1/17/2015 update: This Department of Defense website, for contractors, now has the 1982-1983 DM AFB Titan II complex toxic fuel study online. The original report is the second link with the PDF ending. the other link is the defense contractor information website home page. You will notice on the second page of the document that further toxic surveys were to be accomplished of the Titan II complex during deactivation fuel downloads. Where are those reports?
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/ http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a508338.pdf
The flawed DM AFB Bio-engineering toxic Titan II Missile fuel study was done by:
See correction and reason for error.
Davis Monthan AFB Bioengineering Services at the request of HQ SAC/SGPD.
Major Robert J. Sutay, Certified Industrial Hygienist, was the lead person from DM Hospital
Captain Arnold R. Ferguson, Bioenvironmental Engineer
Staff Sargent James B. Heggie, Bio Tech.
The flawed toxic study was:
Prepared by: Edward C. Bishop, Captain, USAF
Reviewed by: Aurthur P. Cadwell, Col, USAF Chief, Consultant Services
Approved by: Johan E. Bayer , Colonel, USAF, Vice Commander
Five missile sites were chosen in this study. They are 570-1,570-4,570-6,571-4, and 571-9. Of the five missile sites three had UDMH concentrations in the LCC (Yes, the LCC!) that would have failed the Threshold limit Value/Time Weighted Average (TLV-TWA) exposure rates that are in place today for the Air Force and civilian workers working around UDMH, which is 10 ppb TLV-TWA (8 hrs).
The LCC UDMH TLV-TWA 8 hour concentrations (not done correctly, see this analysis) were 570-1=>12.3 ppb, 570-6=>23.0 ppb and 571-4=>22.0 ppb. For crewmembers that stayed for 24 hours the exposure calculation increases. For PTS people it is harder to perform the calculations as they were exposed at missile downloads (I believe there are studies for fuel downloads as the author calls this study a “before download study”). Crewmembers are easier to estimate exposure. According to the Air Force sampling at DM, the LCC was almost the worst place in the complex. This actually surprises me the most about this one study. The whole purpose of the positive air balance in the complex was to prevent this situation.The MSA sampling on level six was the worst for 570-6.
a. The 570-6 LCC measured 41 ppb of UDMH in the 262 minute sampling. The TWA was incorrectly calculated as 23 ppb for an eight (8) hour period. See correction and reason for error. Even though this was a wrong calculation by DM bioengineering it still exceeded the new ACGIH limit of 10 ppb by 13 ppb. The LCC was not the highest reading but was consistently the second highest place in the three Titan II complexes that had the higher readings.
b. UDMH sampling next to the 570-6 MSA on level 6 of the silo equipment area showed a reading of 61 ppb in 236 minute period, and a calculated TWA of 30 ppb. This wrong calculation still exceeds the new limit by 20 ppb. It would also exceed the new ceiling limit of 60 ppb in a 2 hour period if one would be in the MSA area for a two hour period. Wrongly calculated for 8 hrs it should have been calculated using the equation Equation 3-1b TWA = CT1+CT2+CTi / T1+T2+... Ti ). 152µg/m3)(236 min)/236 min = 152µg/m3 converting to ppb (24.45)(152)/60 = 61.9 ppb TWA (8 hour only) actual calculated TWA using 236 minutes measured exposure at Missile site 570-6 in the equipment area .This is 6 times the ACGIH TWA (10ppb) that is allowed today in 2015. This still does not account for skin intake which is worse than inhalation.
c. Hydrazine was also measured and was present at very low levels. So, which toxic chemical did it convert to which was not sampled for by the DM bioengineering department. Hydrazine leaked out of the missile in the same quantity that UDMH did. As Aerozine-50 is 50 percent Hydrazine and 50 percent UDMH it did not disappear it just converted to another toxic chemical that suspended in the silo and control center!
d. NDMA was present at the silo exhaust at four complexes with an average concentration of 0.20 ppb levels. Other locations in the silo were less. There are no established exposure levels for NDMA, so no comparisons can be made. Crew members were supposed to be informed of NDMA to the hazards similar to information briefed to PTS personnel (1983). 1974 OSHA regulated carcinogens. “Exposures of workers to theses 13 chemicals (NDMA being one of them) are to be controlled through the required use of engineering controls, work practices, and personal protective equipment, including respirators”.
Problems with the study:
The study has a major flaw that I recently (Jan, 2015) noticed. Quoting from the study under Results and Discussions on page 2 under A: General: The TWA CONC column is the concentration time weighted over 8 hours adjusted to 25°C, 760 mm Hg, assuming no exposure for the unsampled period. This disclosure by the DM bioengineering team that conducted the study shows the inexcusable lack of knowledge of the combat crews 24 hour jobs or their lack of standard sampling of toxic air procedures. So, they are saying that after sampling the LCC for 262 minutes (4.36 hours) and getting a 23 ppb TWA UDMH reading they are going to ignore the balance of 3.64 hours in the 8 hour TWA calculation, saying that they got zero readings for the balance of 3.64 hours! According the OSHA manual they should have used the formula 3-1b (TWA= sample concentration x time period of the sampling/ 60 = 103 µg/m3 and converting to ppb is (24.45)(103)/60 = 42 ppb TWA) which assumes the same concentration for the balance of the 8 hours unless the crewmember was not in the complex or further exposed the same UDMH concentration in the LCC. Where else would we go? This is a major error by the DM Air Force Base Bioengineering team. See correction to the actual TWA for UDMH.
Nothing is noted in the Titan II Air Force DM study as to the time handling of the air samples. The samples were analyzed by NIOSH in Cincinnati OH.
The fuel testing units were purchased from Thermo Electron Corp just for this study, which may imply this was the first attempt at DM Hospital Bioengineering personnel in checking the normal fuel exposure of the Missile Combat Crew using more sophisticated fuel monitoring equipment.
The study did not look at the oxidizer readings. Nitrogen dioxide is another bad chemical and is a decomposition product of N2O4. This was unfortunate as the presence of oxidizer helps in forming more NDMA. So if the missile also had a small oxidizer leak it would have explained higher NDMA in some sites verses others in the testing.
No fuel samples were taken of the LCC air intake to determine where the UDMH was coming from.
Complex air balance was not noted in the report.
Formaldehyde dimethylhydrazone FDH a break down chemical of UDMH is not mentioned here but is mentioned in the 1962 medical conference as very hard to eliminate 6 weeks after spills.
Questions arise from these fuel sample readings at the three sites:
1. Was the air intake for the LCC topside actually pulling air exhausted topside from the silo exhaust which was at 206 ug/m3 or 83 ppb UDMH for its sampling period? Or, was the air balance in the site reversed with negative pressure in the LCC? Some HVAC techs have indicated the blast lock had conduit under the floor that was not plugged thereby allowing fuel to penetrate the LCC even when the air dampers between the silo and the LCC were closed.
2. The blast lock had a lower sample reading at 10 ppb indicating the fuel was passing under the blast lock. From smoke bomb tests we know there were major leaks through the conduits passing through the blast locks.
Conclusions:
1. The purpose for the American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) TLV-TWA limits is that the body must have time to cleanse itself after exposure to the chemicals in an eight hour work day. The body can remove toxic chemicals when only exposed to the TLV-TWA limits and if not exposed to the chemical again during the next 16 hour rest period.
2. Other Titan II missile fuel leak complex studies exist and UCLA researchers who read those studies claim widespread NMDA was noted in the Titan II complexes. However, the only report made public by the Air Force is this DM study. Somehow the UCLA Rocketdyne Study was able to get the other studies. I have contacted the UCLA authors and they have provided no help in where the Titan II studies are or who to obtain them from.
3. This study shows that based on the new ACGIH TLV-TWA UDMH standard the Air Force adopted, that the Titan II workers of the 1960-1985 range were over-exposed (by more than 6 times) to the UDMH fuel based on today’s medical knowledge.
4. I have located another NDMA study from Rocky Mountain Arsenal in CO. The most important take away from this study is that NDMA was also around the storage tanks when no other operations were going on. On a non-work day. The study implies that leaks from valves and previous day spills and cleanups were not adequate to rid the area of NDMA. My take on this observation would be a similar expousre to NDMA would have been found during normal missile complex status due to tank/valve/seal leaks. During fuel downloads and uploads at the Titan II missile sites NDMA would be worse.