German version: Realismus und Außenpolitik
Representatives of the American Trump administration have stated that restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity and Ukraine's NATO membership are simply not "realistic." The realist school of foreign policy emphasizes power relations as the fundamental "reality." Other aspects, including international institutions, any—however defined—world community, or even justice and law, may play a role but are subordinate to the dynamics of power relations. Trump's worldview is not far from Putin’s: Europeans are cowardly misers who enjoy making money while letting others pay for their security. Furthermore, they are competitors who, through unfair trade surpluses, deprive Americans of their jobs. On top of that, these arrogant dwarfs tend to criticize the U.S. and especially its electoral winner. Only the U.S., China, and Russia hold real power. The Europeans need to be shown their place, and then they will comply.
We may find this worldview inappropriate, absurd, or simply foolish. That does not change its political effectiveness. Such a Europe can only be despised. There can be no talk of a community of values, NATO can continue to exist, but it will gradually become irrelevant to the U.S. under Trump. This was the scenario predicted a year ago by John Bolton, Trump's former and later dismissed national security advisor.
I no longer remember who it was, but in an interview on German television, someone accused Vice President Vance of bringing the "culture wars" raging in the U.S. to Europe with his speech at the Munich Security Conference. However, it did not require any intervention from Vance for this to happen. Political trends from the U.S. repeatedly spill over into Europe and are fanatically preached in a completely different context.
The postmodern, anti-scientific so-called "theories," which, in the spirit of Gramsci, first infiltrated academia and have now also permeated the media and politics, have developed a parallel vocabulary. On their journey from France through the U.S. back to Europe, they have adopted totalitarian claims.
The discourse of freedom, respect, and emancipation familiar in our traditional universe, rooted in the Enlightenment tradition of rational argumentation, is overlaid by a second language in which the same terms are postmodernly charged and shifted in meaning. These are no longer "culture wars" in the U.S.; they are social and political battles that do not recognize rationality, facts, argumentation, or tolerance. Instead, lies are established as "alternative facts," and both sides relativize all truth. "Cancel culture" and a speech police enforcing "wokeness" sanction deviations from the parallel linguistic level. Criticism of this is then countered with the first, traditional level of language. Those who do not accept "critical race theory," "queer theory," or "gender theory" are summarily denounced as racists, homophobes, or misogynists and, if necessary, silenced.
Academic lectures in Germany and Europe that discuss two biological sexes have already been prevented. In the media, a massive framing effort makes a postmodern claim to truth visible. Criticism of this is complicated by the importance of a "defensive democracy" in light of Germany's past and the justified rejection of Nazi propaganda. However, the situation becomes problematic when every critic of postmodern paradigms is labeled a Nazi, when these critics are excluded from the media, or when statements "below the threshold of criminal law" are denounced to reporting offices and socially sanctioned, even leading to job loss. The words "hate speech" and "delegitimization of the state" are used in ways reminiscent of the laws against "state-hostile agitation" in the GDR. If a large number of people feel that they cannot express their opinions freely, that is an alarming sign. We must be able to counter Nazi propaganda as well as disinformation from all sides—but the way it is done weakens our democracy.
These excesses provide ample ammunition for a rhetorical broadside like the one Vice President Vance delivered in Munich. The election of Donald Trump as U.S. president had much to do with the fact that large parts of the U.S. population were fed up with being patronized by the postmodern elites of the East and West Coasts. "Cancel culture" and the speech police spread fear of expressing one’s opinion.
Trump countered this with a crude language that has always belonged to the "regulars' table" in our culture. The part of the population that some Democrats had denounced as "trash" stood up against this and elected a megalomaniacal, notorious liar as president, surrounded by people ranging from opportunistic sycophants to militant fascists (in the classical sense of the word—not in the broad sense used by Stalin, Putin, and postmodernists to mean any opponent).
For now, these are only "culture wars" in our context. In the U.S., however, they contributed to the Democrats' loss of power and the rise of Trump's revolutionary faction. The outrageous aspect of Vance’s speech is that someone who shamelessly repeats Trump’s lies about the "stolen election" presents himself as a champion of free speech. Our weakness lies in the fact that the necessary defense against disinformation (from Russia, China, and Trump’s U.S.) is visibly restricting our spectrum of opinion through the postmodern approach to truth and freedom of speech.
I stand with those who say: "I do not share your views, but I will fight for your right to express them freely!"
Wars are the ultimate test of power. Diplomacy seeks to avoid such power struggles but only carries weight when the possibility of force looms in the background. Some theorists argue that diplomacy should rely on the strength of better arguments. This should not be dismissed outright, as most international actors perceive their actions as rationally justified. However, great powers often develop the notion that they are not obliged to rationally debate their actions since doubts can always be resolved through the exercise of power. Power means being able to impose one’s will on others. Diplomacy carries only as much weight as the counterpower it possesses or can organize.
Today, power application occurs across a broad (hybrid) spectrum between verbal battles, threats, destabilization, information wars, and sabotage before open military conflict erupts. Even then, there are many escalation levels between cold peace, cold war, localized wars of varying intensity, full-scale wars, and catastrophic wars involving weapons of mass destruction. The distinction between civilian and military means is blurred; self-defense is largely in civilian hands, yet military self-defense also begins with self-protection. Both are only possible if the will to defend exists within the population.
Returning to Ukraine: When President Putin ordered the military invasion of Ukraine, he apparently hoped that the Ukrainian government would quickly capitulate. This possibility was quite "realistic" at the time, given the power imbalance between the Russian nuclear power and the Ukrainian army. Many "realists" in 2022 advised Ukrainians to "submit"—with all the foreseeable negative consequences for freedom and self-determination from Lviv to Kharkiv. Those who demand submission from Ukrainians accept oppression and persecution by Russia.
Only when President Zelensky requested weapons instead of a taxi—and received them—did Putin’s "special operation" become an interstate war. The aggressor seeks to win without a fight, while the defender risks war. This changed the reality. Some "realists" struggled with this. Law and justice were on the side of the Ukrainians, while power and violence were on Putin’s, who was willing to sacrifice the lives and health of many of his soldiers and mercenaries. Since 2022, Ukrainians have been urged by all kinds of experts to be "realistic." However, Zelensky has significantly altered what is considered "realistic." He could only do so because the U.S. and Europe massively supported him with weapons and money. Ukraine alone could not withstand Russia.
Now, President Trump has withdrawn support for Ukraine. This was announced in advance, but many did not want to believe it. Trump wanted a "deal" with Putin over the heads of the Ukrainians—now it is said that Zelensky may participate. Europeans will only be included when it comes time to pay the price—in every respect—for such a policy. When a power, upon which Ukraine’s defense has depended, radically changes its policy, it creates a new "reality." In such a case, no one adapts to reality; rather, reality is reshaped to fit the new ideology.
At the beginning of the war, there was an eerie debate over whether Ukraine could or should "win," or whether it could or should merely "not lose." My sympathies lie with those fighting for their self-determination and freedom; my concern is about encouraging the criminals in the Kremlin to expand further. I have always considered the delivery of weapons to Ukraine necessary. At the same time, I am cautious with any military assessments—others are better suited for that. The only certainty is this: standing on the side of good does not guarantee that good will prevail. Crimes are sometimes rewarded, and dictators and autocrats can indeed win—especially when defenders of law and justice give up, or when former allies can no longer be relied upon. That, too, is part of reality.
Many now argue that Ukraine cannot sustain a war of attrition for much longer, as recruiting soldiers is becoming more difficult. Others believe that Russia is also significantly weakened and is currently gaining ground only because Putin is willing to sacrifice an unlimited number of people. On one side are people treated as mere "human material," while on the other side are those fighting for human dignity, who fundamentally regard every loss as painful and therefore seek to minimize casualties.
The Ukrainians are fighting for their very existence as a people. However, if their most important arms supplier tells them they are fighting for "unrealistic" goals, morale could plummet. It is now up to the Europeans to give the Ukrainians renewed encouragement. This requires a massive effort. Whether Europe is capable of this, I do not know—but I hope for the realization that such an effort, despite its high costs, is necessary to deter an even greater war in Europe.
Putin has long planned to hold out until a possible re-election of Donald Trump as U.S. president. His imperial understanding of great-power relations—similar to the Cold War notion of two "superpowers"—aligns with Trump’s worldview. A bilateral negotiation to establish a new balance of power among the great powers is thus considered a form of "realism." Putin was right: Trump was a reliable and predictable person.
What is unique about this kind of realism is that such thinking does not necessarily stem from existing realities but instead seeks to create new ones. The abandonment of a law-based world order and the declaration of a new power-driven multipolar world (with the "poles" being the U.S., Russia, and China) is meant to intimidate all others into accepting the dictates of the "truly relevant" powers in a "realistic" manner. Putin, Xi, and Trump could easily agree on this. And Europe?
"Realism" in this sense means accepting the all-too-familiar imperialist logic from history. This has always been incompatible with the freedom and self-determination of the smaller neighboring countries of great powers. It is also incompatible with the interests of Europe.
During the Cold War, it was clear that, as a result of Yalta, the sovereignty of the Eastern Bloc states was restricted by Moscow, for example under the Brezhnev Doctrine. In the West, Washington acted as a benevolent hegemon, reacting very cautiously to challenges from sovereign friends like France. Each side respected the other's sphere: the West did not intervene in Budapest or Prague but held its position in Western and Southern Europe, and most notably in West Berlin. This kind of "balance" was glorified by some as political wisdom.
The oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe saw things differently, since they became victims of the balance-of-power politics that was considered the only "realistic" peace policy. Incidentally, before 1989, it was always clear in Germany that "the key to German reunification lay in Moscow."
If the big three powers now wish to return to an imperial logic, urgent questions arise for Europe. First of all: would Europe, organized as the European Union and as the European part of NATO, be able to resist this? Could Europe remain sovereign if Russia and the USA, with China's blessing, were to agree on their respective spheres of influence in Europe? The answer is: YES, but not in the current state of European politics and certainly not with the prevailing naive worldview in Europe.
In the 1960s, French President Charles de Gaulle called for France’s "force de frappe" to ensure defense in all directions, a "défense tous azimuts." At the time, this was considered eccentric because it was clear that the U.S.-led West primarily had to defend itself collectively against the Soviet Union. However, the situation has gradually changed since then.
Since Donald Trump's second term in office, the decline of the previous "West" has been accelerating. And it is up to Europe to build a new West. The fact that Trump is abandoning Ukraine (Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi used the phrase that someone who was "at the table now finds themselves on the plate") cannot be glossed over, even if European politicians naturally try to salvage what can be salvaged. To be clear: I consider every effort to influence the U.S., even a form of wishful thinking, to be legitimate. As a retired diplomat, I can speak plainly. But responsible politicians will need to proceed with caution. Diplomacy is not psychotherapy, but in dealing with psychopaths, a psychological advisor might prove useful.
Vice President Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 14, 2025, was so outrageous that Putin’s 2007 speech at the same venue, in which he announced a new Cold War against the West, seemed almost polite in comparison. Demanding freedom of speech for Nazis should not be accepted. I explicitly emphasize that I consider the German practice of excluding the AfD from media and public discourse rather than challenging them substantively to be fundamentally wrong. Only in the last few weeks has this changed in light of the election campaign, and the AfD can now show for itself that it is not an alternative. However, Vance only demonstrated that he is as ignorant of European history as Elon Musk. He championed Russian disinformation—Europeans should not be so foolish and naive to accept that.
His endorsement of the AfD may have been retaliation for the fact that almost no Germans, and only a few Europeans, refrained from taking a position before the U.S. election—and that position was overwhelmingly against Donald Trump (this applies to me as well—I was realistic enough to expect his re-election, but I was nevertheless stunned that such a man could be elected). Nevertheless, the Vice President’s interference in the German elections went far beyond anything European officials have ever dared to do when on an official visit to the US.
What should be done? Trump has long demanded that Europeans take their defense into their own hands. We should take this seriously, as we are not only losing American guarantees but also gaining a new ideological opponent. Vance’s speech does not stand alone. Trump is rapidly enforcing conformity in the U.S. and dismantling democratic control mechanisms. A transatlantic community of shared values can hardly be said to exist anymore. In facing the U.S. as an ideological and trade policy adversary, Europe must develop economic and military strength—unless we prefer to lick the boots of autocrats, both in Moscow and, in the future, Washington.
The immediate reaction is often: we must respond "prudently." Correct: when someone is irrational, we need not emulate them. A thorough analysis of our own mistakes may be helpful, but there is no reason for self-flagellation.
Looking at the actual power dynamics, it is not "realistic" to provoke unnecessary conflicts based on the motto "many enemies, much honor." While romantic transatlantic bonds may be over, this does not exclude pragmatic, transactional cooperation in Trump's sense. Under these circumstances, other options also arise. If we must collaborate with unpleasant partners for power-political reasons, it also means we should have a choice among different partners. If Trump thinks like Putin or Xi, then we can also engage transactionally with Russia and China.
The key point is that maintaining friendly relations is difficult when the other side openly declares its hostility—sometimes with undertones of outright enmity. Transactional action means: fostering the best possible relationships wherever feasible and building resilience where it is not. Where we are strong, we must assert ourselves; where we are weak, we must pragmatically and, at times, subversively adapt.
As long as the war against Ukraine continues—which for Putin is also a war against Europe—we should welcome all those who stand with us against Putin. This applies particularly to the so-called "Global South." Regarding those who maintain a pro-Russian neutrality, we must respond according to the power dynamics: engaging them where possible but, when necessary, reacting unfavorably, for example, by reducing cooperation.
The question of "guns or butter" will arise: we will need a significantly stronger domestic and European defense industry, we will have to accelerate military research, and we must carefully shield it from competition—also as a bargaining chip for reciprocity. We will need to rearm—and support others in doing so.
Chancellor Olaf Scholz insists that the necessary additional funds must be raised through debt, as cuts alone would not suffice. His opponent Friedrich Merz does not completely reject this idea but initially aims to cut what he considers "waste" in the federal budget. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen suggested in Munich that debt rules within the Eurozone might be relaxed.
A great deal is being shaken up. Fundamentally, increased military spending always competes with other budget priorities. However, it remains unclear which areas will be affected. Every national budget contains controversial, inefficient, or unnecessary expenditures—the Federal Audit Office complains about them year after year. Each budget item has advocates who often follow their hearts more than their heads. It is a leadership task to reflect fundamental political changes in the budget—only then does politics become operational.
The next German government will no longer be able to afford generous NGO funding; these organizations must prove their viability by becoming financially independent of government support. Development aid for the Global South is directly linked to the costs of a war supported by pro-Russian "neutrals." The argument that China would step in is irrelevant as long as recipient countries actively choose us over Russia.
But these cuts alone will not suffice. In a situation requiring clear preparation for a potential defense scenario, loans are a legitimate tool, and a higher level of debt is justified. However, even this has limits. While citizens would not immediately pay additional taxes or face further budget cuts, the eventual debt service will drastically reduce political flexibility. The ECB will have to respond with significantly higher interest rates if it takes its role seriously.
When debt reaches its limits, the question of "butter"—what must be reduced to pay for "guns"—will once again be on the table.
At that point, the social budget, as the largest expenditure, will no longer be untouchable. The SPD might have had a campaign-winning issue with the citizen’s allowance if not for the fact that about 60% of the funds go to newly arrived migrants—this is the primary reason why the program has never been popular, especially since it acts as a pull factor for further illegal migration. But regardless of this, social cuts will become necessary—which, in turn, will make defense efforts unpopular, a dilemma every government will seek to avoid.
The "guns versus butter" dilemma ultimately revolves around strengthening defense so that citizens are not plundered by a victorious enemy in war or even by the threat of war—while ensuring that they do not feel plundered by their own government under the pretext of rearmament.
This problem exists in all European countries. Highly indebted states have less room to maneuver and will quickly find themselves caught in the "guns versus butter" dilemma. A counterbalance could be a defense-driven economic boom, but even this faces limits due to a shortage of qualified and motivated workers.
Despite everything, Europe faces a choice. It can either watch powerlessly and angrily as the great powers consume it while markets and capital increasingly align with politically coercive forces. Or Europe can consolidate its strength and invest in joint projects that benefit everyone—education and training (STEM fields, not gender studies), economic strength and innovation (without fear of AI), military capabilities, and, crucially, resilience against information warfare.
Is that "realistic"? Postmodern thinkers claim that reality is a social construct, shaped by our identity through the power of language—always wielded to exert and abuse power. To some extent, I agree: we do shape reality. But that is not the whole reality. We must recognize and account for the other reality, the objective facts surrounding us. And those facts include the great powers embracing a new imperialism.
Achieving this will require tremendous political effort, as well as financial and labor investments. Postmodern thinking leans toward detachment from reality, discarding truth and scientific rigor. If our necessary efforts are to be realistic, we must approach them soberly and without voluntarism, overcome resistance, and use arguments to find the best possible path forward, in short: with realism. At the same time, time is running out. Political leadership means acting swiftly and boldly while building alliances.