Syllabus in English
Winter / Thursdays 4th (15:00-16:30) and 5th (16:40-18:10) / Room J
Office Hours: by appointment
E-mail: yosuke.yasuda <at> gmail.com
Website: https://sites.google.com/site/yosukeyasuda2/home/lectures/grips2025_game
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[2026, February 2] --- The website (this page) has just been created.
Last update: February 2, 2026
This is an introductory course in game theory, which will provide you with mathematical frameworks for analyzing strategic situations---your optimal decision depends on what other people will do.
Game theory has been widely recognized as a common and important analytical language in such fields as economics, management, political science, psychology, computer science, and biology.
To illustrate its analytical value, we will cover a variety of applications, including international relations, development, business competition, marriage problems, and so forth.
[Course Goals]
Students will learn and apply mathematical frameworks of game theory.
The topics covered include (a) static games, (b) dynamic games, (c) games with incomplete information, and (d) market design.
The goal is to be able to model interactions of agents based on the above mathematical frameworks.
(a) Static Games (4-5 Lectures)
Dominant Strategy, Nash Equilibrium, Mixed Strategy
(b) Dynamic Games (4-5 Lectures)
Backward Induction, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Repeated Games
(c) Games with Incomplete Information (3-4 Lectures)
Auction Theory, Signaling Model
(d) Market Design (2-3 Lectures)
Matching Mechanisms, School Choice
The final grade will be based on the assignments (40 points in total) and the final exam (60 points).
TBA
ANYONE in GRIPS (including faculty members) can audit this course.
There is NO prerequisite for this course, although familiarity with probabilistic thinking would be helpful.
Working on the assigned problem sets is also an essential part of the course.
Instructor will use this website to provide further information and materials for the course.
Required:
There is NO required textbook for this course.
Others:
While lecture slides are the main material for the class, the books listed below might be useful if you need supplementary readings.
The following introductory textbooks are full of intuitive explanations:
Dixit, A., Skeath, S., and Reiley, D., Games of Strategy, 5th ed., 2020.
Watson, J., Strategy, 3rd, 2013.
The following books are recommended to understand game theory more lucidly.
The first one is the most concise, the second is the most accessible, and the third one is the most comprehensive among the three.
Gibbons, R., Game Theory for Applied Economists, 1992.
Tadelis, S., Game Theory: An Introduction, 2012.
Maschler, M., Solan, E., and Zamir, S., Game Theory, 2nd, 2020.
Haeringer, G., Market Design: Auctions and Matching, 2018.
An intermediate-level textbook that provides a balanced coverage of the two pillars of market design: auctions and matching.
Below are some reliable advanced-level textbooks.
Osborne, M and Rubinstein, A., Models in Microeconomic Theory, 2nd ed., 2023.
You can download the book (pdf) for free here.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J., Game Theory, 1991.
This is the definitive, advanced resource for anyone looking to pursue game theory seriously.
Lec 1. Introduction to Game Theory Feb 5
Lec 2. Dominant Strategies Feb 5
Lec 3. Nash Equilibrium Feb 12
Lec 4. Mixed Strategies Feb 12
Lec 5. Games with Sequential Move Feb 19
Lec 6. Credibility and Commitment Feb 19
Lec 7. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) Feb 26
Lec 8. Repeated Games Feb 26
Lec 9. Applications to Business Competition Mar 5
Lec 10. Bayesian Games Mar 5
Lec 11. Auction Theory Mar 12
Lec 12. Signalling Model Mar 12
Lec 13. Collective Decision Making Mar 19
Lec 14. Matching: Theory and Applications Mar 19
Lec 15. Practical Issues in Market Design ???
Final Exam （120 mins） Mar 26?
This is a 120-minute closed-book exam.