As Axis forced advanced deep into the countries that they have invaded, leaders of the defending nation-states are left with a tactical and moral dilemma. They have the option to destroy their own infrastructure, such as bridges and railways, and resources, such as farms, food stores, homes, and factories, so that the invading enemy cannot use them. Should the defenders attempt to deprive the invaders of resources, knowing that the civilians left behind enemy lines may be left without homes and food?
This is particularly true for the Republic of China, an immense country whose armies were forced to retreat before the Japanese. Since 1937, Japanese military was able to capture most of the major Chinese cities along the coast, where Japan's dominant navy to move and resupply the army with relative ease. However, the rugged Chinese interior and the sheer size of the Chinese Nationalist Army made advances deep into China costly and time-consuming.
With the Japanese poised to capture Wuhan, the collapse of China’s entire war effort seemed a distinct possibility. As the tide of war turned against them, Nationalist military officers raised the possibility of breaking the Yellow River’s dikes to impede the Japanese.
The objective was to cut the Long-Hai railway, which ran along the river’s southern bank, before the Japanese could reach Zhengzhou, thereby halting the enemy’s advance and ensuring the retreat of Chinese armies. Otherwise, Wuhan would fall in only a matter of days, the Nationalist regime might not have time to withdraw, and China would likely have to surrender. Breaking the dikes was a product of utter desperation. Nationalist leaders accepted this stratagem as a military necessity. For them, national survival outweighed the damage they knew the floods would cause.
The flood coincided with the peak agricultural season, when wheat stood ripe in the fields or lay newly harvested, ready for threshing. Hesitant to abandon crops and fields, rural residents left their farms only reluctantly. Those not caught completely by surprise stacked their possessions on wheelbarrows and ox-carts or carried them on shoulder poles, joining the long lines of refugees. People tried to rescue young children and the aged. They tried to save tools, livestock, grain, and other belongings but there was not enough time to salvage everything. Many people drowned in the flooding; far more would succumb to illness or hunger in the difficult months and years that followed.
Refugees of the Flood
"The flood region’s area extends to over ten counties... Among the population affected by the disaster, those who will perish without relief amount to over 600,000.... The displaced masses have left and returned only to return and leave again. They are already in a dilemma and their livelihoods have been cut off. ... In Xihua the [number of] flooded villages has also reached over 430. Over three hundred disaster victims and over three hundred draft animals have drowned, so one can imagine the severity of the disaster. ... In addition, before the Yellow River flood [these areas] were occupied one or more times [by the Japanese]. Rape and pillaging left them in ruins and their vital energies had already been greatly harmed. After they were flooded, bandits and traitors have also pounded their bones and sucked out their marrow, extorting grain, draft animals, and property so that nearly all houses are empty and have no reserves. Residents who have not died in the floods perish from hardship. Those who have fortunately stayed alive are already urgently gasping for breath and groaning in agony."
(Nationalist government report, 1940)
Wartime flooding killed well over 800,000 people and displaced nearly 4 million people in Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu. The wartime floods also turned almost four million people – over 20 percent of the total population – in Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu into refugees.
Source(s): Disasterhistory.org and Institute for Historical Review