim, J. (2009)
10. - Auctions in Context (1) 12/22
Entry Fee
Levin, D., & Smith, J. L. (1994) --- 楊 極致
Li, T., & Zheng, X. (2009) ---
<References>
Milgrom: Ch6 "Auctions in Context"
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1987)
Samuelson, W. F. (1985)
11. - Auctions in Context (2) 1/12
Resale
Garratt, R., & Tröger, T. (2006) --- 鄒 娣
Hafalir, I., & Krishna, V. (2008) --- 塩澤
<References>
Milgrom: Ch6 "Auctions in Context"
Garratt, R. J., Tröger, T., & Zheng, C. Z. (2009)
Gupta, M., & Lebrun, B. (1999)
Haile, P. A. (2003)
Zheng, C. Z. (2002)
12. - Internet Auctions 1/19
Sniping
Roth, A. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2002) --- 楊 杰萌
Sponsored Search Auctions
Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., & Schwarz, M. (2007) --- 李 莎莎
Buy Price (Buyout or Buy-it-now) Option
Mathews, T. (2004)
<References>
Bajari, P., & Hortacsu, A. (2003)
Brown, J., & Morgan, J. (2009)
Budish, E. B., & Takeyama, L. N. (2001)
Ely, J. C., & Hossain, T. (2009)
Gallien, J., & Gupta, S. (2007)
Hossain, T., & Morgan, J. (2006)
Melnik, M. I., & Alm, J. (2002)
Peters, M., & Severinov, S. (2006)
13. - Procurement Auctions 1/26
Scoring Rule
Che (1993) --- 方 元駒
Split Award
Anton, J. J., & Yao, D. A. (1989) --- ボロル
<References>
Milgrom: Ch6 "Auctions in Context"
*Wilson, R. (1979)
Anton, J. J., & Yao, D. A. (1992)
Asker, J., & Cantillon, E. (2008)
Branco, F. (1997)
Dana, J. D., & Spier, K. E. (1994)
論文 | Papers
Adams, W. J., & Yellen, J. L. (1976). Commodity bundling and the burden of monopoly. The quarterly journal of economics, 475-498.
Alesina, A., & Drazen, A. (1991). Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?. The American Economic Review, 81(5), 1170-1188.
Anton, J. J., & Yao, D. A. (1992). Coordination in split award auctions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 681-707.
Anton, J. J., & Yao, D. A. (1989). Split awards, procurement, and innovation.The RAND Journal of Economics, 538-552.
Aoyagi, M. (2003). Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 112(1), 79-105.
Ashenfelter, O. (1989). How auctions work for wine and art. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3(3), 23-36.
Asker, J., & Cantillon, E. (2008). Properties of scoring auctions. The RAND Journal of Economics, 39(1), 69-85.
Athey, S., & Bagwell, K. (2001). Optimal collusion with private information. RAND Journal of Economics, 32(3), 428-465.
Athey, S., Bagwell, K., & Sanchirico, C. (2004). Collusion and price rigidity. The Review of Economic Studies, 71(2), 317-349.
Ausubel, L. M. (2004). An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects. American Economic Review, 1452-1475.
Ausubel, L. M. (2006). An efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities. The American economic review, 602-629.
Avery, C. (1998). Strategic jump bidding in English auctions. The Review of Economic Studies, 65(2), 185-210.
Bajari, P., & Hortacsu, A. (2003). The winner's curse, reserve prices, and endogenous entry: Empirical insights from eBay auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 329-355.
Bajari, P., & Ye, L. (2003). Deciding between competition and collusion. Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(4), 971-989.
Branco, F. (1997). The design of multidimensional auctions. The RAND Journal of Economics, 63-81.
Brown, J., & Morgan, J. (2009). How much is a dollar worth? Tipping versus equilibrium coexistence on competing online auction sites. Journal of Political Economy, 117(4), 668-700.
Brusco, S., & Lopomo, G. (2002). Collusion via signalling in simultaneous ascending bid auctions with heterogeneous objects, with and without complementarities. The Review of Economic Studies, 69(2), 407-436.
Budish, E. B., & Takeyama, L. N. (2001). Buy prices in online auctions: irrationality on the internet?. Economics letters, 72(3), 325-333.
Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. (1996). Auctions Versus Negotiations. The American Economic Review, 86(1), 180-194.
Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. (1999). The generalized war of attrition. The American Economic Review, 89(1), 175.
Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. (2009). Why do sellers (usually) prefer auctions?. The American Economic Review, 99(4), 1544-1575.
Bulow, J., & Roberts, J. (1989). The simple economics of optimal auctions. The Journal of Political Economy, 1060-1090.
Calzolari, G., & Pavan, A. (2006). On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting. Journal of Economic Theory, 130(1), 168-204.
Chatterjee, K., & Samuelson, W. (1983). Bargaining under incomplete information. Operations Research, 31(5), 835-851.
Che, Y. K., & Gale, I. (1998a). Standard auctions with financially constrained bidders. The Review of Economic Studies, 65(1), 1-21.
Che, Y. K., & Gale, I. L. (1998b). Caps on political lobbying. The american economic review, 88(3), 643-651.
Che, Y. K., & Gale, I. (2000a). The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer. Journal of Economic Theory, 92(2), 198-233.
Che, Y. K., & Gale, I. (2000b). Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 30(1), 22-43.
Che, Y. K., & Gale, I. (2003). Optimal design of research contests. The American Economic Review, 93(3), 646-671.
Che, Y. K., Gale, I., & Kim, J. (2013). Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents. Review of Economic Studies, 80(1), 73-107.
Che, Y. K., & Kim, J. (2006). Robustly Collusion‐Proof Implementation. Econometrica, 74(4), 1063-1107.
Che, Y. K., & Kim, J. (2009). Optimal collusion-proof auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 144(2), 565-603.
Cremer, J., & McLean, R. P. (1988). Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions. Econometrica, 1247-1257.
Dana, J. D., & Spier, K. E. (1994). Designing a private industry: Government auctions with endogenous market structure. Journal of public economics, 53(1), 127-147.
Dasgupta, P., & Maskin, E. (2000). Efficient auctions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 341-388.
d'Aspremont, C., & Gérard-Varet, L. A. (1979). Incentives and incomplete information. Journal of Public economics, 11(1), 25-45.
Easley, R. F., & Tenorio, R. (2004). Jump bidding strategies in Internet auctions. Management Science, 50(10), 1407-1419.
Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., & Schwarz, M. (2007). Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords. American Economic Review, 97(1), 242-259.
Ely, J. C., & Hossain, T. (2009). Sniping and squatting in auction markets. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 68-94.
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1986). A theory of exit in duopoly. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 943-960.
Gallien, J., & Gupta, S. (2007). Temporary and permanent buyout prices in online auctions. Management Science, 53(5), 814-833.
Garratt, R., & Tröger, T. (2006). Speculation in standard auctions with resale. Econometrica, 74(3), 753-769.
Garratt, R. J., Tröger, T., & Zheng, C. Z. (2009). Collusion via resale. Econometrica, 77(4), 1095-1136.
Ghose, A., & Yang, S. (2009). An empirical analysis of search engine advertising: Sponsored search in electronic markets. Management Science,55(10), 1605-1622.
Graham, D. A., & Marshall, R. C. (1987). Collusive bidder behavior at single-object second-price and English auctions. Journal of Political economy, 95(6), 1217-1239.
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1994). Protection for Sale. American Economic Review, 84(4), 833-850.
Gupta, M., & Lebrun, B. (1999). First price auctions with resale. Economics Letters, 64(2), 181-185.
Hafalir, I., & Krishna, V. (2008). Asymmetric Auctions with Resale. American Economic Review, 98(1), 87-112.
Haile, P. A. (2003). Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities.Journal of Economic Theory, 108(1), 72-110.
Hendricks, K., Porter, R., & Tan, G. (2008). Bidding rings and the winner's curse. The RAND Journal of Economics, 39(4), 1018-1041.
Hossain, T., & Morgan, J. (2006). ... plus shipping and handling: Revenue (non) equivalence in field experiments on ebay. Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, 5(2).
Jehiel, P., & Moldovanu, B. (2001). Efficient design with interdependent valuations. Econometrica, 69(5), 1237-1259.
Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (1986). The winner's curse and public information in common value auctions. The American economic review, 894-920.
Klemperer, P. (1998). Auctions with almost common values: The Wallet Game and its applications. European Economic Review, 42(3), 757-769.
Klemperer, P. (2002). What really matters in auction design. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(1), 169-189.
Laffont, J. J., & Martimort, D. (2000). Mechanism design with collusion and correlation. Econometrica, 68(2), 309-342.
Levin, D., & Smith, J. L. (1994). Equilibrium in auctions with entry. The American Economic Review, 585-599.
Li, T., & Zheng, X. (2009). Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: theory and evidence from procurement auctions. The Review of Economic Studies, 76(4), 1397-1429.
Marshall, R. C., & Marx, L. M. (2007). Bidder collusion. Journal of Economic Theory, 133(1), 374-402.
Mathews, T. (2004). The impact of discounting on an auction with a buyout option: a theoretical analysis motivated by eBay’s buy-it-now feature. Journal of Economics, 81(1), 25-52.
McAfee, R. P. (1992). A dominant strategy double auction. Journal of economic Theory, 56(2), 434-450.
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1987). Auctions with entry. Economics Letters,23(4), 343-347.
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1992). Bidding rings. The American Economic Review, 579-599.
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1996). Analyzing the airwaves auction. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1), 159-175.
Melnik, M. I., & Alm, J. (2002). Does a seller’s ecommerce reputation matter? Evidence from eBay auctions. The journal of industrial economics, 50(3), 337-349.
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982). A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1089-1122.
Moldovanu, B., & Sela, A. (2001). The optimal allocation of prizes in contests. American Economic Review, 542-558.
Mookherjee, D., & Reichelstein, S. (1992). Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules. Journal of Economic Theory, 56(2), 378-399.
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic theory, 18(2), 301-317.
Myerson, R. B. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of operations research, 6(1), 58-73.
Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983). Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of economic theory, 29(2), 265-281.
Pai, M. M., & Vohra, R. (2014). Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers. Journal of Economic Theory, 150, 383-425.
Perry, M., & Reny, P. J. (1999). On the Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi‐unit Auctions. Econometrica, 67(4), 895-900.
Perry, M., & Reny, P. J. (2002). An efficient auction. Econometrica, 70(3), 1199-1212.
Pesendorfer, M. (2000). A study of collusion in first-price auctions. The Review of Economic Studies, 67(3), 381-411.
Peters, M., & Severinov, S. (1997). Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices. Journal of Economic Theory, 75(1), 141-179.
Peters, M., & Severinov, S. (2006). Internet auctions with many traders. Journal of Economic Theory, 130(1), 220-245.
Porter, R. H., & Zona, J. D. (1993). Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions. Journal of Political Economy, 518-538.
Rassenti, S. J., Smith, V. L., & Bulfin, R. L. (1982). A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 402-417.
Reny, P. J., & Perry, M. (2006). Toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium. Econometrica, 74(5), 1231-1269.
Riley, J. G., & Samuelson, W. F. (1981). Optimal auctions. The American Economic Review, 71(3), 381-392.
Robinson, M. S. (1985). Collusion and the Choice of Auction. The RAND Journal of Economics, 141-145.
Roth, A. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2002). Last minute bidding and the rules for ending second price auctions: evidence from ebay and amazon auctions on the internet. American economic review, 92(4), 1093-1103.
Samuelson, W. F. (1985). Competitive bidding with entry costs. Economics Letters, 17(1-2), 53-57.
Shubik, M. (1971). The dollar auction game: A paradox in noncooperative behavior and escalation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 109-111.
Siegel, R. (2009). All‐Pay Contests. Econometrica, 77(1), 71-92.
Varian, H. R. (2007). Position auctions. international Journal of industrial Organization, 25(6), 1163-1178.
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of finance, 16(1), 8-37.
Wilson, R. (1977). A bidding model of perfect competition. The Review of Economic Studies, 511-518.
Wilson, R. (1979). Auctions of shares. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 675-689.
Wilson, R. (1985). Incentive efficiency of double auctions. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1101-1115.
Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., & Matsubara, S. (2004). The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: New fraud in Internet auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 46(1), 174-188.
Zheng, C. Z. (2002). Optimal Auction with Resale. Econometrica, 2197-2224.
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