大阪大学・メカニズムデザイン（2020年2学期）
メカニズムデザイン | Mechanism Design
経済学特論 | Special Lectures in Economics
時間： 月・木曜日 10:30-12:00
10〜11月の二ヶ月間の短期開講になります
教室： 法経・第４番教室（変更の可能性アリ）
10/1, 5, 8, 12はオンライン講義になります。
10/15以降の講義を対面、オンラインにするかは履修者の状況をみて判断します。
講師： 安田洋祐（yosuke.yasuda<at>gmail.com）
最終更新日: 2020年11月16日
お知らせ | Announcement
[2020/9/28] --- 初回講義は10月1日です。最初の2週間（計4回）については、Zoomを使ってオンラインで行います。履修学生にはZoomのURLをメールにて送ります。履修しているにも関わらず、講義当日の10時までに連絡が届いていない場合には、安田まで問合せて下さい。
[2020/1/19] --- 講義は原則として日本語で行います。ただし、質問・ディスカッションは英語で行っても構いません。
講義概要・目的 | Course Objective and Content
近年、理論と実践の両面において発展が著しいメカニズムデザイン／遂行理論について学びます。
優れた日本語のテキストである坂井［2014］, 佐野［2019］, 坂井・藤中・若山［2008］を輪読します。
この分野の研究スタイルに慣れ、関連論文を読みこなす力を身につけるのが目的です。
学部上級レベルのミクロ経済学の知識を前提とします。抽象的な数理モデルの記述や、数学的な定理の証明などを行いますので、この手の作業が苦手な方にはしんどい講義になるでしょう。目安として、たとえば「厚生経済学の第一基本定理の証明を（解説を読んでも）ほとんど理解できない」という方には履修をおすすめしません。
成績評価 | Grading Policy
クラス内での発表と期末レポートで評価します。
発表について
発表でスライド資料を使う場合は、使用言語は英語または日本語でお願いします。
一人につき、報告45分（質疑応答15分程度）の長さを目安に準備してください。
聴講のみの学生にも一回は発表してもらいます。
期末レポートについて
次のいずれかを2〜5ページ程度にまとめてe-mailに添付して提出してください。
メカニズムデザインに関する研究アイデアや論文（の原型）
講義で直接カバーしなかった関連論文・書籍などに関するコメント
関連するトピックのサーベイ
使用言語は、日本語・英語どちらでも構いません。
聴講のみの学生は提出しなくて構いません。
提出期限は【11月30日】とします。
講義テキスト | Textbooks
教科書 | Main Textbooks
[SFW]：坂井豊貴, 藤中裕二, 若山琢磨［2008］. メカニズムデザイン. ミネルヴァ書房. Amazon
参考図書 | Related Books
Krishna, V., Auction Theory: 2nd, 2009. Amazon
A standard and balanced textbook on auction theory at graduate level.
Milgrom, P., Putting Auction Theory to Work, 2004. Amazon 日本語訳
An advanced textbook on auctions that also cover lots of applications and mechanism design issues.
Borgers, T., An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, 2015. Amazon
A rigorous textbook which covers variety of issues on mechanism design.
Vulkan, N., Roth, A. E. and Neeman, Z. (Eds.), The Handbook of Market Design, 2013. Amazon
A reference handbook on market design both on theory and applications.
Hubbard, T. P. and Paarsch, H. J., Auctions, 2016. Amazon 日本語訳
A great introductory textbook on auction without any complicated mathematics.
講義日程 | Course Schedule
(Lectures 1 and 2 will be given by the instructor. All the rest consists of students' presentations.)
Lecture 1. Introduction 10/1
Slides
Lecture 2. Auction and Mechanism Design 10/5
Slides
TEXTBOOK CHAPTERS [Sakai]
Lecture 3. Ch1: Groves Mechanism 10/8
報告者 --- 方 Slides
関連文献
Jackson, M. O. (2014)
Moulin, H. (1986). Characterizations of the pivotal mechanism. Journal of Public Economics, 31(1), 53-78.
Suijs, J. (1996). On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making. Economic design, 2(1), 193-209.
Lecture 4. Ch2: Axiomatic Characterization 10/12
報告者 --- 王 Slides
関連文献
Holmström, B. (1979)
Lecture 5. Ch3-4: Application and Implementation 10/15
報告者 --- テイ slides
関連文献
Sakai, T. (2012). Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem. Economic Theory, 50(2), 499-521.
Tadenuma, K., & Thomson, W. (1993). The fair allocation of an indivisible good when monetary compensations are possible. Mathematical Social Sciences, 25(2), 117-132.
Tadenuma, K., & Thomson, W. (1995). Games of fair division. Games and Economic Behavior, 9(2), 191-204.
TEXTBOOK CHAPTERS [Sano]
Lecture 6. Ch1: Bilateral Trading 10/19
報告者 --- 許 slides
関連文献
伊藤秀史［2003］. 契約の経済理論. 有斐閣
Bulow, J., & Roberts, J. (1989). The simple economics of optimal auctions. Journal of political economy, 97(5), 1060-1090.
Riley, J., & Zeckhauser, R. (1983). Optimal selling strategies: When to haggle, when to hold firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98(2), 267-289.
Lecture 7. Ch2: Auctions 10/22
報告者 --- 周 slides
関連文献
Myerson, R. B. (1981)
Riley, J. G., & Samuelson, W. F. (1981)
Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., & Schwarz, M. (2007). Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. American economic review, 97(1), 242-259.
Varian, H. R. (2007). Position auctions. international Journal of industrial Organization, 25(6), 1163-1178.
Lecture 8. Ch3: Dynamic Mechanism Design 10/26
報告者 --- 李 slides
関連文献
Bergemann, D., & Välimäki, J. (2010). The dynamic pivot mechanism. Econometrica, 78(2), 771-789.
Courty, P., & Hao, L. (2000). Sequential screening. The Review of Economic Studies, 67(4), 697-717.
Demange, G., Gale, D., & Sotomayor, M. (1986). Multi-item auctions. Journal of political economy, 94(4), 863-872.
TEXTBOOK CHAPTERS [SFW]
Lecture 9. Ch1: Social Choice and Implementation 10/29
報告者 --- 孫
関連文献
Maskin, E. (1977, 1999)
Abreu, D., & Matsushima, H. (1992). Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies: complete information. Econometrica, 993-1008.
Jackson, M. O. (1992). Implementation in undominated strategies: A look at bounded mechanisms. The Review of Economic Studies, 59(4), 757-775.
Moore, J., & Repullo, R. (1988). Subgame perfect implementation. Econometrica, 1191-1220.
Saijo, T. (1988). Strategy space reduction in Maskin's theorem: sufficient conditions for Nash implementation. Econometrica, 693-700.
Saijo, T., Tatamitani, Y., & Yamato, T. (1996). Toward natural implementation. International Economic Review, 949-980.
Lecture 10. Ch3: Exchange Economy 11/2
報告者 --- 許 slides
関連文献
Dasgupta, P., Hammond, P., & Maskin, E. (1979)
Hurwicz, L., Maskin, E., & Postlewaite, A. (1995). Feasible Nash implementation of social choice rules when the designer does not know endowments or production sets. In The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency, and Stability (pp. 367-433). Springer, Boston, MA.
Serizawa, S. (2002). Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies. Journal of Economic Theory, 106(2), 219-241.
Tian, G. (1992). Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences. Social Choice and Welfare, 9(2), 117-130.
Lecture 11. New: College Admission + Student Replacement 11/5
報告者 --- 方 slides
Fang Y. (2020). Chinese parallel mechanism with dummy quota policy. mimeo.
関連文献
Abdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach. American economic review, 93(3), 729-747.
Balinski, M., & Sönmez, T. (1999). A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement. Journal of Economic theory, 84(1), 73-94.
Chen, Y., & Kesten, O. (2017). Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 125(1), 99-139.
Chen, Y., & Kesten, O. (2019). Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 115, 83-100.
Zhu, M. (2014). College admissions in China: A mechanism design perspective. China Economic Review, 30, 618-631.
Lecture 12. Ch7: Matching 11/9
報告者 --- テイ slides
関連文献
Alcalde, J. (1996). Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems. Journal of Economic Theory, 69(1), 240-254.
Dubins, L. E., & Freedman, D. A. (1981). Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley algorithm. The American Mathematical Monthly, 88(7), 485-494.
Gale, D., & Shapley, L. S. (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1), 9-15.
Hatfield, J. W., & Milgrom, P. R. (2005). Matching with contracts. American Economic Review, 95(4), 913-935.
Kara, T., & Sönmez, T. (1996). Nash implementation of matching rules. journal of economic theory, 68(2), 425-439.
TEXTBOOK CHAPTERS [Sakai_Ed]
Lecture 13. Ch 4: Optimal Signal 11/12
報告者 --- 周 slides
関連文献
Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. (2013). Robust predictions in games with incomplete information. Econometrica, 81(4), 1251-1308.
Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. (2016). Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games. Theoretical Economics, 11(2), 487-522.
Gentzkow, M., & Kamenica, E. (2016). Competition in persuasion. The Review of Economic Studies, 84(1), 300-322.
Kamenica, E., & Gentzkow, M. (2011). Bayesian persuasion. American Economic Review, 101(6), 2590-2615.
Rayo, L., & Segal, I. (2010). Optimal information disclosure. Journal of political Economy, 118(5), 949-987.
Lecture 14. Ch 5: Stated Preference Method 11/16
報告者 --- 李 slides
関連文献
TBA
Lecture 15. New: TBA 11/19
報告者 --- 川中
Filiz-Ozbay, Emel, and Erkut Y. Ozbay. "Auctions with anticipated regret: Theory and experiment." American Economic Review 97.4 (2007): 1407-1418.
Cason, Timothy N., and Charles R. Plott. "Misconceptions and game form recognition: Challenges to theories of revealed preference and framing." Journal of Political Economy 122.6 (2014): 1235-1270.
関連文献
TBA
関連論文 | Related Papers
サーベイ論文 | Survey Articles
Jackson, M. O. (2014). Mechanism Theory. Available at SSRN#2542983.
Jackson, M. O. (2001). A crash course in implementation theory. Social Choice and Welfare, 18(4), 655-708.
Moore, J. (1992). Implementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information. Advances in Economic Theory, 1, 182-281.
Barbera, S. (2001). An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions. Social Choice and Welfare, 18(4), 619-653.
Maskin, E., & Sjöström, T. (2002). Implementation theory. Handbook of social Choice and Welfare, 1, 237-288.
Palfrey, T. R. (2002). Implementation theory. Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, 3, 2271-2326.
Maskin, E. S. (2008). Mechanism design: How to implement social goals. American Economic Review, 98(3), 567-76.
Myerson, R. B. (2008). Perspectives on mechanism design in economic theory. American Economic Review, 98(3), 586-603.
Bergemann, D., & Morris, S. (2019). Information design: A unified perspective. Journal of Economic Literature, 57(1), 44-95.
Bergemann, D., & Välimäki, J. (2019). Dynamic mechanism design: An introduction. Journal of Economic Literature, 57(2), 235-74.
古典文献 | Classic Papers
Baron, D. P., & Myerson, R. B. (1982). Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs. Econometrica, 911-930.
Clarke, E. H. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods. Public choice, 11(1), 17-33.
Dasgupta, P., Hammond, P., & Maskin, E. (1979). The implementation of social choice rules: Some general results on incentive compatibility. The Review of Economic Studies, 46(2), 185-216.
Gibbard, A. (1977). Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance. Econometrica, 665-681.
Green, J., & Laffont, J. J. (1977). Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods. Econometrica, 427-438.
Green, J., & Laffont, J. J. (1979). Incentives in public decision-making. Elsevier North-Holland.
Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 617-631.
Groves, T., & Loeb, M. (1975). Incentives and public inputs. Journal of Public economics, 4(3), 211-226.
Holmström, B. (1979). Groves' scheme on restricted domains. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1137-1144.
Hurwicz, L. (1972). On informationally decentralized systems. Decision and organization: A volume in Honor of J. Marschak.
Maskin, E. (1977, 1999). Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. The Review of Economic Studies, 66(1), 23-38.
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic theory, 18(2), 301-317.
Myerson, R. B. (1979). Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica, 61-73.
Myerson, R. B. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of operations research, 6(1), 58-73.
Myerson, R. B., & Satterthwaite, M. A. (1983). Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. Journal of economic theory, 29(2), 265-281.
Riley, J. G., & Samuelson, W. F. (1981). Optimal auctions. The American Economic Review, 71(3), 381-392.
Satterthwaite, M. A. (1975). Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of economic theory, 10(2), 187-217.
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of finance, 16(1), 8-37.
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