Home

This website is for ex-Titan II Nuclear Missile service members to look at related documents pertaining to their possible exposure to Titan II Missile fuels: Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (N2O4) and Aerozine 50 which is Unsymmetrical Dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and Hydrazine, plus all the break down chemicals from both propellants after exposure to atmosphere, copper, or water dilution. The toxic breakdown chemicals were N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), formaldehyde, hydrogen cyanide, ammonia, dinitrogen tetroxide, methylamine, cyanic acid, carbon dioxide, dimethylamine, methanol, formaldehyde dimethylhydrazone, formaldehyde hydrazone, tetramethyltetrazene and carbon monoxide. All these breakdown chemicals could not be detected by the MSA and the Vapor Detect Panel (VDAP). These toxic chemicals lasted up to six weeks in the silo after spills or leaks according to the USAF Sanitary and Industrial Hygiene Engineering Symposium convened at the 392 Medical Aerospace Medical Group Vandenberg AFB, California in 1962.

HOME

I started my gathering of the information for this website in 2003.

I have obtained a Davis Monthan AFB Titan II study on fuel exposure of the Titan II crews on normal duty. UPDATE: Please follow this link which will explain that none of the five sites were safe due to NDMA chemical and we should have had self contained breathing apparatuses for the whole complex. Five sites were tested in 1982-1983 by DM Bioengineering. Three of the Titan II missile site launch control centers (LCC'S) would not have met the standards that are in place today by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) TLV-TWA (8 hour)limits. These new UDMH and Hydrazine limits were adopted by the Air Force and NASA in 1995. I posted the report in the "LCC toxic contamination section" section along with my take on the report. This study shows, based on the new ACGIH TLV-TWA UDMH standard the Air Force adopted, that the Titan II workers of the 1960-1987 range were over-exposed by more than 6.5 times the allowed amount based on a 24 hour Titan work schedule for LCC crew members. Silo DSV crew members were exposed to 8 times the allowed 1995 ACGIH amount. This is not acknowledged in this DM AFB study as the TWA was still the old UDMH TWA of 500 ppb in 1983. The wrong calculated TWA the study gives is 23 ppb in the LCC which in itself is twice the 1995 TLV-TWA 8 hour 10 ppb with no adjustment for 24 hour work shifts or errors by DM bioengineering using the wrong OSHA equation. This does not take into account the other toxic chemicals at the Titan II missile site. The calculations can get very complicated but the end fact is the addition of the other chemicals makes it worse than just UDMH and Hydrazine alone. Click on your job title to see work shift adjustment calculations for Launch Crew Members, PTS, Security, and Maintenance.

The Threshold Limit Value/Time Weighted Average (TLV-TWA) exposure rates that are in place today for the US Air Force and NASA civilian workers working around UDMH and Hydrazine, is 10 ppb TLV-TWA (8 hrs). The UDMH exposure standard during the Titan II missile days of 1960-1985 was .5 ppm or 500 ppb TLV-TWA (8 hrs). We were allowed to be exposed to 50 times the vapor concentration than the exposure allowed now. The real issue is the MSA detection system between 1962-1987 could not detect anywhere near the 500 ppb PEL limit. The MSA was calibrated with 10 ppm and 40 ppm samples of UDMH. The MSA vapor detect system was never tested with a .5 ppm amount of UDMH. I recently found, in 2016, the actual + or - 25% accuracy quoted by a co-manager of the Titan II "Mine Safety Appliance Co. (MSA) vapor detection system. This is proof that the USAF had no intention of meeting OSHA regulation for the safety of the Titan II Nuclear Missile workers. Click here for more info.

After graduating college with a BS in Mechanical Engineering I worked for a major missile systems manufacturer and designed defense missile test equipment based on a safety factor of 5. This means that the MSA missile fuel vapor detection system should have been calibrated and tested at 0.1 ppm if the USAF was concerned with our safety. The statistical three standard deviation method of building test equipment required by military contracts should have been part of the design of the MSA. This would have included the inaccuracies of all electrical components/gauges/ length of detection tubes/errors of any component of the MSA equipment. This safety factor of 5 should have been implemented so the .1 ppm calibration would have had a reliable accuracy of 99.9%. The Titan II MSA UDMH detection system failed both criteria miserably.

The mission of the Titan II Nuclear Missiles was based on national security not for the protection of the workers maintaining or launching them. For proof that safety was a third priority of the USAF see page 108 in the 1962 USAF Sanitary and Industrial Hygiene Engineering Symposium document. "Unfortunately, nothing is perfect in this world; while it would be most desirable that a third criterion - safety - be met, it is quite obvious that in missile system components, safety comes in a poor third, if at all." For non-military people, keep this concept in mind as you read all the information on this website.

I am trying to get two other reports obtained by UCLA medical center (1997-1999) on widespread NDMA findings around the Titan II's. These reports should be at Wright Patterson AFAML/TH. The authors of the UCLA Rocketdyne hydrazine report claim they do not have the reports anymore. If anyone can help locate these toxic sample studies please email me at titanii@new.rr.com . One ex-Titan II Veteran tried to ask under the freedom of information act and was told none exist. Listed in the DM AFB study were many USAF facilities that received copies of the DM toxic sample report.

The Headquarters Space and Missile Systems Center, a subordinate unit of Air Force Space Command, is the center of technical excellence for developing, acquiring, fielding and sustaining military space systems. Don't bother looking for the documents, mentioned below at their website, as they were removed since my inquiries to their authors. Under the tab, Headquarters Space and Missile Systems Center, on this website are several documents from the Space and Missile Systems Center’s (SMC) Acquisition Health and Safety Department: US Air Force was represented in meetings to discuss technical needs for monitoring the new lower level requirements of hydrazine vapors.Technical needs number 413, under Current Cost of Process, states “Possible unfavorable legal judgments against the government due to adverse health impact to launch-site personnel unknowingly exposed to hazardous levels of hydrazines could be even higher (tens of millions of dollars)”. This statement alone should be a wake up call to all Titan II Missile Veterans of what we were exposed to versus today's NASA and USAF UDMH lower exposure standards.

Please email your medical information by filling out the health survey questionnaire provided in the health survey section on this website.

If you know of another ex-titan worker please forward him or her a survey to fill out and email back to titanii@new.rr.com.

My Story

Thank you for your service to our country during the "cold war",

Terry

Note: Some documents are PDF files at the end of each page. To download them click on the pdf file name at the bottom of each page.

Survey results from Titan II workers who have responded to the survey are in the "health survey" section. There is a survey form at the end of the survey results. Email the answers with the questions to: titanii@new.rr.com.