English, the enigmas of ground

The enigmas of the ground

©By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

  The notion of ground has a fairly widespread common sense meaning, it is usually understood as a synonym for base, floor, soil, or level of the earth, as when we say, for example, below the ground or above the ground or when it is used conjugated with other words, very common in English, but the notion of ground, in addition to these common sense meanings and its extended uses through figurative meanings, also has a specialized meaning in the philosophy of logic from which semiotics was born and more specifically It occupies an essential place in Peirce's semiotics where it acquires valence, connotations and meanings that are more complex and intricate with respect to those of common sense.

    As we will soon observe, the notion of ground, although essential in the theory of the sign, suffers from imprecisions and ambiguities that I am not the first to highlight.

   My objective is not, however, to engage in a discussion that objects to Peirce and subsequent semiotics up to the present day to these impressions, but rather to first develop some theorizations exclusively focused on the ground matter that has never gone beyond being in semiotics an epigraph for broader developments. on other matters.

   Both in phenomenology, hermeneutics and ontology and in terms of analytical philosophy and language, the concept of reality and the relationship between language and reality are at the center of my attention. On the other hand, I hope to leave a well-complexed theory in linguistic and semiotic terms. and autonomy on the ground that in turn examines the possibilities and possible methodological scope of the concept thus retheorized.

  The issue is central to elucidate a dilemma that is at the center of the theoretical discussion on phenomenology, hermeneutics and pragmatism, present since classical philosophy especially in Hegel and Kant, then it was in the diatribes of the analytical philosophy of language, linguistics. theory and semiotics, I refer first to the concept of reality and then to the relationship between language and reality.

     What happens with this relationship?, language and reality? When one goes back to the classics one sees that what we understand as palpable sensoriality, the data of the senses, was understood as a diverse, heterogeneous multiplicity, what they called sensitive multiplicity, but see in turn that the universe of perceptions, representations and concepts was understood as an abstractive synthesis of that multiplicity, however, when we called the concept of reality to the foreground, this relationship of abstractive synthetic substitutions was ignored since the It led to the realm of the formation of consciousness, the self and self-representation in self-consciousness separated from that which, considered a heterogeneous multiplicity, could be considered in itself as real or reality.

   The analysis of what was considered reality was limited exclusively to how to consider that multiplicity for what it was in itself, but since considering it in itself presupposed the subject who contemplates it, that multiplicity was then distinguished between appearance, presence and relationship. of it as a phenomenon with a substrate or essences, seen this way it did not give way to language and was considered by its phenomenal or own appearance of presence without language in front of it.

  What worried or occupied Kant were the abstractive syntheses through which that multiplicity was reduced to a minimum abstracted in the representations-- pierce-- or more precisely not so much those representations in themselves as the subjective intuitions of the subject regarding To that multiplicity that remained heterogeneous or diverse, they were like a prioris abstractive or conceptual syntheses of sensible and conceptual experience.

   They wanted to abstract the basic synthetic principles just before they will be formed in subjectivity as something completely separated from that heterogeneity since once separated into a world in consciousness as something else internal to the subject and different from that heterogeneity it leads us to a universe of representations whose pure cognitive conceptual principles we cannot abstract as concepts.

   Kant's a priori synthetic judgments were nothing other than efforts to abstract those first abstractive principles on which the separation is then based, which are consciousness, the subject and the representation, the perceptions themselves, stopping first at the entrance just before the separation but from within the subject that understood in that before so close to that sensitive multiplicity although already ready to detach itself from it are still a priori syntheses, that is, a priori concepts abstracted as sensitive intuitions.

    In the case of Hegel, it was about grasping that this separate world that makes up the subject and consciousness is a reflected, phenomenal world and that as such the abstractions that make up that world other than that heterogeneous multiplicity are themselves susceptible to a phenomenology in which both things on the one hand we cannot understand that multiplicity without its reflection in consciousness, concepts and spirit and conversely we cannot know the latter without continuing the phenomenology of that multiplicity now reflected in consciousness and representations.

    Thus in Hegel the real or reality is not only that heterogeneous multiplicity in its palpable sensoriality considered by itself according to its appearance, its presence and its phenomenon, although also as when he defined reality as something accidental and contingent.

   For Kant there was, we could call it, a beginning, a beginning that could be abstracted in its first a priori categories with respect to the subject, a beginning that in Derrida would be the relationship of both continuity and discontinuity between nature and culture,

   What Derrida called in his analyzes of the origin of language and languages ​​a rupture through which nature itself is inverted or generates something that makes it strange to itself, we cannot imagine how it could arise from the state of pure nature something like a society without first having a language and speech but at the same time we cannot imagine how something like a language or speech could have arisen without first having had a society, the principle of the nature-language relationship as this The latter is nature here and now but also culture, it places the contradiction of that beginning that Kant abstracted from which Peirce very accurately defined Kant as a conceptualist.

   In Hegel, on the other hand, the heterogeneous and multiple world of the palpable continues in the spirit and subjectivity and must be known not only as a world in itself according to its representation but also as a reflected world, thus seen in Hegel as nature continues in the substance. , the matter and form of consciousness and representations, although from these it is a phenomenological, reflected world, Hegel denies that this multiplicity can be reached in any other way than with concepts and denies that the latter can be anything other than that Without the knowledge of these concepts becoming a knowledge of that reflected multiplicity, the last is the dialectic-- Hegel-- the first is conceptualism-- Kant, and between the two we see how the same dilemma is expressed in one direction. or the other -- dialectic versus conceptualism when we place language between the two -- Derrida in his discussion of Rousseau, Condillac, Chomsky and the Geneva Linguistic Circle

     But here we still do not have the concept of reality nor do we have the relationship between the concept of language and the concept of reality.

      We have it, however, as an inextricable relationship in Peirce, who considered himself a neo-Hegelian, in Peirce's semiotics, which is based on asking how this multiplicity reflected here within the subject is nothing other than a semiotics whose phenomenology cannot be other than a phenomenology of language and how reality is represented by it, that is, the relationship between the representation and the objects of the representation through which that multiplicity is nothing other than the object of a sign, a sign that is in the place of that object for someone, for a someone who will be its interpretant, a someone who is first the thought itself, the same subject and then the sign that that thought is for another thought.

   In this way, reality is nothing more than a sign, it is a sign since we consider it reflected from the side here, that is, reflected in the subject already separated from that multiplicity insofar as the sign is in the place of the object for an interpretant, but also thought is a sign for an interpretant that is nothing but sometimes as a function another sign sometimes another thought a someone in this way reality or the real is a sign and as such it is language, reality itself is nothing but a semiosis infinite, a chain of signs between which thought and reality become forms of language, however, in this operation it has been passed, going back over the past, directly from nature to culture, the former has ceased to matter in itself and It has come to have its value only as a sign in culture.

     But if instead we consider all the dyadic and triadic elements that make up Peirce's semiotics among which the ground is only one more intricate as between a representatement, a correlate and an interpretant that articulate the infinite semiosis analyzed above. We separate in itself the level of the ground devoid of a correlate, a representatement and an interpretant, we find that with the single ground that passage from nature to culture as something that disconnects the latter from the former is not only not assured in advance. but in itself the very idea that culture can be separated from nature in such a way is relativized.

   We realize that the concept of ground is the only one that has the characteristic that around it that first dilemma between a heterogeneous multiplicity or palpable sensoriality and a subsequent synthesis for its purpose never ceases to remain constant, whether as a dialectic or as a conceptualism between nature and language first and between a language from which that nature -- heterogeneous multiplicity/palpable sensoriality -- does not emerge and an idea of ​​reality that, understood now from a second sense of language as this refers, refers or denotes to objects cannot be separated from that multiplicity in the form it acquires with language

   In short, what I am arguing here is that if we pay focused attention to the ground that semiotics that was separated around an idea of ​​culture so based on conventions and that componentialist semantics that presupposed such an instituted mode of meanings that culture appeared as an entirely separate universe is implantable.

  The above does not have the purpose here, let's call it ecological, of redeeming or invoking a return to nature because although certainly as a neo-romanticist that I am, what defined romanticism was precisely not to separate them and I have repeatedly expressed in this sense my sense of ecology, my The objective here is not naturalistic perse - although it is also - but is also motivated by the understanding that the semiotic dimension of the ground has its own scientific value and that as such it must be understood independently of the representatement, the correlate and the interpretants.

  In fact, I myself have focused on the latter; my book The Correlate of the World focuses on the correlate and the interpretant, while attention to both dimensions requires us to study the correlations of the world in the text and the methodological understanding of them. cultural theorization.

  But, as I have argued elsewhere, we saw in my analyzes of the critique of the sign understood as a closed and separate unit, implicit in Derrida, the development of an analysis focused on the ground is the only one that can allow us to continue the path that never emerges from the relationship between language, nature, reality.

  In fact, when we take the path of the correlate and the interpretants we result in a substitution of reality for language, of the object for the sign, of the meanings for the referents, we lose the meaning not only as discussed in the world correlate of that self is self in both forms outside of language and inside of language according to the relationship being/language and thought/language makes it explicit, but now also of that which relates our sense of language to experience, to the world, to nature and to reality.

  In fact, a language practice sensitive to nature, reality, experience, the world and empirical dimensions is not conceivable without a philosophical and semiotic sense of the ground.

  Only through the ground does language remain in contact with the empirical-sensitive dimensions so that it concerns not only nature but in general everything that involves the life world, pragmatism, reality, and field research.

  We therefore return to Derrida in his essay on the origin of language and the way in which the pure state of nature and that of language occur.

  How could we in fact accept that an object could be a sign if led by the idea that the interpretant replaces the object, a sign could never be an object in itself, how could we accept that a natural or urban sound of reality taken as is , the steps I hear from the neighbor outside my door, the open or closed door, the town crier's bells, or simply the order of the chairs in the room could be a sign if all of them are rather objects? In them the object It becomes a sign, therefore only in the dimension of the ground can we speak of object languages.

  But as we will see, the dimension of the ground is rich and inexhaustible as are the correlate and the interpretant and requires separate attention.

  We have located here the point and the precise epistemological axes on which I want to focus, discuss, propose and develop a logical proposition of mine consisting of the following thesis and scientific hypothesis: the concept among those existing that have treated the relationship between language and reality in The past of linguistics, semiotics and the philosophy of language in which what was previously discussed and what was previously situated between heterogeneous multiplicity and abstractive syntheses is expressed is the concept of ground.

    When we review the available literature on the relationship between language and reality, paying special and focused attention to how the relationship is collected and logically expressed in concepts, we will observe that the concept of ground appears continually full of constant impressions and variations to the point of often being set aside according to some as imprecise, according to others treated each time in such dissimilar ways that they seem to refer either to different concepts or to something in itself not sufficiently theorized and deepened and therefore left to uncertainty, polysemy or undecidability, this is the concept of ground.

    The ground has been an imprecise, multivalent and neglected concept precisely because it is the concept that brings with it and within itself the dilemmas that I have placed before, however not to simply name those dilemmas with the concept of ground but to develop by theorizing the ground. the logical and theoretical problems that have not been theorized.

   On the one hand, the ground in semiotics is a quality, that is, a qualification of the substance perceptible in that multiplicity of presences--, something that allows one presence to be distinguished from another according to some quality, whether it is black, red, tall, rustic, wavy, short. , cornered, etc. whatever receives this quality predicate, an object, a piece of furniture, anything red, black, wavy, tall, etc., but on the other hand the ground in semiotics is a point of view as it presupposes a With respect to, quality thus supposes something that is for someone as a quality enclosing the point of view regarding it.

   At the same time, the ground refers to that object or something according to some of its aspects and not to all or its entirety, that is, the red, wavy, rustic quality is not only so for someone or according to the point of view of Someone also relates to that object through some aspect of it that would be something like a foreshortening of the object, something that reduces its heterogeneous multiplicity to a synthetic minimum. It is in turn the ground by itself or according to it, a relationship which presupposes a concomitant correlation.

    Simultaneously, the ground is the foundation and at the same time it is that through which the object is referred to, indicated or denoted by the sign.

    Finally the ground is sensation, it is an abductive hypothesis and to top it off with multiple irradiations in the sense of a concept, the ground has been referred to a type of sign that Peirce called an icon as opposed to the index or indication and the symbol.

  How can a concept mean so many things at the same time? Be a quality, be a respect to or point of view, be a foreshortening or synthesis that is related to the object in some of its aspects, be a relation for a correlation, be a foundation, be an indication. , reference and denotation, even being treated by some as synonymous with meaning and at the same time being a sensation, being an abductive hypothesis, being a form of sign, the properly iconic one, as Peirce defined it after some time, calling it simulacrum?

  We will discuss all this below, its logical, philosophical and semiotic implications as well as its methodological implications, which is the ground in terms of research.

  The first thing we must specify here regarding this supposed multivalence, apparent pluridimensionality and usual complex imprecision that has characterized the few approaches to the ground is that Peirce's semiotics, as in general that of his previous successors, due to its basic substantialism, has lacked a crucial distinction which, if we sharpen it well, we realize that given by inaccuracies in Peirce himself, in reality it does not reflect anything other than a budding knowledge of something that requires a higher level of differentiation and therefore theoretical development.

  The distinctions that Peirce later tried to make between a firstity, a secondness and a thirdness have been considered too lightly as a mere distinction between culture and metaculture, causing the consideration of the sign as a unit closed on itself, that is, composed of all its sides functioning at the same time, from as a matter of logic only to the supposed thirdness of being made up of symbols that are actually formed and with their own articulation regardless of firstity and secondness because they are considered referred to dimensions that are not fully symbolic.

 This move to thirdness as the only logical dimension has consumed semiotics in metacultural and conventional theory, ignoring that all the levels assigned to the sign also function in firstity and secondness and that what differentiates one from the other is that in firstity the ground governs, in the secondity the representatement and in the thirdness the interpretant and the correlate, but in the firstity there is also representatement, correlate and interpretant only that these are subordinated in it to the ground, in this way we arrive at the distinction that the What defines firstity, secondness and thirdness is not that what is signified and symbolic are fully formed in thirdness as incomplete as mere indications or icons in firstity.

  What separates firstness from secondness and thirdness is not the relationship icon/firstness, indication/secondness, symbol/thirdness, the ground in itself is more than a form of the iconic sign, in the iconic sign certainly the enigmas of the ground are more latent from the moment in which what characterizes the ground is precisely that the empirical dimension prevails in its dimension where the data of that heterogeneous multiplicity, be it nature or social reality of experience, palpable sensoriality, are in such a way that the synthetic display dimensions or Denotants reveal or carry with them the reflected dimensions of their object, much as in the icon the object seems more reflected, but the ground is not reduced to a form of the sign.

  Rather, the ground makes us aware of the fact that sign and object have a common origin in a mutual foundation and that therefore the object can be a sign and the sign an object, in the ground sign and object make explicit their mutual and dialectical relationship originating in a common foundation that makes them contrary but not exclusive and as such mutually necessary to the point that the sign is an illusion without an object something that cannot acquire its identity and the object a delusion without a sign it is not possible for something to acquire the identity of an object Without a sign we saw in my essay the sensible concept, the object is only an object for the subject in a concept, the sign is only a sign for the subject in an object and the object is only an object for the subject in a sign, the dimension of the ground, therefore, it is logically self-sufficient and its firstness corresponds to what Derrida called the origin of language.

  What differentiates or rather let's say what is required to differentiate more is our sense of what firstness, secondness and thirdness are, thirdness is not defined by greater logicality nor by being the only dimension in which the sign is a sign completely formed as a unit. and the symbol symbol presupposition according to which firstity and secondness were prelogical dimensions, this conception suffered from a hypostasis, it was presupposed at each level as such according to an idea of ​​a type of sign, hypostasis of an idea of ​​a type of sign by an idea of level or dimension icon/firstness, indication/secondness, symbol/thirdness, we proceeded even theoretically according to an analogical parameter that undifferentiates the field of effect of the levels, if the symbol is more opaque that is to say less transparent on the one hand with respect to its origin and its foundation something given in its convention and on the other towards its denotation, a fully formed sign was given as thirdness with respect to proto signs or proto symbols, to then distinguish firstity from secondness and thirdness.

  If only thirdness were autonomous because only in it all the elements of the sign work in unison there would have to be only thirdness which, as in Hegel's example, if you remove the above, there will no longer be a below, this would become the only dimension, but it turns out that although in budding and still undifferentiated, Peirce's distinctions were not gratuitous, but rather necessary and intuitively correct.

  It is necessary to distinguish the transparent, the translucent and the opaque, also the tangible from the latent or unmanifest and the intangible, also the present from the stratified and the absent, also the empirical from the conjectural and the abstract, also the inferential of the reflective analytical, also the sensory of the figurative.

  Thus, for example, phenomenology and empiricism as well as physics are firstities, hermeneutics, interpretation and archeology are secondities, philology, symbolism, linguistics and anthropology are thirdities, metalanguage is a thirdness, language is a secondness. and the relationship between language and being, language and thought, language and reality, language and nature a firstity, the ground thus corresponds to the firstity, the representatement or representation to the secondness and the correlate and the interpretant to the thirdness.

   But icon, indication and symbol function on the three levels in the same way, what defines firstity is that the dimension of the ground governs in it, always object and sign, language and reality, maintain their common origin, belong to the same starting foundation. They originate each other, they exchange their place and their identity, the data of experience are at the same time signs and objects, in which the experience originates and is originated is object and sign, reality and language, sensation and abstractive synthesis.

   Denotation cannot be grasped without its foundation in what is denoted, we cannot speak of a referent without referentiality because without the latter it becomes a mere list of contiguous things and objects and conversely without a referent there is no referentiality the signs of a language without a referent are pure empty conventions, opacities, as in the example of a language that we cannot decipher.

   Let's say that we see a series of ideograms but we do not understand Thai or Japanese, we barely see obtuse, opaque empty gestures, which do not refer us to anything because we do not have the code that is only acquired by convention, so that what fills us with senses a brushstroke of three vertical dashed lines on a horizontal one that mean descending the mountain is descending the mountain without descending the mountain the ideogram is a mere abstract painting, without the denotation the denotation is a blind man who does not see a deaf man who does not hear.

   The example of the staff is good here to illustrate we see some drawings of notes on some lines, only the musician knows that the eighth note accompanied by two dashed lines is a chord or another, one note or another on the instrument, those who do not know how to read music alone see doodles.

   In the ground, unlike this, the world is both significant and signified, it is explicit and tacit, the example of the ideogram and the score therefore only have ground for the Japanese and for the musician, in this sense they are examples of thirdities. in which the interpretant rules and in which the ground is subordinate to the correlate and the interpretant.

  When the ground rules, there is no opacity, there is transparency, there is no world as a correlate of the text in the terms in which I discussed it in my book about it, there is instead an empirical and phenomenological dimension according to which sign and object go together or at the same time, It does not mean that there is no representatement, correlative and interpretant, it means that the latter are subordinate to the ground, the ground is a primacy.

   At the level of representation, the sign has been separated from the object as something other than that. For example, the self is a firstity and belongs to the ground. Consciousness is a representation. In it, the representation is separated from what is represented. It does not mean that there is no representation. ground in consciousness means that in it the ground does not govern, it is subordinate, consciousness is not empirical, empirical is the experience that is a firstity, which is ground and belongs to the ground

   Consciousness is a secondness, self-consciousness a thirdness, without descending the mountain the ideogram is nothing, the ground is required but the convention subordinates the ground because without it the ideogram is a mere scribble, then the correlate and the interpretant govern as the representatement is the last in this example, an ideogram is thus a thirdness in the same way that alphabetic language is, but given that without alphabetic language there is no experience we see that it is not whether or not it is alphabetic that defines whether it corresponds to the ground, the representativement or the interpretant.

    The representation is something that is separated in its foundation from the foundation of the object, in the object and representation do not seem to belong to the same source and although this is impossible in some way the ground has to enter for the connection between the sign to be completed. and the object does not govern the ground there, it is subordinate, in the interpretant even less so, in the latter it is already a matter of a substitution, one thing remains in the place of the other, so for example, the espozo is in the party symbolizing its She explains that she could not attend either a meeting at her work because she was traveling or at her son's school where she was the one mentioned.

    In the same way, it is not whether it is iconic or not that makes the ground, an icon can be an interpretant not a ground when, for example, we have the traffic light lights that are iconic par excellence, we see that nothing in them brings with it the reflection or the presence of turning left, turning right, stopping or going straight, the sign is mere convention and is completely in place of the exact object as in the ideogram

  Green, red and yellow can be mere colors or mere abstract painting, nothing in them descends the mountain or turns left, so it is not the iconicity that makes the ground, nor the symbolicity although and per se that in an icon There is more ground than in a symbol, which makes the interpretant the same Peirce's example makes it clear, a metal beam on the eaves of the roof is an object and yet it becomes an interpretant of the direction of the wind

  The dimension of the ground is the phenomenological and empirical dimension/sign and object have in it a common origin and source, they even exchange their places and identities, the object becomes a sign and the object sign remains referred to a phenomenological dimension.

   In principle, if the ground is quality, there is a part of it that refers to things, to something, to forms, to nature, to objects, to the image, to matter but also to the world, wherever there is. sensation and palpable sensoriality there is the ground, regardless of whether that quality is for someone and that as such it presupposes a point of view, the ground is ground for someone without a doubt and thus assumes that the quality is according to what it is quality for a point of view, but a part of it refers to the very quality of that something that can be heterogeneous multiplicity, nature or reality, but can be world, can be experience, can be other subjects and as such continue as ground in everything from speaking. and listening, even the simple course of life, experience, empiry, phenomenon, in this sense the ground refers to a continuity of nature in language and culture and not so much to an interruption in which nature is inverted or becomes strange. itself, as Derrida said, precisely because it is half quality of the thing, half qualification of it, from the point of view, sign and object have in the ground a common foundation and source, they originate at the same time, one for the other, and as such they dialectically become they exchange, only in the ground can an object or anything become a sign and only in the ground can a sign become an object, only in the ground is the concept of object languages ​​conceivable in fact

  Although it is a quality for a someone and thus implies a point of view and a relationship, for someone that is what makes it properly ground, a part of it shares a foundation with the forms and phenomena themselves, therefore the ground is also a presence although it is in the way in which presence is such for someone and as such presupposes at the same time that fold in which it is both a moment or something in that something and a moment of the sign in which its heterogeneity is simplified by referring to it or denoting it.

  In this way, the concept of ground is the only one that takes the appropriate step between nature, language and culture, the concept, for example, of expressive substance or the expression of substance wanted to capture something of that continuity of nature in language but at the same time being a substance and not a qualification of it made the material of language, ousia, gram and lexicon appear as an absolute material of language foreign to sensation and palpable sensoriality as well as above all opaque with respect to reference, denotation and the relationship between language and reality that only prevails on the ground, in the substance of the expression the substance is absolute and as such it interrupts with its close presence the communication with the side beyond, there is no sign and object, what engenders or is in the genesis of the sign and language is then the ground that begins the relationship between the whole of something and a part of it that is a quality for someone, the distinction between various presences given in the qualification itself is therefore a beginning of the sign, its first form, although it does not its only beginning or genesis, as I analyzed in my essay the restoration of the world, there is also the genesis of the sign in what Derrida calls the appearance of ourselves before ourselves in language and consciousness, but it remains to be seen to what extent it has not yet opened ground. In that other genesis, without a doubt, the ground is also there, although it seems secondary.

  I don't think I need much more to make explicit the immense importance of the ground, the ground validates the passage, in fact, between the philosophy of nature, phenomenology, semiotics, hermeneutics and pragmatism and all this without losing the neo-Hegelian dialectic, Therefore, in his opinion, it was open to completely rethink neo-Hegelianism - Peirce, Gadamer and Adornment - which clearly requires an equally immense effort since not everything in Pierce makes that step possible, not everything in Gadamer, not everything in Adornment but certain retheorized aspects, at the same time immense because in this possible articulation semiotics is largely atrophied because the ground was neglected and left aside by convention and metaculture, a new semiotics is required that begins to advance in thinking science one claimed from the phenomenological and comprehensive sociology, and clarifications are required regarding the hermeneutics that I have also advanced.

   The enigmas of the ground are thus the opening of a field that, although it coincides with what Derrida calls the origin of language, distances itself from it through a non-interruption between nature and language, between language and reality, between experience and language, not There is therefore neither rupture, nor estrangement nor virtuality nor fiction, but rather continuity of one in the other exactly as the romantics understood it. Here are the theoretical bases of neoromanticism, the enigmas of the ground.

The object/sign dialectic

    If the ground is sensation and is foundation then it is also presence with everything that presence as a phenomenon involves, form, appearance, etc. But what I want to discuss in this essay is the genesis of the ground, the fact mentioned before that in the ground the Object and sign are born from a common source and foundation at the same time that they exchange their identity. Let's look at it like this once again, returning to an example that I gave before.

   Let's imagine for a moment that you are perceiving a something something, choose it right now in your surrounding environment, a wall, some mosaics on the floor, a shelf in your kitchen, anything like a something that you see out your window or on your bookcase, Right now, notice for a moment that what you perceive is an image in itself regardless of whether you perceive it, perceive it for a while like this, now do the opposite, notice that you perceive it, that your perception is something in itself perse. to that image that you perceive, perceive it for a while, well, you have separated the perception from the perceived

   Now do the opposite, try to perceive that your perception and what you perceive are the same thing, integrate them simply perceive what you perceive. Very well, you have noticed that just as perception and the perceived image are separated, they can also be integrated, both things, perceiving that in itself and your perception as separate and perceiving both things integrated are undoubtedly sensations, you are in contact with yourself. itself and things through sensations, we can say that if the ground is a sensation, all of it is ground, it is present in both moments, now even in neither of the two moments of our experimental examples have you perceived it yet, you have not yet had the sense of being in contact neither with signs nor with objects, this is as undoubtable and true as the above.

    Very well, let's go back to the same thing, re-perceive what you previously perceived as something in itself independent of your perception, now for a moment disconnect from the fact that it is something in itself independently of the fact that you perceive it to be something in itself and you already know it. you know but before you perceived it as it was something in itself with respect to the fact that you perceived it, now skip this last one just concentrate on what it is in itself, start observing its shape and its textures, start perceiving if it is rough and rustic or light and liquefied, its weight or its lightness, its silhouette, its light and its shadow, if it is the kitchen shelf, observe how it relates to the wall and the space, its height, if it is something on your bookshelf, observe your order, if you are a girl who looks out the window, observe her hair and her gestures, you have begun to see objects where you previously saw images, what makes it an object is above all that you have perceived it in itself but not in relation to that you perceive it.

   The object is nothing more than the apperceived sensation of what that thing is in itself, but you have not noticed something, not only did you stop focusing on it as something in itself with respect to your perception but you also began to perceive it integrated into your perception but without notice that it should or should not integrate or separate perception and what is perceived. To observe them in such a way you integrated perception and what was perceived but without noticing what integrated them. While before, when you integrated perception and what was perceived, you noticed the integration, now you did it without paying attention to it and only then have you begun to see objects where before you only saw images, the apperception is thus then a condition of possibility of the object.

  For all this, the object and the object language is nothing more than the language of what that is in itself, what has happened, you have omitted its presence, the world of the natural and the real in itself, that heterogeneous multiplicity of palpable sensoriality has become for you a superobject, to the extent that the subject is omitted even more, even when in the mere retina the subject is just an eye, not even a pure retina or reticule, but the object is increased, far from having it located there or located from The here that perceives it has come to the absolute foreground. What was previously an image for perception is now an object and what was an object has become a superobject.

   Now, to the same extent that it is what is apperceived that makes it an object, that is, the assumption of belonging to the integration of perceived perception but apperceived to that same extent, its object dimension is already its sign dimension, not only because it is so with respect to the The fact that he omits that he perceives it, however he perceives it, is thus a sign for that perception, but because as an object in itself it has become the language of the object, that language of the object or object language is at the same time already for itself at the same time and in its same sign genesis.

  Let's look at it this way, suppose you wake up in the morning and when you enter your bathroom you notice that the curtain is wet and there is some steam and a damp towel, you infer that your girlfriend, the only other person who lives with you, has taken a bath. , the wet curtain and the steam are objects but they are also signs, signs that refer not only to the referent bathed bride but also to the memory that when she woke up she was not in bed, an object sign curtain and steam has been related to another, absence of body in bed, you can go by inferences in retrospect, remember that yesterday you made love and fell asleep so that you did not have time to talk about mutual individual objectives the next day, if instead of falling asleep If they had spoken, you would probably know that she was leaving early for a friend's house and the curtain/steam signs objects had not referred him to the absence in bed that he would have taken as known as spoken and the curtain and steam had only confirmed what he knew. Far from leading you to continue searching, they only told you what you already knew, but since they didn't tell you, those signs are at the same time more informative. You go to the kitchen, check if there is a message on the telephone answering machine, and look around. trying to infer what his girlfriend has done, but in the kitchen he sees a jug of water warming you, which tells him that she is nearby and he goes to the corner.

  Very well, we have just followed a sequence of objects signs where object and sign share and originate from the same ground, in reality where the object itself becomes a sign, now let's do the opposite, let's pay attention to what is seen alone and all the time in relation to what is being perceived.

  Suppose that you go through the objects in your living room with your perception but all the time perceiving your perception, that is, noticing that you perceive them one by one, you perceive that you perceive a bookcase in your perception, you perceive that you perceive a sofa in your perception, you perceive that you perceive a window in your perception, between you and that object a kind of intermediate virtual surface has been created, in reality that surface is not virtual, it is simply physiologically your retina, the optical reticule in which you distinguish that although the object is seen there From perception, a kind of replica of the object always occurs on your retina as a kind of duplication, as a repetition of what you see there here, that repetition is a representation because although you have the sensation of the object as its ground, the ground is now within that repetition, according to the most usual meaning of the sign given by the distinction between the sign and its object, that replica that you feel of the sofa, the bookcase or the window in your grid, that specular spectrum, even when it is almost identical to the object, is separated of it as something separate made of another shape, another material and located spatially far from that object.

   Before we saw objects that became signs themselves, the wet towel, the steam and the curtain, now we see a sign of the object, in fact the object and its sign are separated and the sign and its object the same, when we notice the subject , now the object is a sign for the subject and the subject is a sign with respect to the object, this separation becomes increasingly greater to the extent that the level of representation that intervenes is higher.

   So, for example, a photograph of the sofa, another of the bookcase and another of the window are even more separated because now you not only perceive the object as you perceive it but you see your gaze outside yourself externalized as a sign, you see the see where before he only perceived as a duplication on his retina, he sees how clearly it is the window sign, the bookcase sign, the sofa sign, not the sofa, the bookcase or the window as objects, he sees it more clearly if he replaces the photo with the written word where there is no longer a replica but rather a symbol and convention.

   Now, when you see seeing where before you only saw what was seen in relation to what you saw it, you perceive that your seeing, which has become a sign of seeing, externalizes your own gaze for a third party, which is not yet present, and is inclusive of having externalized seeing as a sign. When you only saw objects that themselves became signs, something that you achieved by not seeing what you saw with respect to your perception, you were in full dimension of the ground, when you saw it according to your perception as a constant film that repeated the image like a replica. of the object on your retina you were in the full dimension of the representation, you however realized that all of this is sensation, therefore the ground is still there as if below or behind the representation at the same time in a stratum that goes to the time one in the other, when you realized that this film as a replica on the retina is another surface and space distant from the object and that therefore it can be repeated outside of you through a photograph, you perceived the division of the representation of the representation, the latter is already a text for you and for another with respect to the object, for this reason it is a correlate, you no longer see what you see in itself but according to a sign, a text of which it is a correlate, but this third still only implicit is in turn an interpretant now more defined as the ground continues as a sensation in the representatement the interpretant is always there equally, once he perceived that as he perceived it, again it was what intervened in the curtain and the vapor were signs of one thing or another according to their previous collections that acted as interpretants, it is thus demonstrated that all the parts of the sign function on the three levels, 1- firstness- dimension of the full ground, objects and signs originate mutually, genesis, 2- reticula-secondness, representation where the ground remains as a sensation, 3-repetition externalized as a sign of that separation, photography or writing of the sign, (correlate and interpretants)/thirdness, but semiosis becomes more complex at levels of metatextuality and metaculture that make it infinite by presenting the strata again in new dimensions, let's see it like this

  Let us imagine an additional possibility to thus complete the trichotomy of the necessary examples to which I will return repeatedly in this book. Let us imagine that the object also sees you.

Unspoken world and infinite semiosis

   For example, let's say that I am from my window looking towards the street while my coffee is being made in the kitchen, I look at the surrounding world, on the opposite sidewalk across the street there is a line of people waiting for the bus, a young girl dressed In black, she waits silhouetted against a wall, the bus is sensorially attractive to me, she wears her hair down and her body posture along with the cut of her clothing, her hair and the style of her posture communicates to me at the same time about her body attitude towards her. in solitude and with people as long as I am surrounded by people in a situation whose practical belonging is waiting for the bus, the sensations of attraction that it provokes in me translate into stimuli in my body that cause me to review my appearance in a certain way. I foresee that she might look at me and I fix my hair while I correct my body position, up to this point all the stimuli that are sensations belong to the ground, but when she has realized that I am looking at her while she looks and types her phone, the coding, we can no longer perceive each other without noticing that we are perceiving it, my gaze follows her movements and hers follow mine, first she must deduce if I am a neighbor in the area at her house or something else, I could be a worker in her office , someone who generally looks at the street or looks at her, in principle I help her interpret initially, I bring a cup of coffee and begin to drink it while I look at the street, when she raises her gaze towards me I try to make her see me distracted looking at the surroundings but when she realizes that I am not looking exclusively at her but at the entire environment, she begins to accentuate body positions to get my attention. When she realizes that she manages to get my attention, she turns off the phone and puts it away while I go to the kitchen and return, from that moment we cannot perceive ourselves without perceiving that we perceive ourselves.

   Let's finally imagine a third party who observes how the girl and I see each other.

   We thus conclude that the dimension of the ground in which sign and object return to their mutual genesis reappears at a superordinate and metatextual level as semiosis, you are now facing what we could call the tacit world in the natural attitude.

  Very good.

            From the above the following diagram is derived

Ground in the world

 unspoken world

 infinite semiosis

   From here everything is organized around this main trichotomy

   Let us examine the levels and degrees in which we could adduce whether Peirce himself in his philosophizing and in his semiotic logic was close to noticing what I have just theorized as a kind of ontological dualism and dialectic of the ground as that which validates and validates the catwalk and the continuity of nature in language and culture, half quality of something or things in themselves, half reference to them without interruption and without breakage, maintaining its semiological consistency does not speak against it.

  Quite the opposite, although we could say that Peirce did not notice it as something commensurable and assignable to the ground itself as a dimension, not properly considering to what extent it is a logically self-sufficient dialectic, the only one through which it is possible for Any something, thing or object can become a sign and any sign can become an object, exchanging their identities in need of each other to acquire identity, even more determined, we could say that all its successors until semiotics is well established as a science since the 20th century. late, they went in the opposite direction and if anyone was closest to noticing it, it was Peirce himself.

   In his important essay, division of the sign, in fact we observe a kind of movement in circular return, that is, returning over and over to the same thing but as if each time dealing not with the same thing but with another level, Peirce never stopped classifying. paradoxes that could be connected with what I call the enigmas of the ground, for example is his definition of the three trichotomies Peirce first says that a sign can be called qualisign, without a sign and legisign, the first is a mere quality that becomes a sign, a without Sign is a real and truly existing thing or event that is a sign and a legisign is a law that is a sign or more precisely that every convention is a legisign, this is therefore its first trichotomy.

   In the second trichotomy Peirce says that a sign can be called an icon, index or symbol, in the third trichotomy he says that a sign can be called rhema, decisign or saying sign, all of these planes that Peirce strove to differentiate and demarcate by means of The levels that we are distinguishing are even intricate, according to Peirce an icon is a sign that is like its object similar to it and that is what relates it to it, an index is a sign affected by its object and that shares with it some quality, a symbol is related to its object through some law or convention, finally in the third trichotomy the distinction between rheme, decisign and saying sign attempts to distinguish that a rheme is a sign that for its interpretant represents a qualitative possibility, a decisign. It is a sign that for its interpretant represents a real existence and a decisign an intermediate that involves rows.

     On the other hand, at one point in his explanation of representation, Peirce differentiates representation from representation, pairing the first with the quality itself of the object and the second with the sign as such.

    If we pay focused attention we will notice that there are moments in which the definition that Peirce gives of index or clue is almost the same as what most modern semiologists later identified as ground even though the index or clue in modern semiotics moved away from that proximity that Peirce had to the ground since the indexicality caused from here was empirically separated from the sign and the index that relates it to the object, modern semiotics tending more to refer the ground to the icon.

   Meanwhile, in modern semiotics, the representatement, which in Peirce's definition had in itself the dualism of the ground without being properly speaking, since representatement was a quality in the object and representation was the sign, became representation, moving away from the object.

   On the one hand, Peirce's distinctions were concerned with distinguishing how qualities could be signs as well as events, real existing things that occur can be signs and conventions can be signs, something that becomes notable above all on an empirical level thanks to the examples that Peirce gave. , but on the other hand, when I had to define sign of object, I did not understand how signs and objects form an identity dialectic in which one is what it is because it is both the other and its opposite at the same time.

   With this said, there being in Peirce himself a certain weak basis for my theory of the ground as the basis of the tacit world in the natural attitude that validates semiosis, it is nevertheless necessary, paradoxically, to return to Hegel because in Hegel, although not articulated as a semiotics, we find in terms logical, the dialectic that explains how what I have called works as a way of capturing the gateway between nature and language, nature and culture, experience, world, reality or pragma versus sign and language that only the ground makes possible as a dimension of its own enigmas. , a kind of dual value through which object and sign have a common foundation, the same source in which they mutually originate, thus reaching the understanding of the ground in the world.

  I leave my house towards the street, I walk along the sidewalk, when I open the door that separates the front parking lot from the sidewalk, moving towards the left, there are people standing waiting on this side of the street for the bus that will stop on the sidewalk. in front because on the opposite sidewalk where you will make your stop the sun is infernal.

  But the people that I see on my left taking the shadow do not all have the same interest in the situations that surround them, in fact the accent that each one places towards the presence of the present is diverse and does not coincide, some are diversely absorbed, for example. For example, a school-uniformed girl, an older man who appears to be going to or coming from work based on his hands full of folders with documents, and a grandmother are concentrated on their cell phones reading an email, responding to someone or playing a solitary game.

   The candy seller with his covered cart is sitting on a stool and seems more attentive to who among all those people could buy him a dulce de leche than to the fact that three are reading his cell phone, while behind him just a meter away three young people sitting on the sidewalk talk to each other and a couple rests on each other, or in the fact that in some faces a clear disinterest in the surroundings is perceived, while paradoxically a girl with an umbrella from the opposite sidewalk seems very present In the vital present of presence, he looks with delighted attention at what everyone is doing while he feels the stifling sun on his back, but the shadow of his umbrella offers him the necessary coolness to enjoy the breeze and feel pleasure in the diversity of his surroundings.

   The world that surrounds me as I walk towards the corner cafe and come across an attractive girl who has sensual tattoos in erotic spots on her body and lush rings who looks at me as much as I look at her is not a world of subjects or actors alike. incorporated into the meaning of others as pre-given objective idealities.

   The accent of reality and the tension of consciousness of individuals alert to common sense is not a world par excellence of subjects occupied with the objectivity of others, the interest in what the presence of others does in a world of other objectives is unequal, some They are depressed, they do not seem motivated towards copresence but rather exhausted by it, others, on the other hand, seem interested but in a different way.

  The milk candy seller is motivated to buy his sweets but not towards the objectivity of others, neither as peers nor as contemporaries, the girl with the umbrella enjoys a natural climax according to which the surrounding situations are presented to her as a live pleasantly, the girl with the rings is on top of her skin, only the one who looks at her feels the narcissistic sensuality of eros and the seductive dating of her beauty, the other three are absent from the presence, lost in their phones.

  The world of common sense for this and many other reasons cannot therefore be given as a generalized other in the sense of George Helbert Mead, although both Shutz and Mead capture something crucial that is of interest to me as predecessors, what they capture is not only partial. there in the life world but above all it generalizes towards the life world something that is brought from external systemic logics to that life world such as social rules, institutions, norms and classificatory precepts.

   The diversity of the life world tells us, on the contrary, of the difficulty of bringing parameters not established from it to this world. Individuals seem to internalize in their own way the world of others as an internalized ideality in Derrida's sense than as generalized others, rather than a predated social world that constitutes the self, it seems to be about the self that, conversely, configures a diversely individuated world in the one that others are idealized reflections in the soil of irreducible monadically interiority, a world of self-absorbed monads that end up stumbling into largely unforeseen situations.

  The conception of my predecessor of indisputable merit tends to bring into the world of our relations to others things that were not obtained from that world but brought to it from outside and then confirmed.

  In my analyzes on Malinowski and Levis Strauss I explained how both had gathered information in the form of corpuses of narratives about culture that they did not obtain from the visual and then Ivan to the visual and transferred those parameters not obtained from the visual itself, trying to The visual confirmed what they obtained in another way and he argued as if, conversely, they had read the culture from the beginning from those same visualities, what they would have obtained about the culture would have been very different from what they had pre-made.

  It is not that Mead's reasons lack arguments, there are undoubtedly many ways to confirm the generalized other, on the one hand we learn a language that is inherited from us, on the other we acquire habits and customs and finally we certainly socialize our person in interaction with others. In a world in which there are norms, but all these things are institutions, if we start from the smallest parameter that makes an institution, speech is the first social institution, at the same time it is worth asking ourselves what is the cut that defines the world of life Because although everything we experience, including institutions, is part of life, the concept of the world phenomenologically proscribes demands to which these strange things are part of life but not of a world that is cut back on itself for subjectivity, for body and for the pragmatics of daily life as the world of daily life, the latter is defined by a course between day and night and is integrated only by our self-reflective monological soliloquy, by what we do in the day as an activity and by intersubjective communications within a scope of situations and interactions, the life world is synchronic not diachronic here and now at this very moment and its conformation is the habitat, it is a natural world, from that world there is no other generalized one, but proxemics and kinesics , spatial displacements, cuties themselves that interact each time in the face of surprise.

  With the same meaning but more pertinent because mead and shutz are about the same type of urban, Western and modern social community that I have between my door and the café, not of aging faces, Boróró villages or Trobriand canoes, the world that I transit from my door to the cafeteria never before better approximated than in both, mead the generalized other, the formation of the self as something social, shutz the objective ideality of the ego of the other and the meanings that the actor assigns to his acts or actions as long as it is more or less accessible, were still transfers of exogenous logics to the life world itself, despite how their understandings are at the basis of the objectification of certain dynamics.

  For example, if Shutz had not objectified the objective ideality that configures for the stream of consciousness and the flow of experiences the relationship between an actual present and a retrospection in terms of Hurselian retention and intentionality and then combined this with motivational observation, The motivated understanding or the subjective and objective meaning in Weber as well as the objectivity of the other's self implicit in Mead would perhaps not have placed the understanding of the actor in the terms required for his common sense sociology, but the norms and institutions that undoubtedly exist They are not part of the world of daily life except under very general principles, the traffic light, traffic laws, the differentiation between sidewalk and street, certain orders of coexistence that are an implicit background for daily life, the latter is made of what What each individual does every day on a pragmatic level, in their monologues and dialogues.

  As I have shown, the world of everyday life is first and foremost a tacit world made up of a continuity of nature in language and culture, a world where the sensory ground continues in the infinite semiosis that makes both things the hermeneusis of culture. and the metaculture that is semiosis.

   Understanding the senses and meanings that people assign to what they do and to their world is of course in continuity with shutz even what interests us most but not to validate there the existence of an idea of ​​the world that is brought preformed from outside in the way of an external insight into what the social is like once and for all, but in the way in which we have accessed it here from the enigmas of the ground towards infinite semiosis, the world of life is a natural world, it is a habitation, not a network. of norms, rules, institutions, generalized others or objectivities of the self of the other.

  We have therefore arrived in the appropriate way in which I have theorized and understood what I define as the tacit world, but having felt it and to a certain extent corroborated it is not even having made it explicit, nor even having understood it in all its complexity and richness, is what continues below.

  The first thing we will affirm here is that the tacit world is first and foremost a natural world and that this natural world is at the same time an ideal world, ideal not because it is unreal but on the contrary because what makes it tacit is its unproblematic nature and Therefore, what distinguishes it as something different from what we understand as reality, reality, as I have argued in another essay, depends on our concept of what is real, a concept that, like identity by difference, where what is is defined according to what is not. It is a negative concept, it is defined on the one hand in the face of scrutiny, when saying what is real we say in turn under scrutiny first in the face of the objectivity that authorizes it as such as perception second in the face of the unreal or illusory.

   In contrast, the tacit world is beyond scrutiny.

    The natural unproblematic character of the tacit world is thus prior to the concept of reality, it refers to an unproblematically accepted world until further notice as a world validated by experience, typification, significance and heritage, it is not a scrutinized world, it is just the world as it is accepted by the natural attitude, this world we affirm here with all the determination of both idealism and romanticism is not only counterproof and factually a natural world is also in itself the only world of common sense in which we live our Everyday life of human beings is actually our habitat and against all scrutiny even our health is part of it and is inscribed in it both for the layman and for us men of science, thought and letters.

    This world is ideal in the sense of transcendental idealism for several reasons, but before entering into the elucidation of those reasons it is necessary to expand a little more within the social sciences on the reasons why we consider that the life-world relationship Common sense must be understood from the natural parameter that we have proposed so far with this chapter, which is not a whim or mere preference.

   If the man of common sense, we ourselves carry it inside and we are also that man, does not distance himself from things such as what marriage is, because kinship relations are what they are, what makes social institutions, what are the norms? and rules that we follow and because they are anticipated in the value systems that make up the telos of our morality, it is not by choice and it is not due merely to a lack of intellectual curiosity or an uncritical acceptance of the world, to understand it in that way would be to underestimate the common sense, if to be a good cousin or a good uncle it was necessary to know why the relationship is the way it is as much as we need to know in the operating manual of an appliance or technological equipment what the red button is and why the cable enters where He enters and leaves where he leaves as much as we need to know how to use the emergency door in case the plane has problems, there is no doubt that all the cousins ​​and uncles would read the manual on how to make nephews be nephews and cousins ​​be cousins. .

    It will be necessary then, once my theory of the ground in the world and the relationship between the tacit world and infinite semiosis has been elaborated, to offer some distinctions with respect to my predecessors in phenomenological sociology.

   Of all the perspectives that I have read regarding Alfred Shutz, the one that most adheres to and reflects, the one that most closely approximates those aspects of Shutz's theory that have been of interest and concern to me based on my reading and direct understanding of his work is that of natanson, natanson summarizes very well an understanding of shutz, certainly not the only one as always happens, close to mine, however natanson himself recognizes that the entire theory of shutz dispenses with both sensation and perception , something relative since Hurssel presupposes them although in the mode of consciousness, but it is certainly precisely what Shutz then ignores, two of the central parameters of my semiotic theorizations: sensation and perception, both with respect to traditional semiotics, which depend excessively on convention and the institutionalization of communication, as towards sociology itself.

   As far as action is concerned, I do not believe that sociology requires anything more than its law of gravity, enunciated long ago by Parson when he argued that the individual, the social and the cultural were functionally separate subsystems.

   I am not a functionalist, among other things, because I start from the clarity that functionalism is a mechanistic mechanism, but the subsystemic functions of action could be understood from the perspective that nothing is possible in practical terms without that separation, the concept of a condition of possibility. He distinguishes between what is possible and what is not necessary and seen in this way, Parson's thesis is as much a law as the law of gravity.

   Beyond the distinctions between Popper's worlds I see no reason to go beyond everything we have in the situation, situationality is sufficient for meaningful understanding.

  But what for me is crucial about shutz regardless of the path he took to get there are two things, first the theory of common sense that he came to develop with the concepts of significance, typification and heritage at the center and second the way in which shutz It moves Weberian comprehensiveness further, reaching the point of stating that what matters to us is the sense and significance that the actor gives to his actions, I mean to his world and to the preinterpreted character of everything, his own things and those of his peers intersubjectively.

   But as I have demonstrated, these articulations work adequately and without setbacks from my retheorizations, both hermeneutic and semiotic. My preferences towards shutz are thus methodological and less relative to their worldviews

   Throughout my most theoretical books in recent years I have been developing, proposing and opening a series of new theories that develop very theoretical questions between classical philosophy, linguistics, semiotics and sociology.

   It is not my objective here to explain again the infinite number of new issues that I have dealt with, but broadly speaking, among all those that I have developed, there were still two pending further development. These were, on the one hand, the need to renew semiotics, taking it back to its original derivation from philosophy and classical logic, specifically the issues that encompass a contemporary reconsideration of transcendental idealism and the phenomenology of the science of logic from Hegel to Peirce as well as the need for a On the other hand, open the empirical field of semiotics towards one of the very concrete and specific areas of phenomenological sociology, that which concerns the world of everyday life in its inert temporality here and now accepted as tacit by intramundane common sense in the attitude natural, a problematic world until further notice made up of the collection of typifications and knowledge at hand, both from the perspective of the monologic soliloquy of the individual person and in that intersubjective, thus resituating an empirical field for her different from that which consumed her. in the mere idea of ​​culture as communication and above all in the impossibility of differentiating the answer to the question that is semiotics from what its field is, usually reduced to the answer that semiotics does not have a field outside of it assured other than by filling it with herself when saying the field of semiotics itself as a science, but at the same time the latter phenomenological sociology as derived by Alfred Shutz from his studies of social phenomenology needs to be retheorized from classical philosophy and semiotics in the sense reconsidered here . Of course, I have been doing both things over the years in my books, both at a theoretical and empirical level, resulting in something new, but that did not mean they had been called into the text as a matter in itself to be treated and expanded with focus. criterion, this essay has brought this double innovation and renewal to maximum development, but the effort is not yet concluded, the book aims to demonstrate its scope after taking it to its maximum elaboration with this chapter.

    Since my first book in 1992 I have considered it crucial to discuss the panorama of the trends in sociology in relation to it from a much more philosophical perspective, to retheorize sociology itself. Alfred Shutz in fact intuited in his time also the need to take sociology back. towards philosophy in the same sense to which I am referring, just as Shutz, faced with the panorama of the different trends of contemporary sociology, warned that it could not address the new developments required without immersing himself deeply in philosophy, but Shutz's efforts to undoubted importance were reduced only to Hurssel and Bergson, which limited the scope of their developments since it is required, as I have already been doing in several books, to deepen and expand the scope of the effort, as I have said, considering much more complex philosophical issues than those treated by Hurssel and Bergson. bergson without detracting from the significance of their efforts.

  This also has as a theme and objective, both theoretical and methodological, to deepen and focus on establishing and enriching as a more exhaustive program the paths of this double renewal that assumes as a result, we have been demonstrating something significantly new in the situated tradition. and resituated heir of course at the same time of her I refer to the to use Peirce's phrase trichotomy hegel, peirce, shutz.

  It is true that Hegel debated in his science of logic continually with two schools which he believed to overcome transcendental idealism and the monism of the ancient Eleatics with their usual resistance to accepting that the dimension of being was corrupted by nothingness while by another side I sensed as a path prior to this the substantialist line that went from Leibnis to Spinoza and Kant.

  The perspective in which we will return to Hegel here does not in fact consider him as far away as he believed from transcendental idealism and the ancient Eleatics specifically referred to Hegel from the science of logic and the phenomenology of the spirit.

   The bases in Hurssel in addition to promoting Shutz's studies towards the intensionality of meanings and above all to accept as given a world in the turn that Shutz undertakes with respect to Weber despite the primacy that Shutz gives to the ways of understanding the self of the another intersubjectively and the bases in Bergson fostered the temporalized attention that gave shutz to the regionalized worlds of meaning that make reality according to the attention to life, tension of consciousness, a rationalized multiple dimension, but in accordance with what for my perspective individual is more crucial in shutz, the formation of the first really demonstrated, although not fully developed, form of a sociology of common sense, the immersion of phenomenological sociology in much deeper, broader and above all previous to Hursel and Bergson philosophical questions is obligatory for its renewal and development as much as it was for Shutz to continue and at the same time imagine new alternatives to Weber's sociology, as much or more so is the determined immersion in semiotics without which, according to my studies, the foundation of phenomenology social in the natural attitude and beyond in nature itself there are not the required springs, just as Shutz's social phenomenology has established the first form of a sociology of common sense, it has not been able with the same determination to defend its axes and limits in the present of the vital present given as a synchronic cut here and now of everyday life, remaining susceptible to institutionalisms and diachronicist historicisms from which I stay away.

   The consequences under this program of phenomenological sociology on semiotics and the traditions of classical and logical philosophy that I will deal with here are in turn beyond doubt from my book thinking science, nutrition and enrichment is mutual as well as new. resulting.

Grades

    1-At this point, semiotics after Peirce absolutized the convention, giving it an overdose of importance. The same echo, in fact, when talking about the mistake of the referent, maintains that semiotics cannot deal with the pregiven object that the sign denotes, that the relationship of the sign with that object, the reference with respect to the referent, must be avoided as not corresponding to semiotics which should deal only with substitution regarding the language-communication relationship understood as sender-message-code-receiver. And the reason for this omission, for this neglect of the ground, is none other than the logical territory that corresponds to the ground, the fact that it and its enigmas have never been the object of focused investigation.

  2-It has taken me so long, thirty years, to have my early sense of one side of reality, of a realia prior to the production of effects of reality according to the effects of representation, I have finally found this discovery, thirty years, It was necessary to separate it and focus on it as a logical dimension in itself, surpassing the substantialism from which I have distanced myself for so long in agreement with Bourdieu. A theory of the world, language, reality and the relationship between the two without ground autonomy is a defective theory, hence not only the aporias of substantialism but also those of its opposites, semiotics for example always resulted in an aporia between the concept field understood as a field of communication and as a science or specialty, that is, a field of semiotics, because leaving aside the ground is denying the logical autonomy of the field, the same as Bourdieu, his visionary critique of substantialism led him Despite its virtues, an absolutization of a field of forces that were externalities between themselves disconnected from experience and the ground, field work in sociology, anthropology and ethnography has suffered from the same defect.

3- Shutz's methodological insights regarding Weber in terms of comprehensive sociology remain as questions of methodology of research in sociology intact in my perspective despite having taken them much further and in new directions, I recognize myself as faithful to Shutz in this sense, recognizing its influence.

Referents

Berger Peter L. and Thomas Luckman, The foundations of knowledge in everyday life, pp, 34-63, The social construction of reality, amorrortu editors

Derrida Jacques, the linguistic circle of Geneva, 175-192, margins

Eco umberto, the ground, The universe of meaning, Pp, 62-136, the absent structure, lumen

Eco umberto, the semiotization of the referent, 77-81, The universe of meaning, Pp, 62-136, the absent structure, lumen

Eco umberto, the mistake of the referent, 66-70,

Eco umberto, interpretante, ground, significado, object

Eco umberto, The ground, 44-46, Pierce, the semiotic foundations of textual cooperation, 40-72

Eco umberto, Denotation in a semiotic perspective, 94-101, The universe of meaning, the absent structure, lumen

Eco Umberto, Connotation in a semiotic perspective, 101-106, The universe of meaning, Pp, 62-136, the absent structure, lumen

Eco umberto, Dynamic object and immediate object, 46-48, Pierce, the semiotic foundations of textual cooperation, 40-72

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, El horizon intramundano, The intramundane horizon: phenomenology and hermeneutic of the quotidian. By Abdel Hernandez San juan/The intramundane horizon: phenomenology and hermeneutics of the everyday

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, sobreordinacion en los mundos de vida, The intramundane horizont: phenomenology and hermeneutic of the quotidian. By Abdel Hernandez San juan/The intramundane horizon: phenomenology and hermeneutics of the everyday

Hegel, reality, science of logic, hachete

Hegel, the foundation, science of logic, hachete

Hegel, the living individual, science of logic, hachete

Hegel, life, science of logic, hachete

Natanson Maurice, introduccion, Pp 1-33, el problema de la realidad social. Por Alfred shutz, compiler Maurice natanson, amorrortu editors, buenos aires

Sanders Peirce Charles, Division of signs, pp 21-43, The science of semiotics, collection of semiology and epistemology, Nueva Vision editions, Buenos Aires

Sanders Peirce Charles, Icon, index, symbol, pp, 45-62, The science of semiotics, collection of semiology and epistemology, Nueva Vision editions, Buenos Aires

Sini Carlo, Pierce, 13-81, semiotics and philosophy, axe

The preinterpreted character of experience and the world

By Abdel Hernandez San Juan

Our usual notions of interpretation take it as a fact that when we say interpret there is something that is interpreted one by one, the usual relationship of the concept of interpretation with that of point of view is known, we interpret because we have a point of view, but the Interpretation goes much further than this in a wide variety of directions, I am not referring here to distinctions that I myself have made in the past between interpreting as a point of view, interpreting as an update in which I mentioned the examples of the philosophical interpretation of a text. classic of philosophy, which a contemporary musician does about a classical musician, and interpret as a reading in which he discussed different modes of reading.

Rather, in new directions in which I have taken the analysis of hermeneutics and exegesis, the first with respect to the ontology of the life world, in the monologue of the person or in intersubjectivity, the second with respect to textual forms that we read. , I have been arriving at new conclusions about the scope and true dimension of interpretive phenomena.

My objective below, in fact, begins to distance itself even more than it already had in the correlation of the world and the intramundane horizon, from the usual directions that the theory of interpretation has previously acquired.

I propose two things this time. On the one hand, I have come to the conclusion that within the individuated subjectivity, that is, of the solitary individual alone with himself, interpretation plays and plays a much more significant place than that which has been assigned to it in the traditions previously. known about its study, on the other hand, I have come to the conclusion that interpretation plays a much more relevant place than that which has been previously assigned to it, with respect to the very ontological conformation of culture.

What has been said before, both towards the interior of individuated subjectivity and towards culture, does not refer to the interpretive activity that we carry out knowing that we are interpreting, nor am I referring here for the moment to the activity of interpreting as we understand it when we say interpret a book, a work of art or, as has been usual even in myself, for example my book the interpretation of art, or developments around the concept such as those of gadamer in aesthetics and interpretation, or clifford geertz in interpretation of cultures, although as we will see the theory of interpretation that I am going to develop will later have important consequences also returning to that direction, I am not referring to interpreting something or a thing as for the first time, I am rather arguing that independently of our voluntary interpretive activity, the ontology itself that makes up the inferential, deductive, cognitive, reflective processes, even merely retentive, reconstructive or evocative processes of the individuated subjectivity with respect to itself are interpretive, that in them we essentially interpret, conversely. , I am maintaining with respect to culture not something about how we should interpret it or about the will to do so, but rather that culture itself is already in itself before we come to ask ourselves the question, an ontologically interpretive phenomenon which I will call or I will define how, both in one direction and the other, the individuated subjectivity or internal world of the individual, which Derrida defines as the ground of our interiority on the one hand, and culture on the other, the pre-interpreted character of experience and world.

In my essay self and heritage I have discussed and developed a theory on three main ontological levels that define the specificities of the self with respect to anything else in our subjectivity, the self, consciousness, ego, altergo, etc., etc., recalling these levels we distinguish between the primary relationship individuate/socialize, internalize/externalize, shaping the process of differentiation and symbolization of subjectivity with respect to the interaction between the self and the social, the individual and the social, the secondary or diachronic relationship, simultaneous with the first, but unlike that cumulative and not always current, between experience and heritage, defined by the intrinsicness of the extrinsic where experience and heritage go from being things experienced and become one and the same thing with the self, this accumulation itself shaping what I have defined as the specific phenomenology of the self, is nothing other than culture expressed and collected as it expresses itself.

and reflects in the experience, and plays in itself a relevant place in the activity of memory, finally a third level through which I have discussed the specificities of the type of self-perception that is proper to the self as opposed to mere self-perception and of self-awareness.

Now I propose to analyze, deepen, develop and elaborate on this phenomenon with its three levels from the ontological point of view relative to the place that interpretive activity plays within it, on the other hand, in my essay on ordination in the worlds of life, I have widely developed my theory on the main notions of common sense sociology, social phenomenology or phenomenological sociology in continuity with the sociology developed in this regard by Alfred Shutz, experience, heritage, typifications, relevance.

Now I propose to analyze the scope, dimensions and significance that interpretation plays in the very ontology of that world, it is my objective to demonstrate that independently and perse of the fact that we interpret we live in a pre-interpreted world and that pre-interpreted character of the world is nothing other than culture itself.

From all of the above it follows that we never interpret as for the first time, but rather we interpret pre-interpretations, culture itself is already interpretation both towards the individual and towards society, therefore interpreting texts, situations, interactions, internal states, experiences. lived, things that others tell us, things that we see or simply something in itself is nothing more than interpreting interpretations, in short, we interpret things previously interpreted, and it is the pre-interpretive character of the world, the individual and the culture, the unique that allows us not only to understand ourselves or understand others, but we cannot even arrive at a medium or moderately accurate understanding without first accessing and before interpreting ourselves to the interpretations that in themselves are already the individual and culture.

Why do I say that the activity we carry out in our monologic soliloquy is interpretive? As I said, it is not about the notion of interpretation understood as a point of view. By saying that we interpret, I do not mean that what we tell ourselves about what we have experienced is something so subjective and so speculative that it must be understood as a whim or a simple ideology so weak or fragile that nothing in it guarantees its determining link between ourselves in our subjectivity and what we live, it is not about relativizing what we tell ourselves about what lived, making it arbitrary, imprecise or capricious, it is rather that the activity of thinking about what we experienced reconstructively and telling ourselves things about it is an activity of elucidation, that is, the things experienced must make sense to us and we elucidate them. .

Elucidating is in itself an interpretive activity, we put things in relation in order to induce internal links, relations between them, inferences, implications, mutual interrelationships, but not merely as something considered outside in the dimension merely experienced as experienced outside our self, but it is precisely the fact that independently of the relations that things have among themselves, how they take shape out there in what is experienced, it is precisely the fact that we have a self, it is precisely the fact that from a certain moment onwards it extrinsic--experienced there--is inevitably going to become intrinsic, becoming one and the same thing with our self through our retentions, our evocations, our memory or remembrance and the revisiting reconstructions of our soliloquy, which at once inetricably welds it together. with our self in the mode of relationships of meaning, the things experienced from the moment they are integrated into the self immediately become relevant due to the way in which they make sense to our self and from that moment on the relationship that we can maintain with them does not It no longer responds to that external nature in which they were extrinsic to each other, but rather they acquire a new intrinsic order which is by nature itself shaped by an elucidative activity.

To elucidate here would be to interpret but not merely as someone who has an opinion or chooses to choose a point of view, but as someone who must have a meaning or a relationship of senses, this process transforms the relationship between the self and what is experienced through the relationship. between experience and memory, in a continuous exploration through which what we tell ourselves about what we experienced becomes ontological with our self, it is a process of course continuous and inexhaustible in no case homogeneous or linear, but gradual, discontinuous and even repeatedly interrupted, it has in itself a sporadic character, it integrates on the one hand aspects of that elu, idation that we receive from mere retention, that is, not everything experienced from the moment it does not maintain the same extrinsic order What was outside in what was experienced is properly retained, but only certain parts, elements, passages, moments, which acquire in the retention itself an evocative nature where memory intervenes.

The elucidative activity, that is, interpretive in this new ontological sense, is not itself retentionist, retention of course precedes elucidation, if we have not retained we cannot elucidate it but at the same time since elucidation is closely related to giving meaning , to make some things relevant and not others, elucidation also participates in retention since it selects paths, fixes or makes certain inferences significant, chooses certain associations and dispenses with others, thus becoming in a superadded form to the retention of confirmation or validation of what is relevant withheld.

On the other hand, the elucidative activity of our soliloquy not only has consequences or is itself what we tell ourselves about what we have experienced, but from the moment it selects, being the one through which things make sense to us, it becomes ontologically determining. in what we subsequently do or stop doing, thus also acquiring relevance not only for the identity of the self but for the pragmatics of successive experiences.

We never know, now externalizing it socially, nor can we foresee, precisely because of what Shutz said, that we do not have access to the ego of the other, the motivations and intentions of their actions, what direction will take what other people will do or not do, well let's talk about known and close people, well let's talk about people we do not know and observe from a certain exteriority in the succession of their actions, but we can be sure and convinced of something, any step that the people we see will take, any course that the acts of our fellow human beings acquire, from the physical direction that their bodies will take in a trajectory or route, to the significant dimension that their actions acquire in terms of meanings, will be closely related and will be the result of what these people have, on the one hand, said to themselves. themselves about what they experienced and have self-elucidated for the other.

The elucidative activity is also interpretive and crucially because its own nature is inferential and from the moment it is inferential, if we are truly Peircian in our logical/deductive parameters, it is in itself a signifying activity, that is, it works continuously with signs. , these signs do not always and in fact most of the time we cannot and should not usually consider them signs in the mere sense of symbols autonomously constituted by an external stimulus-response relationship.

In the universe of self-elucidation as this one acquires its interpretative dimension from the phenomenology of our self, the signs do not have the nature of things extrinsic to each other made up of conactive or phatic materialities and morphologies, nor are they units defined by a reactivist relationship, they are not It deals with signs in the even pragmatic sense where a light tells us whether to turn left or continue straight or where a child's bodily expressions tell us what object it imitates or represents, but rather about inferential signs.

Without inferentiality, in fact, the contiguous exteriority, the mutual externality that defines the way in which things outside are related when we only experience them without having then made them intrinsic to our self, would not be possible, the very process of intrinsicating the extrinsic that transforms the experienced in experience and in the same thing with our self would not be possible without inference because precisely the role that self-elucidation plays in the monologic soliloquy is to make them provided with internal ties between them, ties that they did not have with each other outside, ties that result from attributions of meanings according to that self-reflective soliloquy makes them relevant, this is only carried out through inferences.

Inferential signs are similar to what Peirce called indexical signs in the sense that the object to which they refer is not contained in the sign but rather the latter seems to be a trace of that object, it contains something that is an indication of objects that have been outside of their own, however, even in the indications the relationship between the sign and the object maintains a certain dispositional extrinsication typical of the physical character of the connectivity between things or between somethings, in the elucidative activity that makes up the interpretive mode of our soliloquy, signs are on the one hand immaterial, that is, intangible, they are in a way not exactly replicas, but cognitive schemata through which some things become inferential with respect to others, it is important here to emphasize that the sign has been distributed and disseminated. in hermeneusis, that is, the intra-relationships of meaning coming from the intrinsic relationship that the self maintains with what is experienced through elucidation, causes the signs to be reunited with the senses through associations that only our self knows and selects. , are not topical or conactive entities, fateful in Jacobson's sense, but rather inferential traces closely related to implication and induction.

It is not my objective here to enter into a reflection related to the connective process internal to memory and associations since it is not about psychology here, but rather to understand that the interpretive nature at the ontological level of the formation of our experience is inherently yes preinterpretative

Now, the interpretative dimension of the experience is such and it acquires its form above all and in the first place because our self-elucidations do not occur each time as for the first time in the one-to-one relationship between what we experience each time and what we are telling ourselves, but it takes shape against the background of an accumulation that has become one with our own self and that is formed by nothing other than our successively made previous interpretations, our self in fact is nothing other than that accumulation, that memory or heritage and is made up of the preinterpretations that we have successively made previously.

In this way the self not only goes to the new lived but at the same time goes to the previous preinterpreted with respect to the previous lived, creating a kind of palimpsest of subjectivity where capable and capable of previous preinterpretations always appear under the horizon of the successive elucidations relating that sedimentation of previous elucidations that is our heritage with the successive continuous following elucidations.

The interpretive nature therefore of our experience is by definition preinterpretive and continually works with what is preinterpreted.

However, the semiotic nature in an inferential logical sense that assigns to the characteristics of our experience a pre-interpretive dimension at the ontological level does not seem as decisive in the order of the soliloquy as relevant it becomes - not because of its greater importance outside than inside but due to the greatest recurrence to it--when we put that accumulation, heritage or memory of our self in relation to intersubjective dimensions that involve either social others or merely processes of cognition, coding and interpretation of social experiences and it is this social dimension but also and at the same time cultural because, as I have analyzed in my essay self and heritage, it is precisely that accumulation that, from the perspective of the phenomenology of self, makes up culture, to which I would like to dedicate my greatest effort below, the preinterpretive character of the formation of experience and the world now in the inferential universe of intersubjective and interactive/symbolic processes.

I have already spoken many times both in chapters of previous books and in video conferences that what gives undisputed stability to our surrounding world are the typifications, Shutz was very clear about this and insisted on it, but at the same time everything is not reduced To typifications, typifications are types of typologizing constructions that summarize the main features of the social situation based on the previous experience on the part of the subjects, whether they are situations that involve oral speech, or merely extraverbal interactions in situations of habitation, coexistence or interaction, but the typifications create a rigid outline or prototype given by its very synthesis of what was learned, it was what Shutz defined as the world out of problems until further notice

Beyond the typifications, it is necessary to elaborate and deepen the fact that it is not properly through typifications that the world and experience are preinterpretive in the terms in which it occurs within situations of social interaction, what I mean is that typifications such as pertinences are memories that are resorted to, memories called by the subject around the situation when this subject must speak to refer to them or when it requires patters or schemes of action in the face of those situations.

The typical dwells in the memory not in the interaction itself and its situation, and as such it acts only within the prestructured or predisposed character of the subject's heritage and experience. It is typical that if I feel some steps on the stairs outside my apartment, they are some things and not others and as such I identify the sound of my staircase with previously attributed typifying meanings, but the interpretive activity itself through which the successive interpretations related to the situation and the preinterpretations are recalled and put into relation, is a more process rich and complex than a mere typification

On the one hand we must grasp that the microsituations themselves are traversed, woven, woven, by preinterpretations, it would be something like what in terms of common sense they mean, what makes them a factual situation in itself is already an inclusive preinterpreted universe. to the very ontology of the situation.

Here it is of course about moving beyond Popper and beyond Parson, but also from mere symbolic interactionism or mere ethnomethodology, although of course it is something discernible only from the parameters or on the background of this tradition in which I place myself. and from which I work

It is about understanding that the micro-actions of situationally situated subjects are themselves acts of significance, acts of meaning and interpretive acts put in relation to ongoing interpretations with pre-interpretations, there is neither an act nor a purely abstract action of an actor intended as a social minimum according to parameters of mere behavior, conduct or performance in terms of stimuli and responses or in terms of a mere theatricality of the action, there are rather already pre-given meanings that cross the situation itself and define it in its internal and As such, the horizon of microaction and microinteraction in situation is itself hermeneutic and interpretive.

A situation is nothing more than a relationship between a current interpretation and a preinterpretation, in this way we must grasp how the preinterpreted world goes beyond mere classification to become a hermeneusis.

The accumulations that make up the typifications do not completely exhaust the universe of the situation, it is true that the latter in a given percentage is itself defined by these accumulations but they are not called or are there simply given if we are referring to a dimension that tries to capture at the same time the subjectivity of the situation and the exteriority of its objectivity, something on these two levels belongs in a certain way to the singularity of the situation as it updates the clusters in its own present through calls, calls that since active memory calls something in passive memory, they do not work all the time with all the passive elements of that accumulation, but only with a certain amount of them governed by the relationship between the relevance of the situation and its novelties or specificities. current.

In fact, accumulations, although they offer the parameters that phenomenologically surround the common sense that regulates interaction, do not themselves belong to the ontology of the situation as if it were something distributed on an exteriority, they actually live in the subjects in each one. and in all of them, and are distributed in a certain way as idealizations of the situation that are not outside of it as externalized but regulate its relevance, it is true and here it would be good to remember the proxemics, that a man sitting in a bar in a park at The open air is not just that literal seated gentleman, the design of the bar presupposes and anticipates the idealized situation of potential seated gentlemen and as such the paths of walking and looking at each other are in a certain way predesigned by the space itself of civil engineering and architecture, as much as the sidewalk defines the pedestrian in front of the walkable street and the built-in houses or the moles, or as much as the park anticipates couples on the baquitos, there is undoubtedly something about the situation expected by common sense design according to an ideality accumulated that has become an externalized design of an expected typicality, exactly the same that later participates in the definition of the situation and its potential forms in action when acquiring current place

but the concrete situation already in the present act of that man today who is now sitting there at the bar when he is in front of a group of children who unexpectedly play with the roots of the nearby trees to swing always acquires its own interpretative actuality, as much as in the monologic soliloquy What we tell ourselves about what we have experienced can never but presuppose something unique and unrepeatable in what we experience that day or week that is reconstructed, remembered or meditated on.

and the way this works is none other than the one I am explaining here, the situation itself, woven in what defines it by dormant or passive accumulations but activatable around it, are in reality called by the subject around the variations and updates and therefore they are never presented as such since they are like ideal type concepts but are called according to aspects and according to interpretations put in relation to those preinterpreted universes.

The concepts of hermeneusis on the one hand, woven or stitched meanings, and semiosis, are fundamental here, the sociology of common sense as phenomenological sociology cannot thus be fully developed not only as a hermeneutics in the sense that Shutzs attributed to it, it is required assigning greater preponderance not only to the motivated, intentional and oriented nature of a why and why in its subjective dimension, but also to understand that this subjective dimension is itself interpretive at an ontological level and is crossed from side to side by senses and meanings. that make it relevant in terms of hermeneusis and semiosis

It is important here of course to assign greater importance to the ground than that which has usually been attributed to it in semiotics, just as it is important to understand that a phenomenological sociology cannot be developed to its full extent and in all its possibilities without the exhaustive incorporation of a program semiotic and vice versa

Phenomenological sociology is called upon and in a certain way forced to be a semiotic sociology not only because it no longer or outside of the reductive pragmatics of the semiotic trilogy, sender, message, receiver is not what works here, but because the codes and The codifications function in the situational flow of social action and social interactions in the world preinterpreted in another way that must be understood, analyzed and theorized, let us also call it the life world and more pertinently let us call it with my concept intramundane horizon or intramunity of the world. , to capture how coding issues are presented to the situation interpretively in the manner of a relationship between ongoing interpretations and preinterpretations.

Undoubtedly, the world of everyday life that we obtain within the frame or logical square, experience, heritage, relevance, significance, typifications, is still a world that is too passive for the subject, they are notions that do not contemplate how the situation is itself constrained by interpretations that They are themselves independent of the specific way in which these concepts are to be considered as recalled by the subject in the case in question.

grades

Alfred Shutz obsessively wondered how we can have access to the self of the other or others if we are not within their consciousness. He asked this question because he was convinced, inspired by Hurssel's motivational and intentional phenomenology, that the actions of the another are internally informed by what he calls the why and the why, it was also asked from the perspective of the one who asks the question, the sociologist, the sociology itself that we want to understand, inspired and influenced by the distinctions of Max Weber between subjective observation and objective observation in order to discern for oneself that social action cannot be understood without these two levels, that is, without precise riddles regarding the meanings and senses that inform the action of the other, as well as without a sense of in what way our observation of it can be more or less subjective or objective, from this perspective given the basic incommensurability that closes our access to the ego of the other and the spatial irreducibilities that define the objective conditions of the interaction between bodies, shutz advance that sociology should be at the same time

General bibliography (in preparation)

Berger Peter L. and Thomas Luckman, The foundations of knowledge in everyday life, pp, 34-63, The social construction of reality, amorrortu editors

Derrida Jacques, the linguistic circle of Geneva, 175-192, margins

Eco umberto, the ground, The universe of meaning, Pp, 62-136, the absent structure, lumen

Eco umberto, the semiotization of the referent, 77-81, The universe of meaning, Pp, 62-136, the absent structure, lumen

Eco umberto, the mistake of the referent, 66-70,

Eco umberto, interpretante, ground, significado, object

Eco umberto, The ground, 44-46, Pierce, the semiotic foundations of textual cooperation, 40-72

Eco umberto, Denotation in a semiotic perspective, 94-101, The universe of meaning, the absent structure, lumen

Eco Umberto, Connotation in a semiotic perspective, 101-106, The universe of meaning, Pp, 62-136, the absent structure, lumen

Eco umberto, Dynamic object and immediate object, 46-48, Pierce, the semiotic foundations of textual cooperation, 40-72

Hegel, reality, science of logic, hachete

Hegel, the foundation, science of logic, hachete

Hegel, the living individual, science of logic, hachete 

Hegel, life, science of logic, 40-72, hachete

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, El horizon intramundano, The intramundane horizon: phenomenology and hermeneutic of the quotidian. By Abdel Hernandez San juan/The intramundane horizon: phenomenology and hermeneutics of the everyday

Hernandez San Juan Abdel, sobreordinacion en los mundos de vida, The intramundane horizont: phenomenology and hermeneutic of the quotidian. By Abdel Hernandez San juan/The intramundane horizon: phenomenology and hermeneutics of the everyday

Natanson Maurice, introduccion, Pp 1-33, el problema de la realidad social. Por Alfred shutz, compiler Maurice natanson, amorrortu editors, buenos aires

Shutz Alfred, the formulation of our problem: the methodological concepts of Max Weber, PP, 33-74,

The meaningful construction of the social world, introduction to comprehensive sociology, prologue by Joan Carles Melish, Ilse Shutz, Paidós, basic, 1993

Shutz Alfred, the formulation of our problem: the methodological concepts of Max Weber, PP, 33-74,

Shutz Alfred, Phenomenology of the social world: introduction to comprehensive sociology, introduction George Walsh, paidos publishing house, Buenos Aires, Argentina

Shutz Alfred, the meaningful construction of the social world, introduction to comprehensive sociology, prologue by Joan Carles Melish, ilse shutz, Paidós, basic, 1993

Shutz Alfred, Phenomenology of the social world: introduction to comprehensive sociology, introduction George Walsh, paidos publishing house, Buenos Aires, Argentina

Shutz, common sense and the scientific interpretation of human action, the problem of social reality

Sanders Peirce Charles, Division of signs, pp 21-43, The science of semiotics, collection of semiology and epistemology, Nueva Vision editions, Buenos Aires

Sanders Peirce Charles, Icon, index, symbol, pp, 45-62, The science of semiotics, collection of semiology and epistemology, Nueva Vision editions, Buenos Aires

Sini Carlo, Pierce, 13-81, semiotics and philosophy, hachete