Ukraine: 8
Trauma then triumph? … Violent Russia? … Fractured France?
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Contents
Seven weeks in, Thursday 14th April 2022
The military situation … the Map
…
Re-enacting trauma then triumph: Patriarch and Putin
Nato “… barely a hundred miles from St Petersburg” … Leningrad
“Ukraine … a springboard for a Nato attack”
“Only a sordid bargain will end Ukraine’s war …” … “defeatist rhetoric …”
“Nato should seek closer ties to Putin, says Le Pen.” … populism, etc.
…
France: the Presidential election, 2022, first round
The top three
The distribution in the size of the vote: the 12 ‘populisms’
The distribution in political space: W-shaped, not M-shaped
2017 and 2022 compared
Presidential elections, 1848 and 1965-2022
“Massive” movements to the extremes? … “fractures” in the country?
The risk of Le Pen
Would a better system reduce the risk of Le Pen?
Fractured France? … fraying tempers … living with others
….
Russia
Violent Russia? Steven Pinker
Violent Russia? Nancy Shields Kollman
…
Guns or butter? … Thatcher on the Russians
Power and violence: a basic equation
Power, violence and non-violence
Power and violence: trajectory
…
Far Right Politics in Europe. Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg
A World After Liberalism. Matthew Rose.
Borderlands: a journey through the history of Ukraine. Anna Reid
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Religion (update)
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Seven weeks in, Thursday 14th April 2022
…
The military situation … the Map:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60506682
“The battle for Kyiv is over. The Donbas battle will be very different.”
James Watling, RUSI. The Observer, April 10, 2022: 7.
https://rusi.org/people/jack-watling
Russia is building up troops and military equipment along Ukraine's eastern border ahead of an expected offensive in the Donbas region.
Here are the latest developments:
· Ukraine claims it struck a Russian warship in the Black Sea*
· Russia continues preparations for eastern offensive
· Ukraine also bolstering forces in Donetsk and Luhansk
· Russian forces close to capturing southern city of Mariupol
Moscva has sunk: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-says-flagship-black-sea-fleet-badly-damaged-by-blast-2022-04-14/
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Re-enacting trauma then triumph: Patriarch and Putin
This weekend Patriarch Kyrill will re-enact the trauma of the Cross and the triumph of the Resurrection (1). Putin is re-enacting the trauma of Leningrad and the denazification triumph of 9th May 1945 – through the trauma of the past seven weeks and the trauma that is to come and the ‘triumph’ which he will declare on May 9th 2022 (2). Regarding the Crucifixion, Steven Pinker comments “by today’s sensibilities, it’s more than a little macabre that a great moral movement would adopt as its symbol a graphic representation of a revolting means of torture and execution” (3). Also (4).
(1) https://mospat.ru/en/news/45583/ ; https://mospat.ru/en/news/ ;
(2) Ben Macintyre. “Putin has already decided his victory day. The May 9 parade marking Hitler’s defeat will celebrate the vanquishing of Ukraine, whatever the reality on the ground.” The Times, April 9, 2022: 33.
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/putin-has-already-decided-his-victory-day-nr7sb3tb7
(3) Pinker, Allen and Lane, 2011, hardback, 13-14.
Also: note that the celebration of denazification triumphs has been a major part of UK and USA culture for the last eight decades. How much more so must it have been in Russia.
(4) “Jesus actor lays down cross after 250 crucifixions.”
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Nato “… barely a hundred miles from St Petersburg” … Leningrad
“Finland on path to join Nato ‘within a few weeks’ … [putting] Nato forces barely a hundred miles from St Petersburg …”
Oliver Moody, The Times, April 14, 2022: 1.
“Russia’s nuclear warning as Nato considers expansion.”
Tom Ball. The Times, April 15, 2022: 13.
2014: “Putin will also have had in mind the siege of Leningrad and his father returning from the front lines for a short break, seeing a pile of corpses outside his apartment, recognising his wife’s shoes, finding his wife was still alive and nursing her back to health … eight years later in 1952 their son Vladimir was born.”
Yearbook 2014, p. 89, citing Hilary Clinton [extracts from the book], The Times, Times 2, June 11, 2014: 2.
See also: Putin https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vladimir_Putin#Early_life;
Kirrill https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriarch_Kirill_of_Moscow#Early_life
Putin and Kirrill have the same golden gene?:
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-leningrad-siege-special-gene-putin-mironov/28983584.html;
https://hoovies.net/titles/301451/the-blood-of-the-blockade;
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“Ukraine … a springboard for a Nato attack”
“Putin insisted that he was forced to act to prevent Ukraine from becoming a springboard for a Nato attack on the country he has led for 22 years. “It’s clear that we didn’t have a choice,” he said. “It was the right decision.” He also accused western countries of encouraging nationalism and Nazism in Kyiv.”
Tom Ball. “Putin shrugs off sanctions and says Russia cannot be isolated.”
The Times, April 13, 2022: 10.
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“Only a sordid bargain will end Ukraine’s war” … “defeatist rhetoric”
“Only a sordid bargain will end Ukraine’s war …Defeating Putin or calling his nuclear bluff are unrealistic options so let’s prepare for a costly and protracted struggle”
Max Hastings. The Times, April 12, 2022: 29.
Letters to the Editor the next two days more disagreeing with Hastings than not.
Letters. The Times, April 13-15, 2022: 32, 30, 32.
“Ukraine needs support not defeatist rhetoric …
… calls for Zelensky and his people to settle for some sort of shabby, negotiated peace are hokum. We’re in for the long haul.”
Iain Martin. The Times, April 14, 2022: 29.
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“Nato should seek closer ties to Putin, says Le Pen.” … populism, etc.
Charles Bremner. The Times, April 14, 2022: 29.
Also: “Le Pen’s rise shows conservatism has fractured. When so-called populists are the only leaders defending western values, voters will turn to them … Yearning for a shared sense of belonging is inextinguishable …
… conspiracy theorists: the west misrepresents as an aggressive and murderous onslaught on Ukraine an entirely understandable attempt by the much-wronged Putin to resist Nato aggression”
Phillips, Melanie. The Times, April 12, 2022: 30.
Phillips brief article notes Rose’s book and runs a condensed argument linking a multitude of concepts, as listed below.
. Putin, Le Pen,
. western values, western civilisation
. western disillusionment, political alienation
. traditional values
. Europe’s Christian cultural heritage
. biblical roots, values, Judeo-Christian values
… source of oppression
. biblical values of universal human dignity, consent of the governed and restraints on power
. civilisation
. cultural deracination of western society
. conservatism, socialist, liberalism, illiberalism, centre ground
. split parties
. political mainstream, the people
. nation, western nation
. national socialist
. nationalist, national identity, love of country (and culture)
. antisemitic
. populism
. populist conservative
. anti-western, anti-government conspiracy theories over Covid and Ukraine
. nationalist, racist and oppressive
. tyrannical state powers
. centrist, left, right, radical right
. democratic politics
. shared
. belonging, identity
. leaders, voters
. electoral tumult, electoral uprising
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France: the Presidential election, 2022, first round
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The top three
The first round of the French presidential elections took place last weekend. President Macron (En Marche) in the centre topped the poll with 28%. Marianne Le Pen (National Rally) of the Far Right came next with 23%, and just behind her was Melenchon (Insoumise) on the far left with 21%. The nine other candidates had much lower percentage votes.
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The distribution in the size of the vote: the 12 ‘populisms’
What is the distribution in the size of the vote for the different parties?
There is a lot of talk about populism. However here I shall define ‘populism’ differently: a ‘populism’ is a mapping from a set of people to an opinion. In the election a set of subsets of people mapped on to a set of opinions. In the second round a different set of subsets of people will map on to a different set of opinions.
Only 28% voted for the most popular ‘populism’ (Macron); 72% voted for the eleven other ‘populisms’.
(The percentages had a “stepped geometric” distribution: 28%, 23, 22, 7, 5, 5, 3, 2, 2, 1, 1, and 1%. Macron ‘populism’ gained 9,560,545 votes. The last ‘populism’ gained 195,844 votes. Green ‘populism’ gained 1,587,534. Other ‘populisms’ were blank ballots, 2%, and null ballots, 1%. Two other ‘populisms’ were abstentions, 25% of registered voters (47 million); and the non-registered populace. Total population: 65,530,201.)
Discourses by politicians, commentators and analysts use a more specific concept of ‘populism’. They also talk of ‘divides’, ‘fractures’, etc.
It is the electoral system which facilitates the use of these concepts, simplifying the underlying distribution of opinion.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_French_presidential_election;
…https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/france-population/ ;
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The distribution in political space: W-shaped, not M-shaped
How are the percentage votes distributed in political space?
As noted three parties topped the voting with roughly the same percentage vote (28%, 23% and 22%), leaving other parties with low percentage votes.
Locating the parties along a left-centre-right continuum in political space, a graph of the vote would show three peaks for Melenchon, Macron and Le Pen, and the smaller parties in the gaps in-between. In other words there is a W-shaped distribution. It is significant that the centre party is one of the three dominant parties.
Other elections elsewhere have exhibited an M-shaped distribution with just two top parties, left and right, and centre parties squeezed and having a low vote, see:
Middle parties and the M-shaped distribution in political space
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2017 and 2022 compared
Four parties were dominant in 2017. Three of them have all increased their vote slightly, most of all Macron’s centrist party (+3.8%). The fourth, the Republicans has seen its vote collapse. The other traditional centrist party, also lost votes. The Socialists’ loss might notionally be thought of as corresponding to the Green’s gain (-4.8%,+4.8%). Where has the large -15.2% loss experienced by the Republicans gone? Perhaps 6.6% have moved further to the right? Perhaps 3.8% have moved to the centre? Perhaps 4.8% have moved somewhat to the left?
. 2017 2022 change 2017-2022
Zemmour Reconquete lp 0 7.1 +7.1
Le Pen National Rally 21.3 23.2 +2.1 ***
Dupont-Aignan Debout (Gaullist) lp 4.7 2.1 -2.6
Pecresse The Republicans m 20.0 4.8 -15.2 [***]
Macron En Marche 24.0 27.8 +3.8 ***
Hidalgo Socialist m 6.4 1.8 -4.6
Jadot Greens m 0 4.6 +4.6
Melenchon Insoumise alp 19.6 21.2 +1.6 ***
Poutou New Anticapitalist alp 1.1 0.8 -0.3
Arhtur Lutte Ouvriere 0.6 0.6 0
Roussel Communist alp 0 2.3 +2.3
Lasalle Resistons 1.2 3.1 +1.9
in second round, support: lp, Le Pen; m, macron; alp, against Le Pen
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Presidential elections, 1848 and 1965-2022
Until 1965, there had only been one presidential election in France: in 1848 Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte won against five other candidates, with 74% of the popular vote.
Since then, in the period 1965-2022, there have been eleven presidential elections. The number of candidates has almost always been between 9 and 12, with a median of 11. In the first round even the candidate with the most votes has almost always gained only less than 29% The exceptions being in 1965, 1969, 1974 and 1988. In the second round the winning candidate has usually gained between 50% and 59%. The two exceptions were in 2002 when Jean Le Pen gained only 18% of the vote and in 2017 when Marianne Le Pen gained only 34% of the vote.
In the eleven elections since 1965, the top-scoring party in the first round has gained 45%, 44, 43, 28, 34, 23, 20, 31, 29, 24, and 28% of the votes.
In the seven elections since 1988, the Le Pen family (father* then daughter) have won 14%*, 15%*, 17%*, 10%*, 18%, 21% and 24%.
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Further notes and links:
“The 1848 French presidential election was the first French presidential election ever held. It elected the first and only president of the Second Republic. The election was held on 10 December 1848 and led to the surprise victory of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte with 74% of the popular vote.”
“The 1965 French presidential election, held on 5 December and 19 December, was the first direct presidential election in the Fifth Republic and the first since the Second Republic in 1848. It had been widely expected that incumbent president Charles de Gaulle would be re-elected, but the election was notable for the unexpectedly strong performance of his left-wing challenger François Mitterrand.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_French_presidential_election;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_French_presidential_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_French_presidential_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_French_presidential_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_French_presidential_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1995_French_presidential_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1988_French_presidential_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_French_presidential_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1974_French_presidential_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1969_French_presidential_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1965_French_presidential_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1848_French_presidential_election
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“Massive” movements to the extremes … “fractures” in the country?
“When you have people who have gone massively towards the extreme left and the extreme right, you can’t pretend that nothing has happened. I can see the fractures in the country.” President Macron …
… quoted in Adam Sage “Macron and Le Pen make cost of living key issue for election. Left-wing voters face choice of whom they dislike least.” The Times, April 12, 2022: 34-35.
Are there fractures in the country? Certainly there are a lot of candidates – namely twelve. Certainly even the most popular candidate gains only 28% of the vote. However the previous section shows that this is nothing out of the ordinary for French presidential elections.
Are there massive movements? Certainly the Republican vote has slumped from 20% to 5%. But otherwise the changes between 2017 and 2022 are not so great.
Has there been a shift to extremes? Let me repeat what I have said in an earlier section:
“The three parties which were dominant in 2017 have all increased their vote slightly, most of all Macron’s centrist party (+3.8%). The two traditional centrist parties have both lost votes. The Socialists’ loss might notionally bethought of as corresponding to the Green’s gain (-4.8%,+4.8%). Where has the large -15.2% loss experienced by the Republicans gone? Perhaps 6.6% have moved further to the right? Perhaps 3.8% have moved to the centre? Perhaps 4.8% have moved somewhat to the left?”
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The risk of Le Pen
Macron and Le Pen go on to the second round. Let us imagine. Suppose each retains all their first round votes: 28% for Macron and 23% for Le Pen. How are the other 49% going to vote?
If the 49% split 21% for Macron and 28% for Le Pen then Le Pen gains 51% overall and wins.
If 10% abstain and the remaining 39% split 16% for Macron and 23% for Le Pen then Le Pen gains 46% overall and beats Macron’s 44% (with 10% abstaining).
…
Opinion polling gives a more favourable split for Macron. Currently opinion polls put Macron on 53%v and Le Pen on 47%.
https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/
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Would a better system reduce the risk of Le Pen?
Every time there is an election Peter Emerson says that there is a better way of doing things (http://www.deborda.org/ ). I agree. Peter advocates the Modified Borda Count for selecting one option and the Matrix Vote for selecting an administration.
The Le Pens, father and daughter, have won through to the second round on two occasions. And they have lost by a large margin on each of the two occasions. It might be argued that the electoral system failed on these two occasions because the first round failed to provide a more even contest. It failed to identify the two best candidates. Perhaps in general the French electoral system fails to identify the two best candidates?
A better system, some argue would be to use the Borda Count. (As noted Peter Emerson advocates the Modified Borda Count.)
In a simple Borda Count voters are asked for their preferences: first preferences, second preferences, third preferences etc.
An illustrative example. In what follows, first preferences score 2, second preferences score 1, and third preferences score 0.
Let us imagine. Suppose that there are just these three candidates.
Let us imagine that the first preferences are:
38% for Macron, 33% for Le Pen and 29% for Mercheron.
This gives scores of 76, 66 and 58.
Let us imagine that the second preferences are:
62% for Macron, 19% for Le Pen and 19% for x.
[For their second preference, extreme supporters prefer the centre to the opposite extreme. The centre’s supporters split equally between the two extremes.]
This gives scores of 62, 19 and 19 …
… giving total scores of 138, 85 and 77.
In this imaginary example, Macron in the centre easily defeats the two opposite extremes – he is the Borda count winner
The median voter theorem. Suppose candidate a and voters are located along a left-right political dimension. There is a theory that under certain circumstances the Borda winner is the median voter. Looking back at the table of results above we note that Macron has less than half the voters to the left of him, and less than half the voters to the right of him. So the median voter is a voter who votes for Macron.
My own approach to this also focuses on the political centre but I prefer to think of the mean voter. See:
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Fractured France? … fraying tempers … living with others
Clearly there is no consensus. So is Adam Sage correct?:
“Whoever wins the election, France’s pressure cooker is ready to explode. Progressives versus populists has replaced left versus right as a dangerous new Faultline in France … With the nation’s tempers fraying and Marine Le pen closing the gap on President Macron in the polls, some experts have issued warnings about a contested result and potentially violent aftermath …Millions of French people seem willing to contest Macron’s choices in the street if they fail to stop him in the polling booth” The Times, April 9, 2022: 34-35.
Writing about Ukraine in 2014 I included the phrase ‘living with others’ in my title. More needs to be said about this.
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Russia
2003: “To the long-suffering Russian people in the hope of a new, and better, future”
2003: Putin’s Russia. Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain” (page vii)
2018: https://rowman.com/ISBN/9781538114278/Putin's-Russia-Past-Imperfect-Future-Uncertain-Seventh-Edition
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Violent Russia? Steven Pinker
The index in Pinker’s Better Angels gives the following entries:
Russia:
Capital punishment 150, civil war 195, 556, compulsory military service 255, crime 89, peasant uprisings 201, retaliation 540, terrorism 349, Time of Troubles 195, 234, World War I 52, Russian Revolution 238
USSR:
Afghanistan 261,269, 304, 324; collapse 89, 250, 260, 284, 292, 352, 674, collectivisation 338, Cuban Missile Crisis 261-2 271, 646, 667, expansionism, 244, genocide 337, 343, great power 223, 258, nuclear weapons 272, 372, Stalin’s purges 191, 328, 338, 343, World War II 52, 269, 309
[Allen Lane, hardback, 2011]
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Violent Russia? Nancy Shields Kollman
Nancy Shields Kollman is the author of The Russian Empire, 1450-1801:
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-russian-empire-1450-1801-9780199280513?cc=gb&lang=en&
Surveys the emergence and governance of the Russian empire across the early-modern period
Explores how the state maintained control of defense, criminal law, taxation, and mobilization of resources, while tolerating local religions, languages, cultures, and institutions
Offers a comparative study of Russia alongside early modern Europe and the Ottoman Empire
Examines art, architecture, and literature as well as politics and economics to explore the governance of an empire
…
Kullman has contributed a chapter to Dwyer and Micale’s book Darker Angels.
The complexity of history: Russia and Steven Pinker’s thesis
Her chapter notes:
“Since the sixteenth century (and reiterated in Cold War rhetoric), Europeans have characterized Russians and their society as despotic, brutal and less civilised than the European ‘West’”. (Dwyer and Micale, 165).
In her D&M chapter, Ullman refers to the following rulers:
Peter I 1682-1725
…
Anna Joannovna 1730-1740
Elizabeth I 1740-1761
Catherine II 1762-1796
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Alexander I 1801-1825
Nicholas I 1825-1855
During this period there was increasing influence from Europe, west of Russia, and the introduction of European practices. This trend had fluctuations. Some of the European influences were less violent, some more violent. Different classes were differently affected, the nobility mainly being influenced by the West rather than the peasantry, the urban affected rather than the rural, the educated rather than the uneducated.
…
A number of statements are in play:
.(1) There is a decline in violence. It is a downward trend with occasional reversals.
.(2) The trend is the same everywhere.
.(3) There is a downward trend everywhere but some places have the leading trend and other places have a lagging trend …
.(4) Some places are always more violent than other places.
.(4a) Russia (and Eastern Europe) is more violent than Western Europe.
.(5) It is not the case that some places are always more violent than other places.
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[To be continued]
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Guns or butter? … Thatcher on the Russians
“Guns or butter” used to be the standard example used in introductory economics textbooks for introducing macroeconomics.
Another use of the phrase was British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's statement, in a 1976 speech she gave at the old Kensington Town Hall, in which she said, "The Soviets put guns over butter, but we put almost everything over guns."[9]
See also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Global_Dilemma:_Guns_or_Butter
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Power and violence: a basic equation
Power corrupts, they say. Perhaps also, power makes violent. The greater the power, the greater the violence. There might even be an equation: the amount of violence v equals some coefficient k times the amount of power p:
v = k p
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Power, violence and non-violence
Let us suppose that power may be expressed either in violence or non-violence. There might even be an equation: the amount of non-violence n equals some coefficient c times the amount of power p:
n = c p
The ratio of violence to non-violence is:
n/v = c/k
The proportions depend on the allocation weight w of power and the productivity b of power.
c = bnwn
k = bvwv
So
n/v = c/k = (bn/bv) (wn/wv)
The proportion of non-violence n* equals the allocation weight w given to non-violence times the productivity weight b of non-violence … times power p.
n* = w b p
(here: n*=n/(n+v); w=wn/(wn+wv); b=bn/(bn+bv).)
Note: Rather than violence and non-violence, the broad argument might be applied to goods and bads.
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Power and violence: trajectory
If the equation is correct then … If the amount of power increases over time, then the amount of violence increases over time. (If c is constant, proportionately so.)
If a country has greater power, then the country has a greater amount of violence. (If c is constant, proportionately so.) Great powers have great violence: great Russia and great Britain have great violence. A key question is whether c is constant. Is the c for the Russian Empire greater than the c for the British Empire?
Note: This looks toward the theory of economic growth. In particular innovations in technology relate to productivity.
[to be continued]
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Far Right Politics in Europe. Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg
Harvard University Press, 2017;
https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674971530
Also
https://newlinesmag.com/reportage/exclusive-russia-backs-europes-far-right/
https://www.illiberalism.org/jean-yves-camus-and-nicolas-lebourg-far-right-politics-in-europe/
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A World After Liberalism. Matthew Rose.
https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300268133/a-world-after-liberalism/
A review of Rose: “Learning from the radical right”
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/matthew-rose-world-after-liberalism-radical-right/
Another review of Rose: “The enemies of liberalism are showing us what it really means.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/03/opinion/putin-ukraine-liberalism.html
Publisher of Rose:
A bracing account of liberalism’s most radical critics introducing one of the most controversial movements of the twentieth century
“Powerful. . . . Bracing. . . . Part of the book’s eerie relevance comes from the role Russia plays throughout.”—Ezra Klein, New York Times
“One of the best books I’ve read this year. . . . Its importance at this critical moment in our history cannot be overstated.”—Rod Dreher, American Conservative
In this eye-opening book, Matthew Rose introduces us to one of the most controversial intellectual movements of the twentieth century, the “radical right,” and discusses its adherents’ different attempts to imagine political societies after the death or decline of liberalism. Questioning democracy’s most basic norms and practices, these critics rejected ideas about human equality, minority rights, religious toleration, and cultural pluralism not out of implicit biases, but out of explicit principle. They disagree profoundly on race, religion, economics, and political strategy, but they all agree that a postliberal political life will soon be possible.
Focusing on the work of Oswald Spengler, Julius Evola, Francis Parker Yockey, Alain de Benoist, and Samuel Francis, Rose shows how such thinkers are animated by religious aspirations and anxieties that are ultimately in tension with Christian teachings and the secular values those teachings birthed in modernity.
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Borderlands: a journey through the history of Ukraine. Anna Reid.
https://www.weidenfeldandnicolson.co.uk/titles/anna-reid/borderland/9781780229287/
‘A fascinating and often violent odyssey, spanning more than 1,000 years of conflict and culture’ Independent on Sunday
Centre of the first great Slav civilisation in the tenth century, then divided between warring neighbours for a millennium, Ukraine finally won independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Tiring of their own corrupt governments, Ukrainians have since mounted two popular revolutions, taking to the streets to demand fair elections and closer ties to Europe. In the spring of 2014, Russia responded by invading Crimea and sponsoring a civil war in the Russian-speaking Donbass. Threatened by Moscow, misunderstood in the West, Ukraine hangs once more in the balance. Speaking to pro-democracy activists and pro-Russia militiamen, peasants and miners, survivors of Hitler’s Holocaust and Stalin’s famine, Anna Reid combines history and travel-writing to unpick the past and present of this bloody and complex borderland.
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Religion (update)
BBC Radio has a short daily slot on religion, “Thought for the Day”. The contributions in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine have not impressed Catherine Bennett:
“I pray in vain for wisdom amid the platitudes of Thought for the Day. Was it too much to expect more than the usual anecdotes after Ukraine was invaded? There are no answers to all the awfully big questions beyond the speaker’s declaration of faith.”
The Observer, April 10, 2022: 47.
The Times has a weekly column on religion, entitled, “Credo”. Last Saturday’s was:
“Taking a refugee into my own home taught me how to love my neighbour.”
Susanna Wright. The Times, April 9, 2022: 82.
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END