Israel and Palestine: self and other, positive and negative; 2023
7 National voting
FIRST DRAFT ( 10 pages)
National voting is of interest to us here for a number of reasons. It provides important information about national opinion. It gives some insight into government – and territory. It relates to the distinctions made in debate between Israel and Palestine in relation to democracy and the nature of Hamas (both its role and its distinctiveness from Palestinians in general).
National voting: Palestine
Palestine
The Oslo Accords
Palestine government
Elections in Palestine
Presidential and parliamentary elections
Local elections
National voting: Israel
Political turmoil in Israel: November 2022 to October 4-5 2023
Conceptions of democracy
Voters and parties in V-space
Political space: elections 2022
Political space: Schofield’s two dimensions, religion and security
Representative democracy and social choice theory
Other Schofield links
7.1 National voting: Palestine
Palestine
The Palestine National Authority was formed in 1994 as a result of the Oslo Accords of 1993. In terms of geography, Palestine is split between the West Bank and Gaza.
Palestine (region)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestine_(region)
Palestinian territories
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_territories
State of Palestine
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_Palestine
Palestine National Authority: formed in 1994
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_National_Authority
Oslo Accords, 1993: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_Accords
The Oslo Accords
“The Oslo Accords are a pair of interim agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): the Oslo I Accord, signed in Washington, D.C., in 1993;[1] and the Oslo II Accord, signed in Taba, Egypt, in 1995.[2] They marked the start of the Oslo process, a peace process aimed at achieving a peace treaty based on Resolution 242 and Resolution 338 of the United Nations Security Council. The Oslo process began after secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, resulting in both the recognition of Israel by the PLO and the recognition by Israel of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and as a partner in bilateral negotiations.
Among the notable outcomes of the Oslo Accords was the creation of the Palestinian National Authority, which was tasked with the responsibility of conducting limited Palestinian self-governance over parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and the international acknowledgement of the PLO as Israel's partner in permanent-status negotiations about any remaining issues revolving around the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Bilateral dialogue stems from questions related to the international border between Israel and a future Palestinian state: negotiations for this subject are centred around Israeli settlements, the status of Jerusalem, Israel's maintenance of control over security following the establishment of Palestinian autonomy, and the Palestinian right of return. The Oslo Accords did not create a definite Palestinian state.[3]
A large portion of the Palestinian population, including various Palestinian militant groups, staunchly opposed the Oslo Accords; Palestinian-American philosopher Edward Said described them as a "Palestinian Versailles".[4] Far-right Israelis were also opposed to the Oslo Accords, and Rabin was assassinated in 1995 by a right-wing Israeli extremist for signing them.[5][6]”
Yasser Arafat, leader of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organisation) died on 11th November 2004.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yasser_Arafat
Palestine government
Since 2007 there have been two separate administrations, the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza.
“The Palestinian government is the government of the Palestinian Authority or State of Palestine. The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization (EC) is the highest executive body of the Palestine Liberation Organization and acts as the government. Since June 2007, there have been two separate administrations in Palestine, one in the West Bank and the other in the Gaza Strip. The government on the West Bank was generally recognised as the Palestinian Authority Government. On the other hand, the government in the Gaza Strip claimed to be the legitimate government of the Palestinian Authority. Until June 2014, when the Palestinian Unity Government was formed, the government in the West Bank was the Fatah-dominated Palestinian government of 2013. In the Gaza Strip the government was the Hamas government of 2012. Following two Fatah–Hamas Agreements in 2014, on 25 September 2014 Hamas agreed to let the PA Government resume control over the Gaza Strip and its border crossings with Egypt and Israel, but that agreement had broken down by June 2015, after President Abbas said the PA government was unable to operate in the Gaza Strip.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_government
Elections in Palestine
Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1995, the following elections have taken place:
Presidential elections in 1996 and 2005;
Parliamentary elections in 1996 and 2006;
Local elections in 2004-2005, 2012, 2017 and 2021-2022.
Elections in Palestine
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Palestine
Presidential: 1996, 2005
1996: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Palestinian_general_election
2005: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Palestinian_presidential_election
Parliamentary: (1923), 1996, 2006
1996: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1996_Palestinian_general_election
2006: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Palestinian_legislative_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_Legislative_Council
Local: (1972), (1976), 2004-2005, 2012, 2017, 2021-2022
2004: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004%E2%80%9305_Palestinian_local_elections
2012: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012%E2%80%9313_Palestinian_local_elections
2017: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Palestinian_local_elections
2021: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021%E2%80%9322_Palestinian_local_elections
Presidential and parliamentary elections
In the aftermath of the Oslo Accord, in the presidential election of 1996, Yasser Arafat won 90% of the vote. His Fatah party won 30.9% of the vote and gained 50 of the 88 seats. Independents had won 57.5% of the votes. There were fifteen parties gaining a combined total of 11.6%, none had more than 3% of the vote, and many had almost zero per cent. (Total votes: 736,825)
In 2004, Yasser Arafat died. In the presidential election of 2005, Mahmoud Abbas of the Fatah party became president with 67.4% of the vote; with Mustafa Barghouli, an Independent, on 21%; and with five other candidates gaining a combined total of 11.6%, none having more than 4% of the vote. (Total votes: 802,077)
In the parliamentary elections of 2006, there was a proportional part and a district part. Votes cast were 990,873 and 4,733,888 respectively. In the proportional part, the Fatah party gained 41.4% of the vote just behind Hamas with 44.5%. There were nine parties gaining a combined total of 14.1%, none had more than 5% of the vote, and many had almost zero per cent …
… in the district part, the Fatah party gained 35.6% of the vote just behind Hamas with 40.8%. Independents gained 20.1%. There were five parties gained a combined total of 3.5%, none had more than 3% of the vote.
Fatah gained 28 and 17 seats respectively; and Hamas won 45 and 17 seats respectively, in the proportional and district parts.
The table below gives the regional results for 2006, ordering the regions according to the strength of Hamas relative to Fatah, for the West Bank and Gaza separately. Hamas is stronger in the north of Gaza (next Israel) and weaker in the south of Gaza (next Egypt). To a slight extent Hamas is stronger in the west (next Israel) and weaker in the east in the West Bank.
Table Parliamentary elections: regional results, 2006
Proportion District share District seats
. Hamas Fatah Hamas Fatah Hamas Fatah other/Christ+
West Bank
Hebron HH HHH 9 0
Nablus HH HH 5 1
Ramallah & HH HH 4 1+
Jerusalem HH H 4 2++
Salfit H H 1 0
Tubas FF H 1 0
Bethlehem F F 2 2++
Tulkarm HH F 2 0 1+
Jenin F FF 2 2
Jericho FFF FFF 0 1
Qalqilya FFF FFF 0 2
Gaza
North Gaza H H 5 0
Gaza City HH H 5 0 1++
Dair al-Baih F H 2 1
Kham Yunis F H 3 2
Rafah FF F 0 3
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0f/Palestine_election_results_2006.svg
The National Democratic Institute (NDI) in partnership with The Carter Center reported "a professional and impartial performance of election officials".[33] The European Union delegation reported "there was nothing which would indicate that the final result was not the outcome chosen by the voters".[34] A CRS Report for Congress on the 2006 elections concluded: "The election was overseen by 17,268 domestic observers, complemented by 900 credentialed international monitors. ... The Bush Administration accepted the outcome of the Palestinian legislative elections and praised the PA for holding free and fair elections. ... The conduct of the election was widely considered to be free and fair."[45]
Local elections
Local: (1972), (1976), 2004-2005, 2012, 2017, 2021-2022
2004: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2004%E2%80%9305_Palestinian_local_elections
2012: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012%E2%80%9313_Palestinian_local_elections
2017: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Palestinian_local_elections
2021: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021%E2%80%9322_Palestinian_local_elections
I have not yet tracked down details for 2004. I have not quite worked out the situation in 2012 …
In 2017, the percentages gained by Fatah were:
. won by elections won by acclamation
First phase 27.6% 74.9%
Second phase 17.6% 60.8%
Local elections in 2021-2022
The situation was complicated:
Opinion polls showed Fatah somewhat ahead of Hamas in the West Bank; and Hamas substantially ahead of Fatah in Gaza:
West Bank: Fatah 38%; Hamas 30%
Gaza: Fatah 29%; Hamas 47%
PSR 82, 8-11 December 2021
7.2 National voting: Israel
Up till the Hamas attack my interest in Israel related to its internal politics as an example of the M-shaped distribution of opinion and the implications of that for “middle democracy”. Earlier I had been interested in an analysis of parties in a two-dimensional political space, not just in Israel but also elsewhere.
The year before the Hamas attack, there had been intense turmoil around the new Netanyahu coalition. Ironically the war has brought about a broad coalition government, something that has eluded peacetime Israel in recent years.
Political turmoil in Israel: November 2022 to October 4-5 2023
Netanyahu and his coalition partners, November 17 2022
[extract from: Ukraine 39: 8 billion … Xi and Biden … USA, Israel, Qatar]
“Netanyahu rattles his defence chiefs.” 16, 34
Netanyahu’s bloc of right-wing and religious parties won 64 of the120 seats in the recent elections.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Israeli_legislative_election
The leader of the Likud party may be about to give control over the army and the police to his allies from hard-right parties: Bezald Smotrich of the Religious Zionism party; and Itamar Ben-Gvir of the Jewish Power party; and Aryeh Deri of the ultra-orthodox Shas party.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bezalel_Smotrich;
“Prospective coalition may try to pass court override bill, then change law to allow Shas chief, barred from ministerial role due to tax offenses, to take office”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aryeh_Deri;
Some of the parties want changes to Israel’s citizenship laws so that only those recognised as Jews by Orthodox religious strictures to emigrate to the country. (16, 34).
Thus the coalition has a distinctive “conception of the national self”.
The geographical distribution of the results shows Netanyahu strong in the south /middle (including Jerusalem and the West Bank) and the north-east and the current governing coalition strong in the north (including Tel Aviv and Haifa). Looking at the map the Netanyahu coalition controls perhaps 80% of Israel’s land border.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Israeli_legislative_election
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel
The distribution of the seats between the ten parties when put on the left-right dimension is 5, 5, 4, 24*, 12, 6, 32*, 11, 7, and 14 seats. It forms what I have called an M-shaped distribution. Israel is one of the countries discussed in:
[inactive link, sorry: Middle parties and the M-shaped distribution in political space]
December 30 2022
“Netanyahu back to lead a coalition of hardliners.” 30, 30.
“Binyamin Netanyahu returned to office last night at the head of the most hardline government in the country’s history, threatening new confrontations with Palestinians, judges and LGBT groups.” 30, 30.
“As hard right takes power, president urges worried Israelis: Don’t say nation is doomed. At public event, Herzog appears to criticize fiercest opponents of new Netanyahu government, while again beseeching the coalition to work on behalf of all citizens.”
Times of Israel: https://www.timesofisrael.com/
Variation within a nation: Israel (January 2023)
Last week a coalition government was finally formed amid concerns that it included the hard right. The current situation in Israel echoes a number of the features that are present elsewhere. A democracy produces a one-sided government and there are appeals for it to work for all the people. Also there are certain features which can also be found in Putin’s Russia, specifically the presence of a tension between religious tradition and religious and social liberalism.
“Palestinian fury at Temple Mount visit.” 4, 26.
Israel protests, June 10, 2023
“ ‘Clear and present danger’: protests enter 23rd week ahead of key judicial panel vote.” June 10, 2023
https://www.timesofisrael.com/
Latest polling in Israel. October 2023, after Hamas attack
“Fury grows with PM even as he seeks unity. … Netanyahu shares power with critics but gets public blame for security failures.” Obs 4-5
Jerusalem Post: https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-767880
[Dialog Center Israel
Conceptions of democracy
All-the-people democracy
It is worth noting that President Herzog beseeches “the coalition to work on behalf of all citizens.” It is not uncommon for a newly elected leader to declare that they will leave the rancour and partisanship of the election behind them and that they will now work for all the people – for example Margaret Thatcher in 1979 quoting Francis of Assisi. However this may not happen in practice.
Thinking loosely, isn’t democracy supposed to be for all the people? If a notional democracy is not for all the people, is it really a democracy?
One-sided democracy … the M-shaped distribution for parties
The democratic process in Israel has produced a one-sided government. A process which allows this to happen might be referred to as one-sided democracy.
[inactive link, sorry: Middle parties and the M-shaped distribution in political space]
[inactive link, sorry:11 Satisfaction with democracy]
Middle Democracy … optimal social choice
Middle democracy produces a middle government – which is the optimal social choice.
[inactive link, sorry:13 Optimal social choice, preference functions: Peter Emerson and Dublin City Council]
[inactive link, sorry:14 Optimal social choice, value functions: social design, ethics and the amount of value]
Voters and parties in V-space
Consider Israel as ‘the self’ and the notion of being positive or negative to the other, particularly the Palestinian other. Suppose that this is a matter of degree. So there is a continuum, V. Voters and parties in Israel are located along this continuum. Religious Zionism is at one extreme with high negativity towards Palestinians; and Arab parties are at the other extreme with low negativity towards Palestinians. In general religious Zionist parties, parties on the right and Netanyahu’s Likud have middling to high negativity. Parties on the middle and on the left have middling to low negativity values.
This V dimension is associated with two dimensions: a religion dimension and a security dimension. See below.
The V dimension is related to a left-right dimension which is routinely used in accounts of Israeli politics. See below.
Political space: elections 2022
“Legislative elections were held in Israel on 1 November 2022 to elect the 120 members of the 25th Knesset. The results saw the right-wing national camp of former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu win a parliamentary majority, amid losses for left-wing and Arab parties, as well as gains by the far right.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Israeli_legislative_election
“In Israeli politics, the national camp (Hebrew: המחנה הלאומי) or right-wing bloc is an informal coalition of nationalist and right-wing, religious conservative political parties that since 1977 has frequently co-operated to form governments.[1]
The coalition is led by Likud, and includes parties to its political right as well as religious parties. Generally, the two Haredi parties (Shas and the United Torah Judaism alliance) align with Likud. In the past, the coalition has included the National Religious Party, the National Union, Gesher, Tkuma, The Jewish Home, the New Right, Yisrael Beiteinu (until late 2019) and Zehut”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_camp
The distribution of votes typically displays an M-shaped distribution with the centre squeezed between centre-left and centre-right. The trajectory shows fluctuations in the strength of the (still small) centre.
These observations are buttressed by Schofield’s in-depth analysis of Israeli politics in an earlier period.
Political space: Schofield’s two dimensions, religion and security
Figures 3 and 4 on page 440:
https://polisci.wustl.edu/files/polisci/imce/handbookelsevier2002.pdf
“The horizontal left–right dimension correlated with attitudes to the PLO, and the [vertical] dimension described beliefs regarding the proper relationship between the state and the Jewish faith.” See below.
[Schofield talks about a factor analysis. The focus is on two dimensions. My guess is that one could say that the first dimension is the familiar Left-Right political dimension and the second dimension is a bipolar dimension contrasting religion and Palestine/security concerns. Alternatively one could say, as Schofield does, that there are two dimensions, religion and security. Both accounts are valid, one being obtained from the other by a rotation of the axes.]
To some extent the difference between political parties corresponds to a difference in conceptions of the national self. Schofield (2002) considers the positions in political space of voters and parties in Israel in the 1990s. Two dimensions are considered: security and religion. These two dimensions are important in relation to conceptions of the national self (cf. Britannia 2022: Three Prime Ministers and a Queen).
Figures 3 and 4 on page 440 of Schofield are of interest showing the distribution of voters and parties in space in the 1991 and 1996 elections respectively. Between 1991 and 1996 the spread of opinions on the religion dimension almost doubles. The positive correlation between security and religion scores which is present in 1991 looks as if it has increased by 1996. There is an emergence of two modes: low negative on security and religion; and slightly positive on security and religion.
Representative democracy and social choice theory
(Schofield, 2002), pp. 438-441
https://polisci.wustl.edu/files/polisci/imce/handbookelsevier2002.pdf
“By contrast, Table 2 presents the outcomes in the last four elections in Israel. The electoral system is extremely proportional, in that vote shares and seat shares are almost identical. (Small parties with less than 2% of the popular vote received no seats).
To understand political motivations in such an electoral system, it is necessary to note that no party may expect to win the election (if this is interpreted to mean “gain a majority of the seats”).
However, it is possible to model post-election bargaining between parties. To understand the nature of the policy space in Israel, surveys conducted by Arian and Shamir (1995, 1999) for the 1992 and 1996 elections were utilized. Factor analysis of responses by a sample of voters (of size approximately 1000) gave a two-dimensional space, Z. The left–right dimension correlated with attitudes to the PLO, and the north– south dimension described beliefs regarding the proper relationship between the state and the Jewish faith. The pre-election declarations (or manifestos) of the various parties were processed using the Arian–Shamir questionnaire. The “positions” or declarations of the various parties are marked in Figure 3 for 1992 and in Figure 4 for 1996. [See Schofield, Sened and Nixon (1998) and Schofield and Sened (2002) for further details].
To extend Cox’s model of electoral competition, let us regard the situation after the 1992 election as a committee comprising the ten parties with seat strengths as given in Table 2. Let us use D1 to denote the family of “winning” or majority coalitions after the election of 1992. Obviously Labor, together with the three small parties (on the left), with 61 seats, form a majority. Likud, and the religious parties, together with Tzomet, have only 59 seats, and so need another party, such as Meretz, to attain a majority. Further, let us ignore government perquisites for the moment and assume that each party has Euclidean utility based on an ideal policy point given by its declaration (as illustrated in Figure 3). With these party preferences and voting weights, the “social preference” in the Knesset can be denoted sD1 . It should be obvious that the “parliamentary” core, or voting equilibrium E(sD1 ) is non-empty, and located at the Labor party declaration. To see this, note that the “compromise set” for each coalition is simply the convex hull of the ideal points of the coalition members. Clearly all “compromise sets” for the various winning coalitions intersect at a single point, namely that of the Labor party. A model of political bargaining proposed by Banks and Duggan (2000) suggests that the only possible outcome of bargaining in the coalition situation D1 is precisely this equilibrium or core point. Moreover Laver and Schofield (1990) argue that Labor would form a minority government. In fact, Labor under the leadership of Rabin did form a minority government, with implicit support from Meretz. As a consequence, the peace accords with the PLO were initiated.
After the election of 1996 a very different coalition structure, D2, was created. It should be clear from Table 2 that under D2, the coalition excluding Labor and the
“left” controlled a majority of 68 seats. In this case, the party preferences and voting weights give a different “social preference”, sD2 say. It is evident that the core E(sD2 ) is empty. Essentially there are, in principle, three different coalition governments possible after 1996: one based on Likud, Shas, and the religious parties; a national unity government of Likud and Labor; and a coalition of Labor, and the “left” together with Shas. Since the equilibrium, or core, E(sD2 ) is empty there is no possibility of a minority Likud government. In fact, Netanyahu (leader of Likud) won a separate prime-ministerial election against Peres (leader of Labor). Although Labor was the larger of the two parties, Netanyahu constructed a majority coalition that depended on Shas.
I suggest that bargaining between the parties is constrained to a set known as the “heart” 4. Under Euclidean policy preferences, the “parliamentary” heart after 1996 is simply the convex hull of the declarations of Labor, Likud and Shas. Because Netanyahu won the separate election, the outcome after this election can be seen to be a point on the arc joining the Likud and Shas positions. However, because the Likud position was not an equilibrium, the Likud-led government was eventually defeated under a vote of no-confidence. (One aspect of this defeat was the defection of Gesher, a small centrist party, out of its alliance with Likud. Gesher is not listed in Table 2, since its seats counted as part of Likud.) After the 1999 election, a majority coalition led by Barak, of Labor, was constructed that collapsed two years later.”
https://polisci.wustl.edu/files/polisci/imce/handbookelsevier2002.pdf
Other Schofield links
Schofield and Sened:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1016304319551
2005: https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00231.x
2007: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41106828
Multiparty competition in Israel, 1988-1996:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4092415
2013: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3872446/ :
The convergence coefficient across political systems
“Formal work on the electoral model often suggests that parties or candidates should locate themselves at the electoral mean. Recent research has found no evidence of such convergence. In order to explain nonconvergence, the stochastic electoral model is extended by including estimates of electoral valence. We introduce the notion of a convergence coefficient, c. It has been shown that high values of c imply that there is a significant centrifugal tendency acting on parties. We used electoral surveys to construct a stochastic valence model of the elections in various countries. We find that the convergence coefficient varies across elections in a country, across countries with similar regimes, and across political regimes. In some countries, the centripetal tendency leads parties to converge to the electoral mean. In others the centrifugal tendency dominates and some parties locate far from the electoral mean. In particular, for countries with proportional electoral systems, namely, Israel, Turkey, and Poland, the centrifugal tendency is very high. In the majoritarian polities of the United States and Great Britain, the centrifugal tendency is very low. In anocracies, the autocrat imposes limitations on how far from the origin the opposition parties can move.”
2015: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629815586878?icid=int.sj-abstract.citing-articles.823
Of interest but not really related is: