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When the words of legislation are plain and unambiguous, effect must be given to them
When the words of legislation are plain and unambiguous, effect must be given to them
The golden rule of construction is that when the words of legislation are plain and unambiguous, effect must be given to them. The basic principle on which this rule is based since the words must have spoken as clearly to legislatures, as to judges, it may be safely presumed that the legislature intended what the words plainly say. The legislative intent of the enactment may be gathered from several sources which is, from the statute itself, from the preamble to the statute, from the statement of objects and reasons, from the legislative debates, reports of committees and commissions which preceded the legislation and finally from all legitimate and admissible sources from where they may be allowed. Record may be had from legislative history and latest legislation also.
Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini (2005)12 SCC 778
Procedural laws are to be liberally construed laws are to be liberally construed and this is more so when it is an enabling provision.
Procedural laws are to be liberally construed laws are to be liberally construed and this is more so when it is an enabling provision.
This authoritative exposition of law (1960 SCeJ 001) clearly shows that in matters of suits on behalf of firm, the provisions of Order 30 are ample and conclusive, Rule 4 of Order 30 specifically deals with right of suit on death of a partner and opens by a non obstinate clause expressly excepting Section 45 of the Contract Act. It is further enabling in nature and clearly shows that where two or more persons are enabled to sue or can be sued in the name of a firm under the provisions of Order 30 and any one of them dies whether before institution or during the pendency to join the legal representatives of the deceased as a party to the suit. Sub-rule (2) does not however affect or limit the right of the legal representatives of the deceased to apply to be made a party to a suit for enforcing their claim against the survivor or survivors. Once it is shown that a suit is on behalf of a firm, it is equally a suit under Order 30 itself and it is plain that the terms "suits" will also include the term "appeal", the same being continuation of the suit. The procedural laws are to be liberally construed laws are to be liberally construed and this is more so when it is an enabling provision. It appears from the very scheme of Order 30, and particularly of \rule 4, that it did away with the necessity of impleading the legal representatives of the deceased partner in express terms, and avoiding abatements of the partnership causes in Court. It is perfectly possible to see the object underlying the provision and that is to enable the enforcement of the firm-obligation without least complications. Otherwise the partners who have brought the suit properly would be visited with penalty of facing an abatement of the action only for legal representatives are not brought on record. It is conceivable that such a partner may not be knowing at all, all the legal representatives or there may be various difficulties in bringing all of them on record and in law can be treated as best representing interest of the deceased partner. To attract Rule 4 the action needs be in the name of the persons collectively, called "firm". The words "where two or more persons may sue or be sued in the name of a firm", under the foregoing provisions, indicate that the suit may be by a person or partner on behalf of the firm for enforcing the firm-obligations. it would bristle with technicality to say that the suit must be in the name of a firm. Even a suit properly laid for the firm by the authorized partner is well within the terms of Rule 4. The terms of this rule being permissive in nature I am not inclined to impose or imply any technicality in its construction.
1973 SCeJ 001 (Bom.) Godavari Pravara Canal ... vs Krishnarao AIR 1974 Bom 52
Where the language is ambiguous or capable of more than one meaning
Where the language is ambiguous or capable of more than one meaning
Towards interpreting statutes, the Court must endeavour to see its legislative intendment. Where the language is ambiguous or capable of more than one meaning, the Court must sympathetically and imaginatively discover the true purpose and object of the provision by filling gaps, clearing doubts, and mitigating hardships, harshness or unfair consequences.
Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jadavji Keshavji Modi, (1981)4 SCC 660 (Paras 14 to 16).
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