Cooperative Game Theory (2023 1st)
Special Studies in Economics | Cooperative Game Theory: Introduction and Practice
経済学特研｜協力ゲーム理論の入門と実践
1st semester, Mondays 1st (8:50-10:20), Room 32 （文法経講義棟3階 32番教室）
→ Seminar Room No.2（法経講義棟2階 演習室2）Office Hours: Mondays 1245-13:30 (or by appointment)
E-mail: yosuke.yasuda <at> gmail.com
Website: https://sites.google.com/site/yosukeyasuda2/home/lectures/osaka2023_cooperative
Last Update: July 19, 2023
Announcement | お知らせ
[July 19] --- We will have a final lecture on July 24. There will be no lecture on July 31.
[July 3] --- The deadline for the final reports is July 31.
[June 25] --- There will be NO lecture on July 17, since this is a national holiday (Sea Day).
[May 29, 2023] --- There will be NO lecture on June 5. Here is an assignment (for everybody). Find an academic paper (not necessarily in Economics) that utilizes the concept of Shapley value and briefly summarize its contents in the next class (1-2 minute talk without a presentation slide would be OK).
[May 8, 2023] --- Slides for lecture 3 are uploaded here.
[April 18, 2023] --- From the second lecture on April 24, the lecture room will be changed to Seminar Room No.2.
[April 17, 2023] --- There will be NO lecture on May 1 due to the preparation for Icho-sai （銀杏祭）.
[April 10, 2023] --- The first lecture will be on April 17 (Mon). Lectures will be in English, but your questions and presentations can be in Japanese.
Course Objective and Content | 講義概要・目的
We study cooperative game theory and its applications.
This course is mainly based on students' presentations.
First, we read the selective part of the leading textbook, Peleg and Sudhoelter (2007).
Then, we read several survey articles covering this subject's practical applications.
Learning Goals | 学習目標
To acquire analytical skills in cooperative game theory.
To understand how theoretical ideas are applied to real-life issues in the market economy and collective decision-making.
Requirement / Prerequisite | 履修条件・受講条件
Game theory at the intermediate undergraduate level.
Grading Policy | 成績評価
Based on your presentation and final report.
Auditing students SHOULD also make presentations but need NOT submit the final report.
You can give a talk in either English or Japanese, but you should prepare SLIDES typed in ENGLISH. (so that everyone can understand the contents)
Your presentation should be about 20 to 30 minutes long. After each talk, we will invite questions and comments from other participants.
You can write the final report in either Japanese or English. The suggested length is 2 - 5 pages. Your report should be either
1) an original research paper/idea on matching market design,
2) a referee report on a paper (which is not directly covered in class), or
3) a survey on a specific issue of matching market design.
Textbooks | 講義テキスト
There is the main textbook for this course.
Main Textbook
Related Books
Maschler, Solan and Zamir [MSZ], Game Theory, (2nd), 2020. Amazon
A highly readable and comprehensive textbook on game theory.
The 1st edition of this book will be posted in CLE.
Owen [Owen], Game Theory (4th), 2013. Amazon
A traditional game theory textbook that covers a wide range of topics on cooperative game theory.
The relevant parts will be posted in CLE.
Handbook of Game Theory and Economic Applications [HB], Vol.1, Vol.2, and Vol.3, 1992, 1994, and 2002.
You have access to each chapter through the Osaka University network.
Gura and Maschler [GM], Insights into Game Theory: An Alternative Mathematical Experience, 2008. Amazon
Moulin, Cooperative Microeconomics: A Game-Theoretic Introduction, 1995. Amazon
Course Schedule | 講義日程
(The instructor will give lectures 1, 2, and 3. All the rest consists of students' presentations.)
Lecture 1. Introduction April 17
[PS] Ch1; [Owen] Ch10
References
Ch36: Games in coalitional form
Keywords
Taxi problem, DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization), blockchain, Chat-GPT, normative analysis, axiomatic approach.
Lecture 2. Bargaining (slides) April 24
[MSZ] Ch16; [Owen] Ch9; [HB] Ch35
References
[HB] Ch7: Noncooperative models of bargaining
**Nash Jr, J. F. (1950). The bargaining problem. Econometrica,155-162.
*Kalai, E., & Smorodinsky, M. (1975). Other solutions to Nash's bargaining problem. Econometrica, 513-518.
*Nash, J. (1953). Two-person cooperative games. Econometrica, 128-140.
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A., & Wolinsky, A. (1986). The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling. The RAND Journal of Economics, 176-188.
Okada, A. (2010). The Nash bargaining solution in general n-person cooperative games. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(6), 2356-2379.
Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica, 97-109.
Keywords
...
Lecture 3. TU Games (slides) May 8
[PS] Ch2; [MSZ] Ch17
References
Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944, 2007). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton University Press.
Lecture 4. The Core May 15, 22
[PS] Ch3; [MSZ] Ch17; [HB] Ch12, Ch13
Chapter Presentation --- MISMETTI-LALEURE Clément
Problem Solution --- IZUMI Kohei
Lecture 5. Bargaining Sets May 22, 29, June 12
[PS] Ch4; [MSZ] Ch20; [Owen] 13; [HB] Ch18
Chapter Presentation --- HANAYAMA Manaho
Problem Solution --- YU Junsi
References
[MSZ] Ch21: The nucleolus
[HB] Ch17: Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
Lecture 6. The Shapley Value June 19, 26
[PS] Ch8; [MSZ] Ch19; [Owen] Ch12; [HB] Ch53
Chapter Presentation --- TAKAHASHI Gen
Problem Solution --- LU Qiuyu
Research Papers on the Shapley Value July 3, 24
Each student picks a paper on the Shapley value and makes a presentation for 10-15 minutes.
Presentations
Van Essen and Wooders (2021) --- Izumi
Besner (2019) --- Lu
Sun et al. (2020) --- Takahashi
Strom (1990) --- Hanayama
Zhang et al. (2014) --- Cai
Brügemann et al. (2019) --- Yu
References
[HB] Ch54: Variations on the Shapley value
Besner, M. (2019). Axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value. Theory and Decision, 86(2), 161-183.
Brügemann, B., Gautier, P., & Menzio, G. (2019). Intra firm bargaining and Shapley values. The Review of Economic Studies, 86(2), 564-592.
Strom, K. (1990). A behavioral theory of competitive political parties. American Journal of Political Science, 565-598.
Sun, M. W., Moretti, S., Paskov, K. M., Stockham, N. T., Varma, M., Chrisman, B. S., ... & Wall, D. P. (2020). Game theoretic centrality: a novel approach to prioritize disease candidate genes by combining biological networks with the Shapley value. BMC Bioinformatics, 21(1), 1-10.
Van Essen, M., & Wooders, J. (2021). Allocating positions fairly: Auctions and Shapley value. Journal of Economic Theory, 196, 105315.
Zhang, Y. J., Wang, A. D., & Da, Y. B. (2014). Regional allocation of carbon emission quotas in China: Evidence from the Shapley value method. Energy Policy, 74, 454-464.
Lecture NTU Games July 10
[PS] Ch11; [Owen] Ch15; [HB] Ch55
Chapter Presentation --- Izumi
References
==========
Lecture 8. The Core of NTU Games TBA
[PS] Ch12
Chapter Presentation ---
Problem Solution ---
Lecture 9. The Shapley Value of NTU Games TBA
[PS] Ch13
Chapter Presentation ---
Problem Solution ---
References
[HB] Ch55: Values of non-transferable utility games
Lecture 10. Perfectly Competitive Economies TBA
[HB] Ch14
Presenter 1 ---
Presenter 2 ---
Lecture 11. Imperfectly Competitive Economies TBA
[HB] Ch15
Presenter 1 ---
Presenter 2 ---
Lecture 12. Cost Allocation TBA
[HB] Ch34
Presenter 1 ---
Presenter 2 ---
Lecture 13. Ethics (or Politics) TBA
[HB] Ch19
Presenter 1 ---
Presenter 2 ---
Lecture 14-15. Applications TBA
[Owen] Ch17
Presenter 1 ---
Presenter 2 ---
Presenter 3 ---
Presenter 4 ---
References
TBA
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