Stare Decisis

Held,

Having regard to the volume of work demanding the attention of the court, it has been found necessary in India as a general rule of practice and convenience that the court should sit in Divisions, each Division being constituted of judges whose number may be determined by the exigencies of judicial need, by the nature of the case including any statutory mandate relative thereto, and by such other considerations which the Chief Justice, in whom such authority devolves by convention, may find most appropriate. It is in order to guard against the possibility of inconsistent decisions on points of law by different Division Benches that the rule has been envolved in order to promote consistency and certainly in the development of the law and its contemporary status, that the statement of the law by a Division Bench is considered binding on a Division Bench of the same or lesser number of judges. This principles has been followed in India for several generations by judges. We may refer to a few of the recent cases on the point. In John Martin v. State of West Bengal ((1975) 3 SCC 836 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 255 : (1975) 3 SCR 211), a Division Bench of three judges found it right to follow the law declared in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal ((1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816 : (1975) 1 SCR 778), decided by a Division Bench of five judges, in preference to Bhut Nath Mate v. State of West Bengal, ((1974) 1 SCC 645 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 300 : AIR 1974 SC 806), decided by a Division Bench of two judges. Again, in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain (1975 Supp SCC 1 : (1976) 2 SCR 347), Beg J. held that the Constitution Bench of five judges was bound by the Constitution Bench of thirteen judges in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadakalavaru v. State of Kerala ((1973) 4 SCC 225 : 1973 Supp SCR 1)4 SCC 225 : 1973 Supp SCR 1)4 SCC 225 : 1973 Supp SCR 1)4 SCC225 : 1973 Supp SCR 1). In Ganapati Sitaram Balvalkar v. Waman Shripad Mage ((1981) 4 SCC143) this court expressly stated that the view taken on a point of law by a Division Bench of four judges of this court was binding on a Division Bench of three judges of the court. And in Mattulal v. Radhe Lal ((1974) 2 SCC 365 : (1975) 1 SCR 127), this court specifically observed that where the view expressed by two different Division Benches of this court could not be reconciled, the pronouncement of a Division Bench of a larger number of judges had to be preferred to the decision of a Division Bench of a smaller number of judges. This court also laid down in Acharya Maharaj Shri Narendra Prasadji Anandprasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat ((1975) 1 SCC 11 : (1975) 2 SCR 317), that even where the strength of two differing Division Benches consisted of the same number of judges, it was not open to one Division Bench to decide the correctness or otherwise of the views of the other. The principle was reaffirmed in Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. ((1985) 4 SCC 369 : 1986 SCC (Tax) 11). Which noted that a Division Bench of two judges of this court in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana, ((1981) 1 SCC 11 : (1980) 3 SCR 689) had differed from the view taken by an earlier Division Bench of two judges in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U. P. ((1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144 : (1979) 2 SCR 641), on the point whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel could be defeated by invoking the defence of executive necessity, and, holding that to do so was wholly unacceptable, reference was made to the well accepted and desirable practice of the later Bench referring the case to a larger Bench when the learned judges from that the situation called for such reference.