Henke 2022ch

Lundahl (2022m) does not Understand C.S. Lewis’ Position on Miracles

Kevin R. Henke

September 15, 2022

In Henke (2022b), I wrote the following about verifying history and the supernatural:

“According to his second essay, Lundahl (2022b), there are two ways to verify the existence of the supernatural; namely, metaphysics and history. He is definitely wrong to claim that history is capable of verifying the supernatural. C.S. Lewis (1960, p. 2), a source used by Lundahl (2022a), even agrees with me that “history can never convince us that a miracle occurred.” We can never rule out the strong possibility that “witnesses” to a past “supernatural event” outright lied and made-up a story, or misinterpreted what they saw. These are the bases of Hypotheses #3 and #4 for the Talking Snake, which Lundahl (2022c) utterly fails to adequately address as discussed in Section 5.0 of this essay.

Lewis (1960, p. 87) is also correct when he states that the “progress of science” has not eliminated the possibility of miracles and that science has not demonstrated that miracles are impossible. However, again, Lewis (1960, pp. 17-85) fails to demonstrate that human reasoning or another other process involves the supernatural. He also failed to realize that the burden of evidence for miracles are on those that argue for miracles. Despite his often vague rambling, Lewis (1960) presents no evidence of miracles.

The only way to demonstrate the existence of the supernatural is to have it demonstrated under strictly controlled conditions with multiple investigators from diverse backgrounds. These investigations would certainly involve logic and mathematics, but not any unnecessary pedantic and flawed metaphysical arguments.

As an example, someone might claim that he witnessed a “prophet” raising a cat from the dead. Obviously, this claim could be a lie or a misinterpretation. So, how could anyone confirm that this prophet has the ability to raise animals from the dead? The only reliable way is to test the prophet under strictly controlled conditions. First, you collect a DNA sample from a cat that has just died. Get three veterinarians to independently confirm that the cat is indeed dead. Next, place the cat in a well-secured storage area where it can rot for a week. Then under strictly controlled conditions involving videos, get the prophet to raise the cat from the dead. If the cat comes back to life, immediately collect another DNA sample to confirm that it’s the same cat.

Let’s say that someone was actually able on their own without technological assistance to resurrect a cat from the dead. Perhaps, he lays his hands on dead animals, prays, and in all cases the animals come back to life. Now, some superskeptics might simply argue that the individual has discovered a new, but totally natural, way of resurrecting the dead and that the supernatural remains undemonstrated. For example, someone might argue that aliens from space could have hidden advanced technologies or natural powers that would allow them to resurrect dead animals even after a week. The process would look supernatural to our primitive minds even though natural law was not violated. It is said that advanced technologies appear as “magic” to less technical societies. If this is a genuine concern, have the “prophet” do a bigger task, such as producing a complete solar system from nothing within a light year of Earth. The prophet could be given six days to do it. Now, someone might groundlessly speculate that in a million years people might develop the technology to raise the dead or create solar systems from nothing – ex nihilo creation. Maybe, but if humans every gain the ability through either technology, now unknown natural powers or magic to raise the dead or create entire solar systems from nothing; that is, utterly control space and time, then they might meet the definitions of a god and they might deserve the right to be called gods. However, that doesn’t mean that they deserve worship as gods. Their moral character still may be quite human and flawed. Nevertheless, I’m skeptical that humans will ever be able to do ex nihilo creation and resurrect the decayed dead.

Now, I fully understand that a god, prophet, psychic, ghost, demon, or angel probably would never agree to submit to testing, but this is the only way to verify the supernatural. So, believers in the supernatural are in the unfortunate position of not being able to demonstrate that their claims are real. Too bad for them. Nevertheless, skeptics have no rational reason to lower their standards so that believers’ likely nonsense could be labeled as reality. Advocates of the supernatural have to find some way to meet strict scientific standards and demonstrate their claims.” [my emphasis]

Lundahl (2022m) then comments on the bolded paragraph of this section:

“’Kevin R. Henke: According to his second essay, Lundahl (2022b), there are two ways to verify the existence of the supernatural; namely, metaphysics and history.’

Yes.

‘Kevin R. Henke: He is definitely wrong to claim that history is capable of verifying the supernatural.’

No reference given, except:

‘Kevin R. Henke: C.S. Lewis (1960, p. 2), a source used by Lundahl (2022a), even agrees with me that “history can never convince us that a miracle occurred.” We can never rule out the strong possibility that “witnesses” to a past “supernatural event” outright lied and made-up a story, or misinterpreted what they saw. These are the bases of Hypotheses #3 and #4 for the Talking Snake, which Lundahl (2022c) utterly fails to adequately address as discussed in Section 5.0 of this essay.’

The fact is, on page 2, C. S. Lewis is adressing the mindset of the people he is trying to first convince of the supernatural by metaphysics. He is presuming them atheists and materialists, and is concluding how they will distort historic evidence, and he is putting it in a polite fashion. He is also presuming, they are not likely to get deeper into history than they are already. This has changed on the market, lots of atheists are now geeks who revalorise the Middle Ages and so on.

I disagree with him on methodology. A strong atheist or materialist who has for long applies this philosophy to history would indeed probably need CSL's ordination : a metaphysical overhaul first, before reviewing history from a new angle. An actual agnostic (not that I think Henke's self diagnosis as such a one is entirely correct) would, according to the terms of his own theory of knowledge, unlike the people C. S. Lewis had in mind, be obliged to consider historic evidence as one possible reason to reconsider his (by definition) preliminary world view.”

Lundahl (2022m) is completely misreading Lewis (1960, p. 2). This is the relevant paragraph from Lewis (1960, p. 2):

“If immediate experience cannot prove or disprove the miraculous, still less can history do so. Many people think one can decide whether a miracle occurred in the past by examining the evidence ‘according to the ordinary rules of historical inquiry’. But the ordinary rules cannot be worked until we have decided whether miracles are possible, and if so, how probable they are. For if they are impossible, then no amount of historical evidence will convince us. If they are possible but immensely improbable, then only mathematically demonstrative evidence will convince us: and since history never provides that degree of evidence for any event, history can never convince us that a miracle has occurred. If, on the other hand, miracles are not intrinsically improbable, then the existing evidence will be sufficient to convince us that quite a number of miracles have occurred. The result of our historical evidence thus depends on the philosophical view must therefore come first.” [my emphasis]

Here, Lewis (1960, p. 2) argues for three scenarios on how people could approach the possibility of miracles:

1. Miracles are impossible.

2. Miracles are possible, but they are very improbable.

3. Miracles are possible and they are not improbable.

For individuals that dogmatically proclaim that miracles are impossible, Lewis (1960, p. 2) is correct. No amount of evidence will probably convince them that miracles occur. Lundahl (2022i) falsely accuses me of having this position and in using it as part of a circular fallacy. However, as I clearly stated in Henke (2022a), Henke (2022b), and especially Henke 2022ac and Henke (2022ae), I fully recognize that miracles are possible. However, I’ve simply seen no evidence of them occurring.

The second scenario is my position. I recognize that miracles are hypothetically possible. However, because I see no evidence of them currently occurring, at best, they must be extremely rare at least in the present world. I also doubt the existence of God, angels, demons or other supernatural agents that could perform miracles. Under this scenario, Lewis (1960, p. 2) admits:

“If they are possible but immensely improbable, then only mathematically demonstrative evidence will convince us: and since history never provides that degree of evidence for any event, history can never convince us that a miracle has occurred.”

In Henke (2022b), I quoted the above bolded phrase from Lewis (1960, p. 2) because this is my position. Here Lewis (1960, p. 2) is correct, under the scenario that I accept, “…history can never convince us that a miracle has occurred.” As shown in the above extensive quotation from Henke (2022b), I then argue that miracles could only be demonstrated under strictly controlled and present conditions, and I gave examples involving resurrecting a dead cat or creating an ex nihilo solar system. Lundahl (2022m) has completely misunderstood Lewis (1960, p. 2).

The third situation proposed by Lewis (1960, p. 2), which claims that miracles are “not intrinsically improbable”, is unsupported by any evidence. Any “philosophical” arguments from Mr. Lewis or “metaphysical” arguments from Lundahl (2022m) do not change that. I already agree with Lewis (1960) and Mr. Lundahl that miracles are hypothetically possible. However, philosophical/metaphysical arguments are totally worthless, if they are not immediately supported by evidence (see Henke 2022aj). So, Mr. Lundahl or other advocates of miracles have to produce evidence to demonstrate that miracles actually occur. They have not done so.

Interestingly, Lewis (1960, p. 159) also states:

“Lies, exaggerations, misunderstandings and hearsay make up perhaps more than half of all that is said and written in the world.”

Lewis (1969, p. 159) is basically correct here and many might argue that the number of lies, exaggerations, misunderstandings, and hearsay are much higher than 50%. Lies, exaggerations, misunderstandings and hearsay have always been present, including in claims about the past and especially in the Bible. Fortunately, we now have the internet. When carefully used with plenty of skepticism and cross-checking, the internet can provide evidence that helps us to expose lies, exaggerations, misunderstandings and hearsay that might have escaped detection in the past. Nevertheless, as I argued in Henke (2022b), the likelihood of lies, exaggerations, misunderstandings and hearsay make it virtually impossible to verify any historical claims of miracles, and Lundahl (2022m) fails to realize that.

Reference:

Lewis, C.S. 1960. Miracles, 2^nd ed., printed 1974: Harper One: HarperCollinsPublishers, 294pp.