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AR 24:21 - Beware the incomplete philosophical view of ‘God’
In this issue:
ATHEISM - "the decline of sound popular theology is reflected in the poor quality of our atheism"
+ an atheist Oxford scholar skewers "the distasteful character of most atheism"
SCIENCE - the deceitful threshold of statistical significance
Apologia Report 24:21 (1,429)
May 22, 2019
ATHEISM
"Bad Theology, Bad Atheism" by Nicholas Frankovich, responding to a much-contested op-ed piece in the New York Times <www.nyti.ms/2VWUHat> -- "These days the most common arguments for atheism involve the assumption that God is an idealized imaginary person whose name Christians and other monotheists robotically plug in as the answer to the big ontological question, Why isn't there nothing? Any theists who do that shouldn't, and no atheist should accept them as spokespeople.... The decline of sound popular theology is reflected in the poor quality of our atheism, which consists of a growing number of people rejecting an insufficiently thought-through understanding of God and thinking that's that. ...
"As soon as we try to sketch the nature of God, we encounter difficulties and contradictions." Frankovich's recommended approach: apophatic theology - favored by Eastern Orthodoxy - which, "based on the idea that the best we can do in this regard is specify what is not true of God, has the advantage of doing less than almost any other kind of theology does to obscure His mystery, by which I mean the mystery of being, the mystery that there is anything at all rather than nothing.
"That's the heart of the matter about God. If only those who believe they are atheists would address it with clear eyes and without rancor. ... Their case against 'the God of the philosophers' suffers from ... an incomplete understanding of 'God' as a philosophical term, which is a placeholder. God's name is not 'God.' 'I Am Who Am' is." National Review, Mar 27 '19, <www.bit.ly/2Wdb2qO>
For word of more disappointment with popular atheistic thought, consider this book by "an atheist [who] is more vexed by bad atheistic thinking than by religious belief and practice." In his review of Seven Types of Atheism by John Gray [1], Graham McAleer (professor of philosophy at Loyola University Maryland) describes an impressive resource: "Author of some 20 books, Gray is a public intellectual unafraid to enter the fray and here does so against many of the most cherished beliefs of secularists, leftists, and [the] *bien pensant* establishment."
Gray makes a point to "show the intolerance of atheism and, during the times in which it has held power, its murderous fury. ...
"This book should put to rest the canard that atheism is free thinking, and oh so much more broad-minded and gentle than what is on offer from the dull and cramped-spirited, God-fearing types. Gray thinks theism ill-conceived, but he does not think it has anything like the distasteful character of most atheism.
"Gray reserves special scorn for those he terms 'the Enlightenment Evangelists,' a camp that stands for the proposition that human nature freed from religious belief gives us benevolent liberalism. One of his seven types of atheism, Enlightenment Evangelism is represented by the likes of Sam Harris and Richard Dawkins. Typical of this position is the oft-repeated claim that but for the obscurantism of religion, reason would prevail and a sort of John Lennonesque humanistic utopia, knowing neither gods nor borders, would prevail. ...
"Throughout the book, Gray minces few words: 'Modern racist ideology is an Enlightenment project.' Members of the academy and the literati will blanch reading: 'It is Jewish and Christian monotheism - not the European Enlightenment - that is the chief source of the practice of toleration.'
"A long-serving professor of political thought at Oxford, Gray knows whereof he speaks. (He has also taught at Harvard, Yale, and the London School of Economics.) He is an expert on the history of Western thought, and of the seven types of atheism he identifies - each has its own chapter in the book - he seems more or less to subscribe to [19th-century German philosopher Arthur] Schopenhauer's version.
"First he covers that darling of publishing houses in recent years, the New Atheism, contending that it is neither new nor interesting, and certainly not a subtle version of atheism. Dating back well into the 19th century, the so-called New Atheism is crippled by the fact that it mistakes its target. The New Atheists assume that the struggle with religion is a quarrel over beliefs, but really 'the idea that religion is a matter of belief is parochial.' ...
"In particular, the world's religions try to think through the complex interaction of [the harmony between vitalism and mind], and so the metaphysics of Gray's own atheism appears lacking. Not, mind you, just as a matter of taste, but as bad philosophy. He's right to reject contemporary Gnosticism, but not right to ignore the insight of [fifth-century B.C. Greek philosopher] Parmenides." Law & Liberty, Mar 22 '19, <www.bit.ly/2YwMAhu>
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SCIENCE
The March 2019 issue of Nature (pp305-7) includes a feature which again <www.bit.ly/2W6OoQY> laments the abuse of statistical authority in the published work of scientists. "Retire Statistical Significance," presented by "more than 800 signatories" calls for an "end to hyped claims and the dismissal of crucial effects." The technical writing will likely discourage many from reading the entire piece, yet the message is clear and bears constant repetition that "studies can be biased ... even with the best of intentions." "[A]ll statistics ... naturally vary from study to study, and often do so to a surprising degree." "[B]ucketing results into 'statistically significant' and 'statistically non-significant' makes people think that the items assigned in that way are categorically different. ...
"Unfortunately, the false belief that crossing the threshold of statistical significance is enough to show that a result is 'real' has led scientists and journal editors to privilege such results, thereby distorting the literature. Statistically significant estimates are biased upwards in magnitude and potentially to a large degree, whereas statistically non-significant estimates are biased downwards in magnitude. Consequently, any discussion that focuses on estimates chosen for their significance will be biased." The example is given where "an analysis of 791 articles across five journals found that around half mistakenly assume non-significance means no effect. ...
"Last, and most important of all, be humble: compatibility assessments hinge on the correctness of the statistical assumptions used ... assumptions are at best subject to considerable uncertainty. ...
"The objection we hear most against retiring statistical significance is that it is needed to make yes-or-no decisions." When "there is no simple connection" between findings, authors should "emphasize their estimates and the uncertainty in them" to allow their audience to think for themselves. "Decisions to interpret or to publish results [should] not be based on statistical thresholds. ...
"[M]onitoring the literature for statistical abuses should be an ongoing priority for the scientific community. ... The misuse of statistical significance has done much harm to the scientific community and those who rely on scientific advice." <www.go.nature.com/2tc5nkm>
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SOURCES: Monographs
1 - Seven Types of Atheism, by John Gray (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018, hardcover, 176 pages) <www.amzn.to/2Wd5koQ>
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