講義日程（旧版） | Course Schedule - Concise (Old Version)
赤字の日付は講義、青字は学生による発表の予定
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Single-Object Auctions: Basic Theory
1. - Equilibrium Bidding 10/6
Introduction
Krishna: Ch1
Private Value Auctions
Krishna: Ch2
<References>
*Vickrey, W. (1961)
2. - Mechanism Design
The Revenue Equivalence Principle 10/13
Krishna: Ch3
Mechanism Design 10/27
Krishna: Ch5
<References>
*Myerson, R. B. (1981)
Bulow, J., & Roberts, J. (1989)
Riley, J. G., & Samuelson, W. F. (1981)
3. - Interdependent Values
Auctions with Interdependent Values 11/10
Krishna: Ch6
The Revenue Ranking ("Linkage") Principle 11/17
Krishna: Ch7
<References>
*Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982)
Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (1986)
Perry, M., & Reny, P. J. (1999)
Single-Object Auctions: Extension
4. - Bidding Rings
Weak and Strong Cartels 11/24
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1992)
Marshall, R. C., & Marx, L. M. (2007)
Collusion-Proof Mechanism 12/1
Che, Y. K., & Kim, J. (2006)
Winner's Curse 12/1
Hendricks, K., Porter, R., & Tan, G. (2008)
<References>
Krishna: Ch11 "Bidding Rings"
Bajari, P., & Ye, L. (2003)
Che, Y. K., & Kim, J. (2009)
Graham, D. A., & Marshall, R. C. (1987)
Pesendorfer, M. (2000)
Porter, R. H., & Zona, J. D. (1993)
Robinson, M. S. (1985)
5. - Auctions in Context
Entry Fee
Levin, D., & Smith, J. L. (1994)
Li, T., & Zheng, X. (2009)
Resale
Haile, P. A. (2003)
Garratt, R., & Tröger, T. (2006)
<References>
Milgrom: Ch6 "Auctions in Context"
Garratt, R. J., Tröger, T., & Zheng, C. Z. (2009)
Gupta, M., & Lebrun, B. (1999)
Hafalir, I., & Krishna, V. (2008)
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1987)
Samuelson, W. F. (1985)
Zheng, C. Z. (2002)
6. - Internet Auctions
Sniping
Roth, A. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2002)
Buy Price (Buyout or Buy-it-now) Option
Mathews, T. (2004)
<References>
Bajari, P., & Hortacsu, A. (2003)
Brown, J., & Morgan, J. (2009)
Budish, E. B., & Takeyama, L. N. (2001)
Ely, J. C., & Hossain, T. (2009)
Gallien, J., & Gupta, S. (2007)
Hossain, T., & Morgan, J. (2006)
Melnik, M. I., & Alm, J. (2002)
Peters, M., & Severinov, S. (2006)
7. - Procurement Auctions
Scoring Rule
Che (1993)
Split Award
Anton, J. J., & Yao, D. A. (1989)
<References>
Milgrom: Ch6 "Auctions in Context"
Anton, J. J., & Yao, D. A. (1992)
Asker, J., & Cantillon, E. (2008)
Branco, F. (1997)
Dana, J. D., & Spier, K. E. (1994)
Multiple-Object Auctions
8. - Uniform Price Auctions
Uniform Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
Milgrom: Ch7.1
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
Milgrom: Ch7.2
<References>
坂井: 第3章「国債オークション」（池邉暢平・坂井豊貴）
Brusco, S., & Lopomo, G. (2002)
9. - Sequential Sales
Sequential First Price Auctions
Krishna: Ch15.1
Sequential Second Price Auctions
Krishna: Ch15.2
<References>
Ashenfelter, O. (1989)
10. - Efficient Auctions
Two Stage Mechanism
Perry, M., & Reny, P. J. (2002)
Dynamic Mechanism
Ausubel, L. M. (2004)
<References>
Ausubel, L. M. (2006)
Dasgupta, P., & Maskin, E. (2000)
Jehiel, P., & Moldovanu, B. (2001)
11. - Spectrum Auctions
FCC Auctions
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1996)
European 3G Auctions
Klemperer, P. (2002)
<References>
Rassenti, S. J., Smith, V. L., & Bulfin, R. L. (1982)
12. - Financial Constraints
Non-Market Mechanism
Che, Y. K., Gale, I., & Kim, J. (2013)
Optimal Mechanism
Pai, M. M., & Vohra, R. (2014)
<References>
Che, Y. K., & Gale, I. (1998a)
Che, Y. K., & Gale, I. L. (1998b)
Che, Y. K., & Gale, I. (2000a)
Nonidentical-Object Auctions
13. - VCG Mechanisms
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
Milgrom: Ch2
<References>
坂井: 第1章「グローヴスメカニズム」（坂井豊貴）
14. - Package Bidding
Vickrey Auctions and the Monotonicity Problems
Milgrom: Ch8.1
Ausubel-Milgrom Ascending Proxy Auctions
Milgrom: Ch8.3
<References>
坂井: 第2章「コア選択オークション」（佐野隆司）
Yokoo, M., Sakurai, Y., & Matsubara, S. (2004)
15. - Sponsored Search Auctions
Position Auctions
Krishna: Ch17.2
Varian, H. R. (2007)
<References>
Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., & Schwarz, M. (2007)
Ghose, A., & Yang, S. (2009)
Other Possible Topics
To be written...
War of Attrition
Dollar Auction
Shubik, M. (1971)
Exit Game
Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1986)
<References>
Alesina, A., & Drazen, A. (1991)
Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. (1999)
Klemperer, P. (1998)
Winner's Curse
Bajari, P., & Hortacsu, A. (2003)
Hendricks, K., Porter, R., & Tan, G. (2008)
Kagel, J. H., & Levin, D. (1986)
Negotiation
Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. (1996)
Bulow, J., & Klemperer, P. (2009)
Calzolari, G., & Pavan, A. (2006)
Contest
*Che, Y. K., & Gale, I. (2003)
Che, Y. K., & Gale, I. (2000b)
Moldovanu, B., & Sela, A. (2001)
Siegel, R. (2009)
Jump Bidding
*Avery, C. (1998)
Easley, R. F., & Tenorio, R. (2004)
Repeated Auctions
*Athey, S., & Bagwell, K. (2001)
Aoyagi, M. (2003)
Athey, S., Bagwell, K., & Sanchirico, C. (2004)
Double Auctions
*Wilson, R. (1985)
McAfee, R. P. (1992)
Reny, P. J., & Perry, M. (2006)
Menu Auctions
*Bernheim-Whinston (1986)
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1994)
Seller Competition
Peters, M., & Severinov, S. (1997)
Empirical Studies
Bajari, P., & Hortacsu, A. (2003)
Bajari, P., & Ye, L. (2003)
Ghose, A., & Yang, S. (2009)
Hendricks, K., Porter, R., & Tan, G. (2008)
Li, T., & Zheng, X. (2009)
Melnik, M. I., & Alm, J. (2002)
Pesendorfer, M. (2000)
Porter, R. H., & Zona, J. D. (1993)
その他の関連図書 （上の本ほど難易度が高めです）
Cramton, P. C., Shoham, Y., & Steinberg, R. (Eds.). (2006). Combinatorial auctions (Vol. 475). Cambridge: MIT press. Amazon
組み合わせオークションに関するサーベイ論文集。
坂井豊貴（編著）, メカニズムデザインと意思決定のフロンティア, 慶應義塾大学出版会, 2014. Amazon
Paarsch, Harry J., and Han Hong. "An introduction to the structural econometrics of auction data." MIT Press Books 1 (2006).
オークションの実証研究（構造推計）に関する中〜上級テキスト。
Flavio M. Menezes and Paulo K. Monteiro, An Introduction to Auction Theory, 2008. Amazon
Krishnaよりも難易度が低い、学部上級向けのオークション理論テキスト。
David J. Salant, A Primer on Auction Design, Management, and Strategy, 2014. Amazon
オークション理論のページに戻る