Infrastructure Strategy

20211108 Federation of Ratepayer Associations of NZ - Submission on the Infrastructure Strategy Consultation Document ( authored by Jane Johnston - Chairperson of FoRANZ )

SUBMISSION ON THE NZ INFRASTRUCTURE COMMISSION’S INFRASTRUCTURE STRATEGY CONSULTATION DOCUMENT FROM

FEDERATION OF RATEPAYERS

ASSOCIATION OF NZ INC. SOC.

2^ND JULY 2021

Prepared by the Committee of the Federation of Ratepayers Association of NZ (Inc. Soc.)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. THE FEDERATION OF RATEPAYERS ASSOCIATION OF NZ INC SOC ....................................................3 2. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ................................................................................................................4 3. THE PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION..................................................................................................10 4. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 2002 ...........................................................................................10 5. THE OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE ..........................................................................................................11 6. THE OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL ........................................................................................12 7. THE DEPARTMENT OF PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET ..................................................................12 8. THE NZ INFRASTRUCTURE COMMISSION .......................................................................................13 9. THE BOARD OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE COMMISSION .....................................................................16 10. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................16

Prepared by the Committee of the Federation of Ratepayers Association of NZ (Inc. Soc.)

1. THE FEDERATION OF RATEPAYERS ASSOCIATION OF NZ INC SOC

The Informal or Operative name is NZ Ratepayers Association

The objectives of the Association are to:-

• Establish, facilitate and enable a nation-wide network of ratepayer and resident associations; • Support ratepayers and residents’ associations of New Zealand;

• Prepare and disseminate civics education, and information about the work of local authorities and of Government as it affects ratepayers (for example, in delegating or devolving powers and functions to local authorities);

• Undertake research and otherwise prepare information and advice for ratepayers’ associations about practices in the work of local authorities;

• Provide an advisory service to ratepayers’ associations;

• Distribute information about the work and performance of local authorities;

• Provide a one-stop-shop or repository of information and advice for ratepayers’ associations; • Provide a communications role on behalf of ratepayers’ associations on national matters of relevance to ratepayers;

• Be the national organisation able to pool and share resources and efforts to investigate matters of public interest with regards the functions, powers and work of local authorities (i.e. councils, in their various types).

FoRA NZ would like to highlight for the NZ Infrastructure Commission’s consideration, the important concept of “civics”, which is the study of the rights and obligations of citizens in society. The term derives from the Latin word civicus, meaning "relating to a citizen." Civic(s) education is the study of the theoretical, political and practical aspects of citizenship, as well as its rights and duties. (https://en.wikipedia.org ). And from the Oxford Dictionary: “Civics - the subject that studies the way government works and deals with the rights and duties that you have as a citizen and a member of a particular society.”

It is FoRA NZ’s view that private property owners as Ratepayers are a particular, specific category of ‘citizen’ with specific rights and obligations pursuant to the Rating Act, that ought to give rise to a special ‘stakeholder relationship’ with local authorities (which demand ‘Rates’ from them to fund local infrastructure, local authorities themselves and an array of other functions and services the local government sector provides as devolved to the sector by central Government), as well as with the Infrastructure Commission and central Government itself.

Ratepayers have a special interest in the conduct of the functions and affairs of local government (councils), including the Council Controlled Organisations (CCOs) established to manage significant communal (or public) assets.

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The Committee of FoRA NZ has prepared this submission with the aim of opening a broader conversation with the relatively new New Zealand Infrastructure Commission and with our Government, about how each perceive of private property owners’ rights and obligations, as citizens subject to the provisions of the Rating Act which empowers local authorities to “demand” rates from us.

It must be recognized by the Infrastructure Commission, that it is Ratepayers who fund the operation of councils, and who underwrite all debt incurred by local authorities in planning for, delivering and managing local infrastructure retained by councils (or divested to CCOs, Trusts etc) on our behalf. Central Government is not responsible for local government debt, and hasn’t (in the past), wanted to be as was made very apparent in the case of how Government dealt with the Kaipara District Council’s Mangawhai Sewerage Scheme debacle.

2. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

The Infrastructure Commission has not achieved its ‘main purpose’ which is to coordinate, develop and promote an approach that will encourage infrastructure that improves the wellbeing of New Zealanders.

The NZ Infrastructure Discussion Document does not identify nor evaluate different ‘approaches’ to encouraging infrastructure that improves the wellbeing of New Zealanders. Rather, it has applied a scatter-gun approach to naming a mixed-bag of potential options for dealing with specific infrastructure challenges, none of which are a functional role of the Infrastructure Commission. Each of the aspects targeted by the Commission within this document, fall squarely into the purview of some other agency of Government or of local government (councils).

The discussion document has presented us with an infrastructure-centric ‘vision’ for infrastructure, and a limited and limiting array of ‘outcomes and principles’ purporting to represent what New Zealanders’ wellbeing might consist of in 2050.

The provisioning of/with ‘infrastructure’ is but one means communities have (via their local authorities for example) to provide for their shared interests and to manage progress towards the outcomes they collectively seek (by majority in chambers or in Parliament). It is the case that delay, sequencing, and/or withholding expanded, upgraded or new infrastructure can and often does achieve similarly (i.e. to promote desired outcomes and wellbeing for some community of shared interest). Communities of shared interest at local, district, regional, sub-national and national scales must be central to determining what principals ought to underpin the processes and the outcomes informing a suite of decision-making criteria pertaining to planning for, providing and managing particular infrastructure within (and for) these communities, whether they be servicing property or the residents within these properties (at home, at work or otherwise), depending on the scale and type of infrastructure.

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If the Commission were to investigate challenges for and limitations in strategic planning by central Government agencies and by local councils or authorities and their Council Controlled Organisations (CCOs), it may be that requiring a rapid uptake of the new “Public Service Act 2020” is part of the remedy to what ails us, with respect to national infrastructure planning and delivery. It may be that requiring the State Services Commission to establish “required competencies” for specific types of professional advisors to elected representatives would assist with efficacy in planning for and in delivering infrastructure, as well as establishing “required competencies” for managing infrastructure. It would also be useful to establish an equivalency with respect to the local civic or public service, given the “Public Service Act, 2020” failed to address this significant sector, when it comes to regionally and territorially provided infrastructure.

In attempting to deliver a ‘proposed’ Infrastructure Strategy for NZ, the Commission has highlighted a lack of understanding of the current ‘system’ or approach to managing and providing infrastructure at a national level, at sub-national levels, as well as at regional and or district levels. The establishment of the Commission in itself, was premised on assertions of “systemic” issues; yet this discussion document doesn’t interrogate those assertions or shed light on what gives rise to these systemic issues that might justify transitioning to an alternative approach. Instead, it appears to accept the assumptions, but then launches into a discourse about particular challenges (and opportunities it might be said), within the current situational (and operational) context…. Without actually addressing any of the supposed “systemic” problems built into this context.

The Commission also appears to be duplicating and confounding issues associated with planning for, providing and managing infrastructure (to the right place or people, at the right time, as efficiently and effectively as possible) by the relevant agencies (or local authorities) tasked with these functions. When purposes and functions have been delegated to some national agency of Government, or devolved to some sub-regional Board, or to regional councils or territorial authorities, or transferred to some other state entity – is there any necessity for another national body (such as the Infrastructure Commission) to adopt an informal vision, principles or outcomes to be applied (as some toothless, glib slogan) nationally. Surely, in having delegated or devolved, Government has already determined other scales of operationalizing these purposes and functions is the best idea.

The Commission was not invited to, and so has no mandate, to try to formulate and thence to promote a more centralized or nationalized approach to planning for, providing or managing infrastructure as opposed to what can be efficiently delivered at a local scale. There are other

ways and means for promoting (and working to achieve) best practice, to setting national standards, and for monitoring performance of service providers that do not require a national infrastructure strategy.

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The Commission does not appear to have investigated the experience of other national bodies, attempting to achieve a similar role to that prescribed for InfraCom, but in a different field of endeavor. Perhaps the Commission needed to investigate what worked and hasn’t worked with respect to the Ministry for the Environment (vis a vie Resource Management), or the Department of Internal Affairs (with respect to local government).

FoRA NZ requests the Infrastructure Commission review its efforts to date and reconsider its purpose in light of the legislation that established it. We suggest a rethink is needed, of the useful steps the Commission might take, in contributing to questions of “how might NZ best position itself, and what approach would be best, with respect to developing and managing

physical infrastructure over the next 30 years?” For example, to examine the potential benefits of dispersed or distributed (or remotely accessed serviced) facilities for public services, rather than larger centralized (or regionalized) facilities, reducing the necessity to travel for those needing to access services. Perhaps a mobile teacher, Dr or other clinicians is more efficient than mobilizing those they serve.

In FoRA NZ’s view it is not necessary an appropriate undertaking for the Infrastructure Commission to attempt to produce an “infrastructure strategy” for NZ, when there is a plethora of agencies of Government (central and local) engaging in this very same work, with the specialist knowledge and built for purpose functions and powers to enable them to deliver what is needed with respect to a particular type of infrastructure, when it is needed – if that is what they intend to do, in accordance with the democratically elected ‘governors’ overseeing the work of each agency. Rather than attempting to lead each and all of these agencies, by producing a national infrastructure strategy, perhaps attempting to bring all of the pieces together into a semblance of a puzzle (the bigger picture), and coordinating the pieces being presented together within one frame, so that observers can identify the gaps (what is missing) or where the misfitting pieces are falling, that will not enable integration across the array of infrastructure to provide high performing, or at least functional systems (but may in fact hinder such integration). By way of example, had Government presented such a picture in the past, it would have had a better chance of noticing some of its policies were (cumulatively) creating a ‘housing crisis’.

FoRA NZ wishes to underscore the importance of local, participatory planning and engagement with the directly affected (private) stakeholders (citizen ratepayers and residents) who must make use of and pay for the provision of infrastructure, whether it be provided by public agencies or by private delivery agents. Ratepayers are also those most impacted by poor quality planning for infrastructure and when less than adequate infrastructure services are delivered, particularly when alternatives are not able to be accessed by individuals (i.e. when the provision of services to property rely on a collective-societal response).

There is yet to be any public discourse or engagement with Ratepayers, or disclosure by Government as to what it thinks the demonstrable problems and/or challenges are vis a vie local, regional, sub-national and nationally provided infrastructure.

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We hear statements by commentators, such as “67 is too many territorial authorities” (Minister for Local Government, the Hon. Nanaia Mahuta, July 2021). Allegedly, there are too many water supply systems, too many sewage treatment plants (of varying size and type) and too many councils providing a plethora of localized schemes. This line of thinking would undoubtedly also argue (by logical extension) that there are too many small townships or villages, with too many local roads, pavements, street lights, recreational facilities, parks, libraries, etc.

Yet the Infrastructure Commission has not outlined what it thinks the pressures are, that might lend itself to this sort of commentary, without need for ‘proof’. Should the Minister for Local Government apply the same logic to other ‘societal’ structures. For example, in the Far North District, there is one Territorial Authority with 3 Wards and 3 Community Boards. The elected representatives oversee the provision of 19 potable water treatment plants and reticulated networks, and 17 sewage treatment plants and sewerage networks. However only half of the residents of that District are residing within properties serviced by ‘town-supply’ schemes. Approximately 35,000 (of the 70,000) residents of the Far North District are living within private properties served by private water and waste water schemes, each of which relies in part on access to small town ‘potable water and waste water services’, or access to public facilities and to goods and services within townships (e.g. schools, medical centres, courts, police stations, libraries, recreation facilities etc). There are also over 130 Marae serving Hapu of the Far North District and within the Nga Puhi Rununga rohe. Is 130 Marae too many for the Far North? How can 67 communities of shared interest be too many across the whole of NZ, when there are 130 Marae just in the Far North. Perhaps the Infrastructure Commission could shed light on how the Minister of Infrastructure might perceive of “communities” of shared interest. Currently, most councils make use of targeted rates, to sheet home the costs directly to those property owners considered to benefit, by being connected or able to be via an “availability rate”, to particular local infrastructure.

FoRA NZ suggests that the work of the Local Government Commission is relevant to the Infrastructure Commission. The Local Government Commission has in the past decade, been asked to consider applications for amalgamation by local authorities. Consider the decision of the Commission on the request to form a unitary authority for the Far North, or an amalgamation of the 3 Territorial Authorities and 1 Regional Council of Northland. The fact is, Ratepayers across New Zealand have not been applying for amalgamations, indeed they have tended to do the opposite, and oppose forced amalgamations. The former Rodney District continues to see a significant popular movement seeking to be liberated from the Auckland supercity created by the amalgamation of the former 6 Territorial Authorities and 1 Regional Council serving that area.

The Infrastructure Commission has not looked at how the provision of local infrastructure has changed in the past decade or more. There has been no consideration of what actually did result from requiring councils to tender for private contractors instead of employing their own works’ staff. Did out-sourcing to the private sector see a competitive free market and a reduction in prices, or did it led to increasing dependency on fewer and fewer multi-national suppliers of

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maintenance services, such that now a few are essentially able to set the price? Has the Commission considered a return to the alternative approach, which saw local people with shovels and high vis, and members of the local rugby and league teams getting fit collecting rubbish bags.

Similarly, Government has previously privatized national infrastructure, only to later buy it back and re-nationalise it (e.g. Kiwirail); sold the Bank of NZ – then set up Kiwibank. Which approach to providing certainty, the greatest array of public benefits, stable prices and affordability has proven most efficient and effective? Are these questions relevant to the Infrastructure Commission, because if they are, they were not canvassed in the discussion document.

FoRA NZ does understand there have been localized issues and we are aware of instances of serious events associated with failure of infrastructure, such as the Havelock North contaminated water incident. However, that is an infrequent event given the number and scale of water supply systems across the country, and compared to the increase in food poisoning within NZ that led to the review of the previous Food Act, in favor of a very different approach to public safety with respect to managing and providing food, as outlined in the new Food Act, 2014. When pipes burst in small towns, it is not the crises akin to water mains bursting in central Wellington. It is a legitimate and rational asset management approach, in smaller communities, to “sweat the asset” or to allow pipes to age to a point of a certain frequency of ‘leaks’ (burst pipes) per set length of pipe, and running repairs prior to proceeding to replace that length or all of the network. Aging infrastructure is not in and of itself an issue, but a part of managing inground infrastructure.

We must also note however, that we have a vast experience of renewals and upgrades, having provided timely maintenance and able to cater to rapid growth and development, just as much as we have experience of inordinate delays in securing higher levels of service, renewals and upgrades. The later tend to be a feature of politics. There are success stories, where upgrades and expanded infrastructure is delivered on time to avert problems and to cater to growth in demand. The success stories tend to not make the news however. This presents a biased perspective on systemic problems within the current ‘approach’ to providing and maintaining infrastructure within New Zealand. New Zealand has grown rapidly, not only in the past 20yrs, but in the previous century and even in the century prior (relatively speaking). It did so, with some excellent examples of central planning, but also by and large with localized planning and funding. What is failing in New Zealand’s approach, has, in our view, not been adequately investigated within the InfraCom’s discussion document.

FoRA NZ is yet to see strong, impartial evidence of the systemic failures often alluded to or as stated in various reports to government. The Infrastructure Commission ought to consider who is authoring these reports, and whose interests are being served. For example, reports by Infrastructure New Zealand, and even Local Government New Zealand’s “CouncilMark” initiative, which have failed to facilitate any external review or participation in performance monitoring by local Ratepayers’ Associations, within the assessment process. That ‘quality’ or ‘performance

Prepared by the Committee of the Federation of Ratepayers Association of NZ (Inc. Soc.)

monitoring’ programme is more self-evaluation, than it is community or ratepayer (customer) focused… the outcomes CouncilMark seeks to illuminate are not community outcomes, but are about organizational ones.

In FoRA NZ’s view, the proposed Infrastructure Strategy is remiss in neglecting participatory processes with communities of interest to any infrastructure, as the consumers/users of infrastructure, but also as those who must fund it. The proposed outcomes and principles are silent on concepts associated with participatory planning, engagement and consultation. Transparency is not a substitute for inclusive approaches. And democracy as represented by a triennial election is not adequate as a substitute for accountability associated with the required processes prescribed within the Local Government Act, the Resource Management Act and the Local Government Official Information and Meeting Act (and the Rating Act). We ask, will the Infrastructure Commission look at other approaches to promoting (and ensuring) transparency, ratepayer inclusion, engagement, and accountability – between triennial election cycles.

Therefore, FoRA NZ also wishes to underscore the importance of democracy to FoRA NZ, and the principles underpinning it in practice (e.g. that enable participatory processes), at all levels of government. An issue causing conflict in local communities currently, has been the erosion of democracy (premised on principles of transparency, equity, accountability, inclusion, etc) and of opportunities to engage with developers when significant communal assets have been transferred to Council Controlled Organisations, or divested to (placed with) other unelected entities (Community Trusts). We ask that you look at the mis-use of reasons to withhold information from the public (under the “Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act”), to have “public excluded” items on Council agenda (and in Board meetings when dealing with public assets), the use of closed workshops where staff can wield expert power as a form of political influence they are not entitled to, without correction by an observant public.

FoRA NZ had not participated in the process as undertaken by the NZ Infrastructure Commission to date, that included a survey within “Our Aotearoa 2050” covering issues the Commission had classified as “Getting Around”, “Getting Ahead” and “Getting Ready”. Rather, we were as interested in the results as the Infrastructure Commission. We suggest that the use of this type of survey was, again, not a clean slate investigation as to ‘what are the issues’ as experienced by communities of Ratepayers (or other clusters of customers/citizens), but served to reinforce the well-published commentaries about what key ‘influencers’ of public opinion tell us are the issues. For example, you have asked if it takes “too long” to get around a city. Yet so many people clearly choose to continue to live, work and play where they do, and choose whatever mode of travel they take to get about. It might be said that if anyone really thought their travel is “too long” they would choose to do something differently, would not make the trip, or be supporting alternative solutions to avoid travel-time-distance issues. How long is “too long” was not established at the outset. In our view, what might be considered “too long” is completely context dependent.

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3. THE PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION

FoRA NZ wishes to note the establishment of a NZ Productivity Commission a decade ago. The “NZ Productivity Commission Act 2010” provides its principal purpose is “to provide advice to the Government on improving productivity in a way that is directed to supporting the overall well being of New Zealanders, having regard to a wide range of communities of interest and population groups in New Zealand society” (S7 - Purpose of the [Productivity] Commission).

That Commission has undertaken several inquiries and provided ‘insights’ into the local government sector, some of which are referenced in Section 9 of the Infrastructure Strategy Discussion Document. It has also undertaken an inquiry into ‘housing affordability’, and other sectors where certain ‘physical infrastructure’ is provided by private investment decisions. It does not appear to have investigated the productivity of national infrastructure providers, such as Government agencies (e.g. Ministry of Education, Ministry of Justice, Department of Corrections, Ministry of Health), as well as State Entities (e.g. NZTA) and S.o.E.s (e.g. Transpower), or the productivity of private enterprise (e.g. the telecommunication companies, electricity, gas and oil retailers). It must also be acknowledged that there are other authorities at national level with a role in infrastructure, such as the Electricity Authority (formerly, Electricity Commission, 2010).

The current relationship between the Infrastructure Commission and these other actors has not been explained within your discussion document, nor have any ideas for improving the functional inter-relationships or ‘cross-overs’ where information ought to be shared across different actors at a national level. FoRA NZ suggests effort to outline the character of these relationships, any cross-cutting questions (or issues) and any gaps as information gatherers and advisors to Government, would be a worthwhile undertaking for the Infrastructure Commission tasked with considering NZ’s approach to infrastructure.

4. THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 2002

FoRA NZ also wishes to note, for your consideration, the Purpose of the Local Government Act 2002, as amended in 2019.

“The purpose of this Act is to provide for democratic and effective local government that recognises the diversity of New Zealand communities; and, to that end, this Act—

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(a) states the purpose of local government; and

(b) provides a framework and powers for local authorities to decide which activities they undertake and the manner in which they will undertake them; and

(c) promotes the accountability of local authorities to their communities; and

(d) provides for local authorities to play a broad role in promoting the social, economic, environmental, and cultural well-being of their communities, taking a sustainable development approach.”

Section 3(d): replaced, on 14 May 2019, by section 4 of the Local Government (Community Well-being) Amendment Act 2019 (2019 No 17).

This purpose statement replaced an amendment made less than a decade earlier by the former National Party coalition Government led by the Rt. Hon. John Key, which had provided the following

S3 Purpose – “The purpose of this Act is to provide for democratic and effective local government that recognises the diversity of New Zealand communities; and, to that end, this Act—

(a) states the purpose of local government; and

(b) provides a framework and powers for local authorities to decide which activities they undertake and the manner in which they will undertake them; and

(c) promotes the accountability of local authorities to their communities; and

(d) provides for local authorities to play a broad role in meeting the current and future needs of their communities for good-quality local infrastructure, local public services, and performance of regulatory functions.” (Emphasis added)

Section 3(d): replaced, on 5 December 2012, by section 4 of the Local Government Act 2002 Amendment Act 2012 (2012 No 93).

It is FoRA NZ’s position that any inquiry into possible approaches to planning for, providing and management of local infrastructure (servicing private and community property) ought to be cognisant of the important stake ratepayers have in local democracy and in their local councils (as private property owners who fund these and their activities). We are only now, gearing up to bring a national voice to any proposals for reformation of the local government sector. FoRA NZ wishes to remind InfraCom not to overreach its functional role.

5. THE OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE

The Ombudsman's primary role is to investigate complaints against government agencies, including local authorities. FoRA NZ wishes to highlight a significant underfunding (lack of resources) and limited powers available to this office when it comes to investigating and responding to complaints against government agencies vis a vie their planning for, provision of and management of essential infrastructure, serving local communities.

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FoRA NZ suggests this Office needs to be adequately resourced to provide for more timely investigation of complaints. We also request a review of the functions and powers of this Office, to provide it with an ability to make adequate redress in the event a complaint is upheld.

6. THE OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL

The Controller and Auditor-General is an Officer of Parliament. This means he/she is independent of the Government and can't be directed by whichever political party is holding power. The Auditor-General has two business units – the Office of the Auditor-General and Audit New Zealand. Together, these offices (purportedly) work to give Parliament and the public an independent view of how public organisations are operating. That independence, along with watching the spending, is why the Auditor-General is sometimes called “the public's watchdog” (according to that Office’s website).

There are about 3400 public organisations, including, for example, government departments, State-Owned Enterprises (SoEs), Crown research institutes, the defence forces, district health boards, city and district councils and the subsidiary companies they own, ports, schools, universities, polytechnics, and wānanga. Collectively, those organisations are managing about $150 billion of public money (money that comes from the taxes and rates that New Zealanders pay), according to the Office of the Auditor General’s website.

FoRA NZ suggests that the role of the Office of the Auditor General needs to be reviewed, with an aim of expanding its mandate to provide for an ability to evaluate the efficacy (or productivity) of Government agencies and councils, and to evaluate the efficacy and quality of operational decision-making (as distinct to Governance), of both central and local government agencies and entities.

Similarly, we have been disappointed by the approach taken by the Serious Fraud Office, brought in to investigate the Far North District Council (for example) given serious irregularities by that local authority which had “demanded” significant sums from Ratepayers for the provision of a new water supply (for Kaitaia) that never materialized and the money went unaccounted for (a lack of transparency as to how spent). FoRA NZ suggests there is a role for the SFO to investigate ‘fraud’ perpetuated against communities of Ratepayers by a local authority, when it doesn’t deliver what it has taken via ‘Rates demands’ to deliver. Particularly as Ratepayers have no rights under the “Consumer Gaurantees Act, 1994”. Perhaps that should also be remedied. When promised “levels of service” fail to be achieved, perhaps Ratepayers ought to be refunded part of what they have been made to pay for these services.

7. THE DEPARTMENT OF PRIME MINISTER AND CABINET

The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) occupies a unique position at the centre of New Zealand's system of democratic government. Its purpose, according to its current website

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is to advance an ambitious, resilient and well-governed New Zealand. DPMC's overall area of responsibility is in helping to provide, at an administrative level, the 'constitutional and institutional glue' that underlies our system of parliamentary democracy.

Ensuring that executive government functions well requires the DPMC to maintain close relationships of trust and confidence with the Governor-General, the Prime Minister and Cabinet. As the number of Ministerial portfolios has grown, the role and functions of the DPMC has grown, as have the responsibilities of DPMC within each Ministry. DPMC now serves Ministers with responsibilities relating to national security, risk and resilience, the regeneration of greater Christchurch, as well as for “infrastructure” and “urban development”.

It is not apparent to FoRA NZ, just how the Infrastructure Commission’s Infrastructure Strategy’s proposed “Vision”, “Outcomes and Principles”, “Action Areas [vis a vie ‘building a better future’, ‘enabling competitive cities and regions’ and ‘creating a better system’], and “Proposed Priorities

[for physical infrastructure]” might be reconciled against the elected Members of Parliament party manifestos and consequent work as Ministers and within Cabinet. It appears to us that the Infrastructure Commission is competing with registered political parties, in proposing an alternative ideology and manifesto, but without any pesky party members and general or local body elections.

Similarly, FoRA NZ is watching the Reserve Bank with interest, as it leads a public discussion about the prospect of a ‘cashless society’. We are keen to see what advice this institution provides to InfraCom on the issues and other matters you have focused on within the Discussion Document. We are also looking forward to the advice of Treasury, with respect to not only recovery from COVID impacts, and transitioning to a more resilient nation with respect to not only climate change (as well as in trying to mitigate our influence on climate change), but in light of other risks or threats to our modus operandi or approach to infrastructure and with respect to our economy (e.g. such as a potential change in policy by the Chinese Communist Party with respect to trade with NZ or with Australia etc).

8. THE NZ INFRASTRUCTURE COMMISSION

The “NZ Infrastructure Commission/Te Waihanga Act 2019” provides in S9 that “The main function of the Commission is to co-ordinate, develop, and promote an approach to infrastructure that encourages infrastructure, and services that result from the infrastructure, that improve the well-being of New Zealanders.” (Emphasis added)

Further to that, S10 provides for additional functions of the Commission as follows: “Strategy and planning functions

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(a) to develop broad public agreement on the approach under section 9 and the strategy reports provided under subpart 3:

(b) to provide advice in relation to infrastructure, including (without limitation) advice in relation to—

(i) the ability of existing infrastructure to meet community expectations; and

(ii) current and future infrastructure needs; and

(iii) the priorities for infrastructure; and

(iv) matters that prevent, limit, or promote the efficient and effective delivery of infrastructure, and services that result from the infrastructure:

(c) to provide reports in accordance with subparts 3 and 4;

Support functions

(d) to promote a strategic and coordinated approach to the delivery of current and proposed infrastructure projects:

(e) to provide and co-ordinate information about current and proposed infrastructure projects: (f) to provide support services to current and proposed infrastructure projects.” (emphasis added)

FoRA NZ suggests that the Commission has failed to deliver against its ‘main function’ under this Act, in having presented a discussion document on a proposed Infrastructure Strategy for NZ in which it has failed to account for:-

1. the civic rights and duties or obligations of citizens within NZ, as consumers or clients of infrastructure and related infrastructure services within NZ (as distinct to the preferences or choices of customers in foreign markets for NZ exports), and particularly as ratepayers who (indirectly, through councils) are compelled to pay for multi-national contractors to local authorities, as well as national (and less often, local) contractors to deliver and/or manage community assets (infrastructure servicing our private properties) and community facilities for residents’ use;

2. the rights and obligations of all who own property within NZ (i.e Ratepayers) reliant on infrastructure services to property, who are faced with compulsory payments (as Rate “Demands”);

3. the responsibilities of the Crown and its agencies of Government (which also make use of infrastructure services) with respect to representation of citizens in our democracy; 4. the array of regulatory frameworks associated with existing infrastructure assets both public and private, that contribute to ‘the system’ such as it represents “an approach” to infrastructure.

This Infrastructure Strategy has failed to provide an outline of the array of tools currently utilized by local authorities and Government agencies to manage infrastructure. We observe that such tools range from the use of NZ Standards, to National Policy Statements and National Environmental Standards (under the RMA 1991), Engineering Standards, and local Bylaws (formulated under the Local Government Act, 2002).

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Indeed this Infrastructure Strategy has not provided a cursory account of the existing approach to managing and provisioning NZ with (physical) infrastructure, nor any accounting for the various changes made (i.e. various approaches) over the previous 3 decades of change.

There have been serious revisions of the approaches taken over the past 3 decades. New Zealand has seen a move away from public ownership to the establishment of State-Owned Enterprises (SoEs) and eventual divestment (privatization rather than devolution to regional entities) of some essential infrastructure. We have seen the establishment of Local Authority Trading Enterprises (LATEs), later revised to Council Controlled Organisations (CCOs) who are governed by appointed boards. There has also been a shifting focus of the purpose of local government, and a move to encourage ‘shared-services’ between local authorities. The later has seen the establishment of regional hubs, in which a number of neighboring territorial authorities, a regional council and in the case of the Northland Transport Hub, the NZTA have co-located within offices to enable closer collaboration and to achieve efficiencies.

Local Government New Zealand is an example of a national hub – providing shared service on behalf of all local authorities (if not the ratepaying public who fund them). There is nothing to prevent the sector from organizing itself into groups of like, to establish other shared service hubs, without necessitating any significant reform of the sector. Such hubs do not have to be based on proximity (as in the Northland Transport Hub, where adjacent neighbours agreed to cluster together), they can be based on character (as in metro, regional, provincial, for example). Just as Government can establish a ‘procurement’ body to bulk purchase on behalf of all central Government agencies (as it did with Fuji-Xerox for example), look to remove barriers to local authorities self-organising to secure efficiencies in how they perform their function. Councils had already done this, when they established Civic Assurance decades ago. And did so again more recently, in establishing the NZ Local Government Funding Agency, that each local authority can choose to opt in to (or not).

That councils were compelled (by Government) to tender and use private contractors to deliver and manage infrastructure, rather than continue to use employees must be investigated by the Infrastructure Commission, as to the array of consequences of this approach.

There has also been only a recent requirement upon the local government sector, to formulate 30-year infrastructure strategies for their jurisdiction. The first of these were being produced in 2014-2015, as part of Long-Term Planning 2015-2025 (LTPs outline a 10 year prospective work programme and budgets). Councils have only just completed their 3^rd review of these 30-year

infrastructure strategies (and LTPs). Yet the Infrastructure Commission’s Strategy has not demonstrated any cognizance of the relevance of these regional, unitary, district and city council strategies, in that there appears to have been no effort to see how these pieces fit together as a national puzzle of planning for, delivery of and management of local infrastructure.

Prepared by the Committee of the Federation of Ratepayers Association of NZ (Inc. Soc.)

FoRA NZ suggests that the NZ Infrastructure Commission has over-reached its ‘additional functions’ as provided for in the Act that establishes this Crown Entity. In doing so, the ratepayers of NZ, within communities of shared interest (e.g. as reflected by the frequent use of Targeted Rates) have not been recognized as stakeholders and partners with local authorities that they are, in the provision of infrastructure.

That multi-national contractors are referred to as “partners” with councils and by Government, in literature discussing potential reforms of the sector (for example, to consolidate our 3-waters infrastructure into larger super-regional entities) is a concern to ratepayers. We consider ratepayers to be the partners of councils, and that councils serve us – not the other way around. The many corporates who might wish to work for us (or provide services to us), must understand that ratepayers are the paying client (the customer, and councils are our broker), and so we must continue to have an ability to say “no” or “yes” to whatever they or our local authority is suggesting for us, and not only at the polls at election time.

9. THE BOARD OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE COMMISSION

FoRA NZ is not convinced that the Board as currently constructed is competent to deliver the purpose of the Infrastructure Commission. It is concerning to us that the Board and whomever is advising it appears to be suffering from “group-think”. It is apparent to us that the discussion document has glaring information gaps, is focused on a narrow array of purported issues as though they are the driving influences or determinants of what is and isn’t provided for as ‘infrastructure’ in New Zealand. For example, there appears to be assumptions in play, that are contestable, and which ought to be the substantive matters for discussion on “an approach” to infrastructure.

The discussion document appears to assume ‘more of the same’ when considering future rates of population growth, future infrastructure cost pressures, future modes of delivery – other than apparently already accepting significant changes to the mode of deliver for so-called “3 Waters” Infrastructure. The approach to delivering and managing infrastructure needs to be ‘decoupled’ from assumptions (which we assert must be subject to change over time) about population growth, population structure, future technologies we may choose to utilize, and various other objectives of Government (e.g. to do with climate change adaptation or mitigation, resilience or otherwise). The approach ought to be robust enough to accommodate whatever situational contexts arise, otherwise it risks putting the cart before the horse. Infrastructure is not THE foundation, but is one aspect of a society meeting its collective needs or working for agreed outcomes.

10. CONCLUSION

FoRA NZ has not responded to the 36 specific questions outlined in the Discussion Document.

Prepared by the Committee of the Federation of Ratepayers Association of NZ (Inc. Soc.)

We chose not to because we don’t think it appropriate that the Infrastructure Commission lead such a scatter-gun consultation exercise, on an array of very important questions needing to be considered by ratepayers.

Many of the questions asked are on topics which are the specific domain of other agencies with delegated functions, powers and responsibilities or which are matters for political debate. Many of these questions ought not be answered ‘off the cuff’, in an absence of relevant information to inform those being asked to respond.

The discussion document does not provide sufficient information and evaluation of the merits (or otherwise) of different options as choices as to ‘approaches’ to providing infrastructure.