Under Section 47 of the Code of Civil procedure, the main plea raised by the revision petition/judgment debtor was that the suit for specific performance filed by the decree holder was bad for want of impleadment of the necessary party namely, the Bank Manager. Ex facie and prima facie the said plea is not tenable under law and prima facie the said Bank Manager with whom the judgment debtor had some transaction is having nothing to do with specific performance suit. Hence, there is nothing wrong in the order passed by the lower Court. It is not that in all cases blindly, the Court is expected to number application filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and deal with it; if prima facie, no case is made out, then the lower Courts are not enjoined to mechanically number it and waste its judicial time. (A. L. Helan Christina Mary v. Sivaganesh; AIR 2012 Mad 249)

The Court is of the view that, in the present case, section 47, CPC, application made by the respondents herein was totally misconceived. It was not maintainable. The Executing Court had no authority to set aside, modify or vary the consent decree. Clause K makes the valuation by Ernst and Young final and binding on the disputing parties. If, according to the respondents, the opinion of the valuer was tainted, biased or that they had failed to do their duty as a valuer, then appropriate proceedings ought to have been taken by the respondents either for setting aside or modifying the consent decree before the Competent Court but not in the Executing Court which has no power to set aside, modify or vary the decree. It was not open to the respondents to move under section 47, CPC for the relief, namely, to have the valuation report set aside as that would amount to virtually setting aside a portion of the consent decree which, as stated above, constituted very core and the basis of the consent decree. In the opinion of the court, without going into the merits of the matter, we hold that section 47, CPC application made by the respondents was not maintainable and ought not to have been entertained by the Executing Court.

2008 SCeJ 004 M/s. Premium Exchange and Finance Ltd.; 2009(106) RD 516

The validity of the attachment proceedings was not raised by the defendants in his objections under Section 47 nor any objection was filed by the defendants under Order XXI, Rule 58 CPC. It transpires that the defendants raised this ground for the first time in the revision which, in the opinion of the court, could not be allowed to be raised for the first time in a revision. In M/s. Gangotri Sahkari Avas Samiti Ltd., Allahabad v. Smt. Usha Mukherji and others; 2002 (20) LCD 284, the court held that a point raised in the revision for the first time, which not raised in the objection under Section 47, could not be raised in the revision nor can it be decided by the revisional court. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case of Khajan Singh (d) By LRs v. Gurbhajan Singh and others; AIR 2007 SC 2941: 2007 (3) AWC 3158 (SC), has held that the revisional court has a limited jurisdiction and the exercise of the revisional power could be exercised on limited grounds and that the appreciation of evidence on the basis of material brought on record was within the domain of the executing court and that the revisional court could not interfere in a finding of fact.

2008 SCeJ 005 (All.) Shobha Kant Chaturvedi v. Hon’ble the Addl. District Judge 2nd, Etawah Court (U.P.) (Revisioning Court) and Others; 2009(1) AWC 568