The study of a practical philosophy like Stoicism is about one thing. It is about how to live well, how to live a good life. We come to it from many different directions, however, and with many questions.
What is a ‘good’ life? Is there anything that really has value? Is there something that really ought to be pursued? On our quest for wellness, what standard should we be measuring ourselves against? On our search to find the best way to live, at what should we aim? What should we value, and what should we do to fully flourish? What is of ultimate importance?
In the midst of uncertainties of all sorts, when people can cheat us, when illness can strike without warning, when life is in essence precarious, we may wonder whether aiming to live well and to fully flourish makes any sense at all.
These are the kinds of questions that the earliest philosophers asked themselves all the time. Much of the foundation that Stoic ethics rests on was laid down many years before Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, even thought of taking up his studies. In Plato’s dialogue, Euthydemus, written about one hundred years before Zeno opened his school in around 300 B.C.E., we find a discussion of what promotes happiness.
Socrates, the narrator of these extracts, is conversing with the young man Clinias, son of Axiochus:
And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you: Do not all men desire happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one of those ridiculous questions which I am afraid to ask, and which ought not to be asked by a sensible man: for what human being is there who does not desire happiness?
There is no one, said Clinias, who does not.
Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be happy? – that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the first, for there can be no doubt of the answer.
He assented.
And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us this, which may be easily answered; for everyone will say that wealth is a good.
Certainly, he said.
And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?
He agreed.
Now, can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one’s own land, are goods? He assented. And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance, justice, courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Clinias, that we shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you say?
They are goods, said Clinias.
Very well, I said; and in what company shall we find a place for wisdom – among the goods or not?
Among the goods.
(Plato, Euthydemus 278e–279c, trans. Jowett)
In your journal, make a list of all the goods that Socrates identifies. There are two distinct types of goods, here, (a) the ones that Socrates mentions first, and (b) the ones he mentions last. Try to think of headings for the two types of goods.
The second group is easier to identify and name: this group of goods consists of temperance (i.e., self-restraint), justice, courage, and wisdom. These could be named as ‘personal qualities’, ‘spiritual qualities’, ‘parts of one’s character’, or something like that. They can also be called the virtues, which is what the ancients called them. For the Stoics, as this course will make clear, the virtues are of key significance to living well.
The first group of goods includes wealth, beauty, ‘personal gifts’ (perhaps intended to cover features such as strength, good eyesight, intelligence, a good voice, and so on), ‘good birth’ (of significantly less importance for us today), power and honours. But what shall we name them collectively? Just ‘Goods’, perhaps? Or ‘Goods that practically everyone pursues’, or ‘What most people want’? Maybe even ‘What I would like to have myself’! Or ‘Goods that bring happiness’.
A bit later, Socrates continues:
You remember, I said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were present with us?
He assented.
And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they benefited us not, or if they benefited us?
If they benefited us, he said.
And would they benefit us, if we only had them and did not use them? For example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of drink and did not drink, should we be profited?
Certainly not, he said.
Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of all that he ought to possess? For example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and plenty of wood, if he never worked?
Certainly not, he said.
And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed them?
No indeed, Socrates.
Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them?
True.
Well, Clinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness?
Yes, in my opinion.
And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly?
He must use them rightly.
That is quite true, I said. And the wrong use of a thing is far worse than the non-use; for the one is an evil, and the other is neither a good nor an evil. You admit that?
He assented.
(Plato, Euthydemus 280b–281a, trans. Jowett)
In your journal, explain why, according to Socrates, merely having possession of good things is not sufficient to confer happiness. What does Clinias conclude is sufficient for happiness?
Clinias concludes that using the good things that one possesses, and using them well or properly (‘rightly’) is sufficient to confer happiness.
Socrates makes the following conclusion:
Then, I said, Clinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are more able to minister to the evil principle which rules them; and when under the guidance of wisdom and virtue, they are greater goods: but in themselves are nothing?
That, he said, appears to be certain.
What then, I said, is the result of all this? Is not this the result – that other things are neither good nor bad, and that wisdom is good, and ignorance is evil?
He assented.
(Plato, Euthydemus 281d–e, trans. Jowett, modified)
Socrates says that for conventional goods, such as wealth, health and power, to truly benefit their possessor, they must be used properly, ‘under the guidance of wisdom and virtue’. That is, the first sort of goods identified in the first extract above can confer benefit only if the agent also possesses the second sort of goods, the virtues, or qualities of character. What we see is that for benefit to result, the virtues have a job of work to do in guiding our actions.
In your journal, note the connection of how the people around you behave, with what they see as being ‘good.’ How does this perspective change your opinion of their behavior? How does the evaluation of what is truly good change your own behavior during the coming week?
With your discussion partner, try to work through the conversation that Socrates has with Clinias. You play the part of Socrates, posing the same questions and making the same points. Does your ‘Clinias’ react in the same way as the original? What other questions do they raise? What additional challenges do they present? Note what you learn from your encounter in your journal.
NOTE: If you have any questions or comments concerning this lesson, either email them to thestoiclife.org@gmail.com, or leave them in the comments section below.