The Incentives of Putin

Why did Putin invade Ukraine?

By Heejun Sir

For us to be able to comprehend the invasion of Ukraine, we must analyze exactly why Putin did so. It is quite baffling to me that the invasion happened in the first place. I believed that Putin was simply pulling off a bluff to get concessions from NATO. Alas, that was not the case, and everything changed when the Russian nation attacked.

Why it doesn’t make sense

Before I talk about why Putin invaded, let me explain why I thought an actual invasion was unlikely. 

Firstly, it seemed unlikely that Ukraine would ever be able to join NATO. Ukraine has an incredibly corrupt government, with little civilian oversight over the military. To make matters worse, it has an active ongoing border dispute with Russia, a big no-no for accession. This meant that Ukraine won’t join NATO in the next 30 years or so, and Putin didn’t really have to worry about NATO enlargement.

Secondly, Putin had largely achieved his geopolitical goals in Ukraine already before the invasion. He had already taken Crimea and controlled it successfully for 8 years. In addition, he set up a separatist republic on Donbas, fuelled internal divisions within Ukraine, and the population seemed to be moving away from the West. Things were already great for Putin, so I’m unsure why he pushed his luck.

But even if Putin wasn’t satisfied with the progress in Ukraine, there were multiple other methods with which Putin would have achieved his goals. He could’ve made cyberattacks on the Ukrainian government, meddling in internal affairs as well as sowing distrust among the populace. He could’ve also rigged elections in Ukraine, effectively gaining political control without triggering a major international backlash.

In addition, it was incredibly risky of Putin to invade when there were already huge domestic problems within Russia. COVID-19 has led to massive unemployment and economic turmoil in Russia. Anti-Putin sentiments were rising, especially with Alexei Navalny challenging his rule. International sanctions meant that Russia’s economy was barely holding on, and a full-blown invasion would surely exacerbate the problem.

Even in the best-case scenario, where Putin had been able to neutralize Ukraine’s army and pacify the population quickly, it’d have still been a geopolitical disaster for Russia. Insofar as Moscow gets increasingly isolated from the rest of the international community, it increases its dependence on China. This can be exploited in a form of conditionality. For example, before the invasion, Beijing mandated the Russia-China trade be in Yuan, strengthening the Yuan while weakening the Ruble. As Russia becomes even more dependent on China, it may fall from a regional power to a Chinese proxy state.

Why did he, then?

Why then, despite all these reasons, did Putin invade?

Let’s start off with his geopolitical incentives. 

1. He had expected that this would create the perception of a credible threat in the eyes of the West, creating disunity within NATO as well as deterring neighboring states from joining.

2. Control of Ukraine meant Russia would have access to Ukraine’s oil pipelines and fertile lands, strengthening its monopoly.

3. This could’ve been a way to get concessions from NATO, such as promising not to have future enlargements or abolishing its forward presence program. 

4. There was urgency from the fact that Washington was sending more and more military aid such as anti-air, which would’ve made a future invasion more costly.

5. Control of Ukraine’s coastline would give land access to Crimea, making it cheaper to control the peninsula.

6. From the perspective of Russian realism, Kyiv’s alignment with the West was an active threat to Moscow as the Ukrainian plains were traditionally an invasion route to Russia, as it increased the mobility of tanks.

Then there’re his electoral incentives. There were broadly four.

1. Putin wants to be seen as a strongman in the eyes of his people. Acting strong in front of the West would reinforce this perception.

2. A quick victory, if achieved, would’ve been a way of distracting the population from Russia’s internal problems, such as Covid-19 or rising inflation.

3. There was the narrative of NATO cannons on the Russian border, threatening her sovereignty. Even if this wasn’t what Putin believed, his constituents did, meaning he was politically dependent on removing the (perceived) threat.

4. And there’s Russian nationalism. In the eyes of the former Soviets, Ukraine was taken away from Russia as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Lastly, I think it’s Putin’s personal incentives that really get interesting.

1. Similar to my last point, Putin himself buys into irredentism. He famously declared the breakup of the USSR 'the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century'. He sees it as his mission to restore the historical greatness that Russia once was.

2. He has experienced past geopolitical success utilizing hard power in the past. He has successfully installed client states in Georgia and Moldova, as well as increased Russian influence in Syria.

3. It also doesn’t help that Putin’s surrounded by yes-men who constantly bolster his beliefs.

4. He deeply distrusts the West. This means that even if it’s unlikely that Ukraine will join NATO, he believes that the West will backstab him in the future.

5. Putin is getting increasingly fragile as he ages, with rumors of him having cancer. This may mean he has become increasingly desperate as he wants to leave some kind of legacy before he dies.

6. Has Putin gone crazy? It’s certainly possible that being isolated from the public for so long has left a mental toll on the dictator. This is an incredibly risky possibility, considering Putin’s access to the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.

What changed?

It’s important to note that the current progress of the war probably has changed Putin’s incentive calculus.

1. The war, uh, hasn’t exactly been going well (for Putin). 

   1. Zelensky turned out to be an inspirational leader in the context of a war. Instead of fleeing the country, he has mobilized support, domestically and internationally.

   2. The Russian military has been hopelessly inept, with broken supply chains, the pride of the navy sinking, and the 331st regiment suffering significant losses. 

   3. Ukrainian civilians are resisting the invasion in the form of guerilla warfare, armed with anti-tank missiles and Molotov cocktails. This is likely to give Russia a blind eye.

2. NATO has in fact been strengthened by the invasion. Ukraine has galvanized huge support from the West, with Biden promising military aid. Thanks to Putin, the West is now in unprecedented unity.

3. There have been widespread sanctions against Russian energy exports, as well as being cut off from the rest of the financial system. This will bleed Russia’s ability to reinforce its lost equipment, and cause unrest within Russia.

The takeaway

1. Putin’s probably regretting the invasion, given the state of the war, economic impacts, as well as global backlash against Russia. This means that, under a rational calculus, Putin is currently willing to negotiate and end the war.

2. However, Putin currently has a path dependency to continue the war as his constituents believe that Ukraine’s existence threatens Russia. In addition, a white peace would signify that the war has been a terrible blunder. This means that, without change, the Russo-Ukrainian war would be bloodshed without a decisive victory from either side.

3. The West must provide Putin with a politically convenient way to exit the war, perhaps offering geopolitical neutrality (while supplying defensive weapons) for Ukraine. This way, Putin can frame the war as a victory for his population, whereas the West can prevent meaningless bloodshed. It might be tempting to give Russia a black eye, but it must be remembered that a quagmire for Russia would also mean geopolitical instability on the border of Europe.