English

Abdel Hernandez San Juan

The couple of epistemology

Practicing sociology/composing anthropology

Contents

Logic after logic: a reconstructive analysis in the logic of science

Substance, naming and subject in social sciences: a diasporic analysis on diasporas

Transference in ethnicity

The Model of usa Multiculturalism

Vaiven: Hermeneutic of the field

Inscriptions and the ontology of fieldwork

The city, the village, the markets

Metropolis and provinces

The embodiment of saying

Bibliography

Logic after logic: a reconstructive analysis in the logic of science

©By Abdel Hernández San Juan

     Pure logic, not that applied to specific sciences, the abstract logic that begins in philosophy, when analyzed in all its moments and implications, seems to be clearly with regard to the classical and ancient past on science, the ancestor of the modern philosophy of science or epistemology, the philosophy of science as a theory of knowledge or science of science, I say ancestor because ancient logic as developed by Aristotle and as it receives its most elaborate form in Hegel, is still a ancestor.

    It is true that in Hegel, as he himself went on to argue, logic first took the form of a philosophy of science, what he called the science of logic, but despite this even in Hegel, who perceived that logic was stagnant and required new transformations since Aristotle, logic is still, at the same time that it is philosophy of science, a form of ontology, that is, of philosophizing itself on topics of philosophy that do not properly refer to the science of science or epistemology more than insofar as deliberations about ontology bring with them logical assumptions.

   Now, in the same way that Hegel observed that logic was stagnant and devoted himself to its transformation, logic after Hegel, in a similar way as happened with Aristotle in the words of Hegel for centuries, logic seemed not having advanced a single step after that, it has not only remained stagnant without advancing a step beyond Hegel, but it has suffered from chronic neglect that has relegated it to a point tending to disappear.

   On the one hand, modern philosophy of science has not been developed properly as a form of logic but has been separated from it as something distinct that no longer requires arguing as logic to be philosophy of science, while, at the same time, time, abandoned by the latter, logic has been transformed into a storehouse of dogmas of all kinds, subsumed or relegated to being a kind of nurse of numbers, algorithms, equations and a kind of philosophy that no longer theorizes nor is properly generator of new logical thought, but resorts to philosophy only in the form of a history of philosophy that helps to justify, like the student who must explain what the premises of his thesis are, the bases on which a largely subsumed logic rests. by physics, mathematics and other algorithmic sciences,

   mathematical logic, physical logic, applied logic, etc., have therefore replaced with numbers and equations, the old place of logic or with that philosophy that repeats like stories what Aristotle or Hegel said without new thought, ways in which to think about logic is to create new avenues of logical thinking, while the philosophy of science, which then occupies the place that once corresponded to logic, continually dispenses with logical thinking, to be articulated around conclusions that are admitted based on the empirical evidence of currents and tendencies that are resolved around thought and theories, certainly, but thoughts and theories articulated on these currents or tendencies, which however no longer return to logic as the place from which to leave and to which to return but separated from it.

   It is true that things that in ancient logic were integrated one within the other, were separated no longer in the manner of formerly themes, topics, subtopics or aspects of logic, but as fully constituted sciences, thus, for example, tendencies. of philosophical thought such as analytical philosophy and the philosophy of language, within them also positivism, neopositivism and empiricism, are nothing more than schools that focus on specific aspects of ancient logic in a way in which they cease to be aspects from a logic to become domains of specific sciences separated from each other

     In this way, abandoned on the one hand by separate sciences that made the whole of their reasons for being things that were previously topics or themes of logic, and stagnated on the other, in an infinite number of dogmatic developments in which nothing is theorized or It is thought that to justify itself in a history of philosophy or in discourses built around numbers, equations, theorems, logarithms and tables, we have reached a point at which logic seems tending to disappear, to dissolve fragmented into isolated islands, or to spread dispersed in irreconcilable matters, silenced in all types of applied logic in which one no longer thinks or theorizes.

  Very similar to the situation in which Hegel found himself in his time when he maintained that logic had to be completely rethought and transformed, today's situation with logic requires a transformation and a rethinking of a similar magnitude, if not even greater than that. the one to which Hegel was forced with respect to the previous logic.

  What are these changes, in what senses and directions, around what questions and towards what answers is it required to rethink logic?

      The issue that focuses my attention here is a series of questions that in one sense we can consider questions of logic and in others ontological, throughout a series of essays and books I have been developing theorizations and reflections around or around the question of In other words, these developments have assumed clarifications that I have made of very abstract and complex epistemological issues that are elucidated around diatribes of classical philosophy, but because these analyzes have been developed mostly around specific topics, they have not been called in themselves. themselves to elaborate around them a broader development around those clarifications that I have made on the background of previous conceptions that have moved around the same issues,

   The objective, however, is not to return to my essays that I make references to discuss myself since the reader can go and read them, rather, I have set the objective of returning to them now in ways that are less specific to topics. that have required them to be theorized around them, to call them to the foreground and discuss those precepts

    In my essay the chrysalis of being, going to the points that were of my attention, I passed over a series of questions related to the question of being as discussed by Hegel that require this time to return to them.

  It is in no case excessive or excessive to actually return to being with respect to Hegel, especially if we take into consideration that he assigns such an important place that it even becomes the first and main concept of his logic of science, the one with which Answers the question where should science begin?

    Now, and my objective here is not to deny that Hegel's science of logic is scientific, I consider that it is, in short, that Hegel manages to demonstrate the bases of a scientific theory of the logic of science.

   Now, the price that Hegel follows to clear this logic by the so-called logic of science, but by others the main ontology after Aristotle, has to pay is very high for the question of being, we actually think that They charge beings prices that should not have been charged to beings since beings have been susceptible to being subject to elaborations that must have been contrary to their own ontological, epistemological and teleological nature. In short, or what is the same as saying, there are developments. to which one arrives that have been deduced or propositionally articulated as a result of a way of understanding being that attributes to being issues that do not correspond to it and that therefore could have been arrived at, with the same results, having started from other conceptual latitudes without the need or requirement to start from being to reach them

    I am here at once denying not in the complex sense that is implied in the Hegelian concept of negation of the negation, or of a first negation, but in a much simpler and more binary sense typical of the logic of common sense, as when we say, mark with an Qualitatively, all these developments that are immersed in arithmetic, geometry, physics and questions related to space and time considered from quantity and calculation, were treated in the doctrine of being due to a starting budget that is what we must call here to the foreground to deconstruct as well as reconstruct

    It is about the relationship between being and nothingness with respect to which, from the beginning of the doctrine of being, Hegel objected to the Eleatics conceiving the idea that only being existed and that nothingness does not exist for anything nor is it. matter of being.

  Indeed, being and nothingness run along parallel avenues and are in no way related to each other as Hegel has excessively assumed, who, faced with the notable disparity between the two as opposites or contraries, proposed to argue from both being and nothingness a dialectical relationship of synthesis. that they would find in the future, according to Hegel, just as being is the opposite of nothingness and vice versa, both pass into each other and become the same thing in the future.

    I have previously dismantled this assumption by discussing how becoming dispenses with nothing in my essay The Chrysalis of Being, but it is necessary to note and warn that if chapters such as those on quantity, measurement, quantum and quantitative calculation were included in the doctrine of being was precisely because it started before the undisputed presupposition that in certain forms of transfer from one to the other both are equal or are the same so that if nothingness and being are united in becoming and becoming can be examined through the relationship between the finite and the infinite, it has been assumed that that step from being to nothing and vice versa, justifies by homology, a step from the qualitative to the quantitative according to which more than half of the doctrine of being could be devoted to topics that have been included because being has been precisely abstracted into nothingness or as nothingness.

     It is in his discussion of Jacobi that Hegel says that empty, dull, abstract meaning that the Hindus, looking at their noses, express when they say om, that is being.

   Undoubtedly, Hegel, through the assumption that being and nothing are the same, has confused being with emptiness and therefore attributed to being issues that do not correspond to it, it is precisely because he has equated being with nothingness and defined according to the second the nature of being as an abstract void, which something like including chapters on quantum, quantity, measurement and another series of mathematical, chemical and physical analyses, have been included by Hegel within the doctrine of being.

   I consider that the very fact of having included those chapters in his doctrine of being demonstrates by basic logical derivation that it was wrong to give being for nothing, those chapters that make up the second half do not correspond to being and as such must be logically removed from the theory of being

   It is true that the Hindus have this meaning given in the om, but it would be easy to demonstrate that no Hindu, not even the followers of yoga, would ever agree that a book on being includes chapters on calculation, on quantity, on measure and on the quantum, so that, although it may seem so by analogy, it is obvious that what the Indian sense puts in the om, is not nothing as we understand this concept in Western terms, a way of understanding it that is precisely which can make it possible for similar chapters to be included in a volume on being, once clear, in which being has been given through nothingness and vice versa in the terms in which Hegel wanted to demonstrate it, the entire second half, then of his doctrine of being, according to this analysis, must be evacuated from there. The aporia or defect to which I am referring starts from the moment it begins to discuss the relationships of attraction and repulsion.

    They must be transferred to the volume dedicated to the doctrine of essence, but, however, at the same time the latter contains an infinite number of sections that, due to aporetic and similar defective assumptions, have been erroneously placed as part of the logic of essence.

   After my analysis up to this point we have a logical, epistemological and ontological reconstruction of the logic of being in Hegel's philosophy of science, the first list shows the order given by Hegel, the second the reconstruction resulting from my analysis

   However, this time it is not about contrariety whose starting assumptions are related to the confusion of being with nothingness, but now this time, to the confusion of substance with the immaterial or dematerialized, Hegel has in fact, located in logic of the essence concepts and notions that do not belong to the essence due to a substantialist conception which I have discussed before in my essays regarding immanence and the sensible concept

    I am referring to the sections on identity, difference, diversity, phenomenon, appearance, the world in itself and the phenomenal world, reality, they belong to the logic of being, not essence, and as such they must be transferred as continuity after the first half of a logic of being that can remain up to that fifty percent as it was discussed by Hegel but making a reservation, diminishing, attenuating and dissolving in that discussion, the sections in which it is about giving to the be for nothing and vice versa.

    Once these sections have been transferred in continuity with the logic of being and once the second half has been brought to the logic of essence, the latter has been left with its sections: the essence, the essence and the form, the form and the content, the form and the matter, the foundation, the cause and the effect, the positive and the negative, which must then continue with the quantity, the measure, the quantum and the quantitative given before as the second part of the logic of being.

   Up to this point, according to my analyzes we obtain the following reconstruction, the first list shows the order that the doctrine of being and the doctrine of essence have in Hegel, in the second list we have how that order remains for the moment after my analysis

    But our deconstructive and reconstructive analysis has not concluded with these objections; several more epistemological clarifications are still necessary.

    We move towards the logic of the concept in the third volume and in this we have the following, first, we deny that the concept is the truth of the substance and that it therefore presupposes the fusion of being and essence, giving the concept as a result. , we maintained that the concept is immaterial and dematerialized from the beginning and that it should never be given by or treated as derived from the substance, not from the essence and even less from the relationship between these and being, for this reason, we have to jump the hypothesis about the genesis of the concept around thorny to instead, from my essay The sensible concept, completely retheorize what makes the concept which leads us to save here some paragraphs in which Hegel discusses Kant which certainly situate assertive the discussion of the concept, in reality it is a few pages where the genesis of the concept is exposed in a substantialist sense, we jump, having deleted it, directly to the discussion with Kant and we leave in the concept everything that is discussed in its first half until it comes to syllogisms and judgment,

    The latter, which make up more than three quarters of the logic of the concept, must then be evacuated and taken out of the logic of the concept and separated,

    At the end of the syllogisms and the judgment we have a second half of the logic of the concept that, according to my criticism, should be as follows: the chapters on mechanism and chemism that are in the book on the concept do not belong to the concept, they should be those that continue and conclude the volume of the logic of the essence, as long as the chapters on life, the living individual, analysis, synthesis, the problem of knowing and the idea, if they belong to the concept, in this way the first part of the logic of the concept, removing from it the syllogisms and the judgment, and having erased in it the substantialist genesis of the concept, continued by these sections that belong to the concept, life, the living individual, the problem of knowing, the idea, must directly continue the first part of the logic of the concept, but must in turn be treated not as a separate volume but transferred to where we had left off in the logic of being when removing the second half --- and ignoring nothingness—we had continued it with the identity, the difference, the phenomenon, the appearance, the reality, behind this we must continue what we have chosen in the logic of the concept, thus closing the volume of the logic of being that From then on it would have to be titled logic of being and concept.

    Once we bring chemism and mechanism to the logic of the essence in continuity with the composition of the essence as essence, form, content, matter, cause and effect, positive and negative, quantity, measurement, quantum, quantitativeness, etc., the logic of the essence is concluded, it is towards the end of it that the theme of nothingness must be brought to closure, regardless of being.

    We have thus been left with a floating section, the syllogisms and the judgment, these must be restructured in order to form a third volume on the logic of language, let's see how it looks after my reconstructive analyzes

The objectivity

    Having in this way offered my critical insights into Hegel's logic, we have not, however, concluded, everything discussed above has an infinite number of consequences both in terms of the logic of science and in terms of ontology, which is why I give the above as a necessary introduction that would examine the consequences of these epistemological insights in the contemporary theoretical discussion of philosophy of science, epistemology and phenomenology, which presupposes, as we said before, a whole series of reflexivities and analyzes around Derrida, Gadamer and Habermas.

   Perhaps mathematical physicists, physicists, cybernetics, and biologists could argue with respect to my epistemological clarifications that these are clarifications proper to an understanding from the social sciences and they certainly are, but they are no more and no less, in the same way in which They are also both with respect to logical positivism and later empiricism, on the one hand, and with respect to all known forms of neo-Hegelianism, with the exception of Derrida, which presupposes that they are also with respect to other conceptions of the social sciences.

  I will thus close this necessary introduction by comparing two graphs that will show the reader what differentiates these clearances from a conception of the social sciences such as that given by Levis Strauss. I reproduce below the table given by Levis Strauss to define the place of anthropology. , and then I conclude with my table on the logical order of the sciences in my perspective

Levi Strauss said

Psychology

linguistics

geography anthropology

                                                                                                                               Archeology

Sociology

Let's close this introduction with mine

Philosophy of science

Philosophy Sociology Language sciences

                                                                                           Linguistics, semiotics

Philosophical anthropology psychology Cultural anthropology

Ethnography, aesthetic ethnology archeology

Philology, literary criticism, art criticism

      As we see in the Levis Strauss graph, psychology appears at the highest level of the hierarchy in the center and above, anthropology has been subordinated to psychology but placed in turn or at the same time by linguistics and archeology on the right. , we cannot forget with respect to this painting that the anthropology that Levi Strauss refers to, although it does not exclude, as he himself maintains, the anthropology of our own Western societies, it is an anthropology that carries within it ethnography and ethnology and that subsumes sociology or makes it subordinate to anthropology among other things because it dilutes it as a tool without autonomy disseminated within that anthropology that is itself ethnography and ethnology, the psychology to which it has been subordinated, on the other hand, is not accountable to the philosophy of sciences, but is nothing more than a psychology in itself, on the other hand we see that at the same level as anthropology and related to it, due to the type and concept of anthropology in question, there is geography, while certainly located to the right between linguistics and archeology, as we have argued elsewhere, it is not a linguistics that operates as a science of language that studies language phenomena, but rather it is a linguistics that is taken as a parameter for analogical and homological studies, that is, it studies non-linguistic phenomena that do not refer to language but to other phenomena as if they were. At the same level of the latter, archeology supplies resources to that anthropology. In summary, the Levis Strauss graph is a anthropocentric graph, all the sciences surrounding anthropology are subordinate to it in the mode of instruments

    My graph is completely different, at the top of the hierarchy there is not psychology, but rather the philosophy of science, a philosophy of science in which psychology does not enter, the passage or communication from the philosophy of science to The rest of the sciences must necessarily first go through sociology, a sociology that is not conceived here as subordinate or disseminated in other sciences, but is contemporary and modern sociology of our own Western societies autonomously disciplinary, all are excluded from this sociology. the authors who have incorporated sociology into anthropology and there remain only those who, understanding sociology in direct relation to the philosophy of sciences, philosophy and the sciences of language, have worked in their autonomy, that is, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, August Comte, Talcon Parson, George Helbert Mead, Alfred Shutz, Luckman, Popper, Harold Garfinkel, Junger Habermas, Pierre Bourdieu, neither Mauss, nor Kroeber, nor Boas, nor Rahild de Brown, nor any anthropologist enter here.

     The communication of the philosophy of science with the rest of the sciences happens first on its way to and on its return through this sociology, there is no authorized communication in this graph between philosophy of science and the rest of the social sciences, without that on the way out and on the way back they must all go through sociology, at the same time to the left and right of sociology and at the same level, although not in the center and not aligned with the philosophy of sciences, philosophy is pure and the sciences of language, including in this last philosophy of language, linguistics and semiotics which means on the one hand that sociology is between these two but at the same time that all other social sciences are subordinated to them three philosophy, sociology and language sciences,

   Indeed, psychology is at the third level, but subordinated to sociology and at a lower level than the latter and philosophy and the language sciences. It is necessary to add that these language sciences are not language sciences disseminated within an anthropology that uses them to analyze phenomena that are not language, but are language sciences fully constituted as autonomous and dedicated exclusively to the study of language and communication phenomena that take shape through languages ​​and signs.

   Indeed, psychology is at the third level, but subordinated to sociology and at a lower level than the latter and philosophy and the language sciences. It is necessary to add that these language sciences are not language sciences disseminated within an anthropology that uses them to analyze phenomena that are not language, but are language sciences fully constituted as autonomous and dedicated exclusively to the study of language and communication phenomena that take shape through languages ​​and signs.

   In turn, let us observe that the step to philosophical anthropology is direct from philosophy, there is therefore no anthropology formed before philosophical anthropology, philosophical anthropology is the first form of anthropology and is in turn subordinate to philosophy and below of sociology and the sciences of language that to which ethnography and ethnology are successively and at a close level of subordination, the latter two thus appear in a direct relationship subordinated to anthropology philosophy so that they do not have a direct relationship neither with sociology nor with cultural anthropology

  At the same level of philosophical anthropology, there is then psychology in the center and cultural anthropology on the right, but the latter is directly subordinated to the language sciences and is constrained between philosophical anthropology and psychology, subordinated in turn in the higher level than philosophy, sociology and the language sciences, the movement from left to right at its own level emphasizes at the same time that philosophical anthropology is first and that it only passes to cultural anthropology reaching it from the previous left through the philosophical anthropology and psychology and reaching it from its higher levels through sociology and the sciences of language, without excluding pure philosophy, there is therefore no direct communication of cultural anthropology with the philosophy of sciences, it, to receive the parameters of philosophy of science is obliged to subordinate itself to sociology and the language sciences above, and to philosophical anthropology and psychology above on the same level

    Treated in this way, cultural anthropology is neither ethnography nor ethnology, nor does it include them within itself, to the same extent it cannot incorporate sociology by disseminating it within itself, it is scientifically subordinated to an autonomous and disciplinary sociology, ethnography and ethnology to In turn, they only receive their immediate parameters and are directly subordinated only to philosophical anthropology, which in turn is subordinate to pure philosophy, as well as being the higher level than sociology and the language sciences.

   Sociology disseminated within ethnographic and ethnological studies is not included within it; these, like the rest of the social sciences, are subordinated to a disciplinary and autonomous sociology without which they cannot communicate with the philosophy of science.

   We then see that, however, at the same time, ethnography and ethnology have been subordinated to psychology below and on the sides, a psychology subordinated in turn to sociology, but a psychology with which they are not related in any way. direct but only insofar as philosophical anthropology corresponds to them in their communication with the immediately higher line or level while on the right they are located on the same axis and in the proximity of archeology with respect to which we can say the same as with respect to ethnology and ethnography

     Cultural anthropology, in turn, it is worth saying, does not use the language sciences, but is subordinated to them and obliged to study culture through the study of language and signs.

     The above could give rise to arguing that in my picture cultural anthropology has been loosened, misplaced and dislocated from the tradition of the so-called traditional anthropology of primitive peoples,

   Indeed, in my painting, cultural anthropology has been separated from colonialism and has been called from the authority of the philosophy of sciences to render an account among the modern sciences so that the possibilities of cultural anthropology of calling back to that tradition from this painting of mine It presupposes that a contemporary cultural anthropology cannot, even where it studies cultures or cultural phenomena that are not those of our own Western societies, be formed around a bibliography that does not decenter it from that colonial tradition which can only be reformulated, and pertinently recalled in other degrees and percentages, but there is no longer here a cultural anthropology of non-Western societies whose bibliography is only and only bibliography of studies of primitive cultures,

  Primitivism as a general concept results in this picture completely refigured and begins to experience a process of refiguration that progressively disseminates it among sciences that do not fall within primitivism. This presupposes not only the dismantling of colonialism, but far beyond that, the dismantling from the very idea that the culture of the observer is authorized to issue truly scientific interpretations of cultures of which the observer is not a part,

  As we have said and maintained elsewhere, a culture that is not the culture of the observer can only be known by emigrating to it, that is, by becoming part of it and at the price of the cultural transformation of the anthropologist, it is therefore not possible to study the Middle East. without becoming in some way an exponent of middle eastern culture,

   and so on with any culture, cultural anthropology is first subordinated from above to the sciences of language and sociology and preceded before by a philosophical anthropology subordinated to pure philosophy, the study of our own Western culture through the study of language, and it is once interested in other cultures, forced to be a transcultural anthropology, that is, in which the anthropologist's culture is transformed, ethnography and ethnology, likewise, but subordinated in turn or in their difference to the Philosophical Anthropology

   It is necessary to add here with respect to the anthropology of primitive cultures that in my painting we consider that what in that anthropology is primitive is not only the cultures it studies but first of all anthropology itself, in a few words, just as it happens in modern art. and in the fine arts that stylistically and aesthetically it is said that an artist such as Rousseu and Guaguin are of a primitive style because they paint the primitive world, the anthropologists of primitive cultures are stylistically and aesthetically primitive within Western high literature too. , that is, they are and are literary and stylistically part of what we call primitivism, their aesthetics are part of primitivism, they are primitive, so when we say dissemination of primitivism within my painting we say it in both senses, first dissemination of that anthropology that is itself stylistically primitive within and across the non-primitive social sciences, and at the same time disseminating along with them what they study.

     Returning to the logic of Hegel's science, it is undoubtedly an important work, even more, in my perspective, than Hegel's own Phenomenology of Spirit because despite the relevance that the consciousness to which it is dedicated has in it. little or almost nothing in the science of logic, it is undoubtedly a colossal effort to locate as complete an image as possible of the logical program of science, but Hegel's logic, despite this, suffers from defects, defects that in My consideration is not those who have generally been identified as either their declared followers or their declared detractors.

   The part of existentialist philosophy that continued Hegel placed its emphasis on a defective aspect of Hegelianism, that related to his differentiations between an abstract being and a determined being or existence, which magnified the emphasis that Hegel placed on nullifying being in nothingness. and vice versa, a defect in its logic of being, which is what led the latter to confuse sensible being or quality with questions of physics, mathematics, arithmetic and geometry as part of the same logic, while Marxists defined as the best in Hegel what was precisely the most defective in that, his confusion of the essence with the being, the concept and the matter deriving Marxism in a more modality of unconscious theology.

    Finally, of all the post-Hegelianisms only Adorno and Frankfort in general seem to recover what in my opinion are the best results of Hegelian logic, but despite this in Frankfort there are still countless undiscussed issues regarding Hegelian logic, I have discussed one before, that of the relationship with immanence

    I have proposed to do a reconstructive analysis of Hegelian logic that focuses on locating what I consider to be his great achievements and at the same time on clearing or separating what in my opinion is defective by using a word that Hegel himself is a perfectionist. used.

    I am not generally a friend of perfectionism, I believe that every system inevitably suffers from defects and that this is generally necessary, but I believe that reconstructive criticism helps both, to improve at the same time and also to revalidate

    In his analysis of being, after asking what is the origin of science, its beginning, where it should begin, Hegel not only declares that the beginning of science must be being and not other concepts such as the self, the subject, etc., but at the same time, it establishes that being and nothing are the same thing, they are the opposite, but at the same time each one is its other, being is nothing and nothing is being, arguing that nothing is Being, as he himself argues, is contradictory, since what is nothing cannot be a being, but at the same time, according to Hegel, becoming would not be understandable without understanding that being and nothingness merge. I have previously analyzed this and maintained that It is defective and aporetic, we do not need nothing to understand the future.

   For those who have not read and studied the science of logic, perhaps this may seem like a meaningless entelechy, pure talk, as Hegel told him, but when it is carefully read, we understand that in no way would the logic of being have included more than half of its content relating to the analysis of quantity, quantun, measurement, arithmetic and calculation, if it were not presupposed that being can be given by nothing and vice versa

   In my reconstructive analysis it is therefore required to deny that being and nothingness are the same thing, not only are they contraries but they are not dialectical contraries, when being and nothingness are united, a higher synthesis does not occur through which the opposites demonstrate to be moments of the same, to go from being to nothingness and through it to include in the logic of being all the chapters related to physics and the organic world is therefore, in my opinion, erroneous.

   Thus removing the emphasis on the fact that all his analyzes of being are the same, they prevail in force in the first part of the first volume until they reach the ought to be in the limit and the relationship between finitude and infinity.

    But these denials, if you will, at the same time reconstructive and deconstructive, do not destroy the Hegelian edifice, rather they reform it, polemize it if in a critical sense, remodel it and rearticulate it, but the Hegelian logic continues after this current and living deconstructive reconstruction.

  This validity, however, has been the result of a current and contemporary interpretation that no longer accepts Hegel as Hegel presented himself, but rather retheorizes Hegel in the sense of current and contemporary questions, it is however a discussion that does not end here since in itself it is different from other ways in which Hegel has been previously inherited and assimilated by different trends that have continued him.

   As I said, of the neo-Hegelian tendencies after Hegel, only Derrida and Frankfort remain closer to my perspective, however, my perspective is also different from that of Derrida and Frankfort, while at the same time contrary to those of existentialism and Marxism. ,

Bibliography

Habermas Junger, constructive and reconstructive sciences, moral conscience and communicative action

Derrida Jacques, introduction to Hegel's semiology, margins of philosophy, professor

Derrida Jacques, Introduction to Hegel semiology, Margins of philosophy, the university of Chicago press

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, In front of immanence, the intramundane horiuzont

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Chrysalides of being, the intramundane horizont

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Sensible Concept, Thinking Science: new phenomenological avenues between philosophy and sociology

Hernández san Juan Abdel, Textual inference and object language: Semiotic theory and sociology of culture, in semantic elucidation

Hegel, Science of logic, axe

Substance, naming and subject in social sciences: a diasporic analysis on diasporas

©By Abdel Hernández San Juan

        The purpose of this essay is not in itself to offer a substantive and nominal development around the concept of diaspora, by saying substantive and nominal I assume that naming a concept generally presupposes, as the matter was discussed since Aristotle and not It ceased to be so in Hegel until today, that what names a subject and an identity is in itself a substance,

    Substantialism, as Bourdieu insistently reiterated in his criticisms of substantialism, presupposes that the name names an essence or an identity of which at most it can be nothing more than an expression, in short, if the name names an essence or an identity It is because the name itself, which is nothing but a subject, is named by a substance of which it and what fills it with content is an essential expression, named or not named, even unnamed, what rests behind the naming is the presupposition that the name is only the intermediary between two forms of the substance, the one of which it is the expression and which in reality from an essential immanence makes it reach the form as a necessary expression, and another substance, equally given by essence, identity or immanence, that its cut between naming and what is named, fills content with the essence or identity that it distinguishes as a name.

    But it is not my objective here to digress into traditional questions specific to nominalism that refer in retrospect to Espinosa and that to this day has remained the same, the assumption that the name is only the necessary expression of the identity that it names and that that identity is itself. a substantive essence of which the name is only the necessary expression before---that substance which in the name names the subject, and afterwards, that substance which fills with content what the name supposedly contains, has continued to be the same since Aristotle to the present day.

   The concept of diaspora, like any other concept in anthropology, is one of this nature and type, when we say diaspora we assume that the word is named as a subject – in this case the phenomenon presupposed as diaspora in cultural reality – and that it substantively names the identity and substantive essence of a content.

  However, as I propose to discuss and demonstrate in this essay, the cultural reality that the concept of diaspora aims to fill is far from confirming and validating these assumptions.

   Like many other concepts that become recurrent in anthropology, and it must be said that it is an exclusive phenomenon of anthropology, not of other neighboring social sciences such as sociology, psychology or semiotics, once the concept is defined and named the territory that was supposed to be filled as the content of the concept in its semantic field, that is, what the concept refers to and refers to, denotes in the cultural reality that it presupposes, begins to radiate such extreme and continuous variations and relativizations, that ends up not knowing what we are talking about.

   In effect, this extreme laxity of concepts in anthropology, of those concepts that claim to be referents through relationships between substance and naming, of a social and objective reality external to discourse and, above all, that are assumed to be related to phenomena in culture relating to ethnicity, cultural identity, race and other substantive parameters of anthropology, too often calls into question their scientific nature.

   If one day when we said multiculturalism, for example, to refer to a concept of cultural anthropology, we thought of a precise cut, such as the phenomenon of multiethnic coexistence communally expressed in free markets and in the corporate civil society of our state society unite as with the same cover as that which was denotatively its own, the American experience, unique in the world, that in a neighborhood, school, urban and city community, you have at the same level of expression of contemporaneity both visually and effective, concrete people, as symbolic, recognition and reach of those people in what is recognized as contemporary on the street, in restaurants, on park benches, as pedestrians, driving cars, on school desks, of Japanese, Indians, Pakistanis, Thais, Iranians, Chicanos, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans and people of all cultures along with white Anglo-Americans, in just under a decade, the initial use of this concept to describe a short-lived reality, migrations and emigrations that occurred in less than between one and five decades, especially since the eighties and accentuated between the nineties and the new century, stopped responding to that well-cut and descriptively measurable parameter that filled the content of what the word named, to start to blur everywhere.

   As soon as a concept in anthropology, as I said before, if that concept refers to a parameter of culturality that presupposes ethnicity, cultural identity and race, its parameters and its radius of denotative measurability emerge with pretensions of cultural diagnosis, in less than a decade. is completely destroyed.

    In less than a decade of use of the concept, it was no longer known what we were talking about when we said multiculturalism.

    The semantic altercation began with the scholars and professors from the Caribbean, Latinos and Latin Americans living in the United States, who, lying to themselves and lying to American society, began to say that their societies of origin were multicultural, never a lie. It spread so quickly.

    Latin, Caribbean and Latin American teachers, nostalgic for their countries of origin, began to idealize their cultures of origin, fantasizing with the idea that they had multiculturalism when in reality it was a first profusion of the concept of multiculturalism that altered and distorted Its initial semantics now referred not to a short-lived economic reality contingent as a migratory phenomenon to a recent present directly linked to the transnationalization of economies with its consequences on interconnectivity and intracommunications, as towards migration, but to a long-standing ethnological perspective that looks towards the ethnological past of a culture from the point of view of the ethnicities that participated in its remote sense of the ethnic-national, that is, that merged into the composition of what a nation designates as its own identity in terms of the ethnic groups that participated in it,

    so, if in Caribbean and South American countries, there are white Canary Islanders or emigrants from the Canary Islands, Mayorca and other regions of Spain, there are black people from Africa, and there are Indians,---and if at the end of the day in the streets, In schools, in parks, driving cars and as pedestrians, people with white, mestizo, Indian, Oriental and European features coexist, since these are ultimately multicultural societies when in reality they are very far from being so, the ethnicities that participated in The ethnic-national certainly were once emigrants but in each country no less than between one hundred and two hundred years ago, one hundred and two hundred years after which half of the 19th century and half of the 20th century passed without these ethnic-national formations giving entry into their social and cultural reality to new ethnicities and without opening themselves to multiethnic coexistence of today, current, now and here in the present world, Hindus who arrived yesterday, Japanese who arrived yesterday, Greeks who arrived yesterday, Italians who arrived yesterday , Pakistanis, Iranians, Thais who arrived yesterday and who today or tomorrow at dawn live with us as part of our multiethnic reality, integrating, assimilating and incorporating.

   As soon as this altercation was made to the concept of multiculturalism, it stopped naming what it previously named and became an indefinite and loose notion that can be applied to everything.

   The paradoxes of substance, naming and the subject in anthropology themselves lie in this lack of definition, given that anthropology as a science itself presupposes that the cultural is something substantive, essential, immanent, the ontological reality of a culture in itself substantive and essential that anthropology must study for what it is in itself, the concepts suffer from that same immanentism and as such, while paradoxically it was assumed that if they named something substantive and were the substantive expression of an essence, the name should be delimited to the denotative radius of the field. semantics of concepts, in reality it happens that as substantive as the essences they claim to name, they do not name anything or they name everything.

    It happens frequently in anthropology, especially where it is about the ethnic, the cultural identity and the racial, the same thing that happens with what Eco called the words bag that you can put in the bag whatever you want, even if they are opposite things the word in any way names it because it as much as anything can be put in the bag in reality it no longer names anything.

      The concepts in anthropology, again, when they seek ethnic correlates and cultural identity are more imprecise than the metaphors in poetry, it is no longer known what the name is if multiculturalism, transculturality, interculturality, diaspora, syncretism, creolization and miscegenation become different. ways of naming the same thing or of naming different expressions of the same phenomenon for which there would then be different names with none of which distinguish something different from the other.

   The concept of diasporas goes the same way.

   Yes, indeed, the use of the concept began in its beginnings trying to name something similar to what was included in concepts such as migration, emigration and immigration and specifically how this was expressed in our American cultural reality, but as soon as a first decade passed of its uses, it was already very far from that first meaning, in fact, the very concepts of migration, emigration and immigration despite being more circumscribed in their descriptiveness to the effective activity of displacement from a culture of origin to subsequent cultures of resettlement , incorporation, assimilation and belonging, also already contained those impressions, since in the same way that we are migrants, emigrants and immigrants in the United States in times of transnationalization of economies and what is thereby marked as post-national or outside of national constraints, American society itself in long ethnological history was formed by migrations.

   But the concept of diaspora that initially came to want to circumscribe or underline the sides of that ambiguity, the fact that it is a subjectivity that on the one hand belongs to, is incorporated and is assimilated in the new culture, but on the other has the memory, experience and recurrence to the cultures from which it comes, preserving at the same time something of the concepts of immigration, emigration and migration, but with less emphasis placed on the action itself of emigrating, immigrating, migrating and more on The culturalized subjectivity of the phenomenon, once it has become a cultural reality in a social reality for what it implies to the concepts of memory, identity, current and past, etc., has suffered the same fate as its nominal relatives in anthropology and today it is not known that is being denoted in terms of cultural realities with it.

   If in an essay about diaspora, we remove the word diaspora and put interculturality, multiculturalism, transculturation, or any other among those that aim to designate ethnological realities, we no longer know what we are talking about when we say diaspora.

   After this necessary digression on the denotative nominal indefinition that has behind it insoluble paradoxes of anthropology regarding the classic relationships between substance, name and subject, I will therefore move on to offer my analyzes on the phenomenon in question.

   Firstly, the concept of diaspora presupposes, seen from the point of view of the ethnic-national formations from which people emigrate to other cultures, that what is a diaspora is a diaspora of that ethnic-national formation, in fact, the ethnic-national formations whether or not they are nation states to accentuate James Clifford's insistence that nation is not the same as nation state, they see in the diasporas fragments of themselves that have ended up somewhere else and that, seen from the national imagination, belong to that ethnic-national formation as their detachments, as diasporized fragments of their own cultural identity; therefore, the concept of diaspora is far from semantically facilitating the entire area of ​​economic and cultural transnationalization with respect to which it initially emerged.

   The above, from my point of view, is unfortunate, among other things, because if there was something attractive about the concept at the beginning, it was precisely that it tried to grasp how it was culturally perceived in subjectivity, the fact that transnationalization began to generate new cultural and identity formations of its own and unique aspects of transnationalization, something that for some time even became highly suggestive seen from the United States and Europe as it underlined the consequences on native or long-established subjectivities of the ethno-national characteristics of these cultures, United States, England, Europe, from the process of transnationalization, these found some culturalized name for the nomadization to which advanced capitalism tends in subjectivity

 so that, while it was a phenomenon in principle referring to migrations, it ended up being a concept of endogenous value insofar as it enabled semantic nuances to understand via migrations what ultimately, contingent on transnationalization, occurred in general with all the subjectivity in the current capitalism including native subjectivity inevitably moved by that same nomadization that results in subjectivity.

   But we have here the two opposite extremes, contradictory and irreconcilable, of a concept that no longer designates anything, how can the same concept simultaneously designate new cultural formations of identity corresponding to and proper to transnationalization, new culturalized meanings for the subjectivity of nomadicity to that the phenomenon of transnationalization is tending to the native culture as something endogenous, and at the same time designating the impression that ethnic-national cultural formations relatively closed on themselves this time in relation to memories have on the subjectivity and imagination. and to the cultural past in the culture of origin and origin of the migrations supposed to be dysporic, something that they see as an expression of them that has dispersed and has gone to another place, finding fragmentary expressions of their same cultural identity, as can the same concept designate or denote exactly two opposite and contrary things, and continue to be the same concept, undoubtedly, it is a simple concept that no longer designates anything or designates everything as has ended up happening with all culturalist concepts in anthropology.

    But even taken to a painful point for the natives of the new culture since, as I said, it is a notion that persuaded the native to recognize their own nomadicity in processes of subjectivity similar to those denoted by diasporicity, when it is collected on itself and semantically approximated to its similarity with emigrant, immigrate and migration, that is, understanding it as closed in itself around the cultural experience of the one who emigrates and thus becoming exclusive of the native, it begins to reflect the setbacks to which the relationship assimilation incorporation rejection in the new culture inasmuch as precisely because it presupposes relating the new cultural context with the past of origin or with various previous emigration contexts, it tends to validate that emigrants living in new cultures are more aware of their cultures of origin via nostalgia or as James Clifford says, the illusion of returning, that of their new cultures to which they have been incorporated and assimilated, participating as a contemporary expression in them, seen from this perspective, the concept does nothing other than end up collapsing the transnationality to which it was initially seen related.

    My position in this regard is objectionable towards the excessive postmodernization of the concept since it is precisely its postmodernization that encourages the dismantling of its precise semantic meanings. On the other hand, I prefer either to completely discard these culturalist and ethnic-racial concepts of anthropology, that is, not working with them, or if I use them I am given to cutting them around precise semantic meanings, clarifying which ones they are and distinguishing them from what they are not.

   In this way, I understand multiculturalism and I agree to call multicultural only and only, a phenomenon of multiethnic coexistence in the same contemporary and current community social reality of ethnicities that have settled in the new culture recently, that is, as a consequence of the process of transnationalization of economies, excluding from the concept of multiculturalism any effect of multiethnicity that can be deduced from long-standing ethnological elements, in this way my concept of multiculturalism highlights something that is not related to and is not part of the ethnic-national, that is always transnational and in its local community expressions it is defined as such inasmuch as it presupposes, for the purposes of the native culture in the white Anglo-American United States, the coexistence, assimilation and incorporation, of and with other ethnicities of recent arrival, I understand this arrival from the decades From the eighties to the present, any other phenomenon in which multiethnicity is observed is not multiculturalism or otherwise the concept loses value and becomes a catchword without specificity and without scientificity.

   Transculturation, in turn, cannot be applied to any phenomena of interculturality resulting from multiethnic interactions; it refers exclusively to the formation of a new culture that transformatively takes shape as a new formation of cultural identity resulting from the conjunction of different matrices that do not refer to each other. directly to the ethnic and racial, unlike multiculturalism, transculturation does not designate different ethnic groups that coexist, but rather a culture in formation that results in a new culture as a result of that interaction, coexistence and relationship between cultures, transcultural is exclusively A culture that has become such in its transculturalized identity may therefore result from intercultural and multicultural processes, but it in itself is not interculturality or multiculturalism, nor syncretism, creolization or hybridization.

   The diaspora is an exclusively migratory concept, it encompasses the three aspects of migration, emigration, immigration and migration and as such presupposes a relationship with the imaginary that defines the idea of ​​dispersed and disconnected properly transnationalized fragments of a culture of origin from which they have been detached to integrate, assimilate and incorporate into a new culture, therefore, nostalgia for returning to the culture of origin is excluded from the diaspora, effective returns to the culture of origin are excluded from the diaspora, ways of living the culture of origin within the new culture as a modality of ethnic self-isolation that presupposes non-integration, non-assimilation and non-incorporation into the new culture, they are excluded from the diaspora,

   How then to call that meaning that ethnic-national formations have, conversely, on those fragments of their same cultural identity that are dispersed by other cultures, if we also called them diasporas, we would have to accept that a migrant culture can be assimilated and incorporated into the new culture at the same time that it is claimed in its identity by the culture from which it comes or claims within the new culture its culture of origin, both things are contradictory with the first definition that we have given of the concept, therefore Therefore, either a circumscribed arrangement of the semantic meaning of the word is reached or it is transformed into a bag of contradictory and irreconcilable things, a diaspora is one thing or the other, but if it is all, it is nothing.

   Either it is agreed to call diaspora the view that the ethnic-national culture has on something that has become detached from it and has ended up in another culture claiming it as part of its cultural identity, or on the contrary we call diaspora, diasporicity and diasporic, the effect on the subjectivity of the native culture of a migratory culture that has been incorporated, assimilated and adapted to it, but both things at the same time is impossible.

   If we say diaspora to designate a migratory cultural formation that occurred in recent times related to the transnationalization of economies and cultures, we cannot at the same time call what happened to Africans when they were brought as slaves by the colonizers diaspora, nor call diaspora to the emigrations that the Indians experienced in the United States from their original territories to their later reservations assigned by the republican divisions, or we call diaspora something related to today's economic transnationalization and nothing else, or we call diaspora any detachment of a culture in another but then disconnecting the concept of economic transnationalization, the latter is recent, in the seventies it had not happened, so, if to be a diaspora it has to be transnational and we are forced to say that the forced migration of Africans are a diaspora, we would then have to say that this migration was transnational and as soon as we call those migrations transnationality, then it becomes the concept of transnationalization that loses its specificities, or we call transnationalization economic phenomena of advanced capitalism consisting of formations and developments. economics that go beyond ethnic-national constraints, or we call transnational anything that without the existence of transnationalized economies occurred beyond nations before economic transnationalization existed, but both things at the same time for the same concept is impossible.

   Postmodernism, in order to refute and evade the dogmatisms of scientific definitionism, has wanted to call for semantic profusion in a way that ends up dismantling the scientific nature of concepts. If we do not already know what we are talking about when we say diaspora, it is only because we already The concept is not scientific, the idea of ​​disconnecting from the nature of the object of study is contradictory, if we do not start from a factual verification regarding what we are talking about, we cannot fix ourselves around the concepts.

   I am going to give an example of how this happens and why my objection to postmodernism at this point.

   The phenomenon of the Native Americans in the United States, that is, the American Indians. Undoubtedly in terms of telos, of the ethical duty to be, of the utopia of how we would like it to be, once we understand that our sense of Americanness is impossible and incomplete without the place that our American Indians have in our own cultural identity, in our ethos American, that, as I have said elsewhere, we cannot close the circle of Americanness without them who in the end are in reality the authentic and true Americans, but we know well that although we believe that it is appropriate, due to the history of How the relationship with the Native Americans was in the colonial past, it is made explicit and elucidated that there were not only divisions but also exclusions and abuses; therefore, in current and contemporary circumstances, it is inevitable that any way of claiming union beyond citizenship documents, is transformed even unintentionally into a form of activism and seen in this way, we come to the conclusion that multiculturalism, once recognized in its transnationally contingent present, is convenient to solve the dilemma of integration, but as soon as it is postmodernized this relationship, then multiculturalism that is different from the long-standing ethnic-national composition of which the Indians are a part loses its definition and its own contours, if within multiculturalism we have to incorporate the American Indians, multiculturalism disappears, disseminates and is lost, it is transformed into an ethnological concept, ceasing to be a cultural anthropological concept and from that moment on it becomes profuse and undefined with ethnological concepts related to the history of the relationship between ethnicity and nation because the Indians more or less integrated , like Africans otherwise, form part, along with Anglo-Americans and in general Euro-Americans, of the ethnic-national composition. By ceasing to be transnational and by ceasing to be a short-lived concept, postmodernist activism for the profusion of multiculturalism becomes loses, in fact, not in vain, the concept of multiculturalism that had a great boom between the eighties and the nineties has been progressively declining, reaching the beginning of the new century and being almost abandoned.

Bibliography

Clifford James, Diasporas, center for cultural studies, university of California, santacruz, Cultural anthropology, 9 -- 32-33, 1994, American anthropological association

Clifford James, Traveling Cultures, cultural studies edited and with an introduction by Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, Paula A Trichler, with linda Baughman and assistance from john macgregor wise, routledge. New York, London, 92

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Model of united states multiculturalism, in the couples of epistemology: Practicing sociology/composing anthropology

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Transference in etnicity, in the couples of epistemology: Practicing sociology/composing anthropology

Transference in ethnicity

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

   In this essay I am going to discuss the attribution and adjudication of ethnicity, that is, the ways in which ethnicity is awarded and attributed, modalities in which, as both concepts imply, it aims to fix, establish in some way an ethnicity, that is, this is ethnicity, and not that other. My two concepts, however, leave open or specify the sense that it is ultimately about attribution, something is attributed to something, and adjudication, that is, something is attributed and then awarded, in neither of the two. cases it is assumed that attributing and adjudicating necessarily coincide with the being in themselves of things, if it is an attribution and the adjudication that follows it, it is assumed that it is, to use a valuable Hegelian distinction, a distinction between something put or interposed, and the being in itself of something that receives both attribution and adjudication.

  The Hegelian notion of something posited, however, only specifies the superimposed, added or superadded character of something that was not there, 'but it does not distinguish the process of subjectivation that is supposed, and not because of its mere subjective character, but in its tacit sense. of attributing something as a noun, adjective or property to something, and the adjudication that this entails, does not specify the transfer process by which we go from attribution to adjudication. We will see later that the transition from an attribution to an adjudication does not follow any path, to pass an attribution to an adjudication, a simile is required, for the attribution to go from attribute to attribute, it must be adjudicated, the step from attribution to attribute is completed by adjudication, but the step of the complete continuity that goes from the assumption of attribute to its adjudication, needs that simile, that is, something that, according to some analogy, metonymy, metaphor or synecdoche, conveys an impression of what it is in itself, or of the being in itself of that or of it, to that which is attributed to it and which, because attributed, cannot be an attribute in itself of that being in itself or of what it is.

   Without an adjudication that to establish itself requires complete circulation that goes from the impression of being through some simile to attribution, this circulatory process would not be possible, it is not only carried out through the mediation of continuous transfers that pass impressions of the be by attributions of attributes, but also, to attribute requires reference points, these reference points, as they change or are modified, in turn modify both the impressions of the being itself of what it is, and the parameters of attribution , the change of point of reference here is not different from that of relativistic physics, whether understood in the sense of Eisentein or in that of Bergson, but it also contemplates issues related to the semantics for any assumption about being in itself. and the conditions of attribution in cultural phenomena that suppose, for any diatribe about what things are, and the establishment of what attribution and adjudication suppose, interpretations, polysemy, heterogeneity, meaning, relationality, mutuality, reciprocity, multi-aspectuality, variability.

  For what has been said before, in culture attribution can never establish a fixed point, since to attribute a simile is required, two or more things must be put in relation from the beginning, the relation in itself supposes a position that is contrary to the position that things have according to being in themselves or what they are and how only through a relationship that usually involves both things, association and comparison, is it possible to establish the simile or figure in whose language it is expressed. transposes an impression of being in language to an attribution of being, the relationship itself cannot but be a transference. If the ethnic question did not involve attributing or adjudicating, that is, passing something of the impression of being in itself from what it is as it is received in language to the attribution of what it is by adjudication, this step would not have to be transference, nor would circulation require that the entire process must be re-established by returning to the simile and again passing the complete transfer, it could be resolved in the relationship between several signifiers or deliberated as a purely semantic question, on the path of the signifiers. pure to the semantic sense in its entirety, an infinite number of phenomena that pertain to culture are discernible which, however, to be established, discussed and deliberated, do not require attribution of being or to being, nor adjudication of being.

   Ethnicity as a concept asks for this transference, and requires it, it specifies or demands, that an attribution of being be given as the being, a being here that asks to be it as a being of culture and more precisely of culture here not because of the other things that culture involves, but for one of them, ethnicity, for this reason, ethnicity is always a consequence of a transference process, it is not transferred well, we know it from any point, an attribute once attributed can be anywhere , admits a distribution in space and time, but not a transfer, so that if the attribute in ethnicity is transferred, it is assumed that in the step of attribution to the attribute the transference process stops continuing, but we know this. In the contemporary world it is impossible. '

   The level of continuous connectivity, accessibility, mutuality, reciprocity, permeability, communicativeness and interrelationships that cultures receive in our modern times prevents the transfer from being carried out just once and then everything is a matter of dealing with the space and time of the cultures. attributive distributions, the transfer, which does not admit, like the attribute, distribution in space and time without limits of extension, requires being redrawn again and again, not by choice or preference, by contingency, although it cannot be carried out from any place or distributed without limits in space and time, if it can be established where a point of view, whatever it may be, requires returning to a simile to once again establish a relationship that once again becomes an association. and a comparison, association and comparison are relative, but they require relationship parameters, the transfers are carried out from these points that, although they are not points that can be fixed, also vary continuously, they cannot be distributed and since they cannot be distributed in space and in time are in a certain way free of space and time.

  This kind of independence or autonomy of the transference process at the same time limits and enhances it, ultimately the relations of ethnic-cultural attribution and adjudication cannot be established without transference processes, they result from continuous transfers so that if the transfers are free of space and time, the transference process has great ethnographic importance.

   It is significant at this point to move away from certain pre-Lacanian ideologies about transferences, we are using this concept in a post-Lacanian sense, a better reference could be Kristeva, who assigns a relevance to the processes of non-subjection to substance, this post-Lacanian concept of transference is very far from that according to which the transference is a simple projection, as ordinary usage says, if this girl thinks that the friend's friend is half a whore it is possibly because she must be one at a significant level too, in the case of attribution of whoring, things are not so critical, but when a transfer involves saying that Argentines are haughty and have an air of superiority, things get a little more intricate, that Argentines are haughty, decades of coexistence tell me with Argentine friends, is absolutely false, a passing impression, whether or not it is a transfer from some ethnicity that, feeling superior, is less ideologically persuaded to let it be seen, is something much more difficult to sustain in terms of an attribution of arrogance to an ethnicity. Suppose, our concept of transfer here is far from these facile attributions, we speak of a transfer in the sense of giving a phenomenal impression of language through an ontological attribution of being, that is, of a transfer that passes a phenomenal of language, the which, moreover, establishes the relationship of copulation for everything that refers to the being of anything.

   We do not receive the impressions of being, and its objectifications in any other way than in language, by an attribution of being, by an adjudication of being in itself or substance, this process is transferential, not as something bad or imprecise, it is. per se as a continuous characteristic of the circulation process that comes from form. Transfer is also a form of communication, if I transfer I take a step, I make a thing pass in one direction from one side to another and back again, I pass a thing that is from one side to the other, I circulate a material that requires put one thing in relation to another, I put one thing in relation to itself according to another, or I put things in relations between things in themselves according to themselves, or relations between things according to other things are in relation to each other, I move through the mediation of figures, predication relations.

   Since the topic itself involves dealing with the word ethnicity as a concept or notion in itself, I am going to offer a general distinction that allows us to at least establish what we are talking about when we say ethnicity.

   When the point of view is so immersed in a specific culture that it becomes diluted in it, in the foreground here long years of life in a given culture surviving and getting ahead with everything in and from it, the sense of ethnicity is still present , whether it is Anglo-Americans or Russians, Japanese, Indians, Pakistanis, but it tends to become diluted, given that you are among people of this or that ethnicity and immersed in a given reality as your own reality, when the questions of a culture become your own questions and affect your life in such a way that you become both part of it and an exponent of it, where your dreams, your goals, your purposes, the whole meaning of your life, the meaning of what it is, take shape. An ethnicity tends to be diluted, given that each ethnicity, especially those more closed on themselves, which I have defined as ethnicity clousure, considers the world and perceives it from within itself, claiming as universal for all ethnicities that which, according to its attribution and ideological allocation of a sense of essence to their ethnicity, be it for the others also with respect to what is human.

   In contrast to the previous example, I will situate here a multicultural point of view as we define this concept in American multiculturalism, my ideal setting will be in this sense a large mole or sales setting in the United States where the different ethnicities are defined by races or halls where you can buy foods that are specific to these different ethnicities. Only from a multiculturalized cultural relativist setting in the free markets of the United States can it be perceived with sufficient precision what an ethnicity is. Standing in front of 30 optional pacillos, when taking one, our client will find pancakes, syrups, various roff beaffes and beef, jams, butters, toast, hard-boiled eggs, bacon, fast food, lush sandwiches, clams, intricate families of shrimp, shells , French fries, hams, chocolates and ice creams, Anglo-American ethnicity, when you take another you will find spaghetti, lasagnas, cannelloni, risottos, cheeses and sausages, Italian ethnicity, when you take another you will find croissants, sweet and savory baked pai, variety of breads, pate, dates and preserves, france ethnicity, when having other hot dogs, german ethnicity, other roasted meat, yogurt sauce and breads, greek ethnicity, smetana, russian ethnicity, mango sauce, rice with herbs, indian and pakistan ethnicity, sushi , japanice ethnicity, noodles, shot suai, lou man, chou man, chinesee ethnicity, tacos, mexican ethnicity, chaphapas, hayacas and arepas, venezuelan ethnicity, guava casquito, malanga fritters, kimbombo, ajiaco, matelba soda, malted milk , merenquitos, duro frio and yucca, Cuban ethnicity.

  However, to the same extent that when an ethnicity is alone the sense of ethnicity tends to be diluted and that through things such as food and certain customs ethnicities seem precise, the allocations of attribution and ownership to ethnicities show the On the contrary, the fact that these cannot be established at a precise point around the being itself or the defined ontology of an ethnic culture. As in bank transfers, we transfer money from one bank to another, or from one account to another, why do we call it a transfer, and not simply withdrawal and deposit? If the deposit and withdrawal are made for the first time, there is no transfer , but once there was a deposit, it is required that there be something that is the same, that has been in one place, and is placed in another, the same has been transferred, the transfer is this action.

   So that it does not seem like a pure theoretical entelechy, I am going to discuss and give several examples of this relativism. The first is myself, born in Cuba, of Cuban parents, I lived my youth in my twenties in the neoliberal Venezuela of the nineties, then the end of my twenties and thirties in Texas, completing a circulatory process of life and work , maturity, development and career, far from the place where I was born and my parents, then after meeting my parents on a trip from Texas to Monterrey, I lived for a while with my parents in Havana where I returned to the culture in which I lived until the 19.

  In Texas I am an American considered inclusive of the Anglo-Saxon American culture of Cuban origin, being American I cannot be for a Texan in the same terms as another Texan, or Venezuelan for the Venezuelan in the same terms as another Venezuelan, I am therefore assimilated as subjectivity nomadic in a globalized world in which transculturation and multiculturalism are in the foreground, the more globalized a culture is, the more appropriate it is to my experience, the less globalized the less. My first son is another example, also of Cuban parents, born in Cuba, he is however, less nomadic than me because he lives his experience in the United States with me very little, kindergarten, primary, secondary and pre in Texas, Spanish and English go in their experience in unison and are constitutive of their subjectivity from their first years of life. The attributions and adjudications of ethnicity derive from continuous transfers without fixed points, I am a good example of the multinational character of nomadic identities, even more so than Marcel.

  My second example is an anthropologist born in the United States of Guatemalan parents. I have written an essay about this anthropologist and I am going to move it in two different ethnographic contexts, in one, I am going to place it after an extensive essay on the theory of fine arts. European, along with others that will move on a scale that includes writings about native Texans, European emigrants in the United States, Hispanic emigrants in the United States and contemporary exhibitions of Anglo-Saxons from New York, in this textual group the text about this anthropologist who makes field work in Mexico Yucatán, that is, studying ruins and spectacles of the Mayan culture in Mexico, I am going to read it twice, once in Cuba, once in the United States, in the first reading it stands out for exalting the different, being a Anglo-Saxon anthropologist who exalts minorities, that is, it appears in a mobile textual ensemble not limited to a precise, volatile, intangible geography, sponsored by a European literature of fine arts, but then I am going to take this text and place it behind an essay of mine published in Texas about an artist that I am going to call Cuban-American, of Cuban parents born in the United States, this time I am going to emphasize that it is an anthropologist of Guatemalan parents, and I am going to define him as a Mayan-American anthropologist, here the The allocation of attribution is received as familiar and less strange for the purposes of Guatemalans, and represents a reduction in foreignization, something that, in the case of the inventive relationship between Mayan and American, can work for the acceptance of culturality of an anthropologist born in the United States. of Guatemalan parents.

   This attribution of ethnicity is based on a series of similes, the basis that nourishes these similes is a theory of culture that is situated on the side of the analysis of cultures as migratory phenomena, this anthropologist was born in the United States, but his parents They are Guatemalans, a country of Mayan culture par excellence, so it is assumed that they grew up in a home where Spanish is spoken, which in fact they speak, and perhaps Mayan, which as an anthropologist, they also speak, this first relationship of attribution and adjudication, that requires or implies taking for granted that things are themselves and how they should be understood in ethnic-cultural terms, at the level of ethnographic similes, finds the required familiarities or familiarizations in a possible or potential acceptance of Americanness in the Guatemalan sense, also of attribution, something that Guatemalans would be led to accept under a concept of Americanity accepted in the case of an anthropologist born in the United States, as long as this is accompanied by an acceptance of the Mayan, here again the passage from a simile to an attribution of attribution, the familiarity that distances strangeness on a scale, would go from the least strange to what is properly foreignized, here we have at the pole of foreignization someone born in the United States.

  However, these two relationships that go from a simile to an allocation of attribution, as we see, each turn out to be completely different; in one the anthropologist stands out for his relationship to an excluded minority that is different from him as an Anglo-Saxon and American anthropologist, in the other , this anthropologist is awarded a condition of Mayan-Americanness, here Mayan-Americanity seeks a relationship of adjudication and attribution that it receives from and at the same time offers to its proximity with a relationship of Cuban-Americanness, if in the first example, we had attributed Mayan-Americanness to this anthropologist , his field work would be seen as an autoethenography as situated after an extensive essay on European fine arts and among people who live in the United States, it stands out for what distances him and distances him from a culture in which perhaps he is looking for his parents, but of which it is not a part and in which it does not complete itself, it is, for the same reason, field work on something other than itself, Americanity here, so it does not close the circle, however, it is necessary to add that none of these ways of moving from the simile to the allocation of complete attribution or satisfies the way in which this anthropologist sees himself in its entirety, on the one hand, both attributions attribute something that this anthropologist only perceives as things that draw attention to certain partial aspects of consideration, the whole that they evoke may seem suggestive to this anthropologist as ethnographic compositional proposals that I develop and evoke a way of looking at himself, but none of these ways, other than for simple ethnographic enjoyment, coincides with the how he sees himself, nor does it coincide with the way he is seen by other Anglo-Saxons, other Americans and even by Mayans, Mexicans and his own parents.

   The relations of ethnic-cultural adjudication and attribution are always productions of the foreigner and projections of the exclusive; the adjudicator seeks familiarity to the extent that to match an image with an ideology of an essence, he tries to complete an ethnic-cultural clousure that can be placed here. to this anthropologist is a fixed position that would move between what familiarity distinguishes by simile as an attribute of ethnicity and the transfer of adjudicative attribution, that is, here as a projection of the exclusive, trying to see to what greater or lesser extent this anthropologist Whether it be considered the in itself or not, here attribution, adjudication, Mayan-American, American or Anglo-American, this transfer, needless to say, is the same one that Derrida discusses in philosophy, through the step taken by a simile, here a relationship of association and similarity, is attributed and awarded to the ontos, something that is actually in language on its outside a continuous relationship of retribution, in reality an economy, between that which in language, here gramme, we could say, passes, circulates. , flows, in attribution to the being or the spirit through and according to that language, and something that would fall outside, as if it abandoned it, becoming the immanence of an ontos.

  Derrida, unlike Deleuze, denies that this ontos can be established at a fixed point, can be an attribution or an adjudication, in Derrida, being and spirit in language, deny that an immanence another arrival of some essence that does not corresponds itself to the form, and devoid of that continuous circulation without a fixed point, can be established or specified at a point, the transferential passage of the simile, to the adjudicative attribution, is here a total and absolute invention, pure economy of the projection of the exclusionary and foreign production, an economy whose only point of measurement in relation to gold is the remuneration ratio, as analyzed and discussed elsewhere. Paradoxically, my experience is more nomadic, being a good example of the multinational character of nomadic identities.

Notes

   It is certainly less likely to find a group of Italians eating meringues, marshmallows, matelma sodas, malted milk and taro fritters than to find a group of Greeks or Anglo-Saxons eating spaghetti, lasagna and cannelloni. This has to do with the level of globalization. cultural, but a good risotto, or some splendid noodles, some toast with butter, a little bacon, and some Chinese butterflies will not be missing in a Mexican or Cuban cuisine, nor will a succulent spaghetti or a splendid pizza whose cheese melts. That a malanga fritter is something completely Cuban, there is no doubt, but that one day the people of Thailand will prefer malanga fritters instead of olives, it is something that Cubans cannot avoid, it is enough that the malanga fritters are in the market. If we give multicultural hype to the cuisine, the supermarket is watered, instead of pacillos, it seems that everything is exchanged, why not, a package of chot sue next to some noodles, a suchi next to some succulent cannelloni, a malted milk or a taro fry next to a pancake syrup or a pâté, and if, in globalization, cultures tend to merge, although they maintain their idiosyncrasies, someone would say that it would be like finding Stephen Wonder's black glasses in a painting of Henri Matisse.

Bibliography

Derrida, Jacques The Supplement of the Couple: Philosophy versus Linguistics, Margins of Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, The Crisalide of Being, Pp, the Intramundane Horizont, Book and Phenomenological Anthropology, book

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Being and Monad, Pp, Being and Monad, Book

G.W.F Hegel, Science of Logic, Tome I, Doctrine of Being, Solar, Hachete

The Model of United Sates Multiculturalism

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

'The answer to the question that is culture is here assumed and it expresses epistemologically dissimilar positions that need to be aired, issues that are rarely reconcilable in terms of the parameters and reference points that are taken in the elaboration of cultural and anthropological theories. , but if the different approaches seem to agree on something, it is that no theoretical, axiological or critical treatise or development that proposes the concept of culture can be developed, neither in language theory, nor in educational sciences, nor in direct analyzes on phenomena considered cultural, if not it is established precisely what concept of culture we are referring to, what is the concept of culture on which a certain theoretical or critical elaboration regarding it rests or is supported.

  On the other hand, despite the variety of assumptions about the concept of culture on which one or another elaboration on culture may be based, the different points of view do not overlook the fact that any approach to cultural phenomena involves specifying what and about which specific or specific aspects, a given approach is cut, delimited or discerned in its relationship to a broader concept of culture.

  The broader concept of culture contemplates the answer to ultimate questions about what culture is as a whole, it encompasses the most general distinctions that distinguish a linguistic conglomerate from a natural, technological and social one, and the modes of relationship of that formation. linguistic conglomerate with that technological and social conglomerate, supposes a linguistic conglomerate in its relationship to a social, city, metropolitan, urban conglomerate, as well as the relationship of that linguistic conglomerate with technological and economic conglomerates, not also disregarding its relations to suburban and rural conglomerates. .

  The most general concept of culture is related to ultimate questions, becoming the question that culture is as ultimate as what is language, what is being, what is space or what is time, this includes language, education, Social transmission and the reproduction of social knowledge through education and the means of information, technology and communication, also encompasses the economy, the systems and repertoires of values ​​related to both that economy and society as a whole. also contemplating the heritage, the repertoire of experiences, and includes habits, customs, traditions and idiosyncrasies, within this broad conglomerate of aspects that the concept of culture contemplates, a concept of culture that we define here as a cultural relativist concept with respect to which ethnicity and race are just two specific aspects with respect to which our concept of culture is distinguished and separated.

  The multiculturalism in the United States that I have taken as a parameter for my previous examples, the 30-pack supermarket, what we live in social, urban, economic, city, technological and community life as multiculturalism is related to the first aspects that we previously saw relative to a general and broad concept of cultural relativist culture itself. This does not mean that the concept of multiculturalism in the United States, while it contemplates a phenomenon of multiculturalism, does not imply, in the same way that the broader concept of culture implicitly presupposes them, those meanings, it means that without a broad cultural relativist concept of culture at the very basis of the concept of multiculturalism that contemplates at the foreground the general social, community and economic principles on which the social and economic coexistence of various heritages, experiences and traditions is based, multiculturalism would not be possible as multiethnic coexistence.

  Multiculturalism in the United States involves coexistence, coexistence and mutual sharing within a more general and broad concept of culture that involves cities, communities and markets, of defined cultures according to their heritage, traditions and idiosyncrasies, which coexist within a society that is as a whole Anglo-American, Anglo-Saxon for its language, English, traditions, values, etc., and American for its latitude, its territory, its values ​​and mixtures of ideosyncrasy, a conjunction of two matrices Anglicity and Americanity which forms This mixture, this new hybridization that is Anglo-American culture, is therefore Irish, English, Israeli, European, Greek, Hindu, Arab, Asian, African American, Latino present at the urban level with their culinary and clothing businesses, their conglomerates of styles and customs, explicit by their presence where social life takes place, automobiles, highways, parks, recreational places, restaurants, universities, clubs, sports centers, schools.

   This multicultural character that is also reflected in the intellectual presence and knowledge, commercial, in books, authors, bibliographies, commercial and university bookstores, libraries, in American corporations multiculturalism is also expressed, explicit just by reading the credits of the teams of production of any software corporation or computer program, is something related to the human, humanitarian and economic contingency that economic and technological globalization contracts at a social and community level, it is an expression resulting from the multiculturalization to which transnational globalization tends. economic, technological and media now and here in the synchronic cut of the social whole, the tendency of globalization to put together cultures coexisting economically, socially and communally in the same human conglomerate, permeating each other in free markets within a society in its Anglo-American groups, it is therefore not a concept related to the process of formation of a specific ethnicity.

   The cultural relativist concept of culture is essential to understand multiculturalism in the United States since without a relativistic concept of culture, which relativizes what a culture is in favor of that which relates them, communicates them and removes them from their supposed essences, the American multiculturalism would not be what it is, it requires that one culture can dress and eat like another, cultures in the market, that you can and should eat Greek today, Hindu tomorrow, Arabic the day after tomorrow, Thai the following week, and the Next, go shopping and put your home in the style of the culture you choose, like if you want to live in the United States in one of those styles for the rest of your life, you have it full of Mayan outfits, for example, you can live like a Arab without being one, like a Greek, a Hindu, or in the American style. Without a relativist concept of culture this would not be conceivable.

   American Multiculturalism, cultural relativist, relativizes cultures understood as stagnant essences or given once and for all in a single way, at the same time it encourages their mutual permeation while also promoting them. The result is expressed, in terms of cities, markets and communities, both for those who live in the United States and the impression of a society in which a variety of ethnicities coexist, as multiethnic conglomerates.

  It is a concept of cultural and social anthropology that encompasses under a cultural relativist conception of a broader concept of culture the coexistence of several cultures in the same social, community and economic conglomerate here and now Anglo-American, not a concept of ethnology that refers to processes related to the formation of a certain ethnicity. The space and time of Anglo-American multiculturalism in the United States is the free market, the American city and community spaces, the space and time of ethnological concepts, such as those of miscegenation and creolization, is the family tree of an ethnicity where the elements of interracial and interethnic relations are contemplated according to a phenomenon seen through its family tree. These are concepts that refer to diametrically different things.

   American multiculturalism is a form of the globalization process, it is like the economic globalization itself that generates it, transnational, transethnic and transcultural, it is inserted in the United States as part of its globalized economic and social reality but it is superimposed, disseminated by fragments , redistributed and proliferated throughout the economic and urban geography of the country, without forming part of the national ethnicity. It would therefore be necessary to distinguish between those ethnic groups that participated in the process of formation of ethnicity in the United States that we could call native, although their origin was in principle given by ancient emigrations, and the phenomenon currently called multiculturalism which is not only later, but which is also modern and differs considerably from that previous process by collecting processes of cosmopolitan coexistence of social groups that are inserted in the American social reality as juxtapositions, an expression of economic and technological globalization integrated in multicultural markets that were not part of that process. originating from phenomena of interethnic and interracial mixaxion that ruined the meaning of the nation.

   One is transnational and global, the opposite of national, the other is national, one is current, modern and contingent in technological and economic terms, multiculturalism, the other is ancient, native and national. The concept of transculturation, however, can help communicate the dissimilarity of references that according to the concepts previously seen, multiculturalism in the United States, on the one hand, and mestizaje or creolization in the Caribbean and Latin America, are diametrically different since they are transcultural. the consequences that arise from intercultural communication both in American dynamics that involve current processes of short-term technological and economic contingency, and in dynamics of creolization or Caribbean and Latin American mestizaje that involve ancient processes related to long-standing native ethnicities.

   After decades of neoliberalism thanks to which, due to its economic, general human and cultural relativist language tending to what generalizes globally and therefore communicates to men, the human instead of the ethnic, the planetary instead of the national, ecosystems instead of cultures, we Americans were together for the first time, among colleagues from high theoretical academia, the trend in recent years to the detriment of neoliberalism can only be understood from the United States, in the sense of ethnographic studies comparative, as a phenomenon similar to Islamic fundamentalism with which I do not intend pejorative meanings regarding values ​​of the Islamic world, but rather to highlight the generality of a culturality that tends to position itself from fixed assumptions of cultural identity essentialisms that close on themselves as ethnicities around of supposed ideologies to these essentialisms, making the social present, with its sociological simultaneity, subject to century-old entrustments, the dynamics of the social present, justified as entrustments of the ancestors and imposed on the new biological generations as eternal debts.

   Cultural identity as a way of seeing and treating cultures is aporetic and catastrophic when, beyond the heterogeneous presence of culturality in societal idiosyncrasies, it is called by representationality or brought to the foreground in the ways of giving or dealing with totalities, where it attempts to generalize beyond its apogee at the community and societal level, to become a representational banner that mediates a mode of relationship, diplomacy or communication that claims totality, it becomes a banner of that which separates and divides, the Americanness of the South in fact. , sometimes, where cultural fundamentalism prevails, tends not to consider the Americanness of the American North as inclusive.

   The concept of cultural relativism arose and was initially developed in the field of European literary criticism, in the studies of comparative linguistics and philology that, from the Royal school, had to discern structural, formal invariances and generality of rules with respect to the relationships between form and culture, language and nature, generality and specificity, then acquiring, regarding semantics, interpretive polysemy, space of pluralism, heterogenization and high differentiation of language and its relationships, a wide scope in areas of socioculturality, it is a initially European phenomenon that later acquired sufficient axiological and structural stability and invariability to be applied with significant accuracy to very distant linguistic and social experiences on the planet. It is a concept that supposes the relationship between language, nature and culture, which is then extended given its structural, logical and formal invariances to meanings of cultural generality that can involve the extensionalization of a concept or an axis of concepts to which they are implicit. a general answer to the question, what is culture and by answering what it is, answering who we are, who we have been and who we could be.

. What is Islamism? It is possible to advance an analysis not only of cultural relativism and Islamic fundamentalism for what they are with respect to culture, but also to investigate how, over the last decades in Europe itself, certain authors have inclined in one direction or the other and what are the implicit assumptions in language theory to these questions, so that when saying Islamic fundamentalism, as when saying cultural relativism, not only and not in the foreground will I be referring to a phenomenon of latitude geographic as Islamism by everyone known in the Middle East, from which of course this concept comes, but I will be referring to those rules of generality about relationships between language, form, nature and culture that as the field of the concept of cultural relativism, that of Islamic fundamentalism supposes.

   This axiological extensionality makes it easier to advance a series of sociological analyzes taking Max Weber as the main starting point and then ethnographic.

  What Islamic fundamentalism is is that it is a social structure of rationality on which social reproduction is based, including all levels of this, language, religion, education and transmission developed according to the evolution of the rationality of the social structures of the West. , the separation of science, religion, morality and art, the social division of labor, specialization and technical and technological development, the development of science and technology, all coming from the West in the structures of that society, the state, The relations between economy and society, the moral structures of reproduction in the family, citizenship in the polis, natural law, civil law and legal law, are appropriated by an instance of charismatic powers that base their popularity on the appeal to race and ethnicity understood from the point of view of the ancestors, that is, according to the long-standing family tree of an ethnicity, the races that participated in its formation.

  The Western structures of rationality are then appropriated in the name of that raciality and ethnicity, turning them against the West. It is not then a question of the simple idea of ​​appropriation of a structure of rationality, but of the name in which this appropriation is developed, an appropriation that in the name of the ideology of the essence of that ethnicity and that race, as an essence that is considered above such structures, although these are structures with respect to human beings in general due to their rationality, and therefore to which structures themselves must remain subordinate.

  Cultural relativism focuses on the stability inherent to the rationality of these structures of rationality and their forms, and therefore, as I said, it develops a concept of culture that does not put ethnicity and race at the foreground, in fact, cultural relativism It is possible precisely because it can encompass in its generality all the other areas that concern culture, without the need to refer or reduce culture to race and ethnicity, it prioritizes the generality of that rationality and therefore establishes this principle of generality as humanitarian.

  Islamic fundamentalism is the opposite, the ideology of an essence assigned to race and ethnicity, itself establishes a charismatic power, like the power of the ancestors of that essence whose mission is to entrust those ancestors, to appropriate those structures. to the essences of that ethnicity and raciality to which the structures themselves will have to be subordinated.

   Charismatic power is established to glimpse, to watch over, to interdict, to intervene, to ventilate, to ultimately monitor those structures of rationality according to the ideology of an essence expressed in race and ethnicity, in whose name those structures must be subject to the name of the lord and the holy spirit, the lord who is not god here, but the cadir of the emirate, the safar, the representative of the inheritance, the representative of the ancestral mission, who, in the spirit has that being, by authority of the charisma, recognized by the offspring as a holy spirit, this in Islamic fundamentalism is called the personification of Christ in the objective man, in the worldly man, the charismatic power watches over an ideology of an essence that the genealogy of ancestors authorizes and with respect to the structures of Western rationality it turns against them.

   Is this possible, to subvert the Western structures of rationality according to which that same society is reproduced in the morality of the family and individuals without such appropriation implying not only something against the West but also the myth against reason?, according to Kristeva, American Californian in Paris, French in the United States and Burgara emigrant in Russia, it is impossible, the Spanish world and everything that corresponds to it in the Spanish language is a world of irrationality. Max Weber in his sociology of religion helps us understand what this phenomenon is like, although it is mythological, Islamic fundamentalism explains it.

   Cultural relativism puts an end to the fact that a culture can never be totalized from any possible or selectable point of view; one point of view is chosen and one result is found, another is chosen and another result is found that is contradictory to the above the two on supposedly the same cultural reference, cultures, like the laws of physics are relative, and nothing can be asserted about them as definitive in any sense other than cultural relativism itself, cultural relativism thus means non-essence, the opposite to an essence, the opposite of elevating an ideology from the essence to representational status of any type that involves groups or social conglomerates, only language presents sufficient stability and language is the same polysemic, plural, irreducible, interpretive, in continuous remaking , cultures are inventions of language and any way of totalizing them in language wants to transfer an essence of language, syntax, phrase, paradigm, phoneme, lexicon, to an essence of culture.

   Islamic fundamentalism is the opposite, the substances of syntax in a language are, as far as the relationship of that language to a given culture is concerned, the same as the essences of that culture and the essences of a culture in Islamic fundamentalism. They are ideologies of the essence regarding the essence of a specific ethnicity and race, languages ​​can only be essential expressions of culture, the latter is subject to ethnicity, race and the worldviews of those related ethnicities.

   Cultural relativism supposes the creation of general societies that are sufficiently homogeneous and coexisting so that all conceivable cultural heterogeneity can coexist in cultural relativist conglomerates, that is, relativizing the fact that these culturalities are essences or ontos, and therefore promoting their relationship, permeate, interrelate, by establishing itself as a principle of relationship, it prevents ideologies of the essence of one of these ethnicities from being imposed on the others, first, and second, from not adhering to cultural relativism that also relativizes their essence as that which rationally fosters and enables the only rationally conceivable way in which cultural heterogeneities can humanly coexist.

   According to cultural relativism, a way in which cultural heterogeneities can coexist is not rationally conceivable if a principle of cultural relativism is not established among them, which by relativizing any essence does not give the essence of any over the rest and therefore establishes as rational the principle of humanity as a principle that must be the same cultural relativist and therefore transethnic and transracial, then, in principle, the humanity of the host ethnicity prevails, in the USA the Anglo-American, of Anglicism, England, of language, the English, and of Americanity, the territory with its consequences in the formation of new mixtures, that is, that which, by welcoming the rest, makes possible in its free markets, communities and society, the multiethnic coexistence that, culturally relativistic, fosters permeability and even sometimes fusion, especially in art and science.

  Transnationalization and globalization is therefore not an expression in itself of one nation or ethnicity becoming transnational over others, it is the expression, like computer language, Esperanto or compatible languages, of a transnational generality of humanity that It is globalized in general human cultural relativism, contemplating cultural heterogeneity as coexisting with and thanks to cultural relativism, it is not one nationality or ethnicity above the others, it is the contingency of the deethnicized and denationalized human, multinational, transnational, multiethnic, transethnic.

   Islamic Fundamentalism promulgates the opposite, the irreconcilable separation of ethnicities and races, thus encouraging ethnicities and races to claim their essences in the general community; its charismatic power, in fact, is established to assert the supreme essence of that ethnicity and race as the essence to whose ideology of the essence these structures of rationality that produce and reproduce Western society must remain subordinated, these, for the same reason, must ultimately be turned against the West, as long as the recognition of The origin of these structures of rationality that reproduce the same society in which they live, leads to the essence of that ethnicity recognizing in such structures of rationality that govern it, other ethnicities.

   Since the ideology of the ethnic essence is what occupies Islamism, no matter how rational the structures in question are, this ethnicity can only fulfill its ancestral mission, the mission of its ethnic essence, and subvert in the name of its essence, the order of that rationality, although the price is mythology, that is, the myth of the redeeming prophet of the essence above the structures of that rationality, this process can only be established through the mediation of a charismatic power, a power that does not respond to those structures of rationality, but to the supreme essence of that ethnicity and its races, from which moment, the emirate, and its temples, the mosque, the cadir, the safar, who is the chosen one and the prophet, recognize it or not, whether he takes the floor and speaks his word, which brings to fruition the prophecy of an ancestor, it is the prophet of that ethnic-racial essence who must fulfill his mission, his entrustment and will govern from then on as a charisma authorized to ensure that supreme essence, whose name is ethnicity and race, above the rationality of any structure, the state, the relationship between economics and society, education, the separation between science, art, religion and morality, the social division of labor , specialization and technique, all these instances of rationality, including science, are appropriated by the charismatic power that interdicts and monitors the imperishable character of ethnicity and race, and promotes that which is universal claimed in the name of their ethnicity and their race, be it for others.

   Cultural relativism progressively deethnifies and deracializes the planet, assumes cultural relativism as the generality of something that, because it is relativistic with respect to the ideology of essences, establishes relativism as the principle of mutual coexistence and interinfluence, interrelation and intercommunication, under which cultures They influence, fuse and progressively merge with each other, as in physics, these are relative, what counts is cultural relativism as a pattern of relationship and a cultural relativist idea of ​​humanity, of the human in a broader sense of culture. not referred to the ethnic or racial. Islamic fundamentalism, in its call for ethnicization and planetary racialization, tends to keep ethnicities and races separated and to call for them.

Vaiven: Hermeneutic of the field

©By Abdel Hernández San Juan

   The Vaivén is an oscillation that occurs and goes from the most spontaneous processes of nature, the swaying of the breeze, the air or the wind that comes and goes, moves the treetops for a moment and then moves away, and it also occurs in suigeneris and recursive ways in social processes, especially those that involve values, values ​​that come and go, prices that rise and fall, supply and demand relations that oscillate, it is expressed in the financial market, that comes and goes, but also in the dynamics of social interaction, and the symbolism of those interactions, taking social conglomerates here and now according to the stability of their structures, coming and going describes the dynamics of the oscillation between what happens to the close-up and then moves away, some call it streak or wave, it collects and releases the coming and going in social and economic processes, both material, symbolic and spiritual, it is what gives the transition from one dynamic to another and is recurrent in the phenomena of fashion and advertising, as well as those related to media cycles.

   The coming and going is also and simultaneously, a concept that reflects how I understand and define hermeneutical work as field work and as writing work, it describes a wandering, the sinuosity of a journey that combines both an intentional process and a natural one. , a voluntary oscillation and an involuntary oscillation, a coming and going, reconciles the interpretive will and the playful indetermination, the random and the motivational in the work of exegesis, the field work when the coming and going can no longer stop. of being in turn and of expressing physical and intellectual mobility together, neither too much of what things are or mean by what they are supposed to be in themselves, nor too much of the unmanifest above the behind or through a latency, the coming and going supposes a mobility that is no longer that of a body, or that of a oneness above the heterogeneity of a multiplicity, neither instrumental voluntarist, nor causal immanentist, as in the breeze that comes and goes, requires the relationship between an intentional wandering, heuristic, moved by a search, and the relationship of hermeneusis to synergy and synesthesia, neither intrinsic or assigned meanings, nor meaningless in entropy or chaos, coming and going describes a wandering in which there are random events, coexistences and returns.

   Vaivén therefore supposes the continuous interaction between the coming and going that things bring, according to which we find them, and that coming and going where going comes and coming goes, it is the coming and going of things, with it ethnography It turns, it turns in the decisive turn, returning to never leave again, to stay, she, who is a woman, long awaited, arrives and remains between coming and going forever, so as never to leave or come again, but to do the two things together and one in the other as in every coming and going, continuous oscillation of an infinite wandering, wandering of one and the one, hermeneutical wandering, and wandering of things, displacement of the body and of reading. As significant as any other concept in anthropology, this, my main concept in ethnography, supposes intensive correlates of objectivity in the social, symbolic and values ​​world, encompassing social and city conglomerates in worlds of daily life, urban, technological or tourist markets, societies very modern or very traditional, or one in the other, in the swing we ourselves modern writers, thinkers and intellectuals are contemplated. This is not how Kula is something that corresponds to a world that is cut out according to the otherness of a dissimilar in a reality other than our own, as if it were on the other side of who we are, have been or could be, rather with Vaivén, like the gaze that comes and goes, ethnography remains itself forever in an infinite vaivén

 Beyond the pages: inscriptions and the ontology of fieldwork

©By Abdel Hernández San Juan

    In recent years I have been developing a series of essays on the concept of inscription, this concept is what actually establishes the emphasis that moves my own literature from philosophy, philosophy of science, sociology and philosophical anthropology, towards Cultural anthropology, in fact, although inscription has been recognized in the past in anthropology, Geertz and James maintained it, theoretical developments in the field of inscription remain completely undisputed, poorly worked on and truly neglected.

   In this essay I propose to extend the scope of my theories on inscription towards a theory on fieldwork, I am going to maintain and discuss that fieldwork is nothing other than a relationship between inscriptions, these inscriptions when we are making The questions from intercultural, transcultural, contemporary and multicultural parameters presuppose us abandoning the thematization of otherness and the other in anthropology. In fact, returning to the meanings of otherness in classical philosophy, we find that the concept of inscription is consubstantial. and condition of ontological possibility of fieldwork precisely because we can no longer thematize otherness nor can we thematize others or the other.

  The other and otherness were a dreamlike delusion, a delirious obliteration of colonial anthropology, anthropology can only be postmodern if it begins by completely ignoring otherness and the other, in intercultural, transcultural and multicultural conditions of anthropology there are only inscriptions and they are the inscriptions, it is precisely the attention to the inscriptions that in itself grounds and makes field work unavoidable and intelligible.

   Let's say that certain individuals maintain that if everything that is around us is exotic and field work occurs right here among us, then why think about field work, it is better to make a sense of our sociocultural worlds and forget the field work, as long as it is our own daily life, it is better to accept it as it is and dispense with field work.

   But what no one could avoid or answer is the fact that as soon as we notice the inscriptions, any sequence of communications, meetings, dialogues, translations, mutual explanations, speeches, sessions, experiences, that is seen and understood from the inscriptions immediately passes. to carry out field work

   In short, what makes fieldwork ontologically are the inscriptions, not the performativity, performativity is undoubtedly a concept of relevance to fieldwork and as he tries to demonstrate, it serves to discuss the ontology of fieldwork, but Seen this way, fieldwork appears as a mentalized strategy, as an action plan, as the relationship between objectives and goals and means to reach them, so that, under the parameters of performativity, although we can discuss the ontology of field work, we cannot find what makes that ontology from within beyond our performative principles.

   Performativity, as I discuss in my essay epistemology, performativity theory and cultural theory, is a specialty of epistemology, the center of its attention is the relationship between subject and object, so, seen this way, it belongs to the scope of knowledge, but not what makes field work ontologically.

   What transforms an experience into field work are the inscriptions, if you have inscriptions in your previously accumulated collection and inscribed in your own limits with respect to what I mean to you with respect to what others similar to me or related to me have meant to you before. you in ways that within your own inscriptions give you the parameters of relevance to decide in what way to mean me, if at the same time, you bring with you, in addition to your inscriptions regarding me, your own inscriptions not only with respect to me, but those that limit and at the same time enhance your heritage, and if at the same time I bring inscriptions about what you mean to me that are added to the inscriptions that I already carry as inscribed by cultural parameters that at the same time limit me and me. enhance, it becomes obvious that we have everything that is necessary for a relationship of inscriptions to unfold between my inscriptions and yours, and that relationship of inscriptions, when it is not just about me and you, makes the ontology explicit and elucidated. of field work

   As much as we want to limit and circumscribe, edit or subject to a framework of analysis, the point from which you speak to me and I respond to you understood as a situation of enunciation and counter-enunciation, you, as much as I, will accept and will accept, that it that comes into play in our communication cannot be reduced solely to what we say to each other, that is, to what is said in the saying, undoubtedly, from the point of view of constrictions and what Stephen calls the co-occurrences that constrain our dialogues, we could turn a blind eye and focus on a topic or defining what the objectives or reasons of our dialogue are, pretending to forget that beyond what we say in the saying, we both have inscriptions,

  Seen this way, although the ideal situation of dialogue is necessary as a modality to illustrate the parameters of intersubjectivity as well as those of rationality, also read relevance in communication, with its necessary consequences for hermeneutics, the model of literal dialogue does not respond or explain because beyond what we tell each other, you bring inscriptions about what I mean to you, I bring inscriptions about what you mean to me and each one brings inscriptions that limit and enhance him in terms of heritage and in cultural terms one in front of the other.

  In short, everything that I am, you are not, and everything that you are, I am not, therefore, between the two there are many more surpluses than the contents, in everything that I contain my saying and you contain yours. In everything that he does not tell me and I do not tell him, everything is drawn in which our inscriptions make us different, but at the same time, only the thought of the inscriptions makes it possible for me to know you and you to me to know each other, understand or study us.

   The above does not mean that the inscriptions are children of lack of communication, they are also present when we communicate and manage to understand each other, they even define what makes dialogue possible, but they nevertheless go far beyond dialogue because they also contemplate the general meaning. of understanding versus incomprehension and without neglecting the latter since misunderstandings reflect all the surplus that our inscriptions bring and has not been integrated, if you do not place me in front of you through the perception of my inscriptions I will never be able to understand it, I will project on you the images that were already inscribed in my own inscriptions, if you do not stand in front of me from your inscriptions I will project on me the images that were already inscribed in your inscriptions and no matter how many times we see each other, you could even invite me to your house and introduce me to your children, let me into your world and try to explain it to me, which I will never give in a tacit, measurable and appropriate way with your culture and who you are,

   to access the moderately arranged possibility that my perceptions of you and yours of me match in some sense from your own limitations and without great ambitions to get to know each other completely, a tacit and modestly adequate approximation of one with respect to the other will not be possible if to understand me you do not start from the objectification of your own inscriptions even and vice versa, without objectifying your inscriptions with respect to me, mine with respect to you and each one's own

    Any culture that is more or less foreign to our cultural parameters cannot be understood without theorizing and without objectifying the inscriptions, let's say, on a scale from high to low, between a New Yorker and a rural subject on the outskirts of Houston, or between a New Yorker and a very intricate village in a South Asian country, or between two people who live in the same city but one in the center and the other forty-five minutes by highway, or between a philosophy professor and a salesman. of hot dogs, or between a lawyer and a carpenter, or between a plastic artist and a filmmaker, or between a hairdresser and an anthropologist, whatever the scale is from highest to lowest degree of strangeness that we are talking about, the putting into The relationship of collections and backgrounds is continually subject to inscriptions, it is the inscriptions that mediate understanding, those that limit it and those that enhance it.

   In conditions of intercultural and transcultural cultural anthropology, fieldwork is inscription, its own ontology is defined by the relationship between inscriptions without others and without otherness rather than in a very loose sense of general classical philosophy the meaning that they have in themselves in the more abstract level the sense of otherness and alterity

   There is no way from intercultural parameters to call another someone whose inscriptions do not coincide with ours, there is only the possibility of developing a cultural anthropology whose field work is the inscriptions themselves.

   There is no way to even deal with the issue of cultural identity without the inscriptions coming to the foreground of attention because only from field work objectified in its ontology by the inscriptions can something like cultural identity be understood deontically.

   Cultural identity, like any form of identity in general, can never be ontological. If it is ontological, it is a catastrophe, fiction, non-coincidence, and it becomes what Stephen would call fatal.

  The discourse, for example, that with the best intentions and ideals, even as he says almost dreamily, cries out for the ethnic, there is no way in which one can work with the relationship between the ethnic and the cultural identity as something ontological in itself without ending in fundamentalisms. ethnicities, without leading, no matter how sad it may be with respect to the beautiful ideal, into self-deception, the only way to find cultural identities is by analyzing them as a result of the study of inscriptions, the ideal of ethnicity can only be achieved through fragments such as evocations in the ethos resulting from defamiliarizations that no longer refer to subjects constituted by effective identities in society since this is seen as a boomerang or scorpion that annihilates itself with its own sting, the fatality of political activism

   to obtain it in fragments is to revoke an experimentality that is not the modernist one to which Stephen referred, but rather one that separates the subjectivity and the forms of the subject that belong to the forms of the text from the effective modes that the subject acquires as a literal subject in the society,

   It is not about giving up the possibilities of the self-recursive loops of self-narratives or the relationships between narratives of experience and objects, it is about these narratives occurring around symbolic settings that are themselves separated from the literal relationship of the subject with the culture. ,

   Here we are dealing with the theoretical discussion not only in that we distinguish between the subject of the statement and the subject of the enunciation that Kristeva referred to in her analyzes on how the relationship of signifiers is a relationship between subjects, as relationships between subjects in the sense Lacanian where the dialogic was understood as an anticipated relationship between the author and an idealized reader as the idea of ​​dialogue culture, but of the Barthesian distinction between the text as a form of subjectivity and what the text deals with,

   That is to say, the subject on which what Stephen calls the whole of the discourse returns and closes is not the one about which we speak in its identity-ethnic or social constitution, but rather a cut between our inscriptions and his that results in an interface that is neither about that literal subject nor about one as a literal subject where cultural anthropology as a text and what it speaks about as Barthes dreamed of plot a third thing resulting from that dance between writing and what is written.

    The result can be nothing more than a therapy with fragments that are neither the whole subject of which one speaks nor the whole one as a subject but something intermediate through mediation and remediation from which a world of culture and an ethos is evoked.

    It is not the same to distinguish that inscribing a culture in the representation is rhetorical but ultimately rhetorical about a subject understood as substantive and immanent, the culture that this text ultimately deals with as the subject on which in the end the discursive whole is closed. and it is intended, as Barthes said, to achieve an intermediate through which it is not that effective subject that is at issue but either the subjectivity itself of the text or, when this is ethically debatable, some form of experimentation that achieves an interface between the text as subjectivity and the subjectivities it discusses

   Inscriptions are therefore ontological conditions of fieldwork and something like fieldwork is not possible without inscriptions.

   ethnicity and identity like any other tropes of immanence and essentialism are here presupposed to be defamiliarized, a cultural anthropology, in fact, is not in a position to be postmodern without defamiliarizations and without therapy, when we defamiliarize we reveal the non-essence and the non-identitarian of the supposed identity, its arbitrariness, for those who so invoke Benjamin and Frankfort, appears in fact as a condition of the profile without equanon of Frankfort, non identity.

   To be truly postmodern, anthropology has to defamiliarize identities and ethnicities by moving beyond them in order to obtain a therapy, the therapy itself is defamiliarizing, it calls aside a representation of the group and as such does not refer to all members of the group nor to their sense of we, but only to those who through the therapy and as a result of it find the evocations through which that we then recognizes itself evoked in the ethos that this defamiliarizing therapy evokes, but The ethos is already elusive, it is an evocation of therapy itself that can only be therapy as defamiliarization, understood as deroutinization as well, and as such around it there is no way to affirm identity or ethnicity as a fundamentalist ontos

   The theoretical thought about the inscription without others is the theoretical thought that corresponds to the anobjectuality to which we arrive after the concept of the observed observer, when we understand that the latter is no longer neither observer nor observed but rather something that is diluted in the total and absolute heteroglossia, as Stephen said, it is an anthropology without observers and without observed

    It is not objectively possible to think and discuss cultural identity without inscriptions, and work with inscriptions is in itself work with meaning. We must say that without making meaning, the ontology of field work is not possible. Giving up meaning is accept the myth that there is a relationship of identity between the representation and what is represented and that identity can be achieved as an effect of the representation that repeats it where apparently one stops thinking about the meaning because one has stopped understanding that the Text can only be a semantic interface between the deep and surface structures that make any text semantic and hermeneutic elucidation,

  Unlike this, because through fictitious identification between the representation and what is represented, it is believed that the substantive identity is captured in the identity of the representation, the effects of reality produced by the text are confused with reality itself, only where it is given to the text. by the real, as if there were identity between both texts and reality, the replacement of meaning by the substantive impregnation of the text by cultural identity can be believed to be possible, that effect or that sensation that we are dealing with the substantial and effective cultural identity of literal subjects and therefore mediation of them with the identity of a culture, is an effect of the representation that produces the illusion that the identity of what is represented is repeated or retained in the representation

   This is nothing more than a fictitious invention, one is not actually in contact with any substantive cultural identity captured as what it truly is out there in the culture, what really happens is that one has an impression through fragments of a ethos that is evoked and as such disappears according to this logic the possibility of finding the whole of culture through its metonymies

   If, conversely, we were to realize that, whether we like it or not, they are always metonymies subtracted from a whole to which they are no longer related but which can be evoked through them, we focus better on the fact that although these metonymies do not retain the identity of the whole to which they refer us, at least we can, in fragments, concern ourselves with understanding that non-identity in repetition can be a therapeutic defamiliarization through which to metonymically evoke a world and an ethos

   The feeling of cultural identity can undoubtedly be comforting at a certain level when it comes to traditions, but if that feeling stops being an evocation of fragments of the ethos and begins to believe that it is the effective presence of an essence or an immanence in which the feeling and the whole are the same thing, the comforting effect is suspended and instead of obtaining gratifications evoked by defamiliarized fragments that therapeutically evoke the ethos, we obtain ethnic-cultural fundamentalisms that give the whole for their representation and as such transform momentary gratification into continuous tragedy

    Substantive identity as an ideology of the identity coincidence between representation and what is represented belongs both in form and content to the genre of tragedy, the substantive identities given by representations are tragic, they are from ancient Greece, through Shakespeare to the present day. .

   If identity is comforting when traditions are evoked, but the latter are not present at the same time, the substantive identity of socially constituted literal subjects is tragic and the incentives of identity are transformed into what a Peruvian critic called the malaise in the culture.

   The inscriptions are nothing more than relations of meaning and the very ontology of fieldwork depends completely on them, which differentiates a man standing looking from inside his cabin over his window to women washing in a community when this is pure life and when it is field work but the inscriptions and what are the inscriptions but semantic relations of meaning.

   We have the dilemma before even thinking about fieldwork as an effective way of being here, there or wherever, when we have to distinguish between our life and our attention to it, when we have to resolve the question we are asking ourselves. sociology phenomenology what is the difference between living life and wondering about it or perceiving ourselves in it, what is the difference between acquiring an experience in life worlds and wanting something more, such as thinking or theorizing the life world, in that simple distinction we already have meaning and semantics, and we also have the inscription that comes from asking ourselves questions of knowledge about what most people only experience in experience,

  The traditional fieldwork scene does not define itself in its ontology except in a way similar to what differentiates a spontaneous body movement from a body movement guided by a script in the cinema where if you move your arms to the right it is because The script tells you, it is not necessary to go as far as imagining the ethnographer as the puppet of a pre-established script, although it must be said and not fail to be sensitive to the fact that there are so many inscriptions that he brings and that inscribe him in the situation that at times according to another logic is often the puppet of its own inscriptions and not of an anticipated script.

   What fieldwork does are the inscriptions ontologically and not only because of that first sociological-phenomenological self-perception that I have remembered, but because if real attention is paid, it is an intercultural and transcultural experience that cannot be avoided even when we want to. or not notice it

    It should be remembered for those who evoke the retro - like Rabinow - that almost all the truly bohemian cultural modernists in Europe did not go to Abyssinia, Taiti, Africa or the islands of South Asia as missionaries but in search of the paradigm lost by the modernity of the authentic, of the primitive, evasively distancing itself from the deafening effects of industrial modernity.

   While Malinowski was in the Trobriands describing canoes as if they were insects and reporting ritual steps as if they were laboratory specimens, hundreds of cultural modernist writers and artists were in Tahiti or Abyssinia in love with their Tahitian women and convinced that they were happier with them than with the white Parisians.

   It would not be as easy as some have hoped - perhaps Leiris could be an exception - to paint Malinowski, who is not the most pathetic, as a cultural modernist, cultural modernists did not describe insects on human faces, they were going to live the life they believed It was better culturally than those who lived in Paris. They were, if you will, already from then on more intercultural, transcultural and postmodern than all of Malinowski's children and grandchildren.

   Compare only the warm, human, understood, involved, sentimental, even homely scenes, the sense of home and customs in their purity as reflected in Gauguin's scenes of Tahitian women with white ethnographers in Melanesia showing with a group of Melanesians the artifact that symbolically represented the price of a bride as if it were the tentacles of a strange insect exposed to the microscope,

  One could of course speculate whether it was not an unconscious search for the terrible insects that Kafka dreamed of. I refer to J W Beattie Hobart's photograph of a Santa Cruz feather coin with the feathers from under the wings of a parrot

    There are no others, no matter how different they are from us or from a us, there are not even others in the most intricate tribe that lives scattered in the forests.

   Transcultural cultural anthropology, the only one that can be postmodern, begins by abolishing the discourse of the other and otherness and instead establishes that fieldwork is ontologically confirmed by inscriptions, interculturality.

   Ethnography is inscription, said Geertz, okay, more than anything else, but it is necessary to add that it is the inscription beyond the pages and beyond the inscription of a culture in the ethnographic text, ethnography is inscription because it What makes the ontology of the field work are the inscriptions and seen this way, both the other and the savages disappear, only the inscriptions remain that make the field work inescapable, an intercultural, transcultural field work in which ethnographies as texts, To use George's phrase, the books we write can only be the result of how the inscriptions were worked with, of how each singular author managed in their work to adorn and weight the inscriptions.

   An ethnography, in short, even, even more so, a cultural anthropology, can only be the expression of how we as field workers, as ethnographers, deliberate, negotiate, ponder and manage to work with the inscriptions.

   A product resulting from fieldwork is undoubtedly also an inscription—in the more specific sense that Geertz refers to, but not only and even less in the sense of inscribing a culture understood as the culture of someone else or of some us, but in the sense that ethnography itself as a text is the result of the abilities we had, of the greater or lesser richness, of the greater or lesser originality, of the greater or lesser imagination with which we managed to relate the registrations,

  The above could ruin the idea, and I prefer here to talk about cultural anthropology, that the latter is nothing more than the result of a translation or a form of cultural translation and that an ethnography like translations would be more or less good in the extent to which it translated more or less well.

   It is not about that, but rather about how the work proposes and what it proposes regarding it and how it deliberates and resolves it.

  Well, regarding this it will be necessary to say that it is not a question here of translating what a text says in one language into another language or of ultimately doing the same thing but instead of between languages ​​between cultures, because the very ideal of translation is constrictive as much as the ideal dialogue, to constrained topics and agreed arrangements for a limited dialogue, understood in this way, we cannot possess the false modesty and ambition of saying that our pages will be representations of what a culture that we have translated really is.

   Truly postmodern anthropology guided by what Stephen called the limits of representation dispenses with and renounces representation and therefore the ideal of exact translation that presupposes bringing to the text, as in any translation, what the other text really is and says, Translating a text is not the same as understanding and comprehending a culture, because in the case of cultures we can believe that we are translating what we assume that culture is in itself without knowing it,

  It is precise and necessary through the theory of inscription to understand that an ethnography can only be the result of an arrangement between inscriptions, only in this way will the result in fact be a little closer to being at least modestly adequate, less crazy, not be the ridiculousness of a conceited text that claims to know what is impossible to know due to the inscriptions, or, as tends to be the most common in ethnography, of a delusion where the culture we believe we represent always appears as pathetically ugly when in In reality it is the opposite, the pathetic delusion that a conceited ethnography derives from knowing what it absolutely does not know and does not understand,

  Seen in this way, the meta-ethnography of pathetic delusions should rather be, as Bachelard said, a psychoanalysis of how ugly ethnography is, where when we say ugly we no longer even say literally ugly, although also because it is pathetic, but ugly because it can only be the object of psychoanalysis. as its only possible metatext.

  A composition of cultural anthropology is a set of composed and arranged texts that ponder a series of deliberations and adaptations through which a given way obtained in field work of working with inscriptions makes ethnography or sociology, As is more the case in my case, or in cultural anthropology, when we compose them that way, a considered proposal to evoke a world of culture, that evocation is itself therapy and as such, the field work, taken outside the pages, continues later in these in an unlimited way because each product, each book is only always the result of a unique, singular and unrepeatable intercultural and transcultural experience.

   Cultural Anthropology and ethnography must thus belong to the thinking of series and serialization where a series of works, books, essays are part of a certain series and others are part of other series. This does not mean that there are no possibilities as well as ideals about Ethnicity means, however, that we should not move from intuitions or ideals to recipes, either in the mode of cooking recipes or in the mode of representational metatextual pamphlets of a certain type of discourse, and much less fall into the temptation of fixing some subjects confusing the theoretical subject with literal subjects in culture such as ethnic groups or exponents of racial or sexualized expressions.

   Postmodern ethnography, as Stephen evokes, is defamiliarizing; it does not intend to fix the subjects according to their identities or their representations; in any case, it only manages to evoke a therapy in the ethos -perhaps something here of what James calls allegories---a through the consideration of a way of deliberating the work with the inscriptions as a result of a field work that is the same ontologically inscription

    She must be at least good-looking even where, as in the point of order or in Koya Language, morphology and patterns of kinship behavior, Stephen is so conscious and careful towards the inscriptions that he decides on a constipated and very circumspect arrangement of the boundaries. that put up the registrations.

     All ethnography in fact, all cultural anthropology as well, even about our own Western cultures and about ourselves, where it is not attentive to the inscriptions is in any case something that results from the inscriptions, which is no less than saying that beyond What is said in the anthropological text, there is nothing to look for in them about the culture about which it speaks in terms of a real knowledge of those cultures, no ethnography anywhere has ever been able to be real knowledge and true understanding of any culture. That this is if that ethnography did not make the relationship between inscriptions the center of an attention to the fact that ethnography can only be an interface of inscriptions, only an ethnography that understands that fieldwork itself is inscription, which is the inscription that makes the ontology of fieldwork and that the study and understanding of inscriptions must be at the center of attention can be something like at most an adaptation that deliberates interfaces on the ways in which it has been resolved to work with the inscriptions.

   Ethnography must be good-looking, not in the exact sense of a cosmetics session in which the ethnographer dedicates himself to putting on makeup and putting makeup on his text so that the agnes on his face is not noticeable, but rather, because what makes it ugly and pathetic to many ethnographies is precisely that they are discourses about the knowledge of cultures that they pathetically do not know, it is therefore a matter of modesty, modesty and moderation to avoid making a fool of oneself or, on the other hand, returning to a truly postmodern anthropology, On the contrary, she must then renounce the cultural parameters of the ethnographer who, from then on, focused on the inscriptions, must throw off all the burdens of his parameters to dedicate himself to intercultural and transcultural work that begins with the very transformation of the ethnographer's culture. The ethnographer here becomes an emigrant and a migrant, -- my experience -- and ethnography becomes dysporic and in diaspora affected by the cultural transformation that involves immersing oneself in the inscriptions now not with a modest modesty but, conversely, with a passionate experience to allow oneself to be permeated. by the culture in question, entering into inscripturalized understanding, that is, intercultural and transculturalized.

   Levis Strauss said that German women seemed very willing to escape the control of their husbands, but he did not say that it was because they were also in Brazil nor did he confess how difficult it is to get a peaceful, relaxed and willing smile from a German woman on the streets of Berlin.

    In postmodern transcultural anthropology, field workers and writers of sociology and anthropology do not have so many exorcisms of their own demons to tell as autobiographies as much to say about what has permeated us from the cultures that have become our own cultures in which our self has been transformed and that returning to the culture of origin is an impossible myth

   even though some of us have had to visit them for some time.

Bibliography

Eugenio, Quetzil The Invisible theater of Ethnography: Performative Principles of Fieldwork, The Open School of Anthropology and Ethnography, Anthropological Quarterly 79 (I)75-104, USA, 

Eugenio Quetzil, Art Writing in the modern Maya art world of chichen itza, Transcultural ethnography and experimental fieldwork, American Ethnologist, Open School of Ethnography and Anthropology, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 21–42, Universidad autonoma de Yucatan, 2004

Eugenio Quetzil, Between Pure and Applied Research: Experimental Ethnography in a Transcultural tourist Art World, Napa Bulletin, 23: 87-118

Geertz Clifford, (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, Basic Books, New York, pp 3–30. [Geertz 1973a]

Geertz Clifford, The Interpretation of Cultures, Barcelona, ​​Gedisa, 1987

Logan Joy, transculturation and affect in the l2 classroom: Teaching English and ethnography in the Yucatan, University of Hawaii at manoa, usa, published at www.osea-cite.org, For OSEA matters please use quetzil@osea-cite.org 

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Between Acerbo’s and backgrounds, en Self and Acervo, the self and the social between writing, research and culture

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Retheorizing Inscription, in Rethinking intertextuality: research method in the sociology of culture

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Rethinking inscription, Pp, the couples of epistemology, practicing sociology, composing anthropology

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, An analysis of transcultural redundancies, en , in Rethinking intertextuality: research method in the soeeciology of culture

Hernández San Juan Abdel, The Model of usa multiculturalism Pp, the couples of epistemology, practicing sociology, composing anthropology

Hernández San Juan Abdel, Transference in etnicity Pp, the couples of epistemology, practicing sociology, composing anthropology

Hernández San Juan Abdel, The Indeterminist true, PP, The Indeterminist true

Tyler Stephen A, Postmodern ethnography, From the hidden document to the hidden document, PP, 183-2º4,

The city, the village, the markets: epistemological parameters on reality and realism in fieldwork

©By Abdel Hernández San Juan

     In his introductory essay on structural anthropology, Levi Strauss mentions a concept that strangely he never returns to in his work, which, however, is of central epistemological significance for the problems that I am going to discuss in this essay focused on displacing the attention beyond the parameters of realism, that is, not only realism understood as a recognizable genre in the stylistic modes of representation, where we develop our images and ideas of reality according to the reality effects that are produced for the representations.

  Beyond this, considering that the infinity of existing modalities of realism are contrary to each other, explaining that realism is nothing more than an antinomy between ideologies of representation, my objective is to discuss a concept of reality prior to representation and that dispenses with it.

  Undoubtedly, any way of referring to reality also presupposes that we understand it, but it is not the same, I think that few would disagree, talking about reality than talking about representation, that is, about the effects of reality produced by the latter.

   Two concepts and only two in the history of theoretical thought as well as in the evolution of all existing forms of empiricism have been related to this principle prior to representation, the concepts of life world and field work, my attention in this occasion is in the last, I propose to discuss that field work is distinguished and made specific precisely and above all just because it presupposes an intramundane world and a horizon of experience prior to and that dispenses with representation, thus being closely related to the concepts of world of life, my concept of the intramundane horizon and the concept of reality or, to put it in Levi Strauss's terms of the realias

    A world of field work is nothing other than returning to the ancients and the classics, a virgin relationship, if you will, between perception and the world that is offered to us as sensitive multiplicities, its epistemological cut is none other than that of the concepts of space and time in a simple and empirical way.

    Secondly, the field work is inscribed in front of and with respect to the philosophical debate on the concept of live reality without the mediation of representation.

  As I have discussed in another essay, what makes fieldwork in its distinction and difference with the life world---although it must be said that fieldwork is a part, a fragment or a series of moments that are cut out in turn within the lifeworld—but what distinguishes it from that are the inscriptions not only as these take shape in the textualized modes of the cultural ethnographies, sociologies or anthropological ones that one writes, but the inscriptions in the culture and outside of the page.

   Seen this way, I would like to analyze next what makes field work is its way of being in the culture, the village, the city, the markets.

    In a relatively recent essay titled anthropology and the city, two anthropologists from the University of California have proposed with respect to the city of Bogotá something similar or similar to what I did with respect to the markets of Venezuela and the city of Caracas in terms of urban anthropology in my ethnographic essay relating the modern with the colonial as well as they have asked about the city in terms similar to those that focused my attention both on Caracas when at the end of my fieldwork I became interested in the city of Caracas as well as later in ninety-eight in Houston when he returned to the cities--, however, despite the similarities in the questions about what difference it makes to write from the city or from the village--in reference to Geertz--or about her, and what it is about of a valuable effort especially where the point is insisted that writing from the city or the village is not the same as writing about them, there are very significant differences between my modality and theirs.

    On the one hand, they take a city as already previously constituted by the discourses that have made it the object of an objective representational referentiality both in governmentality and in general in a series of social discourses that give the city as a previously formed whole, with A social and historical identity like this has been previously constituted and accepted by the discourses of its historicity and its institutionality.

   Unlike this, my conceptualist research model does not take the city as a whole constituted by previous discursive forms instituted by already accepted rhetorics of historicity and by modes of representation related to the rhetorics of realism and modes of governmentality,

   Here, first of all, it is about an experimentation that has abstract concepts at its center and that privileges the multisensory immersive experience of the body as it is collected and experienced phenomenologically; on the other hand, in terms of constructivism in sociology, it is about that research on the city will propose a symbolic construction that is at the same time a reading proposal obtained from that same societal and horizontal immersion,

   From this follows a return to the city with a conceptuality of city proposed by research that refers to the inverse of that previously constituted city, not necessarily to deny or object to it in the way of its instituted representations, but to find other relationships. of meaning that are in turn elucidated and also symbolized but that bring to the construction of the research as scriptural textuality phenomenological issues obtained from that multisensory immersion of the body,

   therefore unique to that immersion and at the same time correlated with the research implicit in the exploration of concepts which have to be philosophically worked and that relate the conceptual a prioris of theoretical abstraction with empirical findings by returning to that conceptuality.

  From the point of view of anthropology, realism has been raised above all in the form of participant description on the one hand and in the form of structuralism on the other.

   The first presupposes a representation of the world as it is observed and cataloged by the description in the “most faithful possible” way, the antinomies of realism made explicit in the fact that its different forms as ideologies of representation of which reality is an effect do not coincide with each other, they deny that such fidelity is possible, understanding and understanding a reality, even more so a culture, is not the same as mimicking its effects in an illusory repetition, it is based on the presupposition that describing things as they are seen is the most reliable way to capture what a reality consists of, I flatly deny this.

   The understanding of a cultural reality is only accessible in a phenomenologically stratified form that requires the hermeneutics of meaning, and as such it works according to parameters other than those that repeat impressions in the representation.

   The phenomenological order that makes this stratification differentiates the appearances of the substrates, understanding a cultural reality is working with those stratifications that are in themselves stratifications of meanings that can only be accessed through understanding, not representation.

   Reflecting a world by repeating impressions through the effects of representations is neither understanding it, nor knowing it nor comprehending it.

    The assumption that the phenomenological order of reality can be transposed to the laws of representational composition through descriptions establishes the main relations of realism with genres through which language is subordinated to reality or must be considered as subject to the rigors and demands of that, placing all the effort in finding the forms of language that best transpose or translate the imperatives of reality to the imperatives of representation.

   Structuralism, conversely, has assumed that by analyzing objective reality through structures that are at the same time abstract models taken from linguistic theory in relation to the objective structures of a reality subjected to linguistic scrutiny, anthropology can achieve modes whose objectivity regarding reality does not derive from a representation or reflection of that reality in the form of transposing what is observed to the laws of written or visual representation, but rather the relationship between structures such as formalized models and objective structures of society, provides the material required to obtain an objectification of that reality rather than its objective representation.

   In both parameters, however, we start from a realistic budget regarding that reality where ultimately what is obtained with respect to it must be objective, thus disdaining the possibilities of subjectivity, imagination, philosophical and reflective abstraction as well as, above all, the possibilities offered by pure conceptualist experimentation focused on concepts where you go to reality with concepts and from concepts.

     Now, given that the model or modality in question here is rigorously conceptualist so that the results of a research are developed around both the empirical and theoretical possibilities offered by working with certain concepts that are chosen in anticipation such as those that govern research, we know that the specificity of the conceptual parameter lies in its tautology, in the fact that conceptualism seems at times to suspend everything related to the understanding or study of a culture or reality to pure concepts, generally subordinating the study of cultures to theorizing about cultures as well as the tautology that is typical of the concepts themselves, I believe that this is something that those of us who are conceptualists must accept and recognize as what on the one hand enhances and on the other limits our research. .

  But although this has always been the limitation of conceptualism, its self-referentiality and its tautology, the fact that everything results in theorizing in an abstract way according to concepts, and that sometimes this appears empty of content with respect to a reality external to the concepts. themselves becoming more formalist than contentist, to the same extent it is their strength since we are less interested in conceptualism in offering an image or an objective representation of a reality understood in terms of realistic representation or transposition, whether descriptive-participant or objectifying structural and more in the understanding that in the first and last instance our relationship to a reality, whatever it may be, is our relationship with it through concepts.

  In fact, we consider that neither realism nor structuralism really manage to understand the reality of a culture that can only be collected in its true dimension through relationships of sense and common sense meanings in the worlds of life.

     The concept of immediacy of the world, in turn, is what has persuaded me to theorize what I have defined as the intramundane horizon; however, in the intramundane horizon, what is phenomenological about a world and what is hermeneutical in its relations of meaning and elucidation that makes this intramundane world different from the concept of reality, because although it presupposes it implicitly, in the concept of reality the emphasis is placed from the perceptual and visual point of view of its phenomenological sense, that is, on the perceptual fact itself. that confirms the relationship between perceiving and what is perceived, and it is precisely this that, despite the real or reality being presupposed or implicit to the intramundane horizon, nevertheless distinguishes and differentiates both concepts.

   An intramundane horizon is undoubtedly a reality, but in it reality is not exposed either to observation or to the question what makes what is perceived real or reality with respect to perception or representation.

    In short, if we say that within the intramundane horizon there is reality, we say it because the concept itself presupposes an accepted reality, but this accepted reality is as given and ongoing, it is not exposed to attention, which in itself already distances us from the concept. itself of reality because, as I propose to discuss in this essay, what makes the concept of reality is nothing other than paying attention to perception, if we stop paying attention to the perception that distinguishes perceiving from what is perceived, it will cease to be a reality and It becomes something else, a world or a universe of which reality is a part but as something tacit, already accepted and therefore already disseminated and diluted into something else.

   To call the concept of reality or more precisely, to call the data of the senses according to the concept of reality is simply to begin to distinguish what separates perception from what is perceived, therefore, if that separation is not the center of our attention it is no longer reality, in fact, perception and what is perceived dissolve into each other just when the fact appears that things make sense to us and become significant to us,

   If the bed makes sense for me to sleep, I integrate perception and what is perceived, I dilute one thing in the other through the meanings. In this way, semantics goes from being more than a simple formal data about the meanings and acquires a cognitive relevance given in which coordinates the meaningful integration of the senses, this integration can only be accessed through understanding and as such results from understanding not from attention to perception, seen in this way, the intramundane horizon is itself comprehensive and refers to a world not a reality.

  What, then, is and how the concept of fieldwork is defined and distinguished from this epistemology, that is precisely what we are dealing with here, the epistemology that does fieldwork, its own cut.

     Let us dwell more precisely on the concept of reality.

     The real is presupposed as tacit as hermeneutically accepted by the meaning that it once gives to subjects involved in phenomenal and interpretive worlds loaded with symbolized and interpreted relationships, since reality is given as tacit, it is at the same time left aside as that on which our attention does not pay attention, the intramundane horizon is not defined in this sense by paying attention to reality in the form of a question or an observation, but rather reality is disseminated in that which is ultimately accepted as presupposed, surpassing it or It goes beyond its mere concurrent principle to that which makes it real or reality in the relationship between perception and what is perceived or representation and what is represented.

  Unlike the intramundane horizon, a concept that ultimately from the ontological point of view refers more to what Hegel called life or the living individual, the concept of reality refers us to or brings with it the presupposition of something that, far from being accepted as tacit is exposed to an observation question whose implicit presupposition is given in the fact that a perception can be more or less close to the object of that perception, even at a given moment a perception that is insufficient or that distorts its object, in this sense the notion or the concept of reality is the same as Hegel maintains a contingent and accidental concept that has at its base the always implicit relationship between the very idea of ​​reality and the notion of possibility.

    What is real or can be is such because it has been or is possible, if it is not possible then it cannot be real, here we approach the ontology of the concept of realias proposed by Levi Strauss.

    At the same time, reality and possibility are so implicit that what is real is so because it is possible and conversely, what is possible is such because it is real or is reality, necessity mediates between the two, and what is presented as reality in definitive is nothing other than the need for a union between possibility and reality because once it has acquired a given form, it has acquired it to the extent that when reality and possibility are united it can no longer be in any other form than the one acquired. In this sense, unlike life, reality is always contingent and accidental even where, together with possibility, it has become a necessary reality and therefore in no other way than what it is, there it is even still accidental and quota

   On the other hand, as we argued a moment ago, the very notion of reality and of the real itself presupposes placing observation or observing right there where in the mere flow of the intramundane horizon we do not consider taking it as tacitly accepted and passing beyond the attention to what makes it reality or real, towards the space in which the world relations and phenomenological and hermeneutical meaning that make up the world of life are plotted.

   Unlike the world of life, the concept of reality presupposes both in an ontological sense – the relationship of contingency, reality, possibility and necessity – and in an epistemological sense, the relationship of perception-perceived, observer-observed, an attention to that which makes it effectively corroborable that deal with a real or a contingently real as opposed to that which could be non-real, unreal, surreal, fictional or imaginary.

   But here, right from the moment we are thinking about the real versus the possible, we talk about the genesis of the real in the realias, the realias are nothing more than this previous moment through which we realize that ontologically if there is something real before thinking In the concept of reality as a crystallized whole, it is precisely the relationship of the real with the possible and the necessary, seen this way, in this cut, we do not speak of reality but of realias as micro levels of the given real.

   The concept of reality is therefore in this sense on the one hand an empirical concept and on the other an experimental concept, since the concept itself presupposes the non-acceptance of what is thereby given to the phenomenal world and the relations of meaning, but rather It presupposes paying attention to it as a distinction between what is real or reality versus what is not or what is unreal.

   The concept itself brings with it the question of corroboration of the observation of whether it is real or not, it is not in fact possible to separate the concept of reality from this question of the real versus the non-real and that is why the concept itself does not It is a concept crystallized as an enveloping whole, but a contingent and experimental concept, the concept of the life world and intramundane horizon in its difference is tacit, it takes the real as accepted and undisputed, it leaves it aside, it accepts it as given and it is ignore it, the world of life and the intramundane horizon are not concepts contingent on a distinction between what is and what is not, or between what is perceived and what is perceived, both things are at once integrated by the senses and meanings are comprehensive concepts where phenomenology and hermeneutics have merged, we are not here but at the very dawn, at the epistemological center of phenomenological sociology, the sociology in which we deal with two things: common sense, as sociology of common sense, and the way we know, the sociology of knowledge.

   We advance with this clarification that the concept of fieldwork can only be theorized as an ontological theory of fieldwork from the sociology of common sense and knowledge, and that fieldwork is epistemologically cut between these two notions, common sense and knowledge

   The contradiction that we have highlighted is implicit in the concept of reality, the fact that on the one hand it seems to designate that which, as truth itself, cannot be anything other than reality and what we accept as such, on the other hand, brings with it that a reality can never be fully addressed by all its parts or accepted as a whole or as a totality, we say reality or the real and we presuppose a certain reality but in this meaning we are no longer saying reality, but we are giving it presupposed as a world or as a mundanity, we are no longer stopped or detained in front of the concept to ask about it, once we do so we immediately perceive that the very concept of reality when we look at it brings with it the observation or the relationship visual between what perceives and what is perceived, what represents and what is represented, then that totality in the same way that Hegel said that we never touch matter, but rather we touch a specific specific matter in relation to a given form, We never touch a reality other than through a determined form, a fragment or a part as it is presented to the senses,

   From this perspective that returns to the concept of sensible multiplicities, the concept of reality is definitely an empirical and experimental concept, as we said, it is experimental not because it is susceptible to experimentality with respect to its opposites such as the unreal, the surreal or the imagination, but because as reality in itself or as the real it presupposes degrees of reality that are given first in the ways in which reality is presented to the phenomenology of its experience in the forms and second because it brings in it the relationship between what is and what is perceived, between what is and what is represented as being and for the same reason between what is in a certain way and the fact that we can represent that way, that is, that reality or that real in appropriate ways. or inadequate, faithful or distorted.

   In this way, the concept of reality, if it is not given as accepted in its tacit generality and therefore surpassed in the concept of the life world and beyond in that of the intramundane horizon, becomes a concept exposed to interrogation in the face of which cannot escape the concept of knowledge since the very idea of ​​reality presupposes its empirical corroboration, it also presupposes and more decisively the mode of its representation, a matter which in itself leads us not precisely to the discussion of reality or of the real, but rather to the problem of realism that refers not to reality but to the forms of its representation and it is precisely when we observe the great variety of forms of realism extrapolated and diametrical to each other that testifies to us about the contingent character itself. and accidental of the concept of reality.

     In fact, if we do not accept reality once and for all and overcome it, but instead draw attention to it in a single way and with a single given form of totality, there would be only one realism regarding it in terms of representation. , but the forms of realism are so far from each other that what is put between question marks is precisely that reality, once brought to the question, can itself be something other than the modes of greater or lesser adequacy

   With this we are not saying that a reality is its representation or that reality has to be replaced by these, rather it is about maintaining, in agreement with Hegel, that the notion of reality does not emphasize anything other than a formality or a form and that Reality as a concept is in itself experimental, therefore the elucidation of the forms of relationship between representation and reality is itself an experimental question that must be subject to reflection on that experimentality.

    In this sense, conceptualism as an alternative to realism or developed as experimentation in its margins, establishes a parameter in which phenomenological sociology comes to the foreground, something that we have discussed before, that is, the relationship between the understanding of a reality and its construction based on fact that it is a world of life and an intramundane horizon and it makes no sense to repeat in language what that reality is in terms of transpositions, the horizon of concepts in their difference places us before the challenge of not interrupting the plane of experience with the plane of representation but rather establish a continuity between thought and being in its relationship to experience vvvvvvvbbbhhyy

  A series of theoretical and empirical questions on the topic of the city that I began to conceive and develop as a result of my field work in the popular urban markets in Venezuela acquired independence with respect to the topic of the market to begin to pay attention to the city in that those markets are located in urban terms.

 The research to which I make references was progressively articulated to the same extent that I was doing my research on urban markets, in the study of these, I had to review visual collections from different periods from the 15th century through the classical world. and modernism to the present of the neoliberal free market and its advertising, as a result, given that the markets on which my attention was focused were always located in certain locations in the city of Caracas, the compilation of images about Caracas as city ​​was taking shape at the same time that I formed a visual memory about the markets, on the other hand, in empirical terms, my field work trips through the different types of market, from when I started at the car wholesaler to all the subsequent in which I immersed myself, took shape in the city of Caracas, all this made me progressively increase my interest in the city now from the point of view of attention towards it beyond the markets, the research to which I make references, due to that I focus on the markets, I did not develop it properly at that moment, but I did start doing a photographic survey together with my friend and colleague Ángel Sánchez from a station that we created together in Galipán, his little town in Ávila, thanks to Ángel and With their help, I took hundreds of photographs of the city of Caracas at that time, which at that time I could not work with but which I kept so that I could return to the subject later, in the year 1998, I announced in Houston my program focused on cities, San Francisco, New York, New Orleans, Houston, and others not included in the program, also contemplating travel

  The city of Caracas had already been, long before I noticed it with the aim of dedicating some research or project that would thematize it, the target of many questions and concerns that over many years from mere life I expressed in different ways to my friends and colleagues, the possibility of articulating a project about cities that includes resuming that first effort with Ángel, is also for me an alternative to also resume my experiences regarding the city prior to having considered the project.

  According to Jean Duvinaud, an idea that I share, the vast majority of large cities were initially formed as interspaces, that is, as places of transit, transfer or passage, from some rural formations to others and they remain fully formed - his analyzes cover the main European cities from the Middle Ages through the Renaissance and the classical world to modern European cities—that is, entirely formed as self-sufficient and self-centered urban conglomerates, a relationship with that rural countryside from which they initially detached.

   The above, when one immerses oneself and above all lives for long years in a big city, is in principle or at first sight difficult to sustain, one perceives that a city is something in itself so self-centered and self-sufficient with its own sensory characters, with its own relationships between centers and routes, itineraries and relationships between bodies and automobiles, between residential areas and recreational areas, between centers of symbolic status and urban peripheries, which is very far away or turns its back on that once rural countryside to which Duvinaud refers the genesis u origin of the formation of cities, but as much as the city certainly seems separated by an insurmountable border from everything that is not it, it is actually an effect of environmental psychology, a modern and urban city can only be falsely defined As a closed system, when we pay attention to the traffic that defines a city we perceive that more than fifty percent of the things that sustain a modern city continue depending on the relationship that the city has on all sides, with the rural countryside, large highways link between a large city and another large city, countless small rural towns from which a significant percentage of the things that usually circulate in a city arrive, or they are nearby estimable towns within a measurable perimeter of that city. city, that is, dependent on it, or from remote towns often dependent on other cities, every city is closely related to its exteriorities and continues to keep in its own configuration an infinite number of things related to that which relates it to what it is not. city

  Thus, for example, a city like caracas is defined through continuous traffic that comes from the market, distribution and traffic from the coast, as well as its exits towards valencia and Maracay, on the one hand, and towards Anzoátegui on the other, at the same time,

  That cities originated around the market thus seems to be true, at least for the majority of them. I would like to close this essay with an example of this as reflected in the testimonies about the Aztec markets of Bernal Castle Days.

The weekly market began to operate before the stars merged with the color of the day. People filled the roads leading to the city and crowded into the canoes heading to Tenochtitlan. Everywhere, inside and outside the city, people were heading to the market.

  The Atox family, like the others, got up at dawn and prepared to go to the market. Since their clan's district was near the main square, they only had to take the large road that led to the center of the city. That road, so called because most of it was built on water, began in the town of Ixtapalapa and extended for five kilometers northward, towards Mexico City. Its outline was so straight and the great temple was so high that it could be clearly seen a few kilometers away. The road was four meters wide and, as it entered the city itself, it was flanked by houses on both sides. Those who entered the city had to pay for the use they made of the road. At the entrance to the city were the Aztec warriors in charge of collecting the toll, which the people paid for part of the merchandise. At regular distances of about fifteen meters, small canals interrupted the road, the cut being covered with a small movable wooden bridge. They were used for defense and to allow the passage of larger vessels.

  Most of the houses lining both sides of the road, and extending in depth, were generally of a single story. The most important ones were built of a partition made with a type of volcanic ash and covered with a layer of brightly painted cement. Most of them had no windows and the only entrance gave to the canals that ran before almost all the houses, where the canoes were moored. You jumped off the boat in a small patio to enter the house through its only door. The one from the atox family was of this type.

   At the end of the road in the center of the city was the large square. The teocali, the house of the Aztec god, was erected in the great plaza. It was a tower more than sixty meters tall and dominated everything. This was what it was planned for, everything looked tiny next to it. The one hundred and fourteen high steps that led to the top were carved into one of its sides. At the top there were two large temples. In one of them the sacred fire could be seen smoking. It could not be turned off except at the end of the year, during the five various days of the Aztec calendar. The priests, wearing long dark robes that covered their ankles, wandered through the temples. It was there where the priests beat the drums every morning to announce the birth of a new day, it was there where they played the sea snails to incite the people to fight the battles of another day.-

   Around the teocali there were other temples and palaces, ball games and markets. That square was so large that its center alone formed more than a tenth of the entire city. More than fifty buildings in the square played the religious, administrative and social part of the city. It extended almost the entire width of the island and was limited by water on two sides. Around the shore stood a frieze of snakes called coatipantli, or wall of snakes, because the mural represented a long, uninterrupted snake coiling to the limits of the plaza. It was painted green and red and was about three hundred meters away.

  On the morning of the day the weekly market was held, all the members of the atox family carried the products they wanted to exchange. The father carried a good number of mirrors made of black volcanic glass, which he had polished. Talking Eagle and his brother had rolled up the duffel bags intended for sale, and were also carrying little boxes made of fiber. The mother and sisters—all expert weavers—carried beautifully crafted cotton canvas on their backs. His slaves carried the corn.

 Not everyone owned slaves, they had to be bought and their price was frequently high. Exslaves were men expelled from their clan for having committed a crime. They had no right to land, nor did they have the protection of the clan. They had lost the rights that the clan granted so they became slaves. , They worked in the fields but did not share the wealth of the house. They slept in the owner's home and were more or less treated like one of the family. There were no rules set about how they should be treated, that was up to the owners. Exslave girls could regain their clan rights by marrying free men. The talking eagle father had never treated them badly and used to tell his children to remember that one of the great Aztec chiefs Itzcoalt was born to a freed slave. By his own merits, Itzcoatl rose to the level of becoming a great tatloani.

The family of eagles that were bent over under the weight of the products they carried joined the crowd of Aztecs that ran towards the market like a crowd of ants. They crossed the wide canal, passed the serpent mural, and turned left.

In front of them the temple pyramid was erected. To the right is the great palace of Montezuman, and to the left in front of the palace is the market. In a corner, where the market judges were sitting under an awning, the stone calendar emerged. It weighed more than twenty-five tons and was so large that no one could imagine how it had been transported from the mainland, across the wooden roads.

  The market, which they called tianguis, was held every week. There was a daily market, where people got what they needed daily, but the major market, the one that attracted people from many miles around, was held only once a week. There were many people who, carrying products on their backs, traveled from their towns, located more than five days away, to attend the market. The talking eagle father, like most people, could tell at a glance where those came from. The tribes wore tunics that distinguished them from each other. Some painted their faces with circles and wavy lines, and decorated their greased hair with red and green parrot feathers. Those were those from the hot land, from the coast, neighbors of the sea. Those who arrived so covered in clothing that they barely showed their faces came from cold lands. They wore simple robes and their faces were wrinkled, like an old leaf.

 Each product had its own place in the market

 In one part, women sitting on mats, covered by a small awning, sold birds and live birds. There were the turkeys, impassive, with their legs tied, the pigeons inside small wooden cages, and the parrots, the owls, the ducks, and the quails. Along with them, the herbalists. The old women who throughout their long existence had come to know the value and name of every herb, root or tree on earth, sold them, taking them out of cotton bags. Herbs were the medicines of the Aztecs, they used them for toothaches, for stomach illnesses, for vision problems, for sore feet filled with blisters from walking so much. The old women said that they had a remedy for every illness.

  The Indians of the warm lands brought jaguar and puma skins, which they spread for everyone to see, they also brought sea otter skins, and for those who could afford them, bat skins, so skillfully sewn that they looked like a single piece of the most fineness of the tissues. They also train live birds and animals for the Moctezuma Zoo.

 Next came the salt sellers, the poorest of all. They spent their time extracting it from the lakes that surrounded the city. They poured the salt water into a shallow container and waited for it to evaporate. They would then clean the thin layer of salt left in the container, put it in clay dishes and sell or exchange it in the market.

 A large space in the market was set aside for those who sold corn and other plant products from the land. That space, naturally, was in high demand. The Indian who had beans to sell and needed corn instead would sit in front of a corn merchant, open the sack of beans and show them for him to examine. The other squeezed them on his fingers, broke one in half and ate it. If it satisfied him, he could perhaps offer half. Of his corn for all the load of beans. Then the haggling began. Each person sitting in front of his sack argued incessantly, and sometimes they raised their voices to such a degree that it seemed as if they had become angry. If they raised their voices too much a market judge walked up and down between the rows of sellers and buyers. If a real difficulty arose, they fixed the matter immediately. If those who argued came to blows, the Aztec warriors would come and the person responsible for the situation would go to jail.

 The Aztecs didn't have money, but they knew the value of things. Value was what each thing meant to an Indian. An equal amount of corn had more value than an equal amount of beans, because the corn that swells when sewn could be used in many derivatives, thus, if the corn had a value double that of the same amount of beans. Gold and silver were highly valued.

 The most precious thing for the Aztecs was jade. Beautiful green stone, it was found in the southern mountains, near Guatemala, and was very rare. They considered it a symbol of good luck and its green color was the symbol of fertility, since living things were green. When an Aztec died, they put a small jade stone in his mouth. They believed that jade was their other heart. All of this had value, even if it was not monetary value.

  Later the cocoa bean was used as currency. The cocoa, from which they made chocolate, came from hot lands. The dark seeds, three times larger than the black bean, are found in large pods of the cacao tree. For an Aztec, the most wonderful drink was chocolate, it was an Aztec passion. First, they roasted the grain, then ground it to a powder, mixed it with water and flavored it with honey and vanilla, spinning wooden wands in the liquid until they produced foam.

Montezuma used to drink hundreds of glasses a day. It was strange, because the cocoa had to be carried from a great distance. Someone used it as currency, a thing could be acquired for as many or as many cocoa seeds.

  The cotton market attracted many, particularly women. These were weavers, and cotton was a luxury. The mother eagle who speaks went to that part of the market accompanied by her daughters. He pays for his place by delivering, to the one who receives the rights, a certain quantity of spun cotton. Mother and daughters arranged their fabrics on the mat and sat down waiting for the buyer.

Before the Aztecs used cotton, women used maguey fibers, with which they made fabrics. This plant, almost as useful as corn, was found throughout Mexico. It grew to the height of a man, with thick, green, moist leaves, provided with sharp thorns like pins on the edges. In fact, Aztec women used them as needles. Once dried and combed, the maguey stalks produced long, highly resistant fibers. By separating and combing them, the weavers obtained a strong thread that they used to make tunics and loincloths for the men and their dresses for them. They also used the maguey fiber to make ropes, handles and many other items for their homes. This plant was also important for another reason, inside the thick and hollow stem there was a sweet liquid, maguey honey. Collecting it and letting it ferment The Indians made octli, a type of very strong beer. The maguey was of such importance that the Aztecs gave it a special goddess.

 Cotton could not grow in the highlands of Mexico. Until the Aztecs conquered and settled, other tribes settled in the warm valleys did not have enough cotton for their needs. Cotton fabric, once a luxury, soon became a necessity. Now everyone in Mexico wore capes made of cotton.

  The Aztecs received cotton as tribute from one of the three hundred and seventy-one tribes subject to them, and it went into the hands of all. First they carded it, then they spun it and turned it into delicate fibers using a manual comb, a procedure that all the girls knew when they were barely eight years old. Then they dyed the threads.

  They obtained the dye from some vegetables or the natural dye of certain marine species. The red of the seeds came from achiote, the carmine of insects that the Aztecs raised, as if they were cattle, on the leaves of the maguey. The black one was obtained from the seed of the genipapo tree. All these natural and vegetable dyes were for sale in the market. When they had dyed the cotton thread, the women wove them and made clothing for their families. There were no factories, women wove in their homes, in their free time.

   In the talking eagle's house there were three looms. They were of the waist type, so called because a belt, which the weaver passed over her back, held the weave of fibers while she worked. One of the first memories that Talking Eagle had of her mother was watching her knit in her free time. She and her daughters naturally made more cloth than they consumed, and sold it in the market. Every market day, on flea market day, she occupied the same place on the same mat and waited for someone to buy or exchange for other items. . And since his work was known for the beauty of its colors, and the woven drawings of animals and birds, people always went to his stall first. This way I obtained more raw cotton, this way I had the means to acquire pieces of jade, live turkeys or ducks, and everything that made life more pleasant.

  There were a variety of things on the market. Large stacks of paper for people to make various objects with. There were the gold and silver merchants, who offered transparent goose feathers. Others sold feather fabrics, in which the feathers of rare birds appeared forming a fabric, so that they produced the effect of a feather mosaic. They were very expensive, but all warriors liked to cover their shields with those feather fabrics. Other Aztecs were artisans who worked precious stones. They offered these turquoise and green stones in the form of wonderful mosaics.

  They had long rows of pottery plates and bowls. They made clay, painted it and fired it over a fire to give it the consistency of metal. In that part of the market you could get the kind of thing you needed, from the largest to the smallest, from those that would barely contain a hummingbird egg to those capable of hiding a tall man.

  Food was sold elsewhere in the market. There were all kinds of foods known to the Aztecs, as well as others of a strange and new nature. And if you wanted to have your long black hair washed, the barbers were also there to do it. They washed it with the roots of the soap stick and perfumed it with oils extracted from sweet-smelling flowers. They shaved with razors made of sharp obsidian.

  But barbers were, however, for the elderly. Most Aztecs did not have facial hair, and having it was considered ugly. By nature, Indians have little facial hair and Aztec mothers put hot cloths on the faces of their young in order to prevent the development or kill the few funicles that could one day grow. And if a transgressive hair appeared, it was immediately plucked. However, for unknown reasons, as Indians age, hair begins to sprout in places where it had never grown. The old men, then, filled the barbershops.

   At noon, when the sun was burning and the sellers took refuge under the awnings, the merchants, or pochtecas, arrived.

   They had been waiting impatiently for them, since their arrival was equivalent to a spectacle that was half circus, half religious procession. The column entered the market from the side of the stone calendar. In front, the warriors blew their seashells, which bellowed like muted trumpets, followed by caged wild animals carried on poles by the Indian carriers. Next came the conjurers, almost naked because they were wearing a loincloth terrifyingly painted with purple and red signs. They threw long logs into the air that they recovered skillfully. The people murmured in admiration until one of those logs fell and a very short hunchback with crooked legs quickly grabbed it with one hand. The log was made of balsa wood, almost as light as air. Let the Indians laugh at their own credulity. Then the pochtecas arrived, walking slowly with great pomp. Each of them carried a curved staff, their robes, tied in Aztec fashion, were magnificently woven made of the finest materials. In front of them walked some Indians equipped with fans with which they chased away the insects, and behind them, forming a long queue, so close to each other that they produced the effect of a coiling snake, were the carriers. Everything that entered and left Mexico entered and left on the backs of the Indians, since the Aztecs did not have pack animals. The carriers carry thirty kilos on their backs, which they carried by resting the strap that held the load on their foreheads.

   The merchants arrived from the southern lands, after an absence of several months. They arrived from the fabulous lands of Guatemala loaded with cocoa, jaguar skins, birds, dyes for cotton, jade and emeralds. Foreign trade was in their hands. Merchants had their own guild, and guild rights passed from father to son. They owned their own clan residential session and paid no taxes. They worshiped their own gods and whether inside or outside Aztec land, they had nothing to explain about their behavior.

  Their carriers transported to other lands the objects made by the Aztecs, mirrors and obsidian knives, metals for grinding corn, mosaics of brilliant stones, wonderfully carved and polished pieces of jade. In exchange for this, for feather fabrics and salt bread, the merchants received objects made by the people of other lands.

  At dusk, people began to pack their things and prepare to leave the market. They returned to their homes and prepared to visit other markets outside of Mexico. These were celebrated on different days, spaced far enough apart so that the Indians could attend them with objects to sell, buy or barter.

  When the market began to lose interest for him, Talking Eagle went with other boys from his clan to watch the warriors playing tlachtli. This game was similar to basketball, and the goals consisted of circular stones with holes in the center. In towns where there was no playing field, or they did not have that stone, the boys trained by making a hole in a basket. The large ball court stood in front of the temple, it was rectangular in the shape of an i. In the center of the long courtyard, located on a wall about five meters high, were the stone baskets. They had to pass that goal with a vertical throw of the ball, not horizontally, that's how the boys learned to play. At the top and around the entire courtyard of the tlanchtli were seats for spectators. One end of the patio was decorated with frightening stone snakes. That's where Moctezuma sat when he went to the game.

 The game was played with a hard rubber ball the size of a small melon, because the rubber ball had to be passed through the hole in the stone, the warriors played with their elbows, knees and hips protected with thick fabrics. It was a great success to get the ball through the basket.

  The tlachtli was very old, so old that no one knew who had invented it. It was played from the depths of Central America, in the lands beyond the Mayans, to the far north, more than a thousand kilometers to Arizona. It came from the rubber of the hot lands, from the Olmec people, said the guy with the talking eagle. Maybe they were the inventors of the game. Everything seemed to indicate them that way, but no one knew for sure. When the warriors left the large field, the boys entered it and, taking an old rubber ball, tried to do what they saw the players doing. Finally someone made the ball over the snake wall and fell into the canal. Talking eagle climbed the wall and rescued the ball from the water. When he stood up he found himself facing the great monztezuma.

  Surrounded by his guards and leaning on their arms, according to Aztec custom, he headed to the market to see what things the merchants were bringing from the south. For a brief moment, terrified, the talking eagle looked at his face, then, as custom ordered, lowered its head and eyes.

Pass by Moctezuma, towards the teocali

Bibliography

Bernal castle days

The market, pp 41-56

Victor W Von Hagen, The Aztecs, Basic Cultures of Humanity, Popular Notebooks, Editorial Joaquin Mortis S.A, Mexico City, 1964

Habermas Junger, The program of comprehension in social sciences, the theory of communicative action, beacon press

Habermas Junger, The problem of understanding in social sciences, theory of communicative action, Taurus

Hernández San Juan Abdel, The intramundane horizon

Hernández San Juan Abdel, The Correlato de mundo: interpretant and structure in postmodern cultural theory

Hernández San Juan Abdel, Thinking Science: new phenomenological avenues between philosophy and sociology

Hegel, reality

Hegel, life

Hegel, the living individual

Shutz Alfred, On multiple realities, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 5, No. 4 (June, 1945), pp. 533-576; Published: by International Phenomenological Society

Shutz Alfred, the knowledge in the worlds of everyday life, edite d by ilse and Thomas Luckmann

Strauss levis Claude, realias, in introduction, structural anthropology

Zeiderman Austin and Andrés Salcedo Fidalgo, Anthropology and City: Towards a critical and historical analysis antipoda nº7 July-December 2008 pages 63-97

Metropolis and provinces: the art of oscillation between the familiar and the unfamiliar

©By Abdel Hernández San Juan

  My starting point contrasts, as I did in my work The Market from Here, not without once again mentioning my admiration, as towards Stephen A Tyler, towards some essays and works by Geertz, many years ago, to the meanings of Clifford Geertz in his essay Being Here, who in my opinion wrongly divides the world between developed countries and emerging countries, to instead return to a conceptual pair that is paradoxically much older, but in my opinion the one that best fits what is being discussed in definitively and ultimately, this is the relationship between metropolises and provinces.

   In short, the relations between developed countries and developing countries repeat, in my assertive point of view, the same principle that takes shape in the relations between large metropolises and provinces within the same country, be it more or less developed in its economic or technological aspect.

   This principle assumes that what can be a metropolis in some countries in relation to its provinces, can be a province in relation to the large metropolises, while at the same time it assumes that some metropolises in provincial countries can sometimes be more or less metropolitan or provincial for the purposes of large metropolises that are provinces within those countries in which the large metropolises are located.

   In summary, the appropriate parameter to understand from the large metropolises the phenomenon of other countries and cultures is found within the developed countries themselves, in looking towards their own provinces is the answer, in the same way that large cities in states United, according to the parameters of those who do not see them from the large metropolises, they turn out to be provincial for the latter, the level of greater or lesser provincialism of any countries and cultures throughout the planet is proportional to the level of greater or lesser provincialism that they can represent. For this great metropolis within its own country, the scale that goes from less cosmopolitan or more provincial metropolises, to explicitly provincial cities, to even more provincial villages, to even more provincial country towns, is what works here.

   In short, more than 95 percent of the dilemmas of all kinds, social, cultural, ideological, that confront the large developed metropolises regarding the planet, here in a rationalist sense, are exactly the same types of dilemmas that are confronted within the developed countries between large metropolises and provinces, this in terms of what gives rise to them, why they are generated, what is at the base of them, what is their type, what is the appropriate way to pursue their logic in a correct way, both in the sense of compass precision, where to go in reasoning, as in that of collections and backgrounds, to understand what it is about in the first and last instance. Only an adequate theorization of the province, of the very concept of province and of the relationship between the metropolitan cosmopolitan, the capital and the provincial, extending to the villager and the townspeople, can put an end to the adequate way of understanding this problem.

   Analyzed from this point of view, in my opinion the only one with objective and objective rationality, the whole question must be retheorized and rediscussed again.

   Let's ask about access, a central question in anthropology, whether the anthropologist has access or not, has or does not have and in what ways or according to what logic, a direct relationship with a certain city, community, village or provincial culture, answering it through The question about what level of access a capital resident can have in a province and vice versa, in my opinion, is exactly the same issue.

   To exemplify this relationship, I tried to illustrate it not so long ago to some friends and colleagues through the situation experienced by a resident of the capital or metropolitan, who suddenly arrives in a small town or city; the level of greater or lesser provincialism is relevant here.

   Let's imagine a situation completely outside the field of anthropology and social sciences, this man from the capital is not suddenly in the little town because he is going to study it, he is there for a variety of other imaginable reasons, he may have a friend or a group of friends who They live in that province and go for him or her, you can have friends from the capital who have friends in that province, you can have relatives who live in that province, or you can have friends who have relatives in that province, this would be a precise way of a relevant relationship, suddenly he walks through the streets, but he goes with this or that person known to him and to the people of the province, they could be friends or they could be family members, this would be a relationship that she herself would propose a series of issues, even not social sciences, just ideological.

  Let's imagine other potential relationship situations between capital or metropolitan residents and provincials, not only metropolitans who operate in provincial realities, but also vice versa, situations in which provincials operate in metropolitan or capital contexts.

  He can be a stranger, someone who is just passing by, an adventurer, someone who is relatively searching for the world, relatively traveling, relatively adrift, relatively in search of something, he can be more or less oriented, he can pass by in search of something. , something that may be there or may not be there and that may only be a place that it encounters, through which it has to pass, some specific circumstance takes it there, it may be as if passing through, heading towards other places, something that You will define from the beginning the meaning and reason for your stay, you can go in search of a love whose direction has gone astray, you can go in search of someone you met, it can be in search of something precise that informs the meaning and reason of your stay. be of his own character as an outsider.

  The capital or metropolitan stranger can also come to the province simply because he wants to know it, this relationship of knowledge can be more or less accentuated and in this way brings him closer or further away from another way in which the capital resident can be in the province, tourism which would in itself be another mode of relationship.

   The relationship between metropolis and provinces, however, itself supposes an entire axiology which provides both concepts and their relationships with their senses and meanings, as well as with their nuances and mutual interconnections and interdependencies. In short, they are two concepts. or notions that need each other, without provinces there would be no metropolis, nor the meaning that informs this notion, we say metropolis and capitals, because we have provinces, and conversely, we say provinces and when we say it the semantics of this word is filled with meanings because it presupposes and requires the meaning and notion of metropolises and capitals, metropolises are metropolises with respect to provinces, imagining a world without provinces would thus be impossible, because even as I said, some metropolises are provinces for other metropolises, if all the metropolises that They are provinces for other metropolises, they would stop being provinces, they would stop being metropolises, and they would become something else that is currently impossible for us to imagine. If all provinces stopped being provinces, they would become metropolises, but by being metropolises they would be provincial metropolises. for other metropolises and so on.

   The province is a province because it looks towards the metropolis, it looks towards the metropolis because it wants to be a metropolis and stop being a province, however, it wants to be a metropolis from its sense of province so that although it looks at the metropolis, it seeks in itself that which can make it a distinguished metropolis either while it is not a metropolis or in the process of being one, in its relationality, being a province in that which distinguishes it, in the process of looking at the metropolis, the province forms itself from an ambiguity that is itself constitutive of the provincial situation, in looking at the metropolis there is something in the province of that which wants to stop being one thing to become another, the metropolis forms in a certain way for the province an ideal, an idea of ​​how they should or where things should go, while at the same time, it wants to become according to the sense of its self, it wants to stop being one thing to become another, but not the same, at the same time, paradoxically, according to a continuous looking towards itself as it would be seen according to the metropolis, this relates it to the metropolis in a precise way.

  The metropolitan who arrives in the province is ineluctably a stranger, but not just any type of stranger, he is a stranger with whom the province maintains an ideologically complicated relationship. To the extent that it is the metropolitan and is at that moment in the province, the province is at the same time facing that towards which on the one hand it looks, which in a certain way it wants to be, but facing that which on the other hand he wants to recognize it and as such, to recognize it in its distinctions, for this reason, towards the interior of the deep province, although the metropolitan symbolizes that towards which the province looks, its direction, its ideal, on the other hand, It also symbolizes what it is not, what it should move towards and therefore what it lacks.

  This situation of ambiguity and this relationship to a lack then makes the relationship between provincials ideologically complicated, since those who pay great homage to the metropolitan, are ideologically seen by other provincials, as those who renounce their distinctions, values ​​are understood to see it in its greatest form. generality, of whatever type, economic, linguistic, idiosyncratic, social, cultural, educational, architectural, traditional, memorial, in favor of the values ​​of the stranger, while those who claim less homage to the metropolitan stranger, are for the previous retrogrades , reactionary, tending to prevent what, on the one hand, defines the province, its relationship to the metropolis and the mutual relationship between the two that we saw before, and what, on the other, tilts the province towards the metropolis.

  But this ideological complication is not only expressed in the deep province among provincials, it also and above all informs the ways of direct relationship with the foreign metropolitan, who never looks good, neither for those who exalt him in the province, nor for those who deny him. .

  He who exalts him expects his exaltation to be recognized by the metropolitan so that the latter, in no variant and no matter how much he does, never looks good; he who denies him expects the metropolitan to reverse the relationship, to deny himself, showing The maximum humility, thus, instead of looking towards the metropolis, expects the latter to recognize and value what it considers its own to the province and, therefore, the metropolitan, no matter what he does, never looks good.

  The relationship between looking good and not looking good simplifies things quite a bit because it refers here only to a situation in which exalters and renegaders only expect less or more in a simple relationship of recognition of what is theirs, while, for simplifying things further, is still a question that arises at other levels, for example, in a variety of situations in which, given the relevance of the situation, it is not precisely a matter of recognizing or not recognizing, but rather situations in which simply the behavior of the metropolitan is being observed and will be evaluated in a provincial situation and or conversely, situations in which the provincial behavior is valued in the metropolis.

  But whatever the way, it is in the nuances between this being more or less good that all the ideological problems of consideration are discerned both for ordinary situations of daily life between metropolitans and provincials, and for relationships defined by the social sciences that by We will leave the moment for later.

  In short, a very high percentage, not to say decisive, almost 100 percent, of the things that have accentuated the estrangement, versus the mutual interrelation, between subjectivities of the metropolis and subjectivities of the province, and by derivation, between objectivities On both sides, it is related to the way in which this diatribe has been carried by immediate ancestors to the current generations, that is, previous to those of us who are the youngest and those who are even younger, including here also the accentuation of estrangements and exoticizations. between metropolises and provinces.

  To defend my point of view I place two experiments, one first not precisely around mundane situations of daily life between metropolitans and provincials, but rather between artifacts of material culture, the levels of greater or lesser familiarity or estrangement, habituation or strangeness, towards precise forms of material and visual culture by discussing them in their contexts and outside of these, doing both, transposing metropolitan artifacts to provincial contexts and provincial artifacts in metropolitan contexts and vice versa, phenomenologically contrasting modes of subjectivity and perception towards metropolitan artifacts in contexts. metropolitan and provincial into provincial, moving for each of the variants, their potential evaluators.

  That is, evaluations made by provincials in the metropolis and by metropolitans in the province, taking as an ethnographic starting point the fact that my provincials are not entirely provincial or are provincial in some circumstances while metropolitan in others, as my metropolises are not. they are so much, or they are so in some senses, and in others not, or because of their relations to other metropolises, and conversely, my metropolitans are not so so, or they are so in some circumstances, while provincial in others, without exclude highly contrasting situations, subjectivities and perceptions, towards the same artifacts in the two types of situations in their contexts and outside of them, by extrapolated perceivers, a New Yorker and a Tokyoite versus a peasant and a farmer, for example.

  At the same time, the effects and scales of estrangement and phenomenological familiarization are different, both in the aesthetics and in the impression perceptions towards the same text of theory of technology and the same text of explicit ethnography by simply showing the ways in which an essay on high technology written in Havana can be read, my attention here towards phenomenological impressions, as a lifestyle in Berkeley, as a fashion catwalk in New York and as cutting-edge technology in Havana, as an ethnography essay written in Houston, can be perceived as a writing by a marketing specialist made by some modern advisor on the financial market in the international monetary fund aware of the multi-situated nature of discourses and bodies in global displacements, among provincials who are not so provincial or metropolitan that they are in relation, or as an ethnography written by self-conscious natives of Melanesian New Guinea in terms of their phenomenological impression, this for a fine and well-informed avant-garde sensibility in fine arts, for example, or for a subjectivity not entirely persuaded to stop asking about the origins of the world capitalist market, for example.

  My purpose is not to say that things are themselves, lifestyles, fashion catwalks or cutting-edge technologies, marketing financial advice or native Melanesian ethnography, not to take for granted a single way that is definitive about a given form of visual and material culture, quite the opposite, my objective is to relativize the fact that things are in themselves in a way to resituate, objectify and retheorize, the ideologies on which the relationships between the familiar and the the strange, the type of ideologies that have been behind these productions of the effects of estrangement.

  Subjectivity can also close on itself where the social situation makes it explicit to close what is different from the stranger, for example, and make explicit only what is equal and similar, or vice versa, as is to be assumed in that look from the province to the metropolis, this It is something that I clearly understood, for example in Texas, beautiful Jevas customs on the outskirts of the big cities, attractively chic at night to spend in the mud and gramour by Houstonians, painted as if in disguise in the night spots of downtown, very reserved to glimpse its customs, while on weekends proud celebrants of its exorbitant and very sensual beauty wrapped in its fine traditions during the day in nightlife places in its small towns and surrounding village places of commerce, when it is the Houstonian or another metropolitan who comes to enjoy the meals, dances and costumes.

  During the display, for example, of artifacts and visual forms, as well as costumes and body attitudes of the Tejano idiosyncrasies during the commercial celebrations of the rodeo, the Tejano culture celebrates its values ​​despite finding these at the rodeo exposed for sale, there the Subjectivity unfolds closed on itself while it is celebrated festively in its rituals while these same aesthetics are reserved and notably pass into the realm of shyness when in the relationship to metropolitan subjectivities in mole businesses and corporate business settings, They involve visits from people from Chicago, New Yorkers or Californians, these interactions require a more moderate and less expressive attitude in the ways of communicating urban, social and cultural Texan rituals such as these are celebrated in the rodeo, as in the example I explained before. , the same girls, proud celebrators of their fine traditions wrapped in sensuality in their small town businesses on the outskirts of the big cities in Texas when it comes to Houstonians and Dallenses who come to these little towns, on the weekends they become completely homogenized chic girls and painted with social cosmetology when they visit big cities at night or on weekends, requiring a more homogeneous attitude from them.

  It is interesting, of course, the type of aesthetics in the costumes and body modes that ruin this Texan adaptation to the homogeneous standard where the idiosyncratic should be not so explicit.

  But the relationship is not always one between what is closed unfolds and what opens is folded or retracted, since in these examples what is unfolded is closed not in the sense of closed to a strangeness, but in the sense of showing itself. as it is or as it ideally enjoys being in its distinctions, also to that strangeness, and requiring it to be inclusive, what folds itself does so to open itself where strangeness cannot govern the mode of the relationship and requires rather familiarity, a sense of belonging, reduction of strangeness.

   My concept of cultures is relational, I consider that cultures do not have ontic essences, but rather species of reservoirs of heritage and backgrounds which are or work as relational arsenals, what gives peculiarity to cultures in terms of customs and idiosyncrasies. refers, it is not an immobile, immutable essence, given in a way, it is not an ontos of that culture, it is a reservoir of peculiar processing that has formed the heritage and the background of a certain regularization, this regularization is fickle, permeable, modifiable , relational. The concept of heritage is the one that best explains how cultures retain a reservoir and at the same time display it, communicate it and relate it in relationships of both familiarity and strangeness, of self-reflection and openness, of celebration or festivity and of fusion to that which makes up their horizons and ideals, their where they look, their sense of telos.

   As in the relationship between metropolises and provinces, central at an epistemological and axiological level here, cultures always look towards some place, and that place towards which they look is always given in horizons of ideals or telos that suppose what permeates them and with which which permeate, cultures are the opposite of closed systems, a closed system cannot be a culture, where any system, whatever it is, closes on itself, culture dies, cultures are relational conglomerates, like heritages, the heritage It is its reservoir, a culture lives in a heritage, the heritage is like the flash memory of the gathered information, it is the living memory of the culture, in it, the culture remains in its modes, both passive and active, they are phenomena of pure Communication, its basis is in language, it originates in intersubjective communication, and is a phenomenon in continuous mobility and circulation, social phenomenology and subjectivity.

   The situation of estrangement that extrapolation means is essential to culture in both ways as self-estrangement and as openness to that stranger as for the first time that symbolizes so clearly the image of the metropolitan who arrives in the province. The relationship between metropolis and province is epistemologically vital and essential for the theory of contemporary culture, it is at the center of the structural and generative genesis of the subjectivity that defines our contemporary world and the relationships between modernity and traditions, regardless of whether the We bring or call the text in some essays and ignore it or not call it in others.

   The example I explained is an experimentation with ready-made around my exhibition La Mismidad that I have been working on from Houston during my life with my partner of six months Carol Kelsey after we left the room with the Filipina in Westheimer, first months of 2003 in the which I display my photographs from '98 and new drawings. Here the scene puts together photographs that I took of the Berkeley carnival, Photographs of the Boulevard Markets in Berkeley, photographs of Down town Houston, some images in everyday life, and a laptop lup of stagings of stagings in scenes of my cousin Robertico with his gigantic group which precisely from a visual point of view recreates the entire aesthetics of the carnival and the circus.

  My goal with this preliminary scene is to communicate my own community and city in Houston, Texas, with my doŵn toŵn, a city that is mine and I feel mine, while also showing those communities further away towards the Pacific, Berkeley carnival, markets in Berkeley, etc., in which I interacted through short trips, a month, two months, feeling, however, a great affinity towards them, even wanting to live there, at the same time communicating to a passerby who does not know them, the sameness symbolic, visual, cultural and societal of all this and of myself in these circumstances, surrounded by the carnival and beautiful markets splendid in colors and values, also relate the circumstances of my cousin and those of these festive events, at the same time I have to contrast that social, subjective, visual, aesthetic, formal sameness, in subjectivity, with the opposite contrast, the ready-made of the almost lunatic image of Houston's down town, an image that paradoxically has an affective meaning for me, because it had and seen in my daily life for many years in my intellectual and emotional life in Houston, one that is seen when you come from wherever you are in Houston, which is, paradoxically, out of its context a symbol of exactly the opposite of the familiar, here the meteorite arrived like the aliens from an extraplanetary world, Houston, the city of NASA, the invention of the city of the future, ultra technology.

   I want to explore the relationship between the sameness of what may be completely familiar to the visitor, family, friends, students, colleagues, spectators, the sameness of the images of the carnival and the boulevard markets, my own images of '98, the image of what completely implausible, but which encourages the discourse of modernity, technology, progress, etc., this scene that is not set up as a set, but rather an environment of daily life, and at the same time is a contemporary art scene, is for me a value and meaning of anthropology to which I will return in years to come as I return to it in writing.

   When I say that cultures do not have ontic essences, I mean that one cannot try to understand them by what they are in themselves and by how they are, assuming that a writing or a speech discourse can be made to coincide with a being in itself of what those cultures are, there is no way to make these two things coincide, because cultures are not themselves extensions deployed in the space of representations in whose planimeters certain languages ​​find certain essences, in any case, and in reality, as societal permealogues of reservoirs of heritages, societies and cultures are phenomena of the type that resort to certain rituals and ceremonies to celebrate given ways of relating to space and time in which the closest thing there could be to an idea of ​​substrate or stratum, to an idea of ​​something that is brought together or accumulated, they are collections, backgrounds and ways of releasing their repetitiveness expressed in societal relations to space and time in both natural senses and values, physical and social.

  Cultures celebrate their societal events through activities that in a way go beyond the repetitiveness of these rituals, although also within them. In Venezuela, for example, vendors of cachapa are distributed along the interprovincial avenues, the cachapa. It is a type of corn tortilla that is eaten with cheese. At these junctions of continuous businesses, a series of spontaneous, unpredictable and heterogeneous dynamics of communication are generated between regulars and strangers, between capital residents and provincials, between metropolitans and townspeople, the element that media in the relationship is previously distributed in the urban and social reality, it has not been placed there as in the readymades that I mentioned before of metropolitan material culture artifacts in the province and provincial ones in the metropolis and vice versa, here the cachapa itself As an element it mediates a relationship in which visitors and visited are clients and services, in which the visitors are passers-by, walkers, people passing through, and the visited, sellers, through this relationship communication dynamics are generated that around the cachapa go directly to the conversation about an economy and a culture, the relationship between stranger and stranger tends to be diluted by the situation that is governed by the market and by the nature of the trip or transfer, which the horizon of where the visitor does not fall back on the emphasis on the location in question, makes that living scene of daily life a reservoir of rich experiences susceptible to revisiting, the visual, cultural, idiosyncratic, spiritual, affective information that the visitor can receive in a given situation could not be more nourished and rich, a conversation structured through the idea of ​​questions as in an interview or the arrival at the site of scholars of a culture would inhibit, inhibit and completely dismember the living fabric of this relationship and could never be more significant to understanding that culture than the way in which the situation itself brings it into the world as given.

   There is no way to know better how love, daily life, the sense of time, values ​​and customs happen, to the Californian, or to the one who lives in San Francisco, than by staying in small businesses of couples in love with their babies on their backs while they prepare some toast with butter on the mountain slopes that go from Oakland to Santa Cruz, where there are hundreds of small cafes and restaurants run by small families and couple businesses. Do they live in the area? Or are they from San Francisco? who go there just to work?, feel for a moment the daily dynamics that this small family and their business run, or stopping for half an hour to contemplate the Pacific with another hundred and fifty Californians who do the same, or sharing a few hours with vendors of crafts on a boulevard, or building affection and communication in everyday life with lonely grannies on the streets of San Francisco, with a punk at a carnival around the image, while people celebrate, or Italian ball players in the bay .

  I move thus between situations of extreme familiarity and belonging, Texas, long years of life, Caracas, long years of life, and less usual situations, short trips, cities to which one goes and that one knows less, by way of contrast, Like my recent examples in San Francisco in California, Caracas, long years of life, and on the other hand the interprovincial avenues of Venezuela, its small provincial towns, to which I go for short stays several times a year.

   The scenes in which the life of a culture and society takes place cannot be searched for, they have to be given and given to one in one's own life circumstances, then they are recalled, at this moment I am barely evoking images that preserve something of what away, the visitor who comes for only a month to visit me in Texas where I live, to whom the month is not enough to explain what it is all about, impossible, has to live it, between these different parameters, the culture and the society that permeates your own life, the car, the market, neighbors, colleagues and friends in the newspaper, to know cultures you cannot go to them like someone who leaves one culture and goes to another, you have to live in them at the same time. point at which they become yours and you theirs, compromising all the aspects that compromise life and that make up desires, hopes, goals, purposes, illusions, passions, circumstances, economy, you have to survive in cultures and understand their logic from within. which is nothing less than to say that completely leaving one's own parameters.

       Issues of adequacy in contemporary anthropology and ethnography must be sensitive to this issue. If an anthropology and an ethnography do not have access to a given society and a living culture, and have to invent it beyond the revisitation and over-ordination that goes from the experiences and the text, to justify the way in which they move in a society or culture, outside the realm of pure experience and life, something is not right with them, cultures and societies are not accessed the way plots of land are accessed, how institutional positions and salaried positions are achieved or how bureaucratic texts are carried, nor how the scales are ordered in military hierarchies, cultures and societies are living, horizontal, free and open societal processes in space and time in which daily life and processes take place. to a lot of very varied people to whom a city, metropolis or province, village or intricate town happens.

  Anthropology and ethnography should not reach cultures like someone who arrives at a film set with a script and a planimeter and is told in that room there is scene 4, in it the maid takes off her dress and the gentleman falls in love with her, in 3 the scene takes place between the grandfather and the daughter, and then everything is a matter of props, the makeup artists there, the costumers on this other side, here the actors, the cameras on this other side, so that later the anthropologist goes to see how the script is confirmed, cultures are permealogues, living dynamics that permeate subjectivity and remodel lifestyles, that redirect and reorient the precepts brought and show the limitations of their own parameters, that forever shake the points of view and ideologies, which completely dismantle the things that one brings as assumptions, which must be reconsidered and reordered.

   Between one extreme and the other, without the mutually inclusive relationship, without the way in which each notion requires the other to be itself, both things would cease to exist, provinces and metropolis, Bleack Runner, tried to imagine that world in which the pair It stops being mutually required for one thing and the other to be relationally what they are, and I tried to imagine what it would be like in a world in which there were no more provinces, no more metropolises.

  The situations that I evoke here to discuss the nuances of this matter are not entirely constructed, they are almost all based on my real experiences, although I do not propose to reconstruct them, nor literalize them, but rather just to return to them, combined by their type and the aspects in them significant. In the situations that I want to place, the stranger arrives at a given situation assisted by the typicality of similar situations recurring during the year, the explanation of what has brought the metropolitan stranger there is not so important, it is important that many metropolitan strangers usually do it.

    I would like to analyze here the opposite parameter, when it is not a metropolitan who goes to the province, it is, as the province said, another metropolitan city in turn for its provinces or the contrasts between a cosmopotite metropolis and rural villages or towns are high, referring to the reverse modality, when it is the provincial who goes to the metropolis, understanding here by provincial its different scales, the one who is not so provincial, in the sense that, for example, he is from a city that is a metropolis in the United States with respect to which other cities and towns are provinces but which in turn results in a province for large cities such as New York, Chicago, San Francisco, etc., or in its contrasting form, which goes from a village or country town to the big metropolises, in Mexico, for example someone from San Luis de Potosi or Nuevo León who goes to Mexico City, in Venezuela, someone from Ciudad Bolívar who goes to Caracas, or even more contracting companies, someone from El Paso who goes to new york, or even more so, someone from some rural country town between Houston and Louisiana who goes to new york or chicago, or from clarines or even some more intricate town in Venezuela, from the guajira peninsula, For example, a Wayuu who goes to Maracaibo or who goes to Caracas,

  Let's analyze what happens. Our imaginary stranger is now in the same way, as the metropolitan was before, an ineluctably stranger, however, to the extent that he moves towards more and more cosmopolitan contexts, the more cosmopolitan the context the less it matters where he comes from, it matters that if he is there in the cosmopolitan city he is in it like everyone else who is in it, so it relates him to what that culture is in itself and from that moment on in a matter of let's suppose a settlement situation, a year, or two years, everyone in the metropolis will consider him from there, to the extent that he begins to develop his life, his work, his work experience, his social relationships and his habitat in that metropolis, in a short time he will be considered a New Yorker, a Californian or a Texan, a Mexican from Mexico City, or a person from Caracas.

  Now, once this subjectivity has left its own parameters according to new parameters that require it to leave its previous parameters with their limitations and adapt to the new culture, this subjectivity is being transformed; on the one hand, it maintains some of the idiosyncrasy from which it comes. , but on the other hand, it is not that specificity that makes him metropolitan like his colleagues or new friends, but rather what relates him to the latter is what through which he has had to become homogenized.

   Let us ask, then, what happens to this subjectivity once it has lived, let us set the limit that is set for any culture to immerse itself in another, first threshold, one year, second threshold, three years, definitive threshold, five years, in five years it is already the new culture completely consolidated and irreversible for its subjectivity, in three years there is no regression from the change it has experienced, in one year the impact is already definitive but it can still regress, let's suppose that this subjectivity returns to the provinces, that of a small country town between Houston and Louisiana after five years in New York he returns to the little town, the one from Nuevo León or San Luis de Potosi, after five years in Mexico City he returns to his province, the one from Clarines in Anzoátegui and the one from Ciudad Bolívar return from Caracas to their province or their town, we are not here considering, of course, which is the most frequent case those who do so after fifteen years, we are here talking about emigration

      This subjectivity will remain halfway between the new culture that he is as a New Yorker, Mexican from DF, Caracas or Havana, and a culture from which he comes but to which he cannot return in the terms in which it would be required to be again. A native who has never transformed culturally, from a social point of view, for example, in terms of work, when he shows his resume in the Guajira peninsula in Venezuela, will have things done in Caracas throughout between five and fifteen years of his life, if you look for a job in San Luis de Potosi or Nuevo León you will have five to fifteen years of things made in Mexico City, if you look for it in El Paso or San Antonio, you will have between five and fifteen years of things made in New york, chicago, houston or san francisco, so that he will definitely never get a job, he will be rejected in the culture from which he comes as a foreigner, this is only in terms of work, we are not here yet analyzing the merely subjective and intersubjective parameter that places us now faced with the foreignization that he suffers in the same culture, village, town or provincial city from which he comes, he may perhaps spend a few years of his life trying until one day he understands that his only alternative is to return to Houston, to new york, to San Francisco, to Chicago, to Mexico City, to Caracas or to Havana, this contradiction, which of course is what we call ns in mathematical equations, equations that have no solution, does not have one either in migratory and ethnic-cultural terms, and in In the same way, this being the center and reason of our discussion, it does not have it in social sciences, it does not have it in sociology and of course it does not have it in anthropology and ethnography.

    What are the alternatives and possibilities that unsolvable equations offer both in theoretical and empirical terms? Undoubtedly, if we are minimally Hegelian in our positions, we will conclude that there is no other alternative than to resort to self-awareness, self-reflexivity, and above all to bring the matter to the foreground to analyze and rationalize it.

   It has no solution but that non-solution itself forms a whole wealth of questions for analysis that contemplates not only the reflective content of what is analyzed or literalized but above all decisions that affect and concern our sense of ethical responsibility over the cultural representations as well as our sense of how to shape now here as authors of social sciences and reflective and theoretical thinking, the form we give to our authorial compositions as textual groups, our works since we are obliged to propose, according to themes and issues, deliberations on these dilemmas through which the works themselves offer, on the basis of the matter in question, interpretations, readings, intelligibility, explanations, elucidations, bringing light on possible perspectives, radiating hermeneutic or phenomenological horizons of understanding.

  The issue as such of course requires a critique of the dilemma of foreignization.

   In the opposite pole to what I have just discussed, examples of extreme familiarity and belonging, long years of life living, surviving and getting everything done in a culture, versus, parameters to consider between belonging, familiarity and strangeness for varied modes of adequacy and variability in the expressions of idiosyncrasy, strangeness and accessibility, there are examples that I have discussed in other essays such as my essay transfer in ethnicity, that of that which can be considered more or less familiar depending on how parameters are transferred to it, especially my example about Quetzil, between the closing of the circle in Americanness for Guatemalans as Mayan-American, due to being the son of Guatemalan parents, his field work understood then as auto-ethnography, and the opposite pole, the fact that being born in the United States , and since the Mayicity does not complete a sense of how they see themselves, their parents see them and society sees them, they would tend towards foreignization.

  How to accept this ambiguity, this impossibility of closing the circle on a fixed point? How to accept this oscillation that can simultaneously contemplate its different aspects, with its irreducible heterogeneity that it implies, accept that neither one thing, nor the other, or each one, all, and a few more related for some things in one way, and for others in others according to relations of relevance? How to accept this Derridarian assertion that an attribution of being is always a phenomenological attribution of language and that, therefore Therefore, it does not refer to being itself, and that it is actually an economy, a retributive exchange, a dynamism of permeabilities and interrelations, not an ontos?

  To understand this phenomenon, my modern sociological concepts of heritage and backgrounds are required, but as a closing, it is something that also requires an ethnographic critique of foreignization, which is precisely that which is aporetic.

   The closing ethnographic question here would be quite mundane, if we adhere to the uses and understandings of common sense, it is simple, clear, and yet, not for that reason, the type of questions that are answered as two plus two equals four, Green is the complementary color of red, mushrooms are not good for digestion, eating at the wrong time is not recommended, following schedules is good for a good weight, keeping things in order helps optimize them, good manners favor relationships, reading It nourishes and enriches, being present in things helps to develop, walking is good for breathing, but rather the type of things like, because the neighbor leaves the music loud, because the tenant does not put the tiles in the display case, because the Lady's hair stands on end, because the man has a hundred cats and ten chickens in the middle of the city, because the furry guy rides the Ferrari wedge along the farmer's embankments, because the newcomer brings a bucolic scent, the type of things that generate and produces what is understood as foreign, it is more related to rejections than to empathy, in the same way that Derrida said that behind philosophy is the friend, behind the foreigner is hypocrisy, courtesy towards the foreigner, it is not both a good manner or a sentimental education, to evoke Voltaire and the Enlightenment, to something that is accepted with the same clarity as the familiar, as different.

   The image of the total foreigner can be contrasted in different ways, in one of them a black and white photograph in the Picassa catalogs shows a portrait of a small town girl shyly hiding behind the adobe in her house, looking outwards, at the little town, the people passing by, the world, the street, as if they were doing something that is completely unknown to them, is forbidden to them, and ultimately, means not being seen. Hidden behind the adobe, she looks as far as possible, trying not to be seen looking into the stranger.

   Behind the foreigner is the conservative pole of cultures, contrary to the avant-garde.

   Avant-garde is a familiar connection with the different, fusion with the strange, deroutinization of stereotypical perceptions that close the inside of a culture, showing it its relationship to an outside that is inside, is part of it and relativizes it, the avant-garde seeks The cosmopolitan and the current, contemporanize and coetaneize, the conservative pole closes itself to the exogenous and foreignizes it.

  Xenophobia towards foreigners was at the base of almost all forms of emigration, exodus, diasporas and exile in Europe in the last century, as Benjamin clearly suggested in his analysis of how what goes to exodus seeks a relationship and fusion in its very sameness with the implausible, empathy, synesthesia, interrelation and permeability with the heterogeneous and for this reason it tends to be progressively rejected by the conservative pole that closes a culture to the outskirts, foreignizes the stranger and the acquaintance who relates.

  Covered in prosopopoeias towards what must be tolerated, it is a notion that has a lot to do with exclusion and nothing with inclusion, the more it alienates a culture, the deeper and more unconscious xenophobia is in its matrix. Foreignization is related to ethnic essentialism, where an ethnicity closes on itself, its closure implies exclusion of what is not it, everything else is foreignized, foreignization moves in the opposite direction to exoticization, what is exoticized It seeks relationship and permeability in the heterogeneous.

  There are modes of pluralizing relationship of the heterogeneous intra, inter and transethnic, one is the familiarization with the different, the other is the opening of the exotic that opens the different from the side that relates it and then dissolves or fuses it, an excessive exoticism It can generate strangeness and exacerbated curiosity, but a moderate exoticism opens up the same and different where it is attracted and not where it is rejected.

   Regarding foreignization, the opposite path is followed, the ethnicity is closed on itself and excludes, it closes a relationship that tends to familiarity, interrelation and fusion, the more a culture is foreignized, the less related and the more isolated it is, explicit, as in the modes contrasting relationship between intricate small towns and large cities, a high level of ethnic isolation, lack of contemporary relationship and globality.

  Globalization is not an invention of bad calculators who seek to expropriate, there is no one behind it plotting something, it is rather the decentralized, pluralized and heterogenized consequence of the relationship and permeability between cultures and beyond them, in that that overlaps them and makes them inseparable from each other, globalization is humanization.

   The excluder, to justify his exclusion, transfers things that from a certain angle could be his or familiar, he detects a relationship that he believes he understands, a pair, let's say, that seems to provide his logic with what it needs to believe he understands, and he transfers to something. which is supposed to be his, thus passes from a simile to an attribution, and makes the transfer of an adjudication that is symbolically assigned to what is different pass from the simile to the attribution, this process is symbolically important at a theoretical level, and remains largely unconscious measure both in cultures and in ethnography.

   First, it is necessary to say that although the ethnic clousure needs a foreigner to justify what it believes to be in itself, the excluder, which is here the one who produces that foreigner and in its production, excludes what it requires to produce its clousure, does not know that this foreigner is not in itself and much less that what makes it so is produced by exclusion, for this same reason, it does not have a sense of the in itself, it only follows by exclusion that which takes it outside, excludes what is not or the not being what it believes to be, its own being, that being to which it attributes a clousure and on whose outside, on the other excluded side, the produced foreigner remains.

  The excluder does not know what produces the foreigner, he believes that the foreigner is something in itself, some ontos, from which his own is separated in another clousure, he supposes the foreigner to be an ontos other and does not know that in reality, the foreigner does not It is something foreign in itself, but only a production of the exclusive, nothing and no one is foreign in itself,

  Since nothing and no one is foreign in itself, there is a direct relationship between the production of the foreign perse to not be something in itself and the projection of the exclusive, the foreign that is not, since nothing and no one is foreign in itself, it is only in so much projected exclusion. Exclusion is itself a projection, this character of projection is what in turn produces the foreigner who is not and is what at the same time makes the exclusion itself remain in a projected dimension that is itself a projection, from that moment.

   It is necessary to understand this, that the production of the outsider is closely related to the projection of the exclusive and that the projection of the exclusive is not only the production of the outsider, but also the production of the exclusive dimension and that which is excluded. This process requires ethnographic precisions, the projection of the exclusive not only supposes and requires the foreigner to be a clousure, in view of the fact that nothing is foreign in itself and in view of the foreigner being just what is not something in itself, without the production of the foreigner the exclusive dimension, which defines the being in itself according to which it excludes according to a what is not that in turn produces the foreigner that is not in itself, could not produce itself, could not even specify the belief of an in itself for itself.

  In this way, the production of the exclusive would not be possible without the production of the foreigner, because only the foreigner as an excluded dimension justifies to the exclusiver what it is not in itself that it requires to produce the dimension of what it believes to be in itself.

   However, to the same extent that nothing is foreign in itself and that the foreign is precisely what is not in itself and what no one is, the resulting exclusive dimension cannot itself be anything other than a projection of the excluded dimension which is in turn a production of the projection of the exclusive dimension, the exclusive dimension itself is a projection of the production of the excluded dimension. The concept of dimension enters here only to evoke that although nothing is foreign in itself and the exclusive cannot be something in itself without producing the foreign that is not in itself, that both things are projections.

  There is therefore, in summary, an intrinsic, mutually required relationship between the production of the foreigner and the production of the exclusiver inasmuch as the dimension that the latter requires to believe in its being in itself requires producing the foreigner as what it is not.

   If we see it from the other side, things become clearer, when the once exclusive is not here deployed on a clousure that completes it on all sides as an inside with respect to another ethnicity that is foreign to it, but is instead found scattered or inserted in a space in which the whole corresponds to the once foreigner, here what in the production of the foreigner previously made the ethnic clousure, is then a pattern or a parameter that limits the previous exclusionary one, is then now, its reverse, the once exclusive is found where it is the once foreign that completes a social or cultural whole, claiming for itself a familiar, permeable, nomadic, non-exclusive dimension, the ethnic clousure, in fact, is in reality always this projection, this is sees more clearly and sharply when the relationship between the once exclusive and the once excluded is inverted, the one who was previously exclusive is now the foreigner.

   The examples in which I think that completely dismantle these parameters of exclusive and excluded production clearly explain the globalized fusion of cultures, some take me from interactions in airports to warm urban scenes in night streets, others from chiqui cheeses and Taco Bells, to small markets auction and quick sale on offer, also to Hollywood with its more humanistic genres, films about the love of a couple, about the modern and contemporary family, humor films and other refreshing genres, has contributed to creating a standard image of the worldly man , transethnic, expressed here in Anglo-American actors, in animated ones, etc., but also, however, Hollywood has also projected an image that exogenizes and inaccessibility the world of globalization and transculturation, deforming its true meaning, by demonizing waste , exacerbate abundance and monstrous fantasy, something that explains the internal contradictions that we experience in the United States between an interconnected, contemporary part of culture, and another, also paradoxically, isolated and split.

  Moving here completely outside of a field of ideological criticism biased towards the media, but rather in an ethnographic sense, I do not include in this criticism very interesting current developments within the so-called science fiction genre cinema that currently ventures among quite a few exponents, relationships that It fosters the given genre in the imagination of hypotheses of worlds, which I have analyzed in the anobjectuality of the object, between technology fashions, projection of hypotheses and issues that require analysis in the anthropology of transculturation.

Bibliography

Shutz Alfred, The Outsider

Shutz Alfred, On multiple realities, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 5, No. 4 (June, 1945), pp. 533-576; Published: by International Phenomenological Society

Shutz Alfred, Knowledge in the Worlds of Everyday Life, edited by ilse and Thomas Luckmann

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, Rethinking intertextuality, research method in the sociology of culture

Vattimo Gianni, The art of oscillation: from utopia to heterotopia, the areas of oscillation and Fall utopia to heterotopia, in GV, La sociate transparente, milan, garzanti, pp63-83, 1989 and in criterion ed Desiderio navarro, pp 14-124, 1991

Tyler Stephen A, Them Others-without mirrors, rice university, 95

 The Embodiments of Saying

Embedding—or the making of a body of saying

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

     Gabriel and Daniel, these two young philosophers whose conference at the philosophy and art workshop that they both coordinated at the Spanish-American cultural center, had already been characterized, since then, by an unusual attention among philosophers, and for that reason, original, towards questions of the visual arts, this time they make even more explicit the priority of their emphasis when, with the aim of going beyond a spatially situated workshop, they propose to compile an edited book on the subject, apply to the design of the book in the definition of this as a textual set, the very question of its theme, trying to ensure that the book, more than an external container of essays that offers the latter the usual conventions of a book, is transformed as a book itself, by the way in which that will be done, in an example that illustrates or makes explicit what at the content level is reflected on the creative process.

   This dilemma that both young people have placed, has consequences that, in my opinion, move beyond the creative process or more precisely the creative process as something in itself, because of what it consists of, although it presupposes and contemplates it, it is Therefore, in general, it is about something that refers to a broader fabric in semantic terms, a fabric whose threads, so to speak, must be unraveled. These are, without a doubt, threads that are also related to the creative process, but not in any way, but in specific ways specific to the series that the matter opens or situates in the sense that Deleuze gives to the series in philosophy.

    I propose below to discuss this series from an epistemological and philosophical point of view, although also in its implications in language theory.

    There is a difference, it seems to us to be notable, between saying and what is said, saying, on the one hand, refers to the form, that is, to the way and how it is said, but saying from the point of view of the semantic content of That saying refers, on the other hand, to the time of enunciation, to the performance of saying with its movement and its temporality, saying is an illocutionary, locutory and perlocutory act that refers to a discourse in situation, what is said is no longer the enunciation in which it is said but the statement said, therefore, it seems obvious that the temporality and spatiality of saying, refers to the event of saying and as such to the very notion of event, saying, is a situation and an action that occupies a time and space in movement, that is, a process, but a process that also presupposes the body of the saying, its form, its how.

   When Gabriel and Daniel define designing their book, trying to ensure that the form of the book is proportional to its content, they are trying to ensure that what is said preserves the form of the saying, that is, they are trying to create a compendium that will retain things said, written or spoken, and which will contain them, preserves the form of saying in its morphology, through this gesture, because what is said is about the process of saying, that is, because the content of the written or pronounced statements refers in the order of its content not to something external to the form about which it is spoken, but rather they refer to the very process of saying, to the form of how, to the creative process, they are trying to make the form of the book evoke that meaning. of saying more than what is said, in this way they are doing several things

   On the one hand they are enacting the semantic content in the form, what is enacting? This is the question, I would like to leave it for later, on the other hand they are doing what in English we would call an embodiment of saying which in Spanish would be something like this how to say “embodying the saying”, looking for a body for the saying or more within the saying, trying to find “the making body of the saying”.

    Does saying matter? This is the question. Undoubtedly it takes shape in the event of saying, in that first, original situation we could tell it, in which the saying is said, but if the saying takes shape in the event of saying and therefore has its own body, because they are there when designing Is your book looking for a body for saying or trying to find the embodiment of saying? Obviously because it is not the same body, undoubtedly since they summarized what was said, they are looking for a body that is no longer that body of the original saying with its situation, its action, its form and its how, but rather they look for a body for a repetition that somehow preserves or evokes that body of saying, in this way they are at the same time working with a memory of saying that is no longer saying.

   To what extent will this repetition be repetitive? It is undoubtedly a repetition, just as every representation is in itself a repetition, but will this repetition be repetitive? It is the same event as that first saying with its situation and its process, with its forms and its hows?, or is it a new event?, or a repetition of an event?, or a transmigration of the body of an event in the embodiment of another event?, we know that through memory the event transmigrates into the To the extent that an original event cannot be completely archaeologized, it cannot be completely reconstructed, the attempt to retain the event in the representation by wanting to repeat it in the latter generally becomes another event or other events.

   We use here this concept of transmigration intentionally in its two senses, on the one hand, of emigrating, transmigrating, on the other, in the sense that Hindus give to the transmigration of souls, but from a meaning that refers not to religion but what Jean Boudrillard called simulacrum.

   The concept of simulacrum, however, does not capture all of its richness in this series because it places too much emphasis on the fictitious or the artificial. Let us call transmigration here the possibility that an event is exchanged for another event, or that an event is given by another event or that speaking of an event becomes another event, for example, the event of saying that the book wants to evoke through its form with respect to the event it wants to represent will preserve the representational relationship that refers to a single and same event. Or will one event be performed by another through the invention of a new event?

    I will try to be more elucidative and explicit about this. Let's dig deeper.

    If saying is the process of saying it and as such refers to the way in which it is said and the way in which it is said, the how, as a form, style, aesthetics, manner, etc., has a body or a corpus, now well, that body as the saying is in itself a statement in situation, that is, a speech in action and therefore an event, it was a body in the process that is no longer the body that memorizes the saying in what was said. . And here begins the dilemma of the new series in which the twist that both coordinators and editors give to their book on the creative process is immersed.

     In this sense they are transforming the memory of saying into what was said in an event, given that the memory of what was said as an inscription and as documentation distances itself as a text from that procedural experience that characterized the saying, a distance that when what was said It does not refer to saying, but to any other thing said, it seems appropriate to the distance assumed in it between the form and the content, between the substance of the expression and the semantics, between the signifier and the signified, between the matter of language. and the immateriality of the senses or meanings, given that saying is in itself the form, how it is said, the process of saying it, if what is said is not about the saying, form and content distance themselves as two different things where, for In general, the form is a mere instrumentalized vehicle, something that serves or lends its usefulness to the content of what is said, but since here what is said is about the saying, the content is about the form.

   How could it be, if the content is about form, to be a book that summarizes what is said about saying? In light of this, both young people want the form of the book to refer via design to the temporality and spatiality of saying even when what is summarized by that book be things said, since what is said is about saying, the book about that form of what is said that refers to saying, wants in its own form to acquire the body of saying, this body of saying, however, it must be said, It can only be an evocation of saying, because being a repetition it is already a representation that does not take shape in the same temporality and spatiality of that saying that is summarized already said although its content is saying.

   In this sense, the embodiment of saying, the making of the body of saying or the search for its body in saying, does not actually refer to the body of saying, but rather seeks the event that involves saying in that which refers it to a process or situation, but this second body is already a simulacrum not in the pejorative sense of the concept, which is why we said transmigration better, but in the performative sense, that is, the book is a repetition that with respect to the time and space of saying , is a representation that at most can evoke saying, but because the content of what is said is not, as usual, about any topic, but here precisely about saying, a tautology is produced between form and content, through this tautology, the fact that in semantic terms what is said refers to saying, seeking for the book to have the form of the content is seeking for it to have THE CONTENT OF THE FORM—I put it in capital letters with intention—and in this way perform an event that is no longer that original event that corresponded to the first saying, that original one that referred to the creative process, but a repetition that wants that relationship between container and content to be itself, by tautology, an event.

    Not only is this event no longer that first event, the philosophy and art workshop in the Spanish-American center, it is also no longer that event that refers as a situation to the evocation of a processual time proper to the creative process of saying as a merely event. semantic without reference to a concrete spatiality, but rather it is a repetition in the representation, hence the role of coordinators of something that was a series of conferences and a panel, they have passed - via the content of what was said referring to saying, to the role of editors and even to define themselves as curators.

   What are Gabriel and Daniel curators here? Why not simply editors? They are curators of an event that is no longer the one that corresponds to the first statement, but rather the event that they, from the moment they decide that the book has the form of the content whose content is the form, they are performing in the relationship between form and content, as I said before, what is said – understand the content – ​​refers to the saying – understand the form, is not just anything said, but what is said about the saying, that is, about the form and its how, about the creative process, when they design the book not as the container that offers its book convention to a textuality of things said, but as a formal experimentation that seeks to bring between the visual and the contained texts, the same thing happens in these texts between their content and the form to which they refer, they perform the event semantically evoked by the content of what is said - that saying to which they refer, the creative process -, with the book itself as an event, that is, giving the latter the form of an event of saying, this event of saying, however, is no longer the body of that saying, but another, performed by the book, which we define as embodiment of saying

      It has always been a dilemma, in fact, with respect to the very concept of the creative process, although I would even say that with respect to the very concept and the experience of any process, of the processual in general, without even adding to the process that it is creative or not, the very question of its memorization, every experience as defined as something experienced, then refers at a second level to its memorization, in fact, it would not constitute an experience without that double relationship, on the one hand the experience is what is experienced or we live, we had this or that experience, or we are having it, but on the other hand, it is a memory, its accumulation, hence what makes it up as an experience is the repetition of both things or their duplication, it is what is lived and it is the retained memory of what was experienced that forms the experience.

   The concept of process refers to this dilemma, we call the temporality and synchronic spatiality of the experiential present in process a process, but once it occurs it stops being a process and becomes its memorization, if we then want this process to be known by someone other than those who lived it must be represented, represented first for oneself, those who lived it, on a level that repeats in the representation what the experience was, and represented even more when it has to be directed to a third party who does not lived the experience and therefore does not have in its semantic body memory the traces, vestiges or indications of fragments of it as a whole, when the latter occurs, the language used to evoke that experience cannot resort to assumptions that People have to, since they are no longer the same people who lived it, they cannot resort to the memory they have in composing a representation of what they experienced, but rather something has to be organized in whose sequence the elements have to respond to external principles sufficiently standardized and typified that a third party can deal with it

   On the one hand, the inscription itself is the first way to memorize that process, for example, when an oral utterance is made, someone speaks, suppose that the transcription of the saying that is in the recording is recorded on a tape recorder or a film. movement, when transcribed it becomes what was said, ceasing to be the saying, and as such, fixes the saying in what was said. If we do not have a recording, we then ask ourselves how to fix what was said through our memory of saying, we remember the movement of saying according to our memory according to certain fragments, certain parts that were relevant to us or caught our attention, but we do not retain all of the saying, to retain all of the saying, we need to record and then transcribe in order to obtain what was said.

   It is something that we also have in any form of retention of an experience, some photographs, for example, that we take of a lived occasion, then it is what we have of what we experienced, in the field of art, it was the center of attention for a side of processual art on the other of fluxus and performance, the latter came along with the question about documentation, that is, how to capture in a representation for a third party who did not live the experience, the repetition of what it was when It is no longer on a representational level that is reconstructive with respect to what was in some way, sequences of photographs, for example.

   Now, there is something that Gabriel and Daniel have proposed more than just a dilemma related to the memorization of a process, the question is this, because the book that they edit leans and defines towards becoming itself a modality in terms of design of what happens in itself in the creative process, on the one hand, because it is the way they have for the book itself to memorize, retain or document the process of its formation as a book, but on the other hand, because Since the internal contents of the book in terms of what the essays and writings say, refers to the creative process, it is assumed that the book that contains that conceptual material becomes the same as a coherent book with respect to that content.

   What they are considering with this refers to the fact that the form of the book, at a formal level, in its aesthetics, is coherent with its content, given that the latter is in itself at the level of saying highly referring to the process. creator and since at the same time the latter includes not only essays that discuss the creative process but creators who express expressions around their experiences in the creative process, it is assumed that the book as a whole in its form illustrates this dilemma.

   The dilemma, however, that they are bringing to the foreground, is no longer the same only about the creative process, but rather about its memorization, about its inscription, about the way of its being formed, if the creative process is of in itself synchronous and responds to a simultaneous temporality and spatiality, since the book that contains the texts that discuss or discuss it, must itself become an example of how it works through the process of editing, layout, layout of the texts, graphic illustration, and visual and image development throughout the book.

    Now, it shouldn't have to be that way. Both could offer a series of texts on the creative process the conventional form of a book containing texts, but the content of these is the creative process, the saying.

   Because they choose experimentation in terms of design, trying to ensure that the relationship between the written textual and the plastic visual acquires in the book the same relationship that this relationship has between what is said and what is said in the visual arts.

   In my opinion, this has two implications, one of them is epistemological and ethical, epistemological because both as editors position themselves in philosophy on the side of the latter as letters, as literature, as imagination, as creation, as poiesis, etc., seeking even that it has correlates with visual art, on the other hand, this phenomenon refers to a concept that I mentioned before and has not been much worked on but that deserves attention here, I am referring to the concept of enactment, what is an enactment? I am trying to explain it.

   We have seen before that it is an embodiment - bodying or making a body, however, there are some semantic meanings of the concept of embodiment that we have not seen here because they go somewhat outside the topic in question but for which we will reserve a note.

   An enactuation is, however, something very different from an embodiment, although they are similar and correspond to issues that are related, as much more or less as related, for example, metaphor and metonymy, synecdoche and allegory, are undoubtedly different figurative languages. one from the other, but they all refer to translations of meaning, the so-called tropes.

   An embodiment is the way in which something becomes a body, an enactment is the way in which one thing is acted on another, for example, Gabriel and Daniel when designing their book experimentally enact in the body of the book, in its form, the relationship between form and content that occurs between what is said about saying and the way in which it is said, act in the mode of the book body or the body-corpus book, the relationship between form and content that occurs in what that book will contain within yours, if it is possible to speak here of an inside as long as it is possible that in formal experimentation the idea that the book is a container with an internal content is relativized, it will undoubtedly have an internal content, the texts that will be included in it , but depending on the level of experimentality that they explore between the visual or graphic and the written, that relationship can be performed and the inside be treated as an outside while the external form of the book is actually its content or its inside.

     If what is said in the texts included refers in its semantics - level of meaning - to the creative process - that is, to the form and how of saying, and the book in which it is to be summarized takes the form of that content and the content in this way the book itself could be transformed into an object like any other book in physical terms, from the semiotic point of view, that is, as a phenomenon of communication for the reader and as a semantic phenomenon of senses, at the level conceptual, in a paratext, in an architext, in a transtext or in a hypertext, if their formalism becomes like an aside, a footnote, a quote, let's see how they do it because depending on whether it is one or the other the other---and it must be said that they already play from the preliminary project with the dissolution of the relationship between reader and viewer--can lead to one thing or the other with their differences

  Which is then to act, to act is to act something that does not in itself constitute an autonomous action but acts something else, generally a theory, a logical principle, a pattern -patters--or certain aspects of meaning of a text other in a performance, The notion of performance comes to emphasize here that attention is not paid so much to the body that is given or sought in it, but to the action that it presupposes, thus while from the physical point of view of the tangible body of the book Gabriel and Daniel, although Gabriel's girlfriend, who is the designer, also explores an embodiment of the saying, a body of saying, or a body of saying that we analyzed before, searching for the form of the book the body or corpus that as a form corresponds to the saying as the content of what is said, that is, the form as content of the content, from the point of view of the action they perform, they enact, that is, they act the book in a way that takes as a pattern -pattern--what What happens between saying and what is said in the content of a book whose content is the form, making it the form of the book, that is, enacting the content of the book in its form

  What can all this teach us about the creative process? would be the question here.

   This will depend on how they do it in formal terms, but I think that in general it can be anticipated on the one hand that it is an ethical dilemma that refers to what we understand as criticism of representation or limits of representation—something that can be defined as the evocation as an alternative to representation or as a solution to the limits of the latter--, a dilemma that is posed to them as compilers, editors, coordinators, and according to the event that we discussed before, curators, but that with respect to the creative process has has always been crucial, as I said before, in the same way that experience presupposes what is lived and what is memorized, the creative process, as the process in general, has never been able to be treated without the inscription, without the memory in which it is inscribed and that more or less it reconstructs it, remembers it, evokes it, documents it or refers to it.

Grades

There is also talk of embodiment, or embodiment in references to the corpus in which a certain rationality becomes, for example, we can say that a computer is the embodiment - the making body or becoming body of the knowledge of computer science and cybernetics that creates it and through which that computer operates, which resembles the notion from a positive side to what in a more critical sense would be the reification to which Habermas refers. The fact that rationality tends to be reified into objects, from this perspective is seen more clearly. Its difference with enaction is that the computer does not act on that corpus of theories of which it is a body, it does not enact it, for there to be enaction there must be an action, an act in which, as in all acting, there is a decision, but where when tries to be explained that acting as an action cannot be explained by what it is in itself autonomously as a way of acting, the way of acting, in the enaction something acts that is outside itself in its autonomy of action, the action or performance of acting has its own autonomous origin, cause and purpose that explain the performance, unlike this, the enaction, is explained by the relationship of the action with something that is outside of it and that it repeats, in this sense the enaction It is a form of repetition, we gave the example of how Gabriel and Daniel act from the moment they decide that a book that will be about things said that refer to saying, that is, to form, is like a book in its form, a body of the event of saying, they enact with the form of the book the relationship between form and content that is given in itself in the internal content of that book.

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