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Our findings indicate that changes in the allocation of resources were the major contributor to the reduction in coverage and delivery of veterinary services. Allocative institutional issues come to the fore in two significant changes: a substantial reduction in the allocation of financial and human resources to public veterinary services, and placing VSD under a non-veterinarian director at district level. The response of the public sector included unequal service delivery in communities, focus on progressive (rich) farmers, farmers’ increased transaction cost in accessing services, and cheating by public veterinarians and para-veterinarians through private practice and under-reporting. Consequently, the quality of service declined, and non-adherence to international protocols for reporting livestock diseases prevailed. In the private sector, many farmers and Fulani herdsmen purchased and administered veterinary drugs that had not been subject to quality control. Only a few communities self-organized to access veterinary services; this indicates farmers’ limited willingness to pay for effective veterinary services. We call attention to the fact that the process of shifting responsibility from the public to the private sector was not regulated. Consequently, the reforms resulted in unintended negative responses from both public- and private-sector actors. Our findings reinforce earlier critical studies of veterinary services reforms in Ghana (Turkson and Brownie 1999, Turkson 2008) and Cameroon (Gros 1994) as well as in several other developing countries (Woodford 2004). These studies also show that governments substantially reduced public expenditure on veterinary services and passively engaged in the reform process. The public sector proved unable to respond to the emergence of an informal animal health delivery system characterized by the prevalence of self-medication and the absence of quality control.