The course if for undergrads/MBA:
It does not go extremely deep in the theory. It's an introduction to market design (e.g., the auction part only considers private values, the examples are with independent and uniformly distributed valuations);
Somes results are proved (but only when the proof is not too involved);
The chapters alternate presentation of formal models with "discussions" or presentations of real-life applications (some chapters are mostly formal, others mostly verbal);
There are lots of examples.
In the TOC below the References are mostly for the instructor, but can be assigned to the students as a reading list.
The companion book is published by MIT Press.
Feel free to modify the files the way you want (and thanks for notifying me any typo you may find...).
Get the slides (TeX, PDF and figures). LaTeX files are standard (beamer), I don't use any weird package that is not in the standard distribution (TeX Live).
Basic questions about what's a market. Limited role of prices. Contains a few slides about Feeding America (as an example of market design).
References:
A. Roth (2015), "Who Gets What - and Why:The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design," Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
A. Roth (2002), "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Econometrica, Vol. 70, pp. 1341-1378.
A. Roth (2008), "What Have We Learned from Market Design?," Economic Journal, Vol. 118, pp. 285-310.
C. Prendergast (2017), "The Allocation of Food to Food Banks," mimeo.
1st price, 2nd price, Dutch, English, revenue equivalence, optimal auctions (mostly the Riley-Samuelson version) + Bulow-Klemperer's reserve price v. adding a bidder.
Reference:
W. Vickrey (1961) "Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, Vol. 16, pp. 8-37.
Bidding and pricing rules. Analysis of sniping (Roth-Ockenfels' Amazon v. eBay paper ---AER P&P version). Very basic, not technical.
Reference:
A. Roth & A. Ockenfels (2002), "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," American Economic Review, P&P, Vol. 92, pp. 1093-1103.
The VCG auction, for private values only.
Reference:
L. Ausubel & P. Milgrom (2006), "The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction," in P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, Chapter 1, MIT Press.
Generalized second price, analysis of GSP long run equilibria, relation with VCG and Generalized English auction.
Reference:
B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky & M. Schwarz (2007), "Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords," American Economic Review, Vol. 97, pp. 242-259.
Not technical at all. Simultaneous ascending auction, exposure problem, winners' curse and demand reduction introduced. Short analysis/description of US 1994 and German 1999 & 2000 3G/4G auctions.
References:
M. Cramton (2006), "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions," in P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, Chapter 4, pp. 99-114, MIT Press.
P. Klemperer (2004), "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Chapter 5 & Chapter 6, Princeton University Press.
Treasury auctions, double auctions, IPO. Not technical.
Opening/closing (NYSE & Nasdaq). Limit order book. High Frequency Trading (including a few slides about frequent batch auctions & IEX's speed bump). A little bit technical at the end (when discussing arbitrage).
Reference:
E. Budish, P. Cramton & J. Shim (2015), "The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 130, pp. 1547-1621.
Marriage model. Stability, Deferred Acceptance, strategyproofness. Man/woman-optimal matchings and polarization of preferences (but not the lattice structure). Blocking lemma (for the proof of strategyproofness).
Reference:
D. Gale & L. Shapley (1962), "College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly. Vol. 69, pp. 9-15.
Introduce the many-to-one model (with responsive preferences), Roth's analysis of the UK market and the experiment with Kagel, Rural Hospital Theorem, decomposition lemma. History of NRMP + a few words about couples.
References:
A. Roth (1991), "A Natural Experiment in the Organization of Entry-Level Labor Markets: Regional Markets for New Physicians and Surgeons in the United Kingdom," American Economic Review, Vol. 81, pp. 415-450.
J. Kagel & A. Roth (2000), "The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by a Natural Experiment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115, pp. 201-235.
A. Roth & E. Peranson (1999), "The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: Some engineering aspects of economic design," American Economic Review, Vol. 89, pp. 748-780.
One-to-one model. Efficiency. Serial Dictatorship, Top Trading Cycles. House allocation (priave/public/mix endowments).
Reference:
A. Abdulkadiroğlu & T. Sönmez (1998), "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Vo. 88, pp. 233-260.
Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem. Stochastic dominance. Random Serial Dictatorship, TTC with random endowments. Ex-ante/ex-post efficiency. Probabilistic serial mechanism.
References:
A. Bogomolnaia & H. Moulin (2001), "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 100, pp. 295-328.
A. Abdulkadiroğlu & T. Sönmez (1998), "Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems," Econometrica, Vo. 66, pp. 689-701.
The Many-to-one assignment model. Immediate Acceptance (Boston), DA, TTC. Short review of Boston and NYC school match.
References:
A. Abdulkadiroğlu & T. Sönmez (2003), "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, Vo. 93, pp. 729-747.
A. Abdulkadiroğlu, P. Pathak & A. Roth (2005), "The New York City High School Match," American Economic Review P&P, Vo. 95, pp. 364-367.
A. Abdulkadiroğlu, P. Pathak, A. Roth & T. Sönmez (2005), "The Boston Public School Match," American Economic Review P&P, Vo. 95, pp. 368-371.
O. Kesten (2010), "School Choice with Consent," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vo. 125, pp. 297-1348.
Weak priorities (Erdil & Ergin's improving cycles), single v. multiple tie-breaking, constrained school choice, manipulability comparison.
References:
A. Erdil & H. Ergin (2008) "What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," American Economic Review, Vol. 98, pp. 669-689.
A. Abdulkadiroğlu, P. Pathak & Roth (2009) "Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: the Boston Mechanism Reconsidered," , American Economic Review, Vol. 101, pp. 399-410.
G. Haeringer & F. Klijn (2009) "Constrained School Choice," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 144, pp. 1921-1947.
C. Calsamiglia, G. Haeringer & F. Klijn (2010) "Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, Vol. 100, pp. 1860-1874.
P. Pathak & T. Sönmez (2013), "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation," American Economic Review, Vo. 103, pp. 80-106.
Bidding for courses. HBS draft mechanism. Approximate competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (+ the Budish-Kessler experiment).
References:
T. Sönmez & M. Utku SÜnver (2010) "Course Bidding at Business Schools," International Economic Review, Vol. 51, pp. 99-123.
E. Budish & E. Cantillon (2012) "The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard," American Economic Review, Vol. 102, pp. 2237-2271.
E. Budish & J. Kessler (2016) "Bringing Real Market Participants' Real Preferences into the Lab: An Experiment that Changed the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton," mimeo.
Trades v. waiting list, kidney exchange algorithm (the QJE version). Efficency + incentives.
Reference
A. Roth, T. Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver (2003), "Kidney Exchange," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vo. 119, pp. 457-488.