Controversy continues to this day on the question of whether the Western Allies could have carried out a successful cross-channel invasion of France in 1943. Some observers contend that such an operation was definitely within Anglo-American capabilities. They argue that had Roosevelt and Churchill followed this approach and avoided embroilment in the Mediterranean, they would have shortened the war and Western troops would have liberated much more of Europe than they subsequently did in 1944-45. But most commentators insist that conditions were not conducive to a successful invasion before 1944. To support their position, they point to the German submarine offensive, which took a heavy toll on Allied shipping until the spring of 1943, as well as shortages of ships, landing craft, troops, and equipment. They also insist that the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy provided valuable combat experience that many Allied troops, especially American, needed before starting a cross-channel operation.
In rebuttal, proponents of a 1943 invasion convincingly argue that the Allies did possess sufficient ships and landing craft before 1944, but in the wrong places - the Mediterranean and the Pacific. They contend that the Allies could have avoided this dilemma had they remained faithful to their original plan to strike across the channel. These critics also demonstrate that the Allies could have provided enough men and materiel for an invasion by the spring of 1943. Although they admit that many of these troops would not have had actual battle experience, they believe that German weakness in the west would have offset this deficiency. Hitler had only 49 divisions in France, most of them of second-line quality, and was especially short of tanks in 1943. A year later, he had assembled 58 divisions and was considerably stronger in armor. German defenses along France's Atlantic coast were also much weaker in 1943 than in 1944, and the Allies would have enjoyed air superiority. The chief question that casts doubt on the possibility of a successful 1943 operation was the threat posed by German submarines to Allied shipping in the Atlantic. Clearly it was still a serious problem in early 1943, whereas it had virtually ceased to exist in 1944. Whether it was critical enough to have prevented assembling sufficient troops and materiel for an invasion is by no means clear.
In the final analysis, it is impossible to answer definitively the question of whether and invasion in 1943 would have led to victory or a serious setback for the Allies. We do know, however, that when the invasion finally came in 1944, it took place despite the continued doubts of many British leaders. British interest in the Mediterranean had increased since the agreement at the Casablanca conference to undertake a cross-channel invasion in 1944. Churchill reaffirmed his commitment to an invasion of Western Europe at both the Washington Trident Conference in May and the Quadrant Conference at Quebec in August. But he also argued for an extension of operations into northern Italy. In fact, the British war cabinet agreed in October that the Italian campaign should have priority and voiced its opposition to promising a cross-channel operation in May 1944.
TEHRAN AND ALLIED STRATEGY
Churchill's attachment to the Italian campaign contributed to American skepticism regarding British intentions. This concern did not finally subside until November 1943, when Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed on the basic details of the cross-channel invasion at the Tehran conference. This was the first face-to-face meeting of all three Allied leaders, the "Big Three." It took place in the capital of Iran, a country that Soviet and British troops had occupied jointly in the summer of 1941 to facilitate the transit of Western aid to Russia and to safeguard Allied access to the Iranian oil fields. At first, Churchill continued to push for extensive operations in the Mediterranean and postponement of the cross-channel invasion (Operation Overlord). But Stalin supported the Americans and insisted on Overlord. The Soviet dictator had long been suspicious of Anglo-American sincerity about opening a second front in Western Europe and still feared that his allies might seek a separate peace, leaving the USSR to face Germany alone. He had repeatedly pressed them to move faster to undertake an invasion and either failed to grasp or was indifferent to the monumental logistic problems involved in a cross-channel invasion. Confronted by the opposition of both of his allies, Churchill reluctantly agreed that the cross-channel invasion would have top priority in 1944, while the Italian campaign would be relegated to secondary importance. They also agreed that American troops would undertake an invasion of southern France to coincide with Overlord but on a lesser scale.
It was also at Tehran that Roosevelt made his decision to appoint Eisenhower supreme commander of the Allied expeditionary forces that would carry out the invasion. Western leaders had already agreed that an American would serve in this post because the United States would ultimately commit larger forces to the conquest of Western Europe than the British. But Eisenhower's appointment came as a surprise to Churchill and Stalin, both of whom would have preferred General Marshall. Roosevelt chose Eisenhower largely because he considered Marshall irreplaceable as chief of staff.
The decision proved especially beneficial to the Allied cause. Eisenhower possessed the ability to get along with both American and British leaders. These qualities were of vital importance in the man who was responsible for holding the Western coalition together. British Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder served as Eisenhower's deputy. Another team player, Tedder had developed a close relationship with Eisenhower in the Mediterranean. He had commanded British air operations in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, with impressive results. Tedder possessed a common touch that made him popular with his subordinates. Montgomery was given command of the Allied ground forces that were to make the landings on the French coast as well as responsibility for much of the planning for the invasion.
By 1944, the Western Allies had produced vast amounts of war materiel that were essential if the invasion were to be successful. This materiel was available not only for cross-channel invasion, but for the war effort in the Mediterranean and the Pacific as well. Nevertheless, Operation Overlord received first priority, and the buildup of equipment and supplies in Britain mounted throughout the months preceding the actual landings on the French coast.
PREPARING FOR THE INVASION
The Allies chose the coast of Normandy for the invasion site. Several important factors influenced their decision. Normandy contained two important ports - Cherbourg to the west and Le Havre to the east - either of which would be valuable for supplying the invading troops. The projected landing areas also lay to the east of the Cotentin Peninsula, which jutted northward to the English Channel, protecting the beaches from the prevailing westerly winds. Ultra had informed Allied leaders that the Germans expected the invasion to come at the Pas de Calais, 200 miles to the northeast and only 20 miles from England across the Strait of Dover. The Allies also knew that the Germans had erected stronger defenses and stationed a larger proportion of their troops there than in Normandy. Finally, the British ports across the channel from Normandy were larger and could handle much greater ship and troop concentrations than those opposite the Pas de Calais.
Six divisions formed the initial seaborne landing force - three American, two British, and one Canadian. The Americans represented the nucleus of the U.S. 1st Army, commanded by General Omar Bradley, and were to land near the eastern base of the Cotentin Peninsula and drive toward Cherbourg. In stark contrast to the flamboyant Patton, Bradley was unassuming and colorless. Although considered to be lacking in imagination by some, his quiet efficiency won the respect of his fellow officers. Bradley had missed active service during World War I and did not gain his first field command until 1941. When Patton took over the 7th Army, Bradley replaced him as commander of the II Corps in the last stages of the Tunisian campaign and in Sicily. Marshall and Eisenhower chose him for the 1st Army post largely because of his administrative ability.
The British and Canadians, the advance guard of General Miles Dempsey's British 2nd Army, were to land farther east near the mouth of the Orne River and capture the important road junction of Caen, which was to serve as the anchor point for the beachhead. Dempsey, like Bradley, was quiet but able. He had served as a corps commander in Sicily and Italy and was one of the few British generals who did not resent Montgomery's interference with operations in the field.
Shortly before these troops went ashore, two American airborne divisions were to land to the west of the U.S. beachheads to provide flank cover, while one British airborne division was to carry out the same mission to the east of the Anglo-Canadian landings. Reinforcements would arrive as soon as the assault units had secured a foothold on the coast.
Until Bradley's troops captured Cherbourg and repaired the damage that the Germans were certain to inflict on port facilities, the invasion force would rely on two prefabricated concrete harbors called Mulberries. Allied ships were to tow the Mulberries across the channel in sections and put them into place off the Normandy coast. They were also to lay pipelines that would provide badly needed fuel. Preparations for the invasion took many months to complete, including the transportation of 1.5 million American soldiers across the Atlantic and from the Mediterranean. Six hundred warships and over 4,000 transports and landing craft formed the greatest invasion armada in history. A total of 12,000 planes provided support for the operation.
Meanwhile, the Germans made preparations to resist the expected invasion. Field Marshal Rundstedt had returned from the inactive list to command all German forces in the west. But the actual leader of the ground forces (Army Group B) in the northern third of France, Belgium, and the southern Netherlands was Field Marshal Rommel. Rommel set out to create as powerful a combination of obstacles as was possible along the coastline - the so-called "Atlantic Wall." His biggest problem was his ignorance of where the Allies would actually strike. As a result, he ordered defenses built on every beach where a landing might be made. This necessitated the expenditure of many precious resources fortifying beaches that would never be attacked. He ordered almost 4 million mines laid as well as the construction of massive numbers of underwater obstacles, thousands of bunkers and casements, some housing 155-mm guns. The underwater obstacles proved especially important because they forced the Allies to land at low tide to prevent landing craft from snagging them. This reduced Allied options as to the timing of the invasion because they needed to land at dawn and would have the benefit of low tide on only a few days a month. German leaders did not agree as to where the invasion would come. Hitler guessed correctly that the target would be Normandy. But Rundstedt and Rommel expected the Allies to attack the Pas de Calais because of its proximity to England. This seemed consistent with the cautious Allied strategy in North Africa and Italy. The Pas de Calais was also closer to Germany and its industrial heartland, the Ruhr. But Hitler's concern about Normandy did lead Rommel to strengthen the defenses there.
Allied leaders also went to elaborate lengths to convince the Germans that an American army, under Patton's command, was present in southeastern England. Its obvious objective, if it existed, would be the Pas de Calais. They even constructed a dummy headquarters, supply depots, and railroad sidings in this area. Bombing raids in the months preceding the invasion also avoided Normandy to help persuade the Germans that it would not be the invasion target. The double agent Juan Pujol (code name Garbo) also fed the Germans false information, indicating that the Allies were going to land at the Pas de Calais. The Germans, who held Garbo in high esteem, accepted his appraisal as genuine. Even after the actual landings in Normandy, Garbo still persuaded the Germans that these were just a feint to divert attention away from the main assault at the Pas de Calais. Ultra reported that these deceptions had reinforced enemy certainty that the assault would come at the Pas de Calais. Meanwhile, air attacks concentrated on the French rail and road networks, including the bridges over the Seine River to the east and the Loire River to the south of Normandy. This interdiction bombing sealed off the invasion site, which made it extremely difficult for the Germans to reinforce their Normandy garrison.
Eisenhower faced a myriad of problems in determining when to actually launch the invasion. Among them were a need for a reasonably calm sea and sufficiently good visibility to enable bombers and naval guns to sight their targets prior to the landings. Even more daunting were two absolutely essential factors that had to occur in combination: a late rising moon to allow airborne forces to carry out their missions, and a low tide just after dawn to enable seaborne troops to land successfully. These two critical requirements would be present in tandem on June 5, 6 and 7, but after that not until July. Eisenhower originally chose the 5th as D Day, but stormy weather threatened to delay the operation indefinitely. German leaders in France were convinced that they had nothing to fear for the foreseeable future. This false sense of security prompted Rommel to visit Germany to celebrate his wife's birthday. Several other Germans generals left their coastal commands to participate, ironically, in a war game simulating an Allied invasion. In contrast, the horrendous weather plunged Eisenhower and other Allied leaders into gloom. But on the evening of June 5, RAF Group Captain J. N. Skagg, the chief Allied meteorologist, informed them that conditions would improve during the next few hours and would continue until about noon on the 6th. After conferring with his commanders, Ike, already worn down by extreme tension and an overwhelming sense of responsibility, silently weighed his options and then announced his momentous decision: "I'm quite positive that we must give the order. I don't like it, but there it is. I don't see how we can do anything else." June 6 would be D Day.
THE INVASION BEGINS
German certainty that the weather would delay the invasion and the absence of so many commanders from their posts contributed to the surprise of the Allied landings. Even after they began, Rundstedt persisted in his belief that the main attack would come at Pas de Calais. Ironically, Hitler, who had originally predicted that Normandy would be the invasion site, now agreed with Rundstedt. The relatively small number of Allied divisions that took part in the initial assault convinced him of this. Thus the German leaders at first refused to divert forces from the 15th Army in the Pas del Calais to bolster the front in Normandy. Rundstedt did seek permission to shift two panzer divisions from reserve to Normandy. But Hitler was sleeping when headquarters received this request, and no one was willing to wake him. Twelve precious hours elapsed before Rundstedt received approval, and several more passed before the divisions actually departed for the beachhead.
The Allies planned to carry out Operation Overlord in three stages. They referred to the first of these as the break-in, which included the actual landings and consolidation of the beachhead. The second was the buildup. This focused on expanding the beachhead and increasing the size of the invasion force. Finally came the breakout, which the Allies were to execute when the buildup was complete. It involved punching through the German defenses around the beachhead and breaking out in the direction of the German border.
Allied forces executed the break-in stage successfully, starting on D Day, June 6. Before the American amphibious landings took place, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions dropped inland to control the approaches to the beaches. They made their drops under cover of darkness, and the paratroopers were badly scattered, but groups of them caused confusion among the Germans and distracted their attention from the beaches. Some accidentally came down over the town of Ste.-Mere-Eglise. Helplessly exposed to fire from the German defenders, many of them were killed before ever reaching the ground. One particularly unfortunate soldier was sucked into a fire that was raging in a nearby building. Two others landed on the roof of a church. One of them managed to escape, while the other hung by his suspension lines from the steeple and pretended to be dead for over two hours. To add to his ordeal, he was temporarily deafened by the constantly clanging church bell located just a few feet from his head. In another preliminary action, three companies of Rangers scaled Pointe-du-Hoc, a sheer 100-foot cliff 10 miles west of Omaha Beach, the easternmost of the two American landing sites. Their mission was the destruction of a battery of 155-mm guns. Despite heavy casualties, they made it to the top only to find, much to their horror, that the guns were not there. The Germans had removed them, apparently to protect them from bombardment. Nevertheless, the Rangers later discovered the guns as they fought their way inland and disabled them. The price had been high - all but 50 of the 200 Rangers had been either killed or wounded. But their great sacrifice prevented the massive guns from shelling the invasion armada and landing beaches below.
The amphibious landings at Omaha Beach encountered every conceivable problem. Omaha's terrain was by far the most difficult of any of the landing sites. The beach itself was relatively narrow and was dominated by a steep and heavily fortified bluff. Below the bluff stretched a sea wall and an antitank ditch as well as an extensive swampy area, all of which blocked access to five ravines that formed the only routes leading from the beach to the top of the bluff. All sorts of problems arose before the invasion force ever reached shore. The navy launched many landing craft too far out, and the choppy sea swamped them, taking a heavy toll of men, tanks, and artillery. Once the invaders reached the shore, they encountered devastating enemy fire. Many never made it out of their landing craft. Those who did found themselves pinned down on the beach with very little cover. As one soldier later put it, "Our life expectancy was about zero." Utter chaos reigned for hours before the Americans finally managed to breach the sea wall and gradually made their way to the top of the bluff. Approximately 2,500 Americans lost their lives on Omaha Beach that day. The Americans who landed at Utah Beach to the west encountered fewer obstacles and far fewer casualties, although here, too, they moved inland more slowly than expected.
British and Canadian troops landed at Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches to the east of Omaha Beach and advanced several miles with relatively little difficulty. But they failed to fulfill their major objective for the first day, the capture of the key communications center of Caen, when counterattacked by the 21st Panzer Division. This enabled the enemy to establish strong defensive positions to the north of the city as reinforcements arrived. The 12th SS Panzer Division was the first of these. Comprised of fanatical teenagers who were members of the Hitler Youth, it was led by equally motivated veterans of the Eastern Front. The division soon collided with Canadian troops and might have broken through their position except for the timely intervention of Allied naval fire. The Germans did take several hundred Canadians prisoner and proceeded to murder them in a flagrant display of Nazi zeal. Once German leaders realized that Normandy was actually the main invasion target, they became convinced that the Allies planned to attempt their breakout from the Caen area. It does appear that Montgomery had originally considered an operation of this type. But strong German resistance and slow Allied progress prevented such a strategy. Instead, the final Allied plan called for the British and Canadians to maintain maximum pressure on the Germans at Caen to give the impression that the main breakout attempt would come there. The Americans were to execute the actual breakout at the opposite end of the beachhead.
Slightly over 100,000 Allied troops reached shore during the first two days. General Friedrich Dollmann's German 7th Army, which was responsible for the defense of Normandy, possessed six infantry divisions and one panzer division at first. Dollmann had commanded this army since the outbreak of the war. His forces had taken part in the conquest of France but had found themselves relegated to garrison duty during the following four years. Within ten days, Allied manpower in Normandy had increased to over 500,000, and by July 1, almost a million men were inside the beachhead. During the same period, the Germans built up their strength to 14 divisions, 9 of which were panzer divisions.
The first major American objective was to pinch off the Cotentin Peninsula and capture Cherbourg. Despite strong German resistance, they finally took the city on June 27. But the Germans destroyed the port installations and blocked access to the harbor with sunken ships. As a result, the Allies were not able to use the port until July 16 and did not complete clearing operations until the end of September.
Not only did Rommel expect the British to execute the breakout attempt, but he was also especially concerned about the terrain on the eastern end of the beachhead. It consisted of a rolling plain, stretching from Caen to Falaise 25 miles to the south, and was ideally suited for armored attacks. Rommel seemingly had less to fear from the Americans, who had to contend with the extremely difficult "hedgerow country" to the west of Caen. High earthen banks, topped by thick hedges, lined the fields and roads of this region, providing the Germans with a deep belt of perfect defensive positions. Heavy fighting followed for several weeks, especially at Caen and Saint-Lo, a small city that was the key point in the projected American breakout. Although the Germans resisted tenaciously, the Allies gradually wore them down.
The buildup of Allied strength in Normandy led to the creation of two army groups by the end of July. The 21st Army Group, under Montgomery's command, consisted of Dempsey's British 2nd Army and General Henry Crerar's new Canadian 1st Army. Crerar, who had spent the interwar years strengthening his country's small army, had served as chief of staff and as a corps commander in Italy. The 12th Army Group, led by Bradley, included the 1st Army, now commanded by General Courtney Hodges, and the newly activated 3rd Army, headed by Patton, who by this time had overcome the disgrace of the slapping incidents in Sicily. Hodges had gained high rank despite being dismissed from West Point because he failed geometry. Undeterred by this setback, he enlisted as a private, quickly gained a commission, and won the Distinguished Service Cross during World War I. Although Bradley considered him a masterful tactician, some of his associates criticized him for not exerting enough control over his subordinates.
The German command structure experienced even more far-reaching changes. Hitler dismissed Rundstedt early in July when the field marshal expressed pessimism regarding the chance of pushing the Allies back into the sea. Rommel suffered injuries when a British plane attacked his staff car on July 17, ending his role in the defense of Normandy. The Fuhrer called on Field Marshal von Kluge, the former commander of Army Group Center on the Eastern Front, to succeed both Rundstedt and Rommel.
AN ATTEMPT ON HITLER'S LIFE
These developments coincided with an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Hitler on July 20, the final chapter in a conspiracy that had begun before the war and persisted into the conflict. When the tide turned against Germany in Russia, a small group of officers on the Eastern Front concluded that it was necessary to end the war and that this would be possible only if Hitler were eliminated. They planned no fewer than six attempts to kill him in 1943, but all of their efforts misfired. Colonel Klaus Schenck von Stauffenberg, who had lost his right hand, two fingers on his left hand and an eye in Tunisia, carried on their mission with the help of officers in Berlin and on the Western Front. Stauffenberg became the key figure in the July 20 attempt on Hitler's life, which took place at the Fuhrer's "Wolf Lair" headquarters at Rastenberg in East Prussia. He attended the meeting in his capacity as chief of staff of the Replacement Army, which had responsibility for training troops. After placing a briefcase containing a bomb under the conference table, he excused himself and made his escape. When the bomb exploded a few minutes later, it killed four men and wounded 20 others. But the table's heavy oak top and stumplike support absorbed enough of the blast to spare Hitler.
Stauffenberg and his fellow conspirators had planned to follow the assassination by seizing control of the government in Berlin and seeking an end to the war. But officers who remained loyal to Hitler received word that he was still alive and quickly arrested Stauffenberg and several others, effectively crushing the plot. They shot Stauffenberg and his immediate associates shortly thereafter. But most of the conspirators were not so fortunate. Hitler took his revenge on them in the weeks that followed. High-ranking officers and civilians had to endure thunderous denunciations from the rabid Nazi judge Roland Freisler, who presided over perfunctory trials and handed out predetermined sentences. Many of the condemned were hanged by piano wire suspended from meat hooks. Hitler ordered the executions to be filmed so that he could view the victims' death agonies at his leisure. From all accounts, he found this entertainment immensely satisfying. Among those implicated in the conspiracy were Kluge and Rommel. Both committed suicide.
Hitler had already replaced Kluge with Field Marshal Walther Model, a veteran of the Eastern Front whose loyalty to the Fuhrer had remained unshaken. A blunt, outspoken officer of middle-class background, Model led a panzer division in the 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union. He subsequently became known as the "Fuhrer's fireman" for his ability to halt Soviet offensives. He commanded all three army groups on the Eastern Front in succession in 1943-44. Model was not afraid to stand up to Hitler and at times even ignored his orders.
Another important change took place at almost the same time as the attempt on Hitler's life, although there was no connection between the two incidents. General Zeitzler, the OKH chief of staff, had become so frustrated by his confrontations with Hitler that he asked to be allowed to go on sick leave. The Fuhrer was so enraged by this request that he dismissed Zeitzler from the army and refused to allow him to wear his uniform. He appointed General Guderian to succeed him.
The attempt in his life increased Hitler's suspicion of even generals who remained loyal to him. And the fact that he had cheated death added to his conviction that he was a man of destiny who would somehow overcome the enormous problems that confronted him.
THE ALLIES BREAK OUT
Meanwhile, back at the front, the Americans took Saint-Lo on July 18, and the British finally completed the capture of Caen two days later. The long-awaited breakout (Operation Cobra) began on July 25. After an intense aerial bombardment, Bradley launched an offensive by the 1st Army along a narrow front south of Saint-Lo. The Germans, still convinced that the British would make the breakout attempt, persisted in keeping most of their panzer divisions near Caen, thus contributing to the American success. Ultra kept Bradley informed of the relatively weak forces in the path of his troops. General J. Lawton Collins's VII Corps provided the 1st Army's spearhead. Collins had proved himself as a division commander on Guadalcanal, where he had earned the nickname "Lightning Joe." An exceptionally vigorous officer, he became famous for his ability to move his troops quickly. He had skillfully directed the capture of Cherbourg and now scored a breakthrough at Saint-Lo. His forces cleared the way for a thrust to Avranches, at the western base of the Cotentin Peninsula.
The 3rd Army exploited the gap that the 1st Army had created. Patton sent two armored divisions sweeping westward into Brittany in the hope of capturing the Breton ports, while the rest of his army wheeled to the east and began to drive across France, against little opposition. The attempt to capture the Breton ports failed because the Germans defended them skillfully in an effort to deny the Allies the use of these facilities. The American breakthrough threatened the entire German position in Normandy and seemed to dictate a general withdrawal to the Seine. But instead of pulling back, Hitler ordered an assault against the American flank at Mortain near Avranches. The attack failed and the German 7th Army now found itself in a highly precarious situation. Elements of the 1st Army were swinging eastward around its southern flank, while the British and Canadians were pressuring it from the north.
Bradley hoped to prevent an enemy retreat by sending elements of both the 1st and 3rd armies north through Argentan to link up with the Canadian 1st Army, which struck south by way of Falaise. But the trap did not close quickly enough. Although the Americans made rapid progress at first, Bradley ordered them to halt because he feared that they would collide with the Canadians in the open field. The Canadians, who encountered stronger resistance, also advanced more slowly than hoped, and Montgomery failed to reinforce them with British troops. This combination of factors enabled 35,000 enemy soldiers to escape before the pincers closed on August 19. Nevertheless, 10,000 Germans died in the Falaise pocket, and another 50,000 surrendered. The slaughter became so concentrated in the battle's final stages that Eisenhower referred to the pocket as a "killing ground." Even the German forces that had escaped fell back on the Seine mauled and demoralized.
Now, when it was too late, Hitler authorized the 15th Army to move south from the Pas de Calais in an attempt to stabilize the front. But it accomplished little and became intermingled with the fleeing remnants of the 7th Army, compounding the confusion. Meanwhile, Patton's forces crossed the Seine and rolled toward the German border. Their rapid progress eliminated any chance of a German stand along the Seine.
THE SOUTHERN INVASION: ANVIL-DRAGOON
While the Battle of the Falaise pocket raged and Patton's troops rampaged through the French countryside, Allied forces landed on France's Mediterranean coast. Eisenhower originally intended this operation to take place at the same time as the invasion of Normandy, but a shortage of landing craft forced its postponement for over two months. The British opposed the operation, which originally had the code name Anvil, because the plan called for the diversion of troops from Italy. Eisenhower and other American leaders insisted, however, and the invasion began on August 15 with the new code name Dragoon. General Alexander Patch's U.S. 7th Army went ashore between the French naval base of Toulon and the resort city of Cannes. A veteran of World War I, Patch had commanded the army forces that relieved the marines at Guadalcanal.
The invaders made rapid progress against weak opposition, and moved inland. French troops, under General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, landed soon afterward. De Lattre had served in the defense of France in 1940 and had refused to buckle under to either the Germans or the Vichy regime during the following months. His outspokenness cost him a ten-year prison sentence, but he escaped to Britain in 1943 and later commanded French troops in North Africa. De Lattre's forces joined with the Americans to capture Toulon as well as the great port of Marseille. The Allies soon received word from Ultra of Hitler's order for all German troops in southern France to withdraw northward. This information enabled them to pursue the enemy up the valley of the Rhone River with great confidence and vigor. Their progress was so swift that on September 12, they made contact with the U.S. 3rd Army north of Dijon in eastern France.
Few operations have received more criticism than Anvil-Dragoon. Most appraisals have insisted that it was unnecessary and prevented the exploitation of the situation in Italy. But the capture of Marseille alone made the undertaking worthwhile, especially in view of the failure to capture the Breton ports. From September through January, the Allies unloaded more supplies at Marseilles than at any other port.
THE ALLIES' SWIFT ADVANCE
As the German position in western France disintegrated following the breakout from Normandy and the Falaise pocket disaster, all Allied armies streaked forward. Paris now lay in the path of the U.S. 1st Army, but Eisenhower planned to bypass the great city. He wanted to avoid street fighting, which might destroy the beautiful capital and cause heavy casualties. If Paris fell, the task of supplying its huge population with food would also create a serious logistic problem. The French, both within and outside the city, decided the issue. French Forces of the Interior rose in revolt against the Paris garrison, and de Gaulle demanded that Eisenhower send troops to relieve the poorly armed Resistance units. While the supreme commander hesitated, General Jacques Philippe Leclerc, commander of the French 2nd Armored Division, acted.
Leclerc had been one of the first officers to rally to de Gaulle in 1940. He won fame in December 1942 by marching a Free French regiment from the central African colony of Chad through over 1,200 miles of desert to join the British at Tripoli. Now the independent-minded general defied orders and sent a force toward Paris. Bowing to the inevitable, Eisenhower approved hi action. But Leclerc's troops progressed more slowly than expected, and Bradley dispatched American units to join in the liberation. Paris fell on August 25. Like Rome, the City of Light had escaped serious damage, but it had been a close call. Hitler had ordered the commandant of Paris, General Dietrich von Choltitz, to defend the city and ultimately to reduce it to "a field of ruins." Although Choltitz did defend Paris up to a point, he could not bring himself to destroy it and surrendered to the French instead. Huge throngs of ecstatic Parisians plied the Allied troops with flowers, wine, and kisses and cheered as they marched in triumph down the famous Champs Elysees.
Soon after the liberation of Paris, the British 2nd, Canadian 1st, and U.S. 1st armies all knifed into Belgium while Patton drove into Lorraine. By September 15, most of Belgium and Luxembourg had fallen into Allied hands, and the German border was only a few miles away. But the Allies outdistanced their supply lines, and shortages, especially of fuel, began to develop. The "Red Ball Express" truck companies, whose personnel were 60 percent black, transported gasoline and other supplies from the beaches to the front. But despite their exceptional efforts, it became clear that all the armies could not continue their breakneck progress. Accordingly, Montgomery urged a single-thrust strategy with the British 2nd and U.S. 1st armies driving toward the Rhine and the Ruhr while the Canadians and Patton's troops halted to conserve supplies. But Eisenhower insisted on a broad-front strategy with both army groups moving forward more or less simultaneously. The supreme commander prevailed, and his decision sparked a controversy that still continues. Montgomery contended that it prevented not only the encirclement of the Ruhr but also a thrust all the way to Berlin.
Evidence now indicates that Montgomery was probably correct regarding the feasibility of a quick drive to the Rhine. The Germans had little strength in the path of such an operation, and the Allies probably had sufficient supplies to service the forces of Dempsey and Hodges or, conversely, those of Patton. But it does not appear that a Rhine crossing was possible, and certainly Montgomery was wildly optimistic about prospects for an advance to Berlin. The Allies clearly lacked the capability to supply such an ambitious enterprise.
Although the capture of Marseille eased the supply problem, the Allies badly needed a major port close to the front. The obvious choice was the Belgian city of Antwerp, one of Europe's largest ports. Allied leaders were elated when Antwerp fell to the British on September 4 with its port intact. The British had advanced so rapidly that the Germans were unable to block the harbor or destroy its facilities. But to take the city was not enough, Antwerp lay on the Scheldt River, 60 miles from the North Sea, and the Germans still controlled the Belgian and Dutch territory that bordered the river's estuary.
Eisenhower obtained warnings from Ultra that Hitler planned to hold the estuary and thus deny the use of Antwerp to the Allies. He therefore gave the highest priority to clearing the approaches to the Scheldt and provided Montgomery with ample supplies for this purpose. A quick thrust might have accomplished this before the Germans could consolidate their defenses there. It might also have trapped the remnants of the German 15th Army. The speed of the Allied advance had pinned them into a pocket on the southern bank of the Scheldt's estuary. But Montgomery's mind was on another objective, and he made no effort to carry out this mission. His failure to act allowed most of the enemy troops to evacuate across the river. This battered but substantial force was then able to participate in the defense of the Netherlands. A German rear guard also continued to hold the Scheldt estuary and prevented its clearing until the end of November. Until then, Antwerp was useless to the Allies.
THE PUSH TO CROSS THE RHINE
Instead of focusing on the vital objective of clearing the Scheldt estuary, Montgomery conceived a much more ambitious undertaking - a massive airborne operation aimed at crossing the Rhine in the Netherlands. If the Allies could accomplish this, they would not only hurdle the formidable river barrier that guarded Germany but would outflank the northernmost fortifications of the West Wall along the German-Dutch border. They would also be able to threaten German V-2 rocket-launching sites in the Netherlands. But the proposed operation would require the Allies to cross four other rivers and three canals before they reached the Lower Rhine at Arnhem. If it were to succeed, Anglo-American airborne troops would have to seize the bridges over these water obstacles while British land forces drove northward to relieve them. The distance to the most remote bridge at Arnhem was 64 miles.
Montgomery gained Eisenhower's approval for his plan, which was given the code name Operation Market-Garden. It was an exceptionally bold undertaking and required precise timing. To compound the risk, Ultra detected the presence of two SS panzer divisions near Arnhem. But neither Montgomery nor Eisenhower was willing to call off the operation. The plan called for the U.S. 101st Airborne Division to capture the bridge across the Maas, the Dutch part of the Meuse, southernmost of the three major rivers, near Eindhoven. This division, nicknamed Screaming Eagles, also would take a number of bridges over lesser streams and canals. The American 82nd ("All American") Airborne Division was to seize the span over the Waal River, a branch of the Rhine, farther north near Nijmegen. The British 1st Airborne Division, called the Red Devils because its men wore maroon berets, drew the most difficult assignment of all. It had to capture the northernmost bridge across the Lower Rhine at Arnhem.
Market-Garden began on a clear September 17 with daytime landings. But it soon encountered bad weather that delayed the dropping of some of the paratroops. Even more serious, Ultra proved correct; the two German panzer divisions were indeed in the vicinity of Arnhem, although they were refitting and not at full strength. This posed a serious menace to the 1st Airborne Division. The British compounded the dilemma by dropping their forces too far from the objective. This enabled the Germans to split them into two regiments and prevent the capture of the bridge. One group of 500 men, commanded by John Frost, a 31-year-old lieutenant colonel who carried a fox-hunting horn into battle, managed to seize the northern approach to the span. But it was too weak to move across without aid from the main force. The 82nd Airborne also had difficulty capturing the bridge over Waal. If the Americans had moved toward this objective immediately upon landing, they would have encountered only a few enemy sentries. Instead, they concentrated on taking the high ground near Nijmegen first. By the time they advanced toward the river, the Germans had sent reinforcements and held the bridge for three days. Only after a bloody crossing at the Waal in flimsy canvas boats was the 82nd able to secure the bridge.
The British XXX Corps, comprising the relief force, had to move through swampy terrain along one narrow road that the Germans subjected to artillery fire. These obstacles, among others, prevented it from advancing as rapidly as anticipated. Ultimately, the relief force came to the rescue of all the airborne troops except those at Arnhem. As General Frederick Browning of the I British Airborne Corps had warned, the bridge there proved a "bridge too far." After nine days of heavy fighting, only 2,400 of the original 9,000 Red Devils managed to break through enemy lines and escape. The failure of Market-Garden ended Allied hopes of crossing the Rhine in 1944.
Shortly before the start of this operation, Hitler had reappointed Rundstedt to his former position as German supreme commander in the west. Rundstedt and especially Model, still in command of Army Group B, managed to scrape together enough forces to reconstruct the front. They did so not only in the Netherlands but also opposite Hodges, who was probing beyond the Belgian border into Germany, and Patton, whose drive was counterattacked by the 5th Panzer Army and bogged down in Lorraine. The 1st Army drove to within a few miles of the German border city of Aachen on September 15 but was unable to complete its capture until October 21. Despite the great success of the Allied summer offensive, the Germans were not yet finished in the west any more than in the east.
THE IMPORTANCE OF D DAY
It is sometimes said that D day was the most important day of World War II and that the success of the landings in Normandy meant that Hitler would lose the war. This would appear to be something of an exaggeration. Clearly D day was the most important day of the war for the Western Allies, and it certainly hastened the final defeat of Germany. But it would appear that the Germans had already lost the war on the Eastern Front - at Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk - long before the Western Allies landed in France. Nevertheless, D day was exceptionally important. If the invasion had failed, the Americans and British might not have tried again. They might have shifted their focus back to Italy and the Mediterranean with dubious prospects. Even if they did try again to land in Western Europe, this would have taken time, and the Red Army would have continued to push the Germans back. Its massive victory in Belorussia shortly after D day is evidence of this. All of Germany and much of Western Europe might have fallen to the Soviets. The success of the D day invasion and the subsequent drive across France, Belgium, and into the Netherlands assured that this would not happen.