Note by Terry: This exchange of information is on the topic of the Davis Monthan Air Force Base Missile Site study listed which found UDMH/NDMA in the Titan II Missile Control Center and NDMA comming from the silo exhaust shaft.
Hi Terry,
Hope things are well on your end.
I have issue with the air balance anomaly/theory in the LCC. I was the HVAC technician that maintained 570-6, 570-5 and 570-9 or known as B sector during the years of 1977-1982. And as a REFER tech, I also went to all of the sites whenever there was a maintenance issue. I also must remind you that before both of our times in the service (I forget when it happened), 0-6 had a major fuel incident that caused the chicken farm next door to become a very big operation. This could have also contributed to the high readings even many years later.
The real problem wasn’t because of poor design, maintenance or the recommended settings of the static pressure as the tech data recommended. The problem was the missile combat crew who continually disconnected the outgoing damper assembly that balanced the static pressure between the LCC and the air lock . And why would this happen?? During normal operation, EF101 exhausted the air downstream out the blast damper and partially discharged air into the LCC which created the positive static pressure. This had a tendency to produce an annoying hum that we all heard during phone calls to the site, radio traffic, etc. And the problem wasn’t just at DM, it was at all three titan bases (I competed for Olympic Arena at McConnell, and re-assigned to Little Rock after 75% deactivation of DM).
If I had a dollar for each of the times I went to any of the missile sites that complained of air balance issues, I would be very rich. All I had to do was look up while getting my team safety briefing from the MCC and I would see the damper linkage disconnected. (This occurrence even happened during fueling operations I may add.) This resulted in giving a negative air balance situation because the pneumatic controls that operated the both the fresh air intake and exhaust dampers would try to compensate for the negative air pressure and would greatly increase the problem. All because some members of the combat crew did not like the hum it produced, so they disconnected it or they would just shut off EF101 all together without shutting the blast damper going into the air lock. Thus the negative air balance. And it was also a well known fact, that almost all of the missiles had some sort of reported leak. So it doesn’t surprise me that only a “few” sites were affected as being tested positive. Most of the sites listed on your report were occupied by senior crew members during my tenure at DM. By being senior, I mean instructor, stand board, and very long time service members serving on crews. Not pointing fingers, just stating a fact.
I am not disputing the facts that contamination occurred, but I did want to set the record straight on how it may have most likely been caused by human error. Does this explain why the MSA gear might have been inadequate? No, but it was the best option at the time the sites were being built (my opinion which I have many) and I’m not qualified enough to speak about the MSA gear as I never actually worked on it. I may have been part of the two man crew, but only watched which I always felt was a false sense of security. Just because we were authorized to be on site did not mean we were qualified to help anybody who worked there. It would be like me helping the R.V. technicians because they needed a body to satisfy the two man rule.
And while we are on the subject. The contamination might have been compounded by the invention of the LDAC switch. (I think you already left the A.F. by the time it was implemented.) (I tried to stop it when I was in Q.C. but got over ruled by the SINC at SAC headquarters and was “told” directly to be quiet about it.) It was a brain child of some engineer that was born from the McConnell site 3-7 oxidizer leak in Rock, Kansas. Its function? To shut off all air conditioning to the silo area in the advent of a leak with one punch of the button on the main counsel. To contain the leak within the silo until certain conditions existed (which I won’t get into). In my opinion, I feel it contributed to the Little Rock 4-7 explosion amongst other factors that caused the ignition. The 4-7 incident investigation (which I was part of)showed the electrical conduits going from the control center to the silo were not as tightly sealed that originally thought, either the potting failed or was never even installed during site construction. So shutting off the LDAC switch COULD have… with a negative air balance (like disconnecting the damper linkage from EF101) allowed whatever type of fuel anomaly to seep back into the LCC, thus contaminating it. (Like I said before, many times I went to correct an air balance and the damper linkage was disconnected because of the hum, even during fuel operations!)
What disturbs me the most? All of this “evidence” is coming out now and was never told to the masses while the titan II was in full service, but is now available for a price. How real is it?
For example: The government did not waste any time at all telling the women who maintained our sites about PCB contamination from leaking lighting ballast, transformers and electric capacitor/filters that working with them would cause birth defects. A.F. men were told nothing of the sort at the time. I learned it from a woman from my shop who thought it was wrong men were not included in the briefings. The women were also offered special jobs out of maintenance who thought it would affect them, some just blew it off and said it was part of the job. So who do you believe anymore?
Enough of my rambling. Keep the information coming, it’s interesting to read.
Ben
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Ben,
I too unfortunately worked at 570-6. I do remember now, after you mention dampers being disconnected and fans being shut off. I was one of the MFT guys who would constantly write-up the air unbalance problem when I was there.
From the readings at 06 it does not make sense about neg air balance and the readings they got on the UDMH air sampling test. The blast lock only had TWA of 6ppb reading and a peak reading of 10 ppb. The control center had a TWA of 23.0ppb and a max peak of 41.0ppb. If it was coming from the long cableway the blast lock should have been at least the same readings. That is why I thought it was coming from the control center intake air. The air being discharged at the silo exhaust was way higher concentration. this stuff was much heavier than air so it stayed on the ground topside and got sucked back in the LCC intake. That is not to say that some could have come from the damper situation, like you indicated.
Yes, I have a problem that they never told us half the stuff they should have. I really want the other UDMH air surveys they took that I can not get through the pentagon storming media website.
Anyway thanks for the info. Good to have the guy who worked on the air balance refer equipment.
Thanks,
Terry
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Note by Terry: I have researched as much as I could find on the CRB filters. The only thing I could find is that each seperate filter is designed to filter out a certain chemical or nerve gas. Remember, if someone wanted the knock out the launch crew the CRB filter was the filter to stop those kind of attacks other than closing the air intake valve. I can't tell you how many times I closed that air intake valve from topside alarms from rabbits or birds. My research did not find any info that states the CRB filtered UDMH or NDMA. If someone else can find such a reference please email me that info.
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Hi Terry,
The CBR filter (activated charcoal) prior to SF101 (which was the fresh air intake fan would have neutralized the UMDH). On Vandenberg where UMDH and MMH are still used today and at semi-conductor fabs, charcoal filters are used for that same purpose as well as neutralizing acids used in manufacturing. That is why I am a little amazed at the readings. It’s too bad they couldn’t redo some of the surveys. The CBR filter media was replaced annually under normal preventive maintenance circumstances of if the static pressure differential got high. The media would also be changed after a fueling operation was completed, to start out “fresh” again even if it was changed just before the fueling operation just for the exact reason you are assuming.
Also if I remember correctly, the wind conditions and delta T had to be within parameters (forget them since it’s been so long) before a fueling op could start. That made sure the minimal “spilled” fuel cloud would dissipate before it left the outer fence line (so in theory I was told that during a cross training exercise).
Try the NASA sites on fueling and United Paragon (U.P. was the contractor in charge of fuel ops on Vandenberg) web site. They may have some details. I do know that NASA Dryden Research at Edwards AFB, uses a derivative of hydrazine called H-70. They use it on their air planes in case of a flame out for restarting the engines. I can tell you they were really lax about it if the alarms went off , even the training was terrible. I spent the summer before last there that is why I know they used it on some of the airplanes. They might have information too.
Ben
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From Beryle:
Terry,
Keep in mind that a positive air flow from the CC existed only if the CC air intake shaft was open with the fans operating. But when a leak was detected in the silo, early policy was to close the control center air intake shaft. Without the positive air flow, that allowed vapors from the silo to drift up the long cableway and penetrate the control center, even with the dampers closed. In the air locks, between the CC and the long cableway, there was a vent at floor level for the drainage of fluids?? That small opening never had the capability to be closed off. It was some years later that it was realized that the control center air intake shaft should remain open as long as the prevailing wind did not carry the output of the silo exhaust shaft toward the CC intake shaft. This maintained a positive air pressure from the CC to the silo. The checklist was subsequently amended to have the crews monitor the wind direction. They were to close the air intake shaft valve only if the wind direction carried the output from the silo exhaust shaft toward the CC air intake shaft. I wonder how many of us were exposed to vapors from the silo that backed up the long cableway and penetrated the CC when that CC air intake valve was closed.
The studies you have were made long after I left crew duty. I was at D-M from 1969 to 1973 and 1976 to 1981. I was later exposed to vapors (although less frequently) at VAFB while employed at above ground Titan II, Titan III and Titan IV launch facilities.
Please keep me posted as to your findings.
Beryle
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Terry,
It appears that the control center was being contaminated by intake air. That doesn’t say much for the CBR filters that were supposed to keep the crew happy and healthy whilst enduring attack from above.
Jim, BMAT @ McConnell
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Terry,
Thanks for doing the research and the update.
Had no idea we were being exposed at all...even in the ppb range. Guess the sampling equipment would not detect that amount.
John
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