Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (26 of 1881) – S. 138, 139 - Accused has admitted issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was issued for the second time, after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even according to the accused some amount was due and payable - Presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability is rebuttable in nature - However, to rebut the presumption the accused was required to lead the evidence that full amount due and payable to the complainant has been paid - No such evidence has been led by accused - Story put forward by the accused that the cheques were given by way of security is not believable in absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption and more particularly the cheque in question was issued for the second time, after the earlier cheques were dishonoured - Both the courts below have materially erred in not properly appreciating and considering the presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the N.I. Act. – Courts below have committed error in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act. – Accused convicted. #2020 SCeJ 45
Section 139 of the Act provides that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.Kumar Exports vs. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513
See Presumption
Applying the definition of the word "proved" in Section 3 of the Evidence Act to the provisions of Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, it becomes evident that in a trial under Section 138 of the Act a presumption will have to be made that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration and that it was executed for discharge of debt or liability once the execution of negotiable instrument is either proved or admitted. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to prove that the instrument, say a note, was executed by the accused, the rules of presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act help him shift the burden on the accused. The presumptions will live, exist and survive and shall end only when the contrary is proved by the accused, that is, the cheque was not issued for consideration and in discharge of any debt or liability. A presumption is not in itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie case for a party for whose benefit it exists. The use of the phrase "until the contrary is proved" in Section 118 of the Act and use of the words "unless the contrary is proved" in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of "may presume" and "shall presume" as given in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that presumptions to be raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over..
Kumar Exports vs. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513 referred in #2020 SCeJ 45