465. Punishment for Forgery.—Whoever commits forgery shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
To constitute fraud there must be “deceit” or injury to the deceived or advantage to the deceiver or both —Appeal Allowed: Conviction set aside.
Vimla v Delhi Administration, AIR 1963 SC 1572 : 1963 Supp (2) SCR 585
The appellant purchased an Austin 10 HP car in the name of her minor daughter Nalini and got the insurance policy transferred in Nalini’s name. Subsequently, the car met with accidents on two occasions and therefore, the appellant filed two claims against the insurance company. In connection with these claims, the appellant signed the claim forms as Nalini and also the receipts acknowledging the payments of the compensation money as Nalini. On these facts the appellant was prosecuted under section 467 on a complaint made by the insurance company alleging fraud on the appellant’s part. The trial court acquitted her, but on appeal, the High Court set aside the order of acquittal and convicted her of forgery under section 467, IPC. The appellant filed a appeal to the Supreme Court.
The definition of “false document” is a part of the definition of “forger”. Both must be read together. If so read, the ingredients of the offence of forgery relevant to the present enquiry are as follows: (1) fraudulently signing a document or a part of a document with an intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document was signed by another or under his authority; (2) making of such a document with an intention to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed. In the two definitions, both mens rea described in section 464, namely, “fraudulently” and “the intention to commit fraud” in section 463 have the same meaning. This redundancy has perhaps become necessary, as the element of fraud is not the ingredient of other intentions mentioned in section 463. The idea of deceit is a necessary ingredient of fraud, but it does not exhaust it, an additional element is implicit in the expression ... the second thing to be noticed is that in section 464, two adverbs, “dishonestly” and “fraudulently” are used alternatively indicating, thereby; that one excludes the other, and must be given different meanings. Section 24 of IPC, 1860 defines “dishonestly” thus: Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing “dishonestly”.
Fraudulently’ is defined in section 25 thus: A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise. The word “defraud” includes an element of deceit. Deceit is not an ingredient of the definition of the word “dishonestly” while it is an important ingredient of the definition of the word “fraudulently”. The former involves a pecuniary or economic gain or loss while the latter, by construction, excludes that element. Further, the juxtaposition of the two expressions “dishonestly” and “fraudulently” used in the various sections of the Code indicate their close affinity and therefore, the definition of one may give colour to the other.
...The expression “defraud” involves two elements, namely, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss that is, deprivation of property, whether movable or immovable, or of money, and it will include any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others.
Certainly, Dr Vimla was guilty of deceit, for though her name was Vimla, she signed in all the relevant papers as Nalini and made the insurance company believe that her name was Nalini, but the said deceit did not either secure to her advantage or cause any non-economic loss or injury to the insurance company ... the entire transaction was that of Dr Vimla and it was only put through in the name of her minor daughter for reasons best known to herself. In the result, we allow the appeal and hold that the appellant was not guilty of the offence under sections 467 and 468 of IPC, 1860. The conviction and sentence passed on her are set aside.