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Animal agriculture is vulnerable to both intentional and unintentional biological threats. Outbreaks, especially intentional attacks, could cause enormous consequences extending well beyond agriculture. Nations, including the USA, are consolidating and coordinating efforts to protect against these biological threats. The efforts employed largely fall into the categories of ex ante prevention/preparedness and ex post response/recovery. The optimal mix across these strategies depends on the event probability, expected economic consequences, costs and effectiveness of strategies, and disease spread rates along with other factors. We review the literature discussing vulnerability and mitigation strategies and issues of relevance to agricultural security and then develop strategic recommendations based on economic analyses. These recommendations address (1) what categories of mitigation strategies are likely to be most effective (2) what implementation issues exist and how these implementation challenges could be managed or overcome and (3) what leverages can be done on technology, scientific advancement and education. Keywords: agroterrorism; animal pathogens; biological threats; preparedness; prevention; recovery; response; risk assessment; risk management; vulnerability. 2 Y. Jin, B.A. McCarl and L. Elbakidze Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Jin, Y., McCarl, B.A. and Elbakidze, L. (xxxx) ‘Risk assessment and management of animal diseaserelated biosecurity’, Int. J. Risk Assessment and Management, Vol. x, No. x, pp.xx–xx. Biographical notes: Yanhong Jin is an Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics at Texas A&M University. She received her MS in Statistics and a PhD in Agricultural and Resource Economics from University of California, Berkeley. She conducts economics research emphasising agricultural biosecurity and marketing. Bruce A. McCarl is a Distinguished Professor of Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University. He received a BS in Business Statistics from University of Colorado and a PhD in Management Science from Pennsylvania State University. He conducts economic research on climate change, resources and agricultural biosecurity. Levan Elbakidze is an Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, University of Idaho. He received BS and MS degrees in Resource Economics from the University of Nevada and a PhD from Texas A&M University. His research revolves around natural resource economics and agricultural biosecurity. 1 Introduction “Perhaps the most important reason for the decline of ancient civilisations, however, was the spread of infectious diseases, most of which were caused by microbes that had spread to humans from domesticated animals” Torrey and Yolken (2005, p.140). Agriculture and food supply is vulnerable to both intentional and unintentional biological threats (Brower and Chalk, 2003; Chalk, 2004; Cupp, Walker and Hillison, 2004; GAO, 2005; Crutchley et al., 2007). This article focuses on risk management for both intentional and unintentional introductions of animal pathogens and infectious diseases. We focus our attention on livestock-related threats because of the livestock industry’s high vulnerability in terms of susceptibility to threats and potentially substantial economic losses. Livestock diseases can spread rapidly and widely as the industry routinely employs rapid, large scale geographic movements through many hands (Chalk, 2004; Cupp, Walker and Hillison, 2004; Crutchley et al., 2007). These movements provide multiple entry points for pathogens and facilitate disease spread. Intentional introductions of livestock diseases are likely to have even larger consequences than unintentional outbreaks and may cause political instability and public terror. Whitby (2002) indicates that historically countries developing biological warfare capability usually place lower priority on crop attacks than animal and human ones and that anticrop attacks have been notably less successful. Plant events tend to have a longer time lag, months or even years, between introduction and outbreak (Madden and Wheelis, 2003) with diseases developing over a single or multiple growing seasons through pathogen multiplication (Campbell and Madden, 1990). For example, the citrus canker was present in Florida for almost three years before it was discovered (Schubert et al., 2001). AU: Sentence ‘Perhaps the most important… ……humans from domesticated animals’ has been moved under section introduction. Please check and approve. AU: References ‘Chambell and Madden (1990), NABSCC (2004), Perker (2005), Sunmer, Bervejillo and Jarvis (2005) and Elbadize (2007)’ have been changed to ‘Campbell and Madden (1990), NABCC (2004), Parker (2005), Sumner, Bervejillo and Jarvis (2005) and Elbakidze (2007)’, respectively, as per the reference list provided. Please check and approve. Risk assessment and management of animal disease-related biosecurity 3 Potential bioterrorism options include microbes which have been known for thousands of years (e.g. smallpox, anthrax, brucellosis, Q fever, tularemia and glanders) as well as microbes which apparently have moved from animals to humans more recently (e.g. Ebola virus and Lassa virus; Torrey and Yolken, 2005, p.130) 2 Animal disease risk assessment: probability and consequences 2.1 Probability of animal pathogen-related threats Many experts argue that the biological risks to agriculture are increasing (Chalk, 2004; Cupp, Walker and Hillison, 2004; Crutchley et al., 2007). Agricultural security is particularly vulnerable to animal pathogens because of the characteristics of the livestock industry and meat supply chain. First, animal agriculture