Precedent - Law of Precedent

Precedents are not to be read as a statute

Law of Precedent

“Judges interpret words of statutes. Their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.”

The Courts should not place reliance on the decisions without discussing as to how the situation fits in with the factual situation. Circumstantial flexibility, one addition or a different fact, makes a difference between conclusions in two cases.

Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda (2004) 3 SCC 75;

Haryana Financial Corporation v. Jagdamba Oil Mills (2002)130 PLR 475 (SC)

Judgments are not to be construed like Euclid’s theorems - All observations made therein must relate to the context in which they were made.

Obviously therefore, an observation of this Court torn out of its context cannot be said to conclude the issue that is now before us.

2021 SCeJ 249 CHINTELS INDIA LTD. Versus BHAYANA BUILDERS PVT. LTD.

All observations made therein must relate to the context in which they were made.

“10. There is one other significant sentence in Sreenivasa General Traders v. State of A.P [(1983) 4 SCC 353] with which we must express our agreement, it was said:

“With utmost respect, these observations of the learned Judge are not to be read as Euclid's theorems, nor as provisions of a statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear.”

We consider it proper to say, as we have already said in other cases, that judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.

In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [1951 AC 737, 761] Lord MacDermott observed:

“The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge....

In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [(1970) 2 All ER 294] Lord Reid said:

“Lord Atkin's speech [Donoghue v. Stevension, 1932 All ER Rep 1, 11] is not to be treated as if it was a statutory definition.

It will require qualification in new circumstances.”

Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed:

“One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament.”

And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board [1972 AC 877 (HL)] Lord Morris said:

“There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.”

There are a few other observations in Kewal Krishan Puri case [(1980) 1 SCC 416] to which apply with the same force all that we have said above. It is needless to repeat the oft-quoted truism of Lord Halsbury that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not for what may seem to follow logically from it.”

Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab (1985) 1 SCC 345) referred in

2021 SCeJ 249 CHINTELS INDIA LTD. Versus BHAYANA BUILDERS PVT. LTD.

Judges interpret words of statutes. Their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.

This Court has held that Judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes, neither are they to be read as Euclid’s theorems. All observations made must be read in the context in which they appear. This Court in Amrit Lal Manchanda, (2004) 3 SCC 75 held as follows:

“Judges interpret words of statutes. Their words are not to be interpreted as statutes.”

Judgments must be read as a whole, so that conflicting parts may be harmonized to reveal the true ratio of the Judgment. However, if this is not possible, and it is found that the internal conflicts within the Judgment cannot be resolved, then the first endeavour that must be made is to see whether a ratio decidendi can be culled out without the conflicting portion. If not, then, as held by Lord Denning in Harper v. National Coal Board, (1974) 2 All ER 441 the binding nature of the precedents on the point on which there is a conflict in a Judgment, comes under a cloud.”

BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., [Civil Appeal No. 9307 of 2019].