6

uncertainty abounds, particularly on the probabilities of alternative attack forms, the levels of damages and the effectiveness of the strategies in each of these strategy categories. While it is difficult to assess the probabilities of various types of events, it is relatively more feasible to evaluate relative effectiveness and costs of various mitigation strategies under various scenarios of disease outbreaks. Much research effort is needed to collect as much information as possible about economic effectiveness of mitigation strategies to arrive at informed decisions pertaining to allocation of resources between ex ante and ex post actions. The resource allocation decisions need to reflect the endogeneity of risks (Barbier and Shogren, 2004). Endogenous risk models take into account that economic agents can affect the likelihood and consequences of events (Shogren, 2000). In the case of animal disease outbreak, prevention investment will reduce the likelihood of certain types of events, while investment in preparedness, response and recovery will reduce the severity of events. For example, timely detection and destruction of infected animals will reduce the chances of disease spread and thus decrease event costs. In the case of intentional introduction of animal pathogens, the endogenous risk issue becomes more complex in terms of prevention. Investments in preparedness will not just reduce severity, but can decrease the probability of events. The strategies and tactics of terrorists are dynamic and reflect rational adjustments in response to ex ante protection and preparedness strategies (Enders and Sandler, 1993). Also, while prevention strategies may be able to deter certain models of attacks they maybe ineffective overall due to terrorists’ substitution to less protected targets. An optimal strategy mix should also consider spillover or co-benefit effects of actions. Often, practices that control or prevent a given disease will also have value for other diseases. For example, periodic testing for FMD may also detect other diseases. Similarly, pre-installed facilities and trained personnel can be also used for other public health crises. Failure to consider co-benefits will lead to underestimation of biosecurity investment benefits (Wolf, 2005). 3.3 Implementation issues A disease-free environment is a public good (Sumner, Bervejillo and Jarvis, 2005). Protecting the herd of one farmer also protects other nearby farmers (Sumner, Bervejillo and Jarvis, 2005; Wolf, 2005). Vaccination undertaken by certain livestock producers or their participation in an animal tracking system decreases the probability of infection for non-participating farmers (Elbakidze, 2007). Hence, some may ‘free ride’ at the expense of those who do participate in the programme.

1 2 3 4 5 6