e. Dexterous en U-403 Engelse versie

Robin Williams Films

wishes to express deep gratitude to Willem Pop for sharing an article entitled:

“FIRE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE TUG DEXTEROUS AND THE GERMAN SUBMARINE U-403 ON MAY 10, 1943.”

From the book “VIEW FROM THE BRIDGE”

Note: Dutch to English translation by Willem Pop and Robin Williams.

The above mentioned book by Willem Pop, Dutch Author. View from the Bridge is about his father

VIEW FROM THE BRIDGE

A portrait of a sailor in the first half of the 20th century.

Enjoy!

Robin & Rosetta Williams

Fire fight between the tug Dexterous and the German submarine U-403 on May 10, 1943

On the 2nd of May convoy SC 129 (SC = Slow Convoy), began its voyage by sailing out of Halifax, Nova Scotia and was slowly moving

toward WESTOMP (Western Ocean Meeting Point), position 46°.38’ N, 48°.55’ where it was joined on May 6 by Escort Group B2. This escort group was led by Commander Donald Macintyre RN and consisted of the destroyers HMS Hesperus, HMS Whitehall, the corvettes HMS Clematis, HMS Campanula, HMS Heather, HMS Sweet Briar, HMS Gentiane and the trawlers Lady Madeleine and HMS Sappar.These two groups of escortships left St. John's, Newfoundland for a rendezvous with convoy HX 237 which was on its way from New York to England.The first group was Escort Group C2 consisting of the destroyer HMS Broadway, the frigate Lagan, the corvettes HMS Primrose, HMCS Chambly, HMCS Modern, HMCS Drumheller, the tug Dexterous and HMS Vizalma, an armed trawler. Group C2 was led by Lieutenant Commander F.H. Chavasse RN.

The tug Dexterous carried the Dutch flag and had a predominantly Dutch crew with the Dutch officers Captain Kalkman and first officer Pop. According to the officer in St. John’s who was in command of the salvagetugs, the above-mentioned convoy would pass St. John's within three days. Captain Kalkman of the Dexterous had received information in which was mentioned that it was swarming with German submarines mainly between Cape Farewell and Bel-Isle Strait. Recently, more than 60 U-boats had been reported. Alas this information later on would prove to be correct when the two convoys and the three escort groups were attacked by thirty-seven U-boats. Captain Kalkman decided to take a southern route in order to reduce the chance of an encounter with a hostile submarine wolf pack. In spite of the news of the U-boats, the Dexterous and the Vizalma departed somewhat earlier from St. John’s than Escort Group C2 and they soon were among the stragglers in a thick fog. Escort Group C2 was itself sailing so slowly that they were unable to join convoy HX 237. Therefore they continued as an independent group and followed the same route as the convoy.

The second group that departed two hours later was the Fifth Escort Group consisting of the aircraft carrier HMS Biter and the destroyers, HMS Pathfinder, HMS Obdurate and HMS Opportune.

The Fifth Escort Group was commanded by Captain E.M.C Abel Smith RN. The intention was that the two escort groups would meet the convoy HX 237 on 6 May southwest of Newfoundland on the WESTOMP to relieve the local escort group which accompanied the convoy along the coast of North America. However, immediately after leaving Newfoundland both groups were confronted with heavy fog that delayed meeting with the convoy.

The same day at noon, an English plane, a Wildcat, appeared and flew very low and a short time later returned and collapsed into the sea not far from the Dexterous. The airplane's fuel was exhausted by a navigation error and the aircraft was outside the reach of the aircraft carrier, which was sailing in the convoy. Although the plane sank very quickly, the pilots were able to get out of the plane in time and activate their life jackets so they could float and wait for rescue. The crew of the HMS Vizalma had seen the crash and arrived quickly to pluck the men out of the sea and bring them onboard to safety. Initially the Dexterous sailed behind the trawler, but in the evening the trawler made signals that they wanted to switch position and fall in behind the Dexterous. That night, the wind increased and the sea became turbulent. To maintain security, Pop warned the captain, who was sleeping in his cabin. He said that he feared the trawler, which was slower than the Dexterous, could not follow much longer. The captain answered that the crew on the bridge should watch for signals from the trawler and act accordingly. The next morning, as they had feared, the trawler had disappeared out of range and the Dexterous was all alone. This meant the Vizalma would have to find the convoy on its own resources.

In the morning of 7 May at 10:00 o'clock a ship was in sight behind which was initially suspected to be the missing trawler. Later on it proved this was not the case. The ship that was overtaking the Dexterous turned out to be the Norwegian tanker, Sandanger, which had departed from New York on May 1 and just like the Dexterous was looking for the convoy. All that day and the next night the two ships stayed together. On 8 May the Sandanger received a message indicating the position where convoy HX 237 would be the following day. The Norwegian tanker declared that it would make the trip alone and soon disappeared out of sight. The Sandanger, however, did not meet the convoy at the indicated position and was torpedoed by U-221 on 12 May. After that, the Dexterous was moving slower looking for the above-mentioned convoy and trying to find the convoy as quickly as possible. Meanwhile the trawler Vizalma joined convoy HX 237 in the evening of 8 May at 19:00 and reported to Chavasse of Escort Group C2 that it had parted company with HMS Dexterous at some distance from the convoy. Chavasse thought the tug probably did not have the latest straggler's route information and he considered it urgent that the Dexterous joined the convoy. The commander vainly attempted to reach HMS Biter by radio-telephone to request airsearch for the missing tug. Because of the low visibility, Chavasse had not seen an aircraft since the morning of 7 May and did not know the position of HMS Biter, which was operating at a distance from the convoy.

The U-403, Type VIIC under the command of Oberleutnant Heinz-Ehlert Clausen, radioed the Befehlshaber der U-Boote (BDU): (U-Boat supreme commander and HQ of the U-Bootwaffe). WHILE FOLLOWING TUG DISCOVERED CONVOY, AFTER M/G FIGHT WITH WHEELED A/C....PUT DOWN BY A/C BOMBS NAVAL GRID SQUARE 2191. The commander of U-403 also reported the firefight with the tug and indicated his position on the German grid map approximately 42°.04’ N and 30°.59’ W.

After the battle the Dexterous sailed full speed under the guidance of a frigate, direction: the convoy, to take her place at the back of the convoy as rescuevessel. The convoy HX 237 initially had numbered 42 ships but there were 52 after the rendezvous point. During the rest of the day on 10 May the aircraft carrier HMS Biter patrolled around the convoy but no U-boats were discovered. In the afternoon, a Swordfish was lost through a navigational error and, overshot the convoy and was forced to crash-land in the sea from lack of fuel. HMS Broadway made an extensive search for the aircrew without result. The crew was later picked up by a warship of the Western Approaches Command.

It remained quiet that day. Nevertheless, aircraft took off from the aircraft carrier with some regularity as long as it was light. They searched for miles around for hostile submarines. During the day the aircraft carrier sailed on the outside and at night in the middle of the convoy. When the U-boat activity around HX 237 dropped off on the morning of 11 May, Chavasse took the opportunity to refuel HMS Broadway and HMCS Chambly from a tanker in the convoy. On the orders of Commander in Chief Western Approaches, the base course of the convoy was altered to intercept the merchant ship Roslin Castle which was independently routed, so that it could join the convoy.

The BDU mistakenly thought that this change of course was an avoiding action of the U-boats to escape. During the afternoon of 11 May, the activities of the U-boats around HX 237 resumed when the Drosselgroup consisting of 8 U-boats closed with HX 237 from the east. At 12:40 HMS Lagan was sent down an HF/DF (High Frequency Direction Finder) bearing to hunt a U-boat. Shortly thereafter HMS Pathfinder also conducted a search for a U-boat in front of the convoy Saturday, but these searches were unsuccessful and Chavasse decided to discontinue surface sorties as wasteful to fuel and unduly weakening the close screen. Instead, he decided to send the destroyers HMS Pathfinder and HMS Obdurate to make a prolonged search for U-boats ahead of the convoy. The two warships did not find any U-boats and returned to HX 237 after dark. As there was a fairly heavy sea running with poor flying weather, Abel Smith did not want to run the risk of aircraft crashing on take off and landing. But at Chavasse's insistence, two aircrafts were flown off HMS Biter because of the increased HF/DF activity. U-89 sighted one aircraft and U-436 was attacked by another. The BDU first learned from U-89 that an aircraft carrier was operating with HX 237. While the BDU thought that seven U-boats were stalking the convoy on the afternoon of 11 May, in fact only U-436 followed the convoy for two hours before driven off.

During the night of 11 May, the U-403 torpedoed the British merchant ship Sandanger, one of the stragglers independently following the same route as convoy HX 237.

On 12 May the escorting ships and an aircraft discovered two submarines. It later turned out that these U-boats were the U-456 and the U-89. The convoy immediately zigzagged after the alarm while the destroyers and the torpedo-boat destroyers sailed at top speed around the convoy and attacked with depth charges in places where they suspected German submarines.

A VLR B-24 Liberator of the group B 86 reported at 11:15 to Chavasse that they had attacked a diving U-boat (U-456) with an acoustic torpedo and three bombs. HMS Broadway then caught an HF/DF call that confirmed the report and HMS Pathfinder was contacted with this information. The plane of the group B 86 reported that the U-boat had submerged and then re-surfaced and apparently was damaged and could not dive.

At 11.51 U-456 radioed to the BDU: UNABLE TO DIVE NAVAL GRID SQUARE BD 6646, a few minute later U-456 again sent a radio message: AM STEERING COURSE 300 DEGREES AT HIGH SPEED, HEAVY INRUSH OF WATER IN AFTER COMPARTMENT, REQUIRE URGENT ASSISTANCE.

At 12:48 U-456 again requested assistance of the BDU. Not knowing that this U-boat was about to be attacked and sunk, the BDU ordered U-89 to assist U-456 at 12:52. At 14:28 U-456 sent a radio message: AIRCRAFT MAINTAINING CONTACT HAS NO BOMBS LEFT. AM STEERING COURSE OF 200 DEGREES, IN RUSH OF WATER CAN STILL BE KEPT UNDER CONTROL FOR PRESENT.

This was the last radio transmission of U-456 before it sank. U-182 radioed that it was going to the assistance of U-456 and the BDU ordered 2 additional U-boats commissioned to aid the stricken submarine.

HMS Pathfinder was recalled to convoy HX 237 before it reached U-456. HMS Opportune, which had been vectored to the area at the request of aircraft B 86, sighted U-456, which dived before the British destroyer could attack. HMS Opportune did not obtain an Asdic contact and U-456 was never seen again nor did it report to the BDU. All hands (49) were lost.

At 12:52 a Swordfish from the HMS Biter reported to HMS Broadway that there was a U-boat, U-89, on the surface about 6 miles ahead of the convoy. Chavasse ordered the convoy to make a 90° turn to starboard to avoid the U-boat and proceed himself on the HMS Broadway with HMS Lagan to attack the enemy vessel. Before the two British warships reached U-89 the Swordfish attacked with depth charges and marked the location with a marker where the U-boat was forced to dive. Chavasse was convinced that the Swordfish had damaged the U-boat for by the time that HMS Broadway arrived on the scene, the submarine had not moved away from the aircraft's marker.

The hedgehog was an anti-submarine weapon to supplement the depth charge. The weapon worked by firing a number of small spigot mortar bombs. The new weapon was much more effective than depth bombs.

Thirty-eight minutes later HMS Lagan conducted a second hedgehog attack which again failed. Then at 14:00 HMS Broadway undertook another attack. Sixteen seconds after the hedgehog bomb hit the water there was a sharp explosion followed by a fainter second explosion. But at 14:10 HMS Lagan gained Asdic contact and carried out a third hedgehog attack without result.

At 14:34 the two British warships began a search and at 14:45 HMS Lagan obtained Asdic contact, which it attacked. Chavasse in his report said that this was probably no sub but at 14:47 HMS Lagan saw lots of pieces of wood floating about. Without an Asdic contact HMS Broadway then dropped a pattern of depth charges with settings of 150 and 300 feet. Immediately after this attack HMS Broadway gained Asdic contact and again attacked with depth charges but only five were dropped because the rails on the port side had jammed. Then many more pieces of wood, pieces too large to fit through the torpedo tube, appeared on the surface. We also saw pieces of clothing and paper on the surface. HMS Lagan reported seeing some substance resembling flesh. HMS Broadway and HMS Lagan had sunk U-89 at position 46°.49’ N, 25°.33’ E. Again, an entire U-boat crew was lost (48 men).

While HMS Broadway and HMS Lagan were hunting and then sinking U-89, a Swordfish from HMS Biter sighted a lifeboat. HMCS Drumheller was sent to investigate and picked up fifteen members of the crew of the merchant ship Fort Concord, which, as already mentioned, was torpedoed by U-403 on 11 May.

As previously mentioned, the Norwegian tanker Sandanger, one of the stragglers of the convoy, was torpedoed on 12 May, after the convoy had not been found on 9 May at the meeting place. Early on the morning of 10 May they saw three ships belonging to the same convoy HX-237. The same day at noon, the four ships were at the meeting place again, but still no convoy could be found, so the ships proceeded at full speed.

Two days later in the evening of 12 May the Sandanger was hit by three torpedoes from U-221 in position 46N, 21W, one torpedo hit the vessel amidships, one hit the pump room and one found tank No. 6.The tanker was immediately engulfed in flames as she had a cargo of 7000 tons paraffin and 7000 tons gasoline. Only the starboard aft motor lifeboat remained intact with some crew members and was lowered straight down into the burning sea. Since the Sandanger still had some speed the lifeboat had drifted a few meters away from the ship. One of the mechanics jumped into the flaming water and tried to swim to the boat. However, he gave up before he

had reached the boat. The boatswain was also half way down the ship's side when he called to the other in the boat to keep rowing. The starboard raft was observed to be thrown into the sea and several members of the crew jumped overboard after it and were never seen again. The after part of the Sandanger sank while the forepart stayed afloat like a giant bonfire. The people in the lifeboat were wet with benzine so that they were in great danger from the flames and intense heat, until a miracle occurred which saved them. Because of the fast combustion, a low pressure area was created, which caused a very strong wind blowing from the direction of the high pressure area outside of the flames. The wind was on the starboard side and split the flames in two forming a flame-free passage. The lifeboat was maneuvered into this passage and for about 40 minutes the crew rowed for their lives surrounded by a wall of flames. The fire went out about five hours after the Sandanger had been torpedoed. All this time the crew rowed the boat in order to avoid the flames. The next morning on 13 May, they could set sail in the direction the Sandanger had been going. The wind changed direction and the survivors were forced to sail westward for two days. In the morning of the third day they managed to get the motor started and set a more easterly course, but after 43 hours they ran out of petrol so the rest of the time they rowed.

On 14 May a bomber aircraft had sighted the lifeboat and dropped food and water for them. The next day, three aircraft flew over, circled and dropped a U.S aid kit and a portable Bendix radio. Although there was no radio operator on board the lifeboat, the radio was used frequently and it was later learned that the signals had been heard and were responsible to a large extent for their rescue. The next day on 16 May, they saw a merchant ship but they were not noticed. Eventually they were picked up on 22 May by the Canadian destroyer HMCS Kootenay and on 23 May the seamen were brought to Londonderry and put ashore. Out of a crew of 39 on the Sandanger, 19 had survived and 20 had died, including the Captain. On 12 May the Norwegian ship, the Brand, also a straggler of the convoy HX 237, was torpedoed by U-603 at 10:35 at position 47°.19’ N and 24°. 41’ W and sank within just a few minutes.

While conducting the last exploration sweeps of that day on 12 May around HX 237, a Swordfish aircraft saw four landing crafts and three lifeboats. HMCS Morden was notified and detached from the convoy to investigate. It discovered the empty landing crafts had come from the Norwegian merchant ship, the Brand, as well as three lifeboats with forty members of the ship's crew on board. HMCS Morden picked up the survivors at 18:45 and rejoined the convoy around 21:58.

Just like the Fort Concord and the Sandanger, the Brand was separated from convoy HX-237 by the fog off Newfoundland on 5 May. It appeared that the enemy had not yet given up the battle because the following day on 13 May a few U-boats were sighted and reported to be stalking the fully loaded ships of the convoy. A counter attack of the escort ships created a continuous heavy banging of explosions from the many depth charges. U-753 (Kpt Mann von Stein) was destroyed and sunk by the action of a Sunderland flying boat of the RCAF, Sq. 423, together with HMS Lagan and the corvette HMS Drumheller. The other U-boats had been forced to submerge by the corvettes, Chambly and Morden.

Convoy SC 129 consisting of 26 ships, lost two ships by the onset of darkness on 11 May by torpedo attacks by U-402, the British Antigone and the Norwegian Grado, 36 members of the crew of the Grado and 43 of the Antigone were rescued.

The destroyer HMS Hesperus of Escort Group B2 claimed to have had a dramatic fight with U-223 on 12 May. After an attack with depth charges, the submarine was forced to come to the surface. Although U-223 was harassed below with more depth charges, by the Hesperus, the U-boat did not sink and even escaped. That same day, at noon, the Hesperus knew to gauge the bearing of U-186 and succeeded to destroy the U-boat. Eleven other U-boats were nevertheless in contact with convoy SC-129 and at night it was thought the HMS Hesperus, HMS Whitehall, and the corvettes HMS Sweet Briar, and HMS Clematus Heather forced them to dive.

With the loss of nine ships and two planes the convoy continued its voyage and the subsequent days passed without incident. Upon arrival in the Irish Sea the convoy dispersed and the ships each went its own way. The Dexterous headed towards Campbeltown where she arrived on 16 May 1943. The next day the Dexterous was ordered to depart for the detested Milford Haven.

On 18 May Captain Kalkman received command and was instructed to leave for Falmouth where they would lie until further orders. After arriving in Falmouth on 19 May, part of the crew got 6 days leave as they had twice crossed the Atlantic with a convoy!

On 16 June 1943 Kapitänleutnant Karl-Franz Heine became the commander of the U-403. On 17 August 1943 U-403 was discovered by a British Hudson aircraft (Sqdn 200/O), from convoy GUS-10 and attacked with depth charges in the mid-Atlantic near Dakar. U-403 was able to escape the attack by diving fast. The U-boat however, was damaged by the depth charges of the Hudson aircraft, because there was a long trail of oil. On 18 August 1943 U-403 was again attacked from the air at position 13°.42’ N - 17°.36’ W near Dakar, this time by a French Wellington, using 6 depth bombs on U-403 and partly destroyed the submarine. All the members of the crew of U-403, lost their lives. (49 men)