Abrahamic V-space: positive and negative in Israel and in Palestine
FIRST DRAFT: December 1st 2023
CHANGES: See section 3
Prologue
1 Abrahamic V-space
Abrahamic Jerusalem
The systems
The four N-Abrahamisms: religion, nation, party, empire, technology and military violence
N-Abrahamism: a certain conception of self and other, of positive and negative
Distributions in V-space
2 Israel and Palestine
2.1 Israel, Part 1
The fifth ‘War in Gaza’ survey - Israel Democracy Institute
Population demography (2023)
Regions
Arab-Israeli General Armistice Agreements (1949)
The dominant conception of the national self [also in W6]
… other conceptions of the national self
… the global structure of local size distributions
Voters and parties in V-space
Political space: elections 2022
Political space: Schofield’s two dimensions, religion and security
2.2 Palestine, Part 1
An opinion poll in the West Bank and in Gaza …
… the response in The Times: an article, opinion pieces and letters
The report by Arab World for Research and Development
The special questions for Gaza
My commentary and further analysis
A Palestine opinion scale? … the modal options
A scale of modal options … a continuum of modal groups
The distribution of modal percentages
Opinion formation
The modal Palestinian
3 Changes since first draft
3.1 Further analysis of IDI survey in Israel …
… an Arabs-in-Israel scale
… measures of agreement/disagreement: differences in the net percentages
… distributions and summarising statistics
… measures of agreement/disagreement: pairing and random encounters
… a brief note on the modes
Prologue
“We are choosing not to hate …
Join us in resisting the path to hatred”
Magen Inon and Hamze Awawde* will be taking part in Building Bridges, Together for Humanity, a vigil opposite Downing Street on Sunday at 3pm.
The Times, November 29, 2023: 32.
*one from the occupied West Bank and the other from Southern Israel
They hate us and intend violence against us – as they have done in the past.
We are forced to reciprocate - again.
Religion tells us to love and not to kill – yet we do the exact opposite.
1 Abrahamic V-space
Abrahamic Jerusalem
Jerusalem’s walled city “contains some of the holiest sites in the three Abrahamic faiths.” (1)
“Tensions rise in the Old City as settlers target Armenians. Christians in Jerusalem are now living in fear of ethnic cleansing.” (2)
“They attack the Al Aqsa mosque.” “The aim of 7th October was to stop the violations of Aqsa.” “It was called Operation Al Aqsa Flood.” “The Al Aqsa Brigade played a very positive role.” (3) to (6).
“The 43-minute film of the Hamas massacre is the worst thing I’ve seen.” (7)
(1), (2) The Times, November 20, 2023: 27.
(3) https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-65184207 ;
.(4) 35%: In their opinion, the main reason for the operation launched by the Palestinian resistance on 7th October was to stop the violations of Aqsa.
.(5) https://english.almanar.com.lb/1917115
.(6) 49%: The Al Aqsa Brigade played a very positive role.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Aqsa_Martyrs%27_Brigades
.(7) “… The footage is extremely harrowing to watch – but you should says Robert Crampton.” The Times, Times 2, November 27, 2023: 7.
The systems
My general idea is as follows. A society is a system which displays valued events - positive events and negative events.
Positivity is caused by a subsystem. We refer to this as the P-system, ‘P’ for positivity.
Negativity and violence are caused by a subsystem. We refer to this as the N-system, ‘N’ for negativity.
The global N-system has a subsystem which generates violence, namely the global violence system - alluded to in:
W6 Positive value … Gaza-Israel … national and world opinion … the global violence system.
World society contains a subsystem involving the Abrahamic religions – the global Abrahamic system. The power of this system is evidenced by the prevalence of Christianity and Islam throughout the world, arising historically from European and Middle Eastern empires – the Abrahamic empires … and an underlying Abrahamic system. There has been much of merit in the Abrahamic system – I, as a mathematician, am particularly interested in the mathematics produced by the Abrahamic system. However it also contains part of the global N-system, in other words the Abrahamic N-system … N-Abrahamism.
In saying this, I am not saying that there is anything special about the Abrahamic N-system. Other systems in the world are equally capable of producing violence and negativity.
And to repeat, there is much of merit in the Abrahamic system. There is P-Abrahamism as well as N-Abrahamism.
The four N-Abrahamisms: religion, nation, party, empire, technology and military violence
The three Abrahamic religions are: Judaism, Christianity and Islam (1). What I mean by the word “N-Abrahamism” is a certain conception of society which involves a certain conception of an Abrahamic religion combined with certain notions of nation, party, territory, empire, technology and military violence … a certain conception of self and other, of positivity and negativity. Most adherents of Abrahamic religions are not adherents of N-Abrahamism.
The following sources have brought me to this notion … Ayaan Hirsi Ali was brought up as a Muslim and encountered the Muslim Brotherhood, then turned first to Bertrand Russell’s atheism and finally to Christianity. She now sees the world in terms of Western civilisation threatened by three different but related forces: great-power authoritarianism and expansionism; the rise of global Islamism; “and the viral spread of woke ideology, which is eating into the moral fibre of the next generation” (2). Somewhat similar world forces are at play in Robert Harris’ Conclave, a fictional account of the choosing of a new Pope (3). Showing now in cinemas is the film Napoleon. An article refers to his ‘civilising mission’ in the Middle East (4). Paris Echo, by Sebastian Faulks, has Christians, Jews and Muslims … “the shadows of Vichy and Algeria … questions of empire, grievance and identity … asks how much we really need to know if we are to live as valuable life.” (5).
Recently I revisited Schofield’s analysis of Israeli politics where he locates voters and political parties in two-dimensional space, the two dimensions being religion and security. I view ‘security’ as relating to military violence – either by the self or by the other or by both. Later I shall say more about this correlation between religion and military violence (6). Steven Pinker noted more than a decade ago that the Hebrew Bible was one long celebration of violence. He also noted the violence of Christendom (7).
All this seemed to relate to my notion of “conceptions of the national self” (8). In particular Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday are important components of “Britannia”, a conception which has been invoked in the Conservative party tumult of recent years. Britannia involves religion, nation, party, territory, empire, technology and military violence (9). Other countries have similar conceptions – for example Putin’s Rus (10).
What then should I think about the atheism and Bertrand Russell alluded to by and rejected by Ayaan Hirsi Ali? Unfortunately for atheism, some forces have embraced atheism with religious fervour – again associated with nation, party, territory, empire, technology and military violence. Some of these forces have occurred in Abrahamic countries and it has been suggested that these atheistic conceptions have drawn on certain Abrahamic ideas. I suggest that this might count as a fourth N-Abrahamism. For example there is reference to communism as “the God that Failed” (11). Somewhat similarly Ayaan Hirsi Ali notes that certain modern ideas are “the product of centuries of debate within Jewish and Christian communities” (2).
[I now discover that others have used the phrase “the fourth Abrahamic religion” (12). This is unrelated to my notion of a fourth N-Abrahamism.]
.(1) Wikipedia: https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abrahamic_religions
Charles Cohen: https://history.wisc.edu/publications/the-abrahamic-religions-a-very-short-introduction/ . Rather unfortunately for me, Aaron Hughes suggests abandoning the idea! https://academic.oup.com/book/12114/chapter-abstract/161491068?redirectedFrom=fulltext.
(2) “Raised a Muslim, I see now that civilisation rests on Christianity. As a child I was forced to follow fundamental Islam, and in adulthood rejected all religion. Now I understand that life without spiritual solace is unendurable – and Christ’s teachings are my guide. … In 1985 the Muslim Brotherhood came to my community in Kenya, … a special hatred was reserved for one subset of unbeliever: the Jew. … ” The Times, November 18, 2023, pp 40-41. Ayaan Hirsi Ali.
https://unherd.com/2023/11/why-i-am-now-a-christian/
Prey: Immigration, Islam, and the Erosion of Women’s Rights.
https://www.google.co.uk/books/edition/Prey/V3MtEAAAQBAJ?hl=en&gbpv=1&pg=PT5&printsec=frontcover
(3) Conclave. Robert Harris. London: Hutchison. 2016.
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/sep/24/conclave-by-robert-harris-review
(4) Locating the Ottomans in Napoleon’s World. Virginia H Aksan.
“The Bonaparte invasion inaugurated an interventionist school of both British and French imperialism, a fumbling towards imperial methods, driven by their great power rivalries with Russia and later Prussia, but equally committed to a civilizing mission and the preferential markets represented by the sprawling Ottoman Empire.”
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9781137455475_20
“From Napoleon to Allenby: the Holy Land and the Wider Middle East”. Robert Fisk.
https://academic.oup.com/book/45676/chapter-abstract/398062731?redirectedFrom=fulltext
(5) Paris Echo. Sebastian Faulks. London: Hutchison. 2018.
(6) See later section.
(7) Page 6 in Steven Pinker. The Better Angels of Our Nature. 2011. Allen Lane Section, The Hebrew Bible, pp. 6-12:
https://wardricker.com/better-angels-excerpt.php
Roman Empire and Early Christendom, p. 12 et seq.
Pinker’s index cites seventeen Pinker pages about the Old Testament and only five Pinker pages about the New Testament.
(8) Nations and world: variation and self.
(9) Britannia: Three Prime Ministers and a Queen
(10) Russian civilisation
The national self … empires in Europe … the Ottoman empire
(11) The God That Failed. 1949.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_God_that_Failed
Darkness at Noon. Arthur Koestler. 1940.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Darkness_at_Noon; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Koestler
.(12) See “other Abrahamic religions” in:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abrahamic_religions
N-Abrahamism: a certain conception of self and other, of positive and negative
Note: N-Abrahamism is not to be identified with Abrahamic religions. Most adherents of Abrahamic religions are not adherents of N-Abrahamism.
Steven Pinker studied the bible looking for instances of violence. I find it helpful to consider these instances of violence in terms of the relationship between self and other.
N-Abrahamism involves a certain conception of self and of other, of positive and negative: it involves a partisanship in favour of the self and against the other.
In the first place the deity is partisan in favour of himself and against other deities and against people. The first three or four commandments are all about the deity himself:
“I am the Lord thy God. Thou shalt have no other gods before me. Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image. Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain. Remember/observe the sabbath day to keep it holy.”
The remaining commandments are important rules which are a fundamental part of most societies. (Pinker, page 7):
The self should not be negative to the other. … [NN]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ten_Commandments
Secondly the deity is all-powerful and when it suits itself, it acts against others – against people. “No sooner do men and women begin to multiply than God decides they are sinful and that the suitable punishment is genocide … [Noah and the flood].” (Pinker, page 6).
Turning now to people, when it suits themselves, they act against others. “When David becomes king, he keeps up his hard-earned reputation by killing by the tens of thousands.” (Pinker, page 9).
Pinker turns to the New Testament. For many, Jesus is about love:
The self should be positive to the other. … [P]
However, at times Jesus also can be partisan in favour of himself and against other people. “He that loveth their father or mother more than me is not worthy of me.” Matthew 10, 34-37 (Pinker, page 12).
At the end, Jesus will divide. He is partisan in favour of a group who believes in him (the sheep); and partisan against a group who do not believe in him (the goats) – the former bound for heaven, the latter bound for hell. Matthew 25, 31-46:
https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew%2025%3A31-46&version=NIV
At school we learned “Holy Willie’s Prayer”, a poem by Scotland’s national poet, Robert Burns. Here is an extract from a speech I made at a Burns’ Supper a year or so ago:
“Holy Willie’s god divided: it divided those bound for Heaven from those bound for Hell. In contrast, in his poem A man’s a man for a’ that, Robert Burns offered a different ‘god’ – a ‘god’ where people unite. Like Burns, Rotary sees a world where people unite.
“that man to man the world oer shall brothers be for a’ that”.”
What is at issue here is binary thinking, dividing people into two groups, ‘our group’ and the ‘other group’. The Christian Jesus in these two excerpts is divisive in - very broadly - the same way as Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s teachers were divisive when they said that if unbelievers “explicitly rejected our summons to Islam, we were to hate and curse them” [(2) above]. Fictional character Tariq has a similar experience to Ayaan’s. As a young child being an Islam was about “being kind to widows and orphans”, but later he encountered a rather different approach: “if you don’t believe that now it’s been explained to you, then you’ll burn in hell for all time.” Faulks pp 271. See (2a) above.
The Quran and Its Biblical Subtext:
https://www.routledge.com/The-Quran-and-its-Biblical-Subtext/Reynolds/p/book/9780415524247 ;
The Quran and The Bible:
https://yalebooks.co.uk/book/9780300181326/the-quran-and-the-bible/ ;
Heaven, Hell and non-Muslims:
https://yalebooks.yale.edu/2020/03/19/heaven-hell-and-non-muslims-in-the-quran/.
Gabriel Said Reynolds: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gabriel_Said_Reynolds
Fortunately however, adherents to Abrahamic religions happily select and follow the more benevolent passages of the bible …
The self should be positive to the other. … [P]
The self should not be negative to the other. … [NN]
Be positive, not negative. … [P, NN]
… sadly, on occasion adherents to Abrahamic religions select and follow the more malevolent passages of the bible – this is N-Abrahamism. (‘N’ for negative.)
The self being negative to the other. … [N]
The self being not positive to the other. … [NP]
Being negative, not positive. … [N, NP]
Distributions in V-space
Jesus indulged in binary thinking and divided people into sheep and goats – he judged individual people (ad hominem) rather than individual instances. Instead, there are distributions:
An individual person has a distribution of instances of [P], [N], [NN] and [NP].
The set of people have a set of such distributions.
Let me clarify the notion of a V-space. It is a space consisting of dimensions, each of which is a V-dimension. A V-dimension is one which measures value, with one extreme, extremely positive, and the other extreme, extremely negative. Numerically the range can be taken as [-1,1] or [-100,+100]. Of particular interest is negativity by the self against the other.
. 0
. extremely negative extremely positive
A particular instance has some value x along the V-dimension. A set of instances has a distribution over the V-dimension. In binary thinking an object is either positive or negative … in distribution thinking an object is a distribution over V-space.
2 Israel and Palestine
At the moment, the attention of world society is on negativity by Palestinians against Israelis; and negativity by Israelis against Palestinians.
“Thou shalt not kill.” … “Love your enemy.”
“[Netanyahu’s] hard-right coalition partners, Religious Zionism and Otzma Yehudit, said they would oppose the deal, insisting that no concession to Hamas should be made.” (2)
“This is his life’s mission. [Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader] knows very well he will be killed but believes he will go to paradise because of his distorted belief of what Islam is about. But his mission before he dies is to free [Palestinian] prisoners.” (3)
.(1) “Tensions rise in the Old City as settlers target Armenians. Christians in Jerusalem are now living in fear of ethnic cleansing.” The Times, November 20, 2023: 27.
.(2) “Nearly 50 hostages to go free in first stage of deal.” The Times, November 22, 2023, 30.
.(3) “Negotiation strategy is bizarre, says soldier’s saviour.” The Times, November 22, 2023, 30-31.
Deaths and death rates, the first four weeks, October 2023
Four weeks after October 7, the deaths in Israel and Gaza were around 1500 and 10,000, respectively – a ratio of roughly 1 to 7.
The population in Isael is 9,223,587 (in 2023). The population of the Gaza strip is about two million – a ratio of roughly 5 to 1.
The death rates are therefore 163 per million and 5,000 per million – a ratio of roughly 1 to 30.
To the extent that Israeli deaths were concentrated on the first day and the Palestine deaths spread out over four weeks, the death rate per day might be roughly the same … I don’t know.
2.1 Israel
The fifth ‘War in Gaza’ survey - Israel Democracy Institute
“Overwhelming majority of Jewish and Arab Israelis:
The release of all hostages is a goal of importance
IDI's fifth ‘War in Gaza’ survey finds that among Jewish Israelis, toppling Hamas and releasing the hostages are pivotal war-goals. The majority of respondents do not think that the government currently has a clear action for the day after the fighting ends, …
… and there is rising support (56%) for an amendment to the Nation-State Law, to safeguard equality for non-Jewish citizens.”
Self and other
The question on the Nation-State Law is of interest in terms of the self and the other. The support for the amendment shows a gradient of support across the political spectrum:
81% support by Arabs; 86% by the Left (Jews); 75% by the Centre (Jews); [56% by Jews generally]; and 32% support by the Right (Jews).
On a methodological note, these percentages are one-sided percentages, and in my view are misleading. The 56% gives the impression of support, ignoring the fact that 33% disagree.
I believe that net aggregate percentages give a more balanced view. The net percentage support amongst Arabs is +75%; amongst Jews is +14%; and overall is +24%. (Scale: -100% to +100%).
However the best measure in my view is the mean score on the underlying continuum. This gives mean support amongst Arabs of 53; amongst Jews, 9; and overall, 16. (Scale: -100 to +100).
Taking Jews as the self, the self is only very slightly in favour of equality for the other. Taking Arabs as the self, the self is very much in favour of their equality with the other. Jews, themselves are distributed along a continuum, less supportive of the other as one goes from Left to Centre to Right.
Sources
The survey was carried out on 19-20 November 2023; and the report came out on 24 November.
Israel Democracy Institute: https://en.idi.org.il/
Israel at War: https://en.idi.org.il/tags-en/51054
Report: https://en.idi.org.il/articles/51616
Download data: at the foot of the report.
Press release: at the foot of the report.
NOTE: further analysis of the survey is planned.
Population demography (2023)
In view of the survey results for Jews and Arabs, the following is of interest:
group population proportion
Jews 7,181,000 73%
Arabs 2,065,000 21%
Other 549,000 6%
Note also: the local size distribution in Israel has changed: Mizrahi Jews are “nearly half” and there are “fewer Ashkenazi Jews in Israel than there are Mizrahi Jews”. See section below.
1. 19 May 2021.
2. ^ "ישראל במספרים ערב ראש השנה תשפ". www.cbs.gov.il (in Hebrew). Retrieved 24 September 2023.
3. ^ "State of Israel – 70 Years of Statistics, Historical Statistical Atlas 1948–2018". cbs.gov.il. Re
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Israel;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Israel#Ethnic_and_religious_groups
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_Jews
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_citizens_of_Israel
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israelis#Other_citizens
Link: Palestinian citizens of Israel.
https://datacommons.org/place/country/ISR/?utm_medium=explore&mprop=count&popt=Person&hl=en
Regions
An account of the regions relating to Israel lists:
.(1) The Green Zone. Area sovereign to Israel after 1949 Armistice Agreements.
,(2) East Jerusalem. Annexed by Israel.
.(3) Golan Heights. Annexed by Israel.
.(4) Seam Zone. (West Bank) Occupied.
.(5) Other areas (Area C, West Bank). Israeli control.
.(6) Areas A and B. 165 “islands” in the West Bank. Palestinian control.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Israel
Areas A and B: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_enclaves
Arab-Israeli General Armistice Agreements (1949)
“United Nations–sponsored armistice agreements concluded in 1949 between the state of Israel and four Arab states.
Between February and July 1949, General Armistice Agreements (GAAs) were signed between the state of Israel and four Arab states: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Iraq, which had participated in the war with an expeditionary force, did not conclude an agreement since it did not have a common border with Israel; its forces just left the arena. All negotiations were mediated on behalf of the United Nations (UN) by Ralph Bunche, whose achievement earned him the 1949 Nobel Peace Prize. These agreements put an end to the Arab–Israel War of 1948. The failure of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine to achieve more comprehensive peace treaties created a de facto situation that made the General Armistice Agreements into quasi-permanent arrangements that regulated the relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors until the 1967 war.”
The dominant conception of the national self (also in W6)
Third Reich to British Cyprus to British Palestine, 1945 to 1948
Exodus, Leon Uris, 1958
Book https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exodus_(Uris_novel)
Film https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exodus_(1960_film)
“Ceasefire supporters fail to understand Israel. The film Exodus underlines how Jews won’t rely on others and why calls by Sadiq Khan and others are pointless…. Now Jews would secure their own land and ensure their safety …” Daniel Finkelstein. Nov 1, 27.
Finkelstein provides an insightful account. While sympathetic to the aspirations of the Jews, he is also alert to the opposing wishes of the Palestinians.
.(1) “This is Israel’s founding myth.” “The book is a romantic tale of the foundation of the state of Israel, centring on the buccaneering exploits of a [fictional] Jew, Ari Ben Canaan …” “a simplistic account with the legitimate claims of the Palestinian Arabs almost entirely and wrongly ignored.”
.(2) The role of the British Empire. In the early period the British were ‘controlling’ the movement of Jews to Palestine. But at various times before and after, the British Empire was supportive:
[An aside. In 1956 I recall the excitement of my classmates at morning assembly asking our young PE teacher whether he was going to be called up. In reality Israel, Britain and France were at war with Egypt. At home we listened as the plug was pulled literally on the radio programme, “Any Questions”.
https://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/6992]
… other conceptions of the national self
Last Saturday’s Times … it was a photo of people in the interior of a bus. The caption said: ‘The forced exodus of Middle Eastern Jews to Israel after 1948, including Iraqis …’.
I had just been writing about Israel and here was a group I had not mentioned and indeed was mainly ignorant about. I had talked to Richard only that week and I thought about the other Jews (not so many) that I knew. I thought about the letters and articles written by Jews in The Times and in The Observer. I thought of the Jews I had encountered in books, television and film – even Fiddler on the Roof! Their family history was in Europe and indeed in many cases the survival from the holocaust. In summary, the locations I have encountered in my life have not had many Jews, but all the Jews I have encountered have been Ashkenazi Jews (of European origin). None of my locations have had Mizrahi Jews (of Middle Eastern origin).
An aside: the global structure of local size distributions
See next section.
I now return to the photo in last Saturday’s Times. It was in an article challenging some of the ideas in recent debates. However my interest here is not on these debates but rather on the Middle Eastern Jews. My interest is in the third paragraph below which refers to the focus on European Jews and the neglect of the Middle Eastern Jews … and specifically to the reference to the local size distribution in Israel and how it has changed: Mizrahi Jews are “nearly half” and “fewer Ashkenazi Jews in Israel than there are Mizrahi Jews”.
“Take the idea that Israelis are white. It is highly doubtful that Ashkenazi Jews, who hail from Europe and have been exterminated in their millions because the Nazis considered them a racial underclass, are simply “white”. (As some have pointed out, there is a bitter irony to the fact that Ashkenazi Jews are perceived as being “insufficiently white” by the far right even as they are increasingly seen as “too white” by the far left.)
The assumption that Israelis are white becomes absurd when you realize there are now fewer Ashkenazi Jews in Israel than there are Mizrahi Jews. After all most Mizrahis, whose ancestors hail from the Middle East, have skin no lighter or darker than the average Palestinian; the same, of course, is true of the hundreds of thousands of Ethiopian Jews.
… And while debates about the Middle East usually revolve around European Jews who fled to Israel in the wake of the holocaust, nearly half of Israel’s Jews came to the country in very different circumstances. They have, since 1948, been violently expelled from Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt and Morocco.”
Note that my interest here is in different conceptions of Israel and its people, and the contrast between those of European origin and those of Middle Eastern origin. My general point is that there are different conceptions of the national self.
… the global structure of local size distributions
This prompts a few broader principles:
.(1) locations in world society vary in terms of the presence or absence of every social group;
.(2) locations in world society vary in terms of the percentage presence of every social group;
.(3) the percentage presences in a particular location I refer to as the local size distribution.
.(4) different locations have different local size distributions.
I now consider my ignorance. My knowledge is based on the locations I have encountered. If these locations are in some way unrepresentative then my knowledge is likewise unrepresentative. When I encounter another person the overlap between myself and the other relates to the overlap in the locations we have separately encountered.
Voters and parties in V-space
Consider Israel as ‘the self’ and the notion of being positive or negative to the other, particularly the Palestinian other. Suppose that this is a matter of degree. So there is a continuum, V. Voters and parties in Israel are located along this continuum. Religious Zionism is at one extreme with high negativity towards Palestinians; and Arab parties are at the other extreme with low negativity towards Palestinians. In general religious Zionist partis, parties on the right and Netanyahu’s Likud have middling to high negativity. Parties on the middle and on the left have middling to low negativity values.
This V dimension is associated with two dimensions: a religion dimension and a security dimension. See below.
The V dimension is related to a left-right dimension which is routinely used in accounts of Israeli politics. See below.
Political space: elections 2022
“Legislative elections were held in Israel on 1 November 2022 to elect the 120 members of the 25th Knesset. The results saw the right-wing national camp of former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu win a parliamentary majority, amid losses for left-wing and Arab parties, as well as gains by the far right.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Israeli_legislative_election
“In Israeli politics, the national camp (Hebrew: המחנה הלאומי) or right-wing bloc is an informal coalition of nationalist and right-wing, religious conservative political parties that since 1977 has frequently co-operated to form governments.[1]
The coalition is led by Likud, and includes parties to its political right as well as religious parties. Generally, the two Haredi parties (Shas and the United Torah Judaism alliance) align with Likud. In the past, the coalition has included the National Religious Party, the National Union, Gesher, Tkuma, The Jewish Home, the New Right, Yisrael Beiteinu (until late 2019) and Zehut”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_camp
The distribution of votes typically displays an M-shaped distribution with the centre squeezed between centre-left and centre-right. The trajectory shows fluctuations in the strength of the (still small) centre.
These observations are buttressed by Schofield’s in-depth analysis of Israeli politics in an earlier period. In particular his show the – see next section.
Political space: Schofield’s two dimensions, religion and security
“The horizontal left–right dimension correlated with attitudes to the PLO, and the [vertical] dimension described beliefs regarding the proper relationship between the state and the Jewish faith.” See below.
[Schofield talks about a factor analysis. The focus is on two dimensions. My guess is that one could say that the first dimension is the familiar Left-Right political dimension and the second dimension is a bipolar dimension contrasting religion and Palestine/security concerns. Alternatively one could say, as Schofield does, that there are two dimensions, religion and security. Both accounts are valid, one being obtained from the other by a rotation of the axes.]
To some extent the difference between political parties corresponds to a difference in conceptions of the national self. Schofield (2002) considers the positions in political space of voters and parties in Israel in the 1990s. Two dimensions are considered: security and religion. These two dimensions are important in relation to conceptions of the national self (cf. above discussion of Britannia). Figures 3 and 4 on page 440 are of interest showing the distribution of voters and parties in space in the 1991 and 1996 elections respectively. Between 1991 and 1996 the spread of opinions on the religion dimension almost doubles. The positive correlation between security and religion scores which is present in 1991 looks as if it has increased by 1996. There is an emergence of two modes: low negative on security and religion; and slightly positive on security and religion.
Representative democracy and social choice theory (Schofield, 2002), pp. 438-441
“By contrast, Table 2 presents the outcomes in the last four elections in Israel. The electoral system is extremely proportional, in that vote shares and seat shares are almost identical. (Small parties with less than 2% of the popular vote received no seats).
To understand political motivations in such an electoral system, it is necessary to note that no party may expect to win the election (if this is interpreted to mean “gain a majority of the seats”).
However, it is possible to model post-election bargaining between parties. To understand the nature of the policy space in Israel, surveys conducted by Arian and Shamir (1995, 1999) for the 1992 and 1996 elections were utilized. Factor analysis of responses by a sample of voters (of size approximately 1000) gave a two-dimensional space, Z. The left–right dimension correlated with attitudes to the PLO, and the north– south dimension described beliefs regarding the proper relationship between the state and the Jewish faith. The pre-election declarations (or manifestos) of the various parties were processed using the Arian–Shamir questionnaire. The “positions” or declarations of the various parties are marked in Figure 3 for 1992 and in Figure 4 for 1996. [See Schofield, Sened and Nixon (1998) and Schofield and Sened (2002) for further details].
To extend Cox’s model of electoral competition, let us regard the situation after the 1992 election as a committee comprising the ten parties with seat strengths as given in Table 2. Let us use D1 to denote the family of “winning” or majority coalitions after the election of 1992. Obviously Labor, together with the three small parties (on the left), with 61 seats, form a majority. Likud, and the religious parties, together with Tzomet, have only 59 seats, and so need another party, such as Meretz, to attain a majority. Further, let us ignore government perquisites for the moment and assume that each party has Euclidean utility based on an ideal policy point given by its declaration (as illustrated in Figure 3). With these party preferences and voting weights, the “social preference” in the Knesset can be denoted sD1 . It should be obvious that the “parliamentary” core, or voting equilibrium E(sD1 ) is non-empty, and located at the Labor party declaration. To see this, note that the “compromise set” for each coalition is simply the convex hull of the ideal points of the coalition members. Clearly all “compromise sets” for the various winning coalitions intersect at a single point, namely that of the Labor party. A model of political bargaining proposed by Banks and Duggan (2000) suggests that the only possible outcome of bargaining in the coalition situation D1 is precisely this equilibrium or core point. Moreover Laver and Schofield (1990) argue that Labor would form a minority government. In fact, Labor under the leadership of Rabin did form a minority government, with implicit support from Meretz. As a consequence, the peace accords with the PLO were initiated.
After the election of 1996 a very different coalition structure, D2, was created. It should be clear from Table 2 that under D2, the coalition excluding Labor and the
“left” controlled a majority of 68 seats. In this case, the party preferences and voting weights give a different “social preference”, sD2 say. It is evident that the core E(sD2 ) is empty. Essentially there are, in principle, three different coalition governments possible after 1996: one based on Likud, Shas, and the religious parties; a national unity government of Likud and Labor; and a coalition of Labor, and the “left” together with Shas. Since the equilibrium, or core, E(sD2 ) is empty there is no possibility of a minority Likud government. In fact, Netanyahu (leader of Likud) won a separate prime-ministerial election against Peres (leader of Labor). Although Labor was the larger of the two parties, Netanyahu constructed a majority coalition that depended on Shas.
I suggest that bargaining between the parties is constrained to a set known as the “heart” 4. Under Euclidean policy preferences, the “parliamentary” heart after 1996 is simply the convex hull of the declarations of Labor, Likud and Shas. Because Netanyahu won the separate election, the outcome after this election can be seen to be a point on the arc joining the Likud and Shas positions. However, because the Likud position was not an equilibrium, the Likud-led government was eventually defeated under a vote of no-confidence. (One aspect of this defeat was the defection of Gesher, a small centrist party, out of its alliance with Likud. Gesher is not listed in Table 2, since its seats counted as part of Likud.) After the 1999 election, a majority coalition led by Barak, of Labor, was constructed that collapsed two years later.”
https://polisci.wustl.edu/files/polisci/imce/handbookelsevier2002.pdf
Schofield and Sened:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1016304319551
2005: https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00231.x
2007: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41106828
Multiparty competition in Israel, 1988-1996:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4092415
2013: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3872446/ :
The convergence coefficient across political systems
“Formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties or candidates should locate themselves at the electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain nonconvergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including estimates of electoral valence. We introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient, c. It has been shown that high values of c imply that there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties. We used electoral surveys to construct a stochastic valence model of the elections in various countries. We find that the convergence coefficient varies across elections in a country, across countries with similar regimes, and across political regimes. In some countries, the centripetal tendency leads parties to converge to the electoral mean. In others the centrifugal tendency dominates and some parties locate far from the electoral mean. In particular, for countries with proportional electoral systems, namely, Israel, Turkey, and Poland, the centrifugal tendency is very high. In the majoritarian polities of the United States and Great Britain, the centrifugal tendency is very low. In anocracies, the autocrat imposes limitations on how far from the origin the opposition parties can move.”
2015: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629815586878?icid=int.sj-abstract.citing-articles.823
Of interest but not really related is:
2.2 Palestine
An opinion poll in the West Bank and in Gaza …
… the response in The Times: an article, opinion pieces and letters
On Monday 20 November, The Times reported on an opinion poll of Palestinians. The next day a piece by Melanie Phillips cited the survey findings. On Wednesday there was a letter response to Phillips; and also a piece by Daniel Finkelstein. There followed four letters on Thursday, one on Friday and four on Saturday.
“Palestinians strongly back Hamas attack.” The Times, November 20, 2023, 28.
“Western opinion is naïve about hatred of Israel. The truth is neither a majority of Palestinians nor any leader wants to live in peace with Jews. … The PA consistently pump out Nazi-style demonisation of Jews.”
Melanie Phillips. The Times, November 21, 2023, 24.
“Israelis and Palestinians must start to listen. Dialogue towards a peaceful solution can only begin when both sides are able to acknowledge each other’s arguments. … The Israeli narrative that Palestinians left voluntarily is incorrect … The settlement policy is clearly a strategic and moral mistake.”
Daniel Finkelstein. The Times, November 22, 2023, 25.
Letters to the editor
Wednesday 22, 28
… equally appalling …
Lord Green … Chairman Medical Aid for Palestine 2001-2003; former British Ambassador to Syria and Saudi Arabia.
Thursday 23, 32
Finkelstein’s measured account … Oslo, Yasser Arafat, Netanyahu …
… Hamas not representative of mainstream Palestinians.
Sir Tony Benton
Previous proposals were all heavily under Israeli control.
James Fox
Phillips and Finkelstein could not be more different in tone and substance. …
No-one prepared to live at peace with Israelis? … the need for dialogue?
Clare MacInnes
… hampered by entrenched and polarised viewpoints … from the river to the sea … can be accomplished without removing Israel.
Michael Scholes
Friday 24, 30
Finkelstein is a welcome contrast to Phillips. … closed minds … a case one might be more open to …
Richard Kinchen, British ambassador to Lebanon, 2000-2003.
Saturday 25, 28
“Ulster-style path to peace in Middle East”
Victory for Hamas would be the elimination of the state of Israel and the death of every Jew.
Jonathan Dickson
I suspect that most people support not one or other but both Israel and the Palestinians … A two-party state is the only hope for long term peace and only Israel can lead the way there.
Peter Kemp
A reply to Sir Tony Benton … the recent poll suggests Hamas is pretty mainstream Palestinian.
Tony Varney
A reply to Michael Scholes … The Arab world rejected the 1947 plan … the phrase means the destruction of Israel.
John Levy
The report by Arab World for Research and Development, Ramallah
“From October 31 to November 7, Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD) surveyed 668 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, during the fourth week of the ongoing Gaza War. At the time of the poll, more than 10,000 Palestinians in Gaza and 185 in the West Bank had been killed, with 27,000 injured in Gaza and 2,500 in the West Bank. Additionally, 2,700 people were reported missing in Gaza, while 2,500 had been arrested in the West Bank. During the survey, a significant number of residents in northern Gaza had been forcibly displaced or were in the process of moving south. The UN estimates that in the period the survey was conducted more than 1.5 million people, out of a total population of 2.3 million, were displaced. The Israeli ground invasion, initiated on October 28, persisted throughout the implementation of the survey …
… The team conducted the survey through tablet-assisted, face-to-face interviews across the West Bank and in shelters and households in the three “southern” Gaza governorates (Deir Al Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah) where people were presently residing. The poll’s sample includes all socioeconomic groups, ensuring equal representation of adult men and women, and is proportionately distributed across the West Bank and Gaza. With a 95% confidence interval, the margin of error for the poll is (±) 4% …
• 98% stated that they will never forget and will never forgive what Israel did and is continuing to do during this war.
• 65% perceived the present war as a conflict targeting all Palestinians, while only 18% viewed it as a war between Israel and Hamas. Other respondents believed: it is a war between Israel and Muslims (5%); it is a war between Israel and Arabs (2%); or it is a conflict between the West and the Arab-Muslim world (10%).
• Reasons cited for the October 7 attacks included: responding to oppression, particularly attacks on Al Aqsa (35%), and addressing broader issues such as freeing Palestine, ending the occupation, and stopping settlements (33%). Breaking the blockade of Gaza was cited as the main reason by 21% of respondents.
• A small percentage (6%) reported that the main reasons behind the war are related to regional interests. This includes serving the interests of Iran (5%) and stopping the ongoing peace and normalization process with Israel (1%).
• As illustrated below, the majority of (59%) strongly supported or (16%) supported to some extent the October 7 attacks carried by the Hamas-led factions, while 16% supported to some extent. 11% reported that they neither supported nor opposed the attack, while 13% expressed opposition to the attacks. Strong support for the attacks was notably higher among Palestinians in the West Bank (68%) as compared to Gaza (47%).
Institution: https://www.awrad.org/
The special questions for Gaza
Table 31: To date: Has your residence been demolished as a result of this current war? Table 32: To date: Has any immediate family member (grandparent, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter) of yours been martyred?
Table 33: Do you trust the instructions provided by Israel (through paper or electronic publications or phone communications)
Table 34: If you were instructed to evacuate your current area, do you know to which destination you would go?
Table 35: For you, is there any safe place for you and your family in the Gaza Strip? Table 36: Displacement
My commentary and further analysis
The sample was 668 people, 58% from the West Bank and 42% from Gaza. On the West Bank 63% were earners and 37% non-earners (student, housewife, unemployed, retired). In Gaza these percentages were reversed: 30% were earners and 70%
non-earners.
The substance of the questions is itself interesting. It reveals an agenda of issues amongst Palestinians which is I feel different from the agenda of issues in Israel or in the West. In many tables the West Bank and the Gaza percentages are – loosely speaking - similar.
A Palestine opinion scale? … the modal options
There are standard procedures for constructing proper measurement scales. The information here is insufficient to do this. Instead the following offers a rough-and-ready approach.
In what follows we look at each question and identify the option which has the highest percentage, in other words the modal option.
Let us consider two questions which have extreme modal options, one modal option with a very high percentage and the other modal option with a very low percentage (at least it is very low, relative to the others).
.(1) “Considering the ongoing events, to a great extent, I feel a sense of pride as a Palestinian.”
This modal option has a very high percentage. It refers to pride as a Palestinian, with 94% choosing it. This is perhaps not surprising: most people are proud to be members of their country. One might think it an ‘easy’ option to choose – so the percentage is high.
.(2) “I expect strongly this war to end by victory achieving the liberation of Gaza from the Israeli invasion.”
One of the
This modal option has a very low percentage (much less than 94%). It refers to expecting victory, with 41% choosing it. This lower percentage is perhaps not surprising: given the destruction in Gaza, victory seems unlikely. One might think it a ‘difficult’ option to choose – so the percentage is lower.
Let us now consider a couple of middling options, middling in the sense of having a percentage between 41% and 94%.
.(3) “I support the solution of establishing one state or two states in the following format: A Palestinian state from the river to the sea.”
This ‘middling high’ modal option refers to support for “A Palestinian state from the river to the sea”, with 75% choosing it. This middling high percentage is, let me argue, not surprising: to many in the West, particularly to Jews, the slogan is anathema, but to Palestinians it may well be a long-established vague aspiration (I offer this tentatively). One might think it a ‘middling easy’ option to choose – so the percentage is middling high.
.(4) “I extremely support the military operation carried out by the Palestinian resistance led by Hamas on October 7th.”
This is a ‘middling low’ option and refers to support for October 7th, with 59% choosing it (see paragraph below). This middling low percentage is, (let me try to find an argument), not surprising: in comparison with the previous middling high option, it is maybe lower because it is specific and it involves military violence. One might think it a ‘middling difficult’ option to choose – so the percentage is middling low.
But, how can 59% be middling low? I have called it middling low because I am judging it relative to the range of percentages, 41% to 94%. A thought must be how can 59% support the atrocities of October 7th? One point is that they were not asked about atrocities they were asked about “the military operation” carried out by “the Palestinian resistance”.
Another point is that their information about October 7th may be limited and selective. (Looking back I see that the front page photograph in The Observer of October 8th showed Palestinian militia standing on top of a captured Israeli tank, waving Palestinians flags.) See the section on opinion formation below.
Finally, alas, if there are people with a mind to commit atrocities, then there are people ‘back home’ with a mind to support it.
Taking the four modal options discussed above we can put them on a scale:
. victory Oct 7 river-sea pride
. 40 60 80 100
. ‘difficult’ ‘easy’
In a similar way one can look at the other questions and their modal options and the corresponding percentages. Ordering the options by their percentages one then obtains a quite detailed opinion scale. Note though that it has not been obtained using the standard procedures. See the section below on ‘The modal Palestinian’.
One general point is that the questions in the scale may be measuring different things. So what might it be a scale of? It is at least a scale of the amount of agreement with the options. Perhaps it is a scale of pro-self sentiment, ranging from strong pro-self sentiment (low percentages) to weak pro-self sentiment (high percentages)? … according to a certain conception of self.
A point to carry on to the next section: the percentage for the modal option depends on the ‘easiness’ of the option.
A continuum of modal groups
Corresponding to the scale of modal options there is a continuum of modal groups of people – the group who chose the modal option. We can label each group by its percentage. A group which chooses a difficult option might be said to be ‘strong’; and a group which chooses an easy option might be said to be ‘weak’:
. 41-group 59-group 75-group 94-group
. 40 60 80 100
. ‘strong’ ‘weak’
Continuing the point from the previous section: the percentage for the modal option depends on the ‘easiness’ of the option and is an expression of the ‘weakness’ of that modal group.
The distribution of modal percentages
I have identified forty-eight modal groups. Their percentages are fairly evenly spread across the range of 31 to 97. Thus it is not the case that there is one unified view of the situation, treating all the aspects in the same way – some aspects are easier and other aspects are more difficult.
.No. of groups four ten three seven nine eight seven
% support 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
. ‘strong’ ‘weak’
Note:
The questions can be grouped – see later section. Here are the modal percentages for the questions in the different groups of questions.
main set 35 41 41 59 64 72 72 75 83 86 93 94 96
decreased opinion 68 71 73 80 87 90
very positive actors 48 49 60 71
somewhat positive actors 36 37
very negative actors 42 46 47 47 49 50 64 69 71 73 74 81 87 89 96 97 97
West reasons 39 48 54 64 66 80
Opinion formation
“… consistently pump out Nazi-style demonisation of Jews.”
Melanie Phillips. The Times, November 21, 2023, 24. (See earlier).
In view of Phillips’ concern, it is of interest to look at the responses to the questions about the media.
What is the main source of information on the ongoing events in Palestine?
. WB Gaza All
Local TV 35 6 23 (Palestine TV 55%)
Arabic TV 81 47 67 (Al Jazireh 92%)
International TV 4 1 3 (BBC 39%; CNN 39%)
Social media 88 82 86 (Telegram 48%; Facebook 31%) `
Family and friends 62 79 69
Other 2 41 18 (radio 56%; … Radio Al Aqsa 17%)
WB: West Bank
The role of Arabic media is viewed as neutral, a net percentage of 0%; (West Bank +14%, net; Gaza -20%, net).
The role of Western media is viewed as very negative, a net percentage of -76%; (West Bank -82%, net; Gaza -68%, net).
Here is Al-Manar TV on Saturday/Sunday October 7th / 8th 2023:
https://english.almanar.com.lb/1917115
Al-Manar TV:
https://english.almanar.com.lb/
Here is Times of Israel, Tuesday 10th October
https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog-october-10-2023/ …
https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/un-180000-gazans-have-fled-their-homes/
https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/sirens-sound-in-towns-near-gaza-border/
https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/idf-tells-gazans-to-flee-to-egypt-while-they-still-can/
https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/israeli-strikes-in-gaza-enter-4th-day/
The Times of Israel
https://www.timesofisrael.com/
The Times, 13th October
“Isis comparisons may push terrorists to free prisoners.” 13, 6
“Invasion is a trap, warns ex-MI6 chief.” 13, 6
“Former generals doubt Israel can destroy Hamas.” 13, 6
The modal Palestinian
The “modal Palestinian” here refers to the set of modal options for the questions in the questionnaire. For example 96% chose the option “not at all” to the question on forgiveness. This was the option with the highest percentage response – the modal option for that question. All respondents are included, male and female, West Bank and Gaza. These modal options are now given below ordered by the percentage choosing that option.
.* Indicates more than two options offered
The main set of questions
*96 He thinks people around him will not at all forgive what Israel did in this war some day
*94 Considering the ongoing events, to a great extent, he feels a sense of pride as a Palestinian.
*93 He thinks people around him will not at all forget what Israel did in this war some day
*86 His main source of information on the ongoing events in Palestine is social media
*83 On this day of the war, he is very supportive of a ceasefire that includes a mutual cessation of hostilities.
*75 He supports the solution of establishing one state or two states in the following format: A Palestinian state from the river to the sea.
*72 He would like a national unity government as his preferred government after the war is finished in Gaza Strip
*72 He does not at all trust the instructions provided by Israel (through paper or electronic publications or phone communications)
*64 He believes that the current conflict in Gaza is primarily between Israel and Palestinians, in general.
*59 He extremely supports the military operation carried out by the Palestinian resistance led by Hamas on October 7th
*41 He expects strongly this war to end by victory achieving the liberation of Gaza from the Israeli invasion.
*41 In light of the demonstrations in support of the Palestinians, he feels hopeful about the future of humanity.
*35 In his opinion, the main reason for the operation launched by the Palestinian resistance on 7th October was to stop the violations of Aqsa.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-65184207
Questions about increase or decrease
90 His conviction in the possibility of coexistence between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples has decreased
87 His conviction in the possibility of achieving a peaceful solution with Israel has decreased
80 Now, his commitment to the dream of achieving the Palestinian state has increased.
73 He believes that Palestine will emerge victorious from this war
71 His commitment to a solution based on the restoration of historical Palestine as a final resolution has increased.
68 His support for the two-state solution (Palestinian state and Israeli state) as a final solution has decreased
Questions about actors
.* In his view the role of the following parties is
very positive
71 Al Kassam (military wing of Hamas)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Izz_ad-Din_al-Qassam_Brigades
60 Islamic Jihad
https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/palestinian_islamic_jihad/
49 Al Aqsa Brigade
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Aqsa_Martyrs%27_Brigades
48 Hamas
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamas
…
somewhat positive
+37? Arabic media 56; 37
+36? Hizballah 46%; 44%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah
…
somewhat negative
None
…
very negative
--42? Russia 43;34
--46 Fateh 27%; 18%
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fatah
--47 IRedC 27;28
--47? China 35; 33
--49 Turkey 36; 31
--50 Iran 33; 33
--64 PA 12%; 8%
--69 UN 14;15
--71Western media 6;13
--73 Egypt 11;19
--74 Jordan 12;13
--81 EU 3;8
--87 KSA 4;1
--89 UAE 3;2
--96 UK 1;2
--97 Israel 0%; 1%
--97 USA 0;1
Questions about the West
**The US and Western countries expressed a clear support for Israel in its confrontation with Palestinian resistance. He agrees that, to a large extent, they did so
80 Due to their political and economic interests in the region
66 Due to the influence of the Israeli lobby inside these countries
64 Due to their hate of Muslims and Islam.
54 Due to their hate of Arabs.
48 As a deterrent against Iran and Hezbollah and their fear of escalation against Israel
39 As a sympathy with Israelian civilians
NOTE: further analysis of the survey is planned.
3 Changes since first draft
3.1 Further analysis of IDI survey in Israel …
The table below gives the responses to the sixteen questions in the IDI survey in Israel – including sub-questions.
The figures reported by the IDI are what I refer to as one-sided aggregate percentages. I prefer to use net percentages which avoid one-sidedness. Net percentages still suffer from being aggregates but have the merit of being easy to calculate. The fundamental measure is the mean on the underlying scale. As a rule of thumb the mean is about a half of the net percentage.
The table gives the net percentages for Jews and for Arabs; and it gives the difference between the Jew and Arab net percentages.
Table Net percentages for Jews and for Arabs; and the difference between the Jew and Arab net percentages
. Jew Arab difference, J-A
The goals of the war
5. Restoring deterrence 87.5 48 39.5
6. Toppling Hamas 92.3 -13 105.3
7. Releasing hostages 91.3 49.6 41.7
8. Distancing Gaza 80.2 -22.6 102.8
Most important?:
9.5. Restoring deterrence 8.2 20.9 -12.7
9.6. Toppling Hamas 36.5 8.1 28.4
9.7. Releasing hostages 48.8 49 -0.2
9.8. Distancing Gaza 2.7 6.3 -3.6
10 government’s plan -28.3 -43.6 15.3
11 The northern front 29.5 -49.4 78.9
16 Israel, United States -11.8 55.5 -67.3
Performance ratings for (1-4)
1. Nat Insurance Institute 18 5.1 12.9
2. The education system 0.3 -6.7 7.0
3. Brothers in Arms 43.1 -1.3 44.4
4. Treatment of evacuees -16.2 -26.9 10.7
12 Issuing firearms -43.4 28.2 -71.6
13 Amend Nation-State Law 13.9 77.6 -63.7
14 Halt judicial reforms … 28.8 63.5 -34.7
15 Ganz remains 29.2 -38.6 67.8
… an Arabs-in-Israel scale
“Overwhelming majority of Jewish and Arab Israelis:
The release of all hostages is a goal of importance”
The headline suggests agreement between Jews and Arabs. We now consider the amount of agreement between Jews and Arabs.
We can take the rows in the above table and order them according to the difference between Jews and Arabs. This highlights those issues where the two groups differ most.
Arabs are on the left of Israel’s political spectrum. So the difference between Arabs and Jews in Israel may relate to the difference between the Jews on the Left and Jews on the Right.
Table Net percentages for Jews and for Arabs; and the difference between the Jew and Arab net percentages
. Jew Arab difference, J-A
6. Toppling Hamas 92.3 -13 105.3 J against Hamas
8. Distancing Gaza 80.2 -22.6 102.8 [J for the south]
11 The northern front 29.5 -49.4 78.9 J against Hezbollah
15 Ganz remains 29.2 -38.6 67.8 [J for government]
3. Brothers in Arms 43.1 -1.3 44.4
7. Releasing hostages 91.3 49.6 41.7
5. Restoring deterrence 87.5 48 39.5
9.6. Toppling Hamas 36.5 8.1 28.4 J against Hamas
10 government’s plan -28.3 -43.6 15.3
1. Nat Insurance Institute 18 5.1 12.9
4. Treatment of evacuees -16.2 -26.9 10.7
2. The education system 0.3 -6.7 7.0
9.7. Releasing hostages 48.8 49 -0.2
9.8. Distancing Gaza 2.7 6.3 -3.6
9.5. Restoring deterrence 8.2 20.9 -12.7
14 Halt judicial reforms … 28.8 63.5 -34.7
13 Amend Nation-State Law 13.9 77.6 -63.7 A for non-Jew
16 Israel, United States -11.8 55.5 -67.3 A for USA
12 Issuing firearms -43.4 28.2 -71.6 A for limiting firearms
Brothers in Arms
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brothers_in_Arms_(organization)
Understanding Israel’s Nation State Law
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/understanding-israel-s-nation-state-law
Measures of agreement/disagreement: differences in the net percentages
In the middle of the table are seven items with a fair amount of agreement between Jews and Arabs: the differences are only between -25 and +25.
Above and below this are items with a fair amount of disagreement: one item between -50 and -25; and four items between 25 and 50.
At the top are four items where there is strong disagreement – between 50 and 105.
At the bottom are three items where there is strong disagreement – between -100 and -50.
If Jews and Arabs were maximally opposed to one another then the difference would be 200. So the results are all well below that. The next section will introduce another approach to the amount of agreement between Jews and Arab in Israel.
Distributions and summarising statistics
The previous section has looked at the net percentage for each question – one simple number to summarise the distribution of responses to that question. There is a danger though that we think of the one number as being what everybody thinks – whereas people have widely varying views about each question. The aim of this section is to remind ourselves of this. We shall look at the distributions for three questions.
Consider first the question about the education system. Looking at the above table, there doesn’t seem much to say about the responses. There is hardly any difference between the Jew net percentage and the Arab net percentage – both net percentages are close to zero.
In fact though people have widely different views about the education system. Their views are spread pretty evenly across the full range of options – not so different from that for a uniform distribution, where each option across the full range has the same percentage. It is not quite a uniform distribution. The middle option ‘3’ is the mode – a mode with a percentage which is not much bigger than the other percentages.
…
2. The education system
. Jews Arabs General Public
1 = Very poor
1 13.3 18.6 14.2
2 17.6 23.2 18.5
3 28.3 24.8 27.7
4 21.7 18.1 21.1
5 9.5 6.8 9.1
5 = Excellent
. 9.6 8.5 9.4
Don’t know
Total 100 100 100
Next consider the question about the importance of toppling Hamas, the question with the largest difference between Jews and Arabs. The two distributions are very different. Almost all Jews think it very important whereas for Arabs there is an almost uniform distribution – an even spread across the full range of options.
6. Toppling the Hamas regime in Gaza and destroying its political and military infrastructures:
. Jews Arabs General Public
1 = Not at all important
1 0.7 17.1 3.4
2 0.7 24.9 4.7
3 2.6 16.6 4.9
4 7.0 10.2 7.5
5 86.7 18.8 75.4
5 = Very important
. 2.3 12.4 4.1
Don’t know
Total 100 100 100
Finally consider the question about amending the Nation-State Law. This question has
the largest (negative) difference between Jews and Arabs. The two distributions are very different. Almost all Arabs strongly agree whereas for Jews there is an almost uniform distribution – an even spread across the full range of options. So it is the reverse of the previous question.
13.To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? “The Nation-State Law should be amended so that it includes the principle of
full equality for non-Jewish citizens of the state.”
. Jews Arabs General Public
Strongly agree 29.4 71.9 36.4
Somewhat agree 22.2 9.1 20.0
Somewhat disagree 19.6 3.9 17.0
Strongly disagree 18.1 2.5 15.5
Don’t know 10.7 12.6 11.1
Total 100 100 100
Measures of agreement/disagreement: pairing and random encounters
One way of thinking about the amount of agreement is to consider pairing off Jews and Arabs in such a way to maximise the number of pairs who are in agreement. Looking at the three above tables we obtain:
13.3+17.6+24.8+18.1+6.8+8.5 = 88.3% pairs in agreement about Education
0.7+0.7+2.6+7.0+18.8+2.3 = 31.5% pairs in agreement about Hamas
29.4+9.1+3.9+2.5+10.7 = 53.1% pairs in agreement about the Nation-State Law
Another way of thinking about the amount of agreement is to consider random encounters: what is the probability that a random encounter between a Jew and an Arab will produce a pair who agree? Between two Jews? Between two Arabs?
In general, if there is an even distribution across n options, then the probability of agreement in random encounter is 1/n.
The table shows that the 1/n model words well, except for high agreement for Jews meeting about Hamas and except for high agreement for Arabs meeting about the Nation State Law.
The probability of agreement in random encounters between
. JA JJ AA 1/n2
Education 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.17
Hamas 0.18 0.76 0.18 0.17
Nation State Law 0.26 0.22 0.54 0.25
… a brief note on the modes
[incomplete]
In questions where the options can be put in an order, two issues arise: is there more than one mode?; and, is the mode in the middle or at the extreme? One might expect that if the net percentage is in the middle, then the mode is in the middle; and if the net percentage is at an extreme then the mode is at an extreme. Of course where there are just two options, both options can be considered extreme and so the mode is necessarily at an extreme.
Question 9 had unordered options
Questions 11, 14, 15 and 16 had two options.
Questions 12 had three options. They had interior modes and extreme modes.
eme
Questions 10 and 13 had four options. They had interior modes and extreme modes.
mem, eee
Questions 1 to 8 had five options. They had interior modes and extreme modes.
mmm, mmm, eb.m.eb, mb.eb.mb, eee, e.mb.e, eee, ee.be, unordered, mem,
…
...
Gordon Burt, December 2wd 2023
THE END