The following are summaries of key Supreme Court rulings over the course of the nation's history.
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 2000 --- CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS
In Buckley v. Valeo, 1976, the Supreme Court had upheld a $1000 limit on contributions by individuals to candidates for federal office. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Court concluded that large contributions will sometimes create actual corruption, and that voters will inevitably be suspicious of the fairness of a political process that allows wealthy donors to contribute large amounts. The Court concluded that the Missouri contribution limits were appropriate to correct this problem and did not impair the ability of candidates to communicate their messages to the voters and to mount an effective campaign.
Reno v. Condon, 2000 --- RIGHT TO PRIVACY (STATE AUTHORITY)
The Court upheld the federal law that forbids States from selling addresses, telephone numbers, and other information that drivers put on license applications. They agreed with the Federal Government that information, including motor vehicle license information, is an "article of commerce" in the interstate stream of business and therefore is subject to regulation by Congress. The Court emphasized that the statute did not impose on the States any obligation to pass particular laws or policies and thus did not interfere with the States' sovereign functions.
Printz v. United States, 1997 --- GUN CONTROL (STATE AUTHORITY)
The Supreme Court ruled that the Brady Act's interim provision requiring certain State or local law enforcement agents to perform background checks on prospective handgun purchases was unconstitutional. Although no provision of the Constitution deals explicitly with federal authority to compel State officials to execute federal law, a review of the Constitution's structure and of prior Supreme Court decisions leads to the conclusion that Congress does not have this power.
Reno v. ACLU, 1997 --- INTERNET REGULATION
The Supreme Court ruled that the "indecent transmission" provision and the "patently offensive display" provision of the Communications Decency Act violated the 1st Amendment's freedom of speech. The Internet does not have the special features (such as historical governmental oversight, limited frequencies, and "invasiveness") that have justified allowing greater regulation of content in radio and television.
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 1990 --- RIGHT TO DIE
A Missouri woman was in a coma from an automobile accident in 1983. Her family, facing astronomical medical bills and deciding that "her life had ended in 1987," directed the healthcare providers to end intravenous feeding. The State of Missouri opposed the family's decision, and the family went to court. The Court ruled that states could require "clear and convincing" evidence that Cruzan would have wanted to die. However, the Court did not require other states to meet the Missouri standard. At a subsequent hearing, "clear and convincing evidence" was presented. The intravenous feeding was ended, and Cruzan died on December 26, 1990.
United States v. Eichman, 1990 --- FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (FLAG DESECRATION)
The Court agreed with the trial courts' rulings that the Flag Protection Act violated the 1st Amendment. Flag-burning constitutes expressive conduct, and thus is entitled to constitutional protection. The Act prevents protesters from using the flag to express their opposition to governmental policies and activities. Although the protesters' ideas may be offensive or disagreeable to many people, the government may not prohibit them from expressing those ideas.
United States v. Lopez, 1990 --- STATE AUTHORITY
Alfonzo Lopez, a Texas high school student, was convicted of carrying a weapon in a school zone under the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. He appealed his conviction on the basis that the Act, which forbids "any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows... is a school zone," exceeded Congress's legislative power under the Commerce Clause. The Court agreed that the Act was unconstitutional, stating that to uphold the legislation would "bid fair to convert congressional Commerce Clause authority to a general police power of the sort held only by the States."
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 1990 --- STUDENT RELIGIOUS GROUPS
A request by Mergens to form a student Christian religious group at school was denied by an Omaha high school principal. Mergens took legal action, claiming that a 1984 federal law required "equal access" for student religious groups. The Court ordered the school to permit the formation of the club, stating, "a high school does not have to permit any extracurricular activities, but when it does, the school is bound by the Act of 1984. Allowing students to meet on campus and discuss religion is constitutional because it does not amount to a 'State sponsorship of a religion.'"
Texas v. Johnson, 1989 --- FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
To protest national policies, Johnson doused a United States flag with kerosene and burned it outside the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas. He was arrested and convicted under a Texas law prohibiting the desecration of the Texas and United States flags. The Court ruled that the Texas law placed an unconstitutional limit on "freedom of expression," noting that "...nothing in our precedents suggests that a state may foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it."
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 1989 --- ABORTION (PUBLIC FUNDS)
A 1986 Missouri law stated that (1) life begins at conception; (2) unborn children have rights; (3) public funds could not be used for abortion not necessary to save the life of the mother; and (4) public funds could not be used for abortion counseling. Healthcare providers in Missouri filed suit, challenging the law, claiming that it was in conflict with Roe, 1973, and that it intruded into "privacy questions." A 5-4 Court upheld the Missouri law, stating that the people of Missouri, through their legislature, could put limits on the use of public funds. The Webster decision narrowed the Roe decision.
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 --- STUDENT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
In 1983, the principal of Hazelwood East High School in Missouri removed two articles from the upcoming issue of the student newspaper, deeming their content "inappropriate, personal, sensitive, and unsuitable for student readers." Several students sued the school district, claiming that their 1st Amendment right to freedom of expression had been violated. The Court upheld the principal's action, stating that "a school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school." School officials had full control over school-sponsored activities "so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns..."
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 1988 --- JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY
A 15-year-old from Oklahoma was convicted of murder and was sentenced to death at age 16. The Court overturned the death sentence, holding that "[t]he Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a person who was under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense." A death penalty was deemed cruel and unusual punishment for someone so young.
Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency, 1987 --- AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Under its affirmative action plan, the Transportation Agency in Santa Clara, California, was authorized to "consider as one factor the sex of a qualified applicant" in an effort to combat the significant underrepresentation of women in certain jobs classifications. When the Agency promoted Diane Joyce, a qualified woman, over Paul Johnson, a qualified man, for the job of road dispatcher, Johnson sued, claiming that the Agency's consideration of the sex of the applicants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court upheld the Agency's promotion, arguing that the affirmative action plan created no "absolute bar" to the advancement of men but rather represented "a moderate, flexible, case-by-case approach to effecting a gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and women... in the Agency's work force, and [was] fully consistent with Title VII."
Bethel School District #403 v. Fraser, 1986 --- STUDENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH
A high school student gave a sexually suggestive political speech at a high school assembly to elect student officers. The school administration strongly disciplined the student, Fraser, who argued that school rules unfairly limited his freedom of political speech. Fraser's view was upheld in Washington State court. The Supreme Court, however, found that "it does not follow... that simply because the use of an offensive form of expression [is permitted by] adults making... a political point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school."
South Dakota v. Dole, 1986 --- FEDERAL WITHHOLDING OF STATE-ALLOCATED FUNDS
In 1984, Congress voted to withhold five percent of federal highway funds from any state that did not set a minimum drinking age at 21. South Dakota, which would lose money under this new law, challenged the government's right to coerce states to adopt specific policies through funding cuts. The Court ruled that the highway funding was not an entitlement, and the national government could impose reasonable conditions upon the states in the interest of the "general welfare." All states that wished to continue to receive full federal highway aid were required to raise the legal age to purchase and consume alcohol to 21 years. In recent years, the threat of spending cuts has become a powerful tool of federal policy.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1985 --- SCHOOL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
After T.L.O., a New Jersey high school student, denied an accusation that she had been smoking in the school lavatory, a vice-principal searched her purse and found cigarrettes, marijuana, and evidence that T.L.O. had been involved in marijuana dealing at the school. T.L.O. was then sentenced to probation by a juvenile court, but appealed on the grounds that the evidence against her had been obtained by an "unreasonable" search. The Court rejected T.L.O.'s arguments, stating that the school had a "legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place," and that to do this "requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject." The Court thus created a "reasonable suspicion" rule for school searches, a change from the "probable cause" requirement in the wider society.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 1985 --- PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOL
An Alabama law authorized a one-minute period of silence in all public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer." A group of parents, including Jaffree, challenged the constitutionality of the statute, claiming it violated the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment. The Court agreed with Jaffree and struck down the Alabama law, determining that "the State's endorsement... of prayer activities at the beginning of each schoolday is not consistent with the established principle that the government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward religion."
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 1984 --- BARRIER ON THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A search in Massachusetts was based on a warrant issued on an improper form. Sheppard argued that the search was illegal and the evidence was inadmissible under Mapp, 1961. Massachusetts argued that the police acted in "good faith," believing that the warrant was correct. The Court agreed with Massachusetts, noting that the exclusionary rule should not be applied when the officer conducting search had acted with the reasonable belief that he was following proper procedures.
Nix v. Williams, 1984 --- BARRIER ON THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A man was convicted of murdering a 10-year-old girl after he led officers to the body. He had been arrested, but not advised of his rights, in a distant city. During a conversation with a police officer while in transit, Williams agreed that the child should have a proper burial and directed the officer to the body. Later, on appeal, Williams's attorneys argued that the body should not be admitted as evidence because the questioning was illegal. The Court disagreed, observing that search parties were within 2.5 miles of the body. "Evidence otherwise excluded may be admissible when it would have been discovered anyway." The decision was one of several "exceptions to the exclusionary rule" handed down by the Court in the 1980s.
Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983 --- DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS
Bob Jones University, a private school, denied admission to applicants in an interracial marriage or who "espouse" interracial marriage or dating. The Internal Revenue Service then denied tax-exempt status to the school because of racial discrimination. The university appealed, claiming that its policy was based on the Bible. The Court upheld the IRS ruling, stating that "Government has a fundamental overriding interest" in ending racial discrimination in education.
Mueller v. Allen, 1983 --- TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR STUDENTS OF RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
Minnesota law allowed taxpayers to deduct the costs of tuition, textbooks, and transportation for children in elementary and secondary schools. Several taxpayers sued to prevent parents with children in religious schools from claiming this deduction, arguing that this would constitute state sponsorship of religion. The Court disagreed, ruling that the deduction was not intended to promote religion and was available to all parents with school-age children. The Court argued that a law must have the advancement of religion as its primary purpose to be found unconstitutional.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 1982 --- PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
In 1968, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, an Air Force management analyst, testified against the government before a congressional subcommittee about cost overruns and problems with the development of an airplane. In 1970, he lost his job in a "reorganization," but he blamed President Nixon's office for firing him in retaliation for his testimony. A long series of official complaints and investigations turned up incriminating evidence against Nixon and two of his aides, including a memo about Fitzgerald recommending that Nixon "let him bleed." Nixon initially took responsibility for the firing at a press conference, but he retracted his admission the next day. Eventually, he offered to settle out of court for a large sum. Fitzgerald persisted, and a final Nixon appeal on the grounds of presidential immunity from prosecution was dismissed by a Federal District Court. Just as the case seemed about to go to trial, more than ten years after the fact, the Supreme Court intervened. It ruled that a President or former President is entitled to absolute immunity from liability based on his official acts. The President must be able to act forcefully and independently, without fear of liability. Diverting the President's energies with concerns about private lawsuits could impair the effective functioning of government. The President's absolute immunity extends to all acts within the "outer perimeter" of his duties of office, since otherwise he would be required to litigate over the nature of the acts and the scope of his duties in each case. The remedy of impeachment, the vigilant scrutiny of the press, the Congress, and the public, and presidential desire to earn reelection and concern with historical legacy all protect against presidential wrongdoing.
Rostker v. Goldberg, 1981 --- WOMEN AND THE DRAFT
In 1980, President Carter reinstated draft registration. For the first time, both sexes were ordered to register. When Congress refused to fund the registration of women, several men sued, arguing that a selective draft violated their due process rights. The Court disagreed, noting that "the purpose of registration was to prepare for draft of combat troops" and that "Congress and the Executive have decided that women should not serve in combat."
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 1978 --- INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The Court decided that New Jersey may not restrict the importation of solid or liquid waste that originated outside the State. The Commerce Clause protects all objects of interstate trade, including waste. A State may not discriminate against items that are identical except for their origin, and thus may not prohibit out-of-state waste that is no different than domestically produced waste. Although waste disposal is a problem in many locations, States may not constitutionally deal with the problem by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 1978 --- AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Under an affirmative action program, the medical school of the University of California at Davis reserved 16 of 100 slots in each class for "disadvantaged citizens." When Bakke, who is white, was not accepted by the school, he claimed racial discrimination in violation of the 14th Amendment. The Court ruled narrowly, requiring Bakke's admission but not overturning affirmative action, preferring to review such questions on a case-by-case basis.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hiram G. Hill, Jr., et al., 1978 --- ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The Tellico Dam was nearly completed - and $100 million had been spent on it - when local residents succeeded in halting construction to save a tiny, nearly extinct fish called the snail darter. The fish's only habitat would have been flooded by the dam. The Court found the injunction against the TVA's completion of the nearly finished dam to be proper to prevent violation of the Endangered Species Act. Congress had declared the value of endangered species "incalculable." The Court refused to overrule Congress's judgment. The ruling affirmed the Environmental Protection Agency's power to protect the environment.
Ingraham v. Wright, 1977 --- STUDENT RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS
A majority of the Supreme Court concluded that the 8th Amendment historically protected people convicted of crimes, and does not apply to public school students. If authorized by local law or custom, public schools have the right to administer reasonable discipline, and students do not have a due process right to notice or a hearing before punishment administered in accordance with law or custom.
Gregg v. Georgia, 1976 --- DEATH PENALTY
In the 1970s, activists tried to get the death penalty reinstated. Several test cases failed when the Court found the sentence had been motivated by racism, issued arbitrarily, or handed down without due process. The case of Gregg, convicted of murdering two men, was considered to be free from such problems. Finding that his conviction and death sentence were fair and consistent with state law, the Court ruled that Georgia's death penalty did not violate the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the 8th Amendment. For the first time, the Court clearly affirmed that "punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution."
Goss v. Lopez, 1975 --- STUDENTS' RIGHTS TO APPEAL DISCIPLINE
Ten Ohio students were suspended from their schools without hearings. The students challenged the suspensions, claiming that the absence of a preliminary hearing violated their 14th Amendment right to due process. The Court agreed with the students, holding that "having chosen to extend the right to an education... Ohio may not withdraw that right on grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred, and must recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause."
United States v. Nixon, 1974 --- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
President Nixon was widely suspected of participating in the coverup of the Watergate break-in. After journalists discovered that he had recorded all of his conversations in the White House, Congress demanded that Nixon hand over the tapes. The President cited executive privilege, arguing that his office placed him above the law. The Court overruled Nixon and ordered him to surrender the tapes. Limiting executive privilege, it ruled that the President's "generalized interest in confidentiality" was subordinate to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." The tapes implicated Nixon in the coverup and led to his resignation.
Miller v. California, 1973 --- OBSCENE MATERIAL
In Miller, the Court upheld a stringent application of California obscenity law by Newport Beach, California, and attempted to define what is obscene. The "Miller Rule" included three criteria: (1) that the average person would, applying contemporary community standards, find that the work appealed to the prurient interest; (2) that the work depicts or describes, in an offensive way, sexual conduct defined by state law; and (3) that "the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value..."
Roe v. Wade, 1973 --- ABORTION
A Texas woman challenged a state law forbidding the artificial termination of a pregnancy, saying that she "had a fundamental right to privacy." The Court upheld a woman's right to choose, noting that the state's "important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life" became "compelling" at the end of the first trimester, but that before then "the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the state, that... the patient's pregnancy should be terminated." The decision struck down state regulation of abortion in the first three months of pregnancy and was later modified by Webster, 1989.
Furman v. Georgia, 1972 --- DEATH PENALTY
Three death penalty cases, including Furman, raised the issue of racial imbalances in the use of death sentences by state courts. Furman had been sentenced to death in Georgia. Overturning state death penalty laws, the Court noted an "apparent arbitrariness of the use of the sentence." Many states rewrote their death penalty statutes, and these were generally upheld in Gregg, 1976.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1972 --- RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION FROM PUBLIC SCHOOL REQUIREMENTS
Members of the Amish religious sect in Wisconsin objected to sending their children to public schools after the eighth grade, claiming that such exposure of the children to another culture would endanger the group's self-sufficient agrarian lifestyle essential to their religious faith. The Court agreed with the Amish, while noting that the Court must move carefully to weigh the State's "legitimate social concern when faced with religious claim for exemption from generally applicable educational requirements."
Lemon v. Kurzman, 1971 --- STATE GOVERNMENT AID TO RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
In overturning state laws regarding aid to church-supported schools in this and a similar Rhode Island case, the Court created the Lemon test, limiting "excessive government entanglement with religion." The Court noted that any state law about aid to religion must meet three criteria: (1) the purpose of the aid must be clearly secular, not religious; (2) its primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) it must avoid "excessive entanglement of government with religion."
New York Times v. United States, 1971 --- FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
In June 1971, the New York Times published the first in a series of secret government documents known as the "Pentagon Papers," which detailed how the United States became involved in the Vietnam War. The Justice Department obtained a court order forbidding the newspaper from printing more documents. The New York Times and other newspapers challenged the order. The Court cited the 1st Amendment guarantee of a free press and refused to uphold the ban, noting that the government must prove that publication would harm the nation's security. The decision limited "prior restraint" of the press.
Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, 1970 --- TAXATION OF CHURCHES
State and local governments routinely exempt church property from taxes. Walz claimed that such exemptions were a "support of religion." The Court disagreed, noting that such exemptions constituted a "benevolent neutrality" between government and churches, not a support of religion. Governments must avoid taxing churches, because taxation would give government a "control" over religion prohibited by the "wall of separation of church and state" noted in Everson, 1947.
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 1969 --- STUDENT FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The Court upheld school students' 1st Amendment rights. Because students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate," schools must show a possibility of "substantial disruption" before free speech can be limited at school. Students may express personal opinions as long as they do not materially disrupt classwork, create substantial disorder, or interfere with the rights of others. In this case, the wearing of black armbands was a "silent, passive expression of opinion" without these side effects, and thus constitutionally could not be prohibited by the school.
In re Gault, 1966 --- JUVENILE RIGHTS OF DUE PROCESS
Before Gault, proceedings against juveniles were originally handled as "family law," not "criminal law," and offenders received few due process rights. Gault was sentenced to six years in state juvenile detention for an alleged obscene phone call. He was not provided counsel and not permitted to confront or cross-examine the key witness. The Court overturned the juvenile proceedings and required that states provide juveniles "some of the due process guarantees of adults," including a right to a phone call, to counsel, to cross-examine, to confront the accuser, and to be advised of the right to silence.
Miranda v. Arizona, 1966 --- DECLARATION OF RIGHTS UPON ARREST
Arrested for kidnapping and sexual assault, Miranda signed a confession including a statement that he had "full knowledge" of his legal rights. After conviction, he appealed, claiming that without counsel and without warnings, the confession was illegally obtained. The Court agreed with Miranda that "he must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has a right to... an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him..." Although later modified, Miranda firmly upheld citizens' rights to a fair trial in state courts.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 1966 --- PUBLICITY OF TRIALS (FREEDOM OF THE PRESS)
Sam Sheppard was convicted of murdering his wife in a trial sensationalized by the national media. Sheppard appealed, claiming that the pretrial publicity had made it impossible for him to get a fair trial. Rejecting arguments about freedom of the press, the Court overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial. Because of Sheppard, judges have issued "gag" orders limiting pretrial publicity.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965 --- BIRTH CONTROL
A Connecticut law forbade the use of "any drug, medicinal article, or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception." Griswold, director of Planned Parenthood in New Haven, was arrested for counseling married couples. After conviction, he appealed. The Court overturned the Connecticut law, saying that "various guarantees (of the Constitution) create zones of privacy" and asking, "would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms...?" The decision is significant for examining the concept of "unenumerated rights" in the 9th Amendment, later central to Roe, 1973.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 1964 --- RIGHT TO COUNSEL (ATTORNEY) BEFORE QUESTIONING
A person known to Chicago-area police confessed to a murder but had not been provided with a lawyer while under interrogation. The Court's decision in the case extended the "exclusionary rule" to illegal confessions in state court proceedings. Carefully defining an "Escobedo Rule," the Court said, "where... the investigation is no longer a general inquiry... but has begun to focus on a particular suspect... (and where) the suspect has been taken into custody... the suspect has been requested... his lawyer, and the police have not... warned him of his right to remain silent, the accused has been denied... counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment."
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 1964 --- SEGREGATION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed race discrimination in "public accommodations," including motels that refused rooms to blacks. Although local desegregation appeared to fall outside federal authority, the government argued that it was regulating interstate commerce. The Court agreed, declaring, "The power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local activities... which have a substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce." Racial segregation of private facilities engaged in interstate commerce was found unconstitutional.
Reynolds v. Sims, 1964 --- REAPPORTIONMENT ("ONE MAN, ONE VOTE")
Most states have constitutional provisions to reapportion representation in their state legislatures every ten years, based on the U.S. Census. By the 1950s, however, it had become clear that some states were ignoring these laws. The United States was becoming more urban, and one-time rural majorities - now minorities - were holding on to political power at the state level by refusing to reapportion. A complaint was filed by a group of residents, taxpayers, and voters of Jefferson County, Alabama, challenging the apportionment of the Alabama legislature, which was still based on the 1900 federal census. The Court supported the "one person, one vote" formula, and applied it to this case, calling for reapportionment based on current census data.
Edwards v. South Carolina, 1963 --- RIGHT TO PROTEST / DEMONSTRATE
A group of mostly African American civil rights activists held a rally at the South Carolina State Capitol, protesting segregation. A hostile crowd gathered, and the rally leaders were arrested and convicted of "breach of the peace." The Court overturned the convictions, saying, "The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views."
Gideon v. Wainwright, 1963 --- RIGHT TO COUNSEL (ATTORNEY) FOR THE POOR
Gideon was charged with breaking into a poolroom. He could not afford a lawyer, and Florida refused to provide counsel for trials not involving the death penalty. Gideon defended himself poorly and was sentenced to five years in prison. The Court called for a new trial, arguing that the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment applied to the 6th Amendment's guarantee of counsel for all poor persons facing a felony charge. Gideon later was found not guilty with the help of a court-appointed attorney.
School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 1963 --- RELIGION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Some Pennsylvania parents challenged a state law that required Bible readings each day at school. The Court agreed with the parents, saying that the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause forbade states from engaging in religious activity. The Court ruled that if the purpose and effect of a law "is the advancement or inhibition of religion," it "exceeds the scope of legislative power."
Baker v. Carr, 1962 --- EQUAL VOTING REPRESENTATION AMONG DISTRICTS
Rapid population growth in Nashville and reluctance of the rural-dominated Tennessee legislature to redraw state legislature districts led Mayor Baker of Nashville to ask for federal court help. The federal district court refused to enter the "political thicket" of redistricting, and the case was appealed. The Court directed a trial to be held in a Tennessee federal court. The case led to the 1964 Wesberry decision, which created the "one man, one vote" equal representation concept.
Engel v. Vitale, 1962 --- RELIGIOUS PRAYER IN SCHOOL
The state Board of Regents of New York required the recitation of a 22-word nonsectarian prayer at the beginning of each school day. A group of parents filed suit against the required prayer, claiming it violated their 1st Amendment rights. The Court ruled New York's action unconstitutional, observing, "There can be no doubt that... religious beliefs [are] embodied in the Regents' prayer."
Mapp v. Ohio, 1961 --- EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY OBTAINED
Before Mapp, the admission of evidence gained by illegal searches was permitted by some state constitutions. Cleveland police raided Mapp's home without a warrant and found obscene materials. She appealed her conviction, saying that the 4th and 14th amendments protected her against improper police behavior. The Court agreed, extending "exclusionary rule" protections to citizens in state courts. The Court said that the prohibition against unreasonable searches would be "meaningless" unless evidence gained in such searches was excluded. The case developed the concept of "incorporation" begun in Gitlow, 1925.
Roth v. United States, 1957 --- DEFINING OBSCENITY
A New York man named Roth operated a business that used the mail to invite people to buy materials considered obscene by postal inspectors. The Court, in its first consideration of censorship of obscenity, created the "prevailing community standards" rule, which required a consideration of the work as a whole. In its decision, the Court defined as obscene that which offends "the average person, applying contemporary community standards."
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 1954 --- DESEGREGATION
Probably no twentieth-century Supreme Court decision so deeply stirred and changed life in the United States as Brown. An 8-year-old girl from Topeka, Kansas, was not permitted to attend her neighborhood school because she was an African American. The Court found that segregation itself was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, commenting that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place... Segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws." The decision overturned Plessy, 1896.
Dennis v. United States, 1951 --- ANTI-GOVERNMENT SPEECH
The Smith Act of 1940 made it a crime for any person to work for the violent overthrow of the United States in peacetime or war. Eleven Communist party leaders, including Dennis, had been convicted of violating the Smith Act, and they appealed. The Court upheld the Act. Much modified by later decisions, the Dennis case focused on anti-government speech as an area of controversy.
Everson v. Board of Education, 1947 --- TAXES USED FOR BUSING TO RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
In a case known as the "New Jersey School Bus Case," the Court considered New Jersey's use of public funds to operate school buses that carried some students to parochial schools. The Court permitted New Jersey to continue the payments, saying that the aid to children was not governmental support for religion. The decision, however, strongly stated that the wall separating church and state must be kept "high and impregnable." This was a clear incorporation of 1st Amendment limits on states.
Korematsu v. United States, 1944 --- JAPANESE (RACIAL) INTERNMENT
Two months after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt ordered the internment of more than 110,000 Japanese Americans living on the West Coast. Although many Japanese Americans were United States citizens, they had to abandon their property and live in primitive camps far from the coast. Korematsu refused to report to an assembly center and was arrested. The Court rejected his appeal, noting that "pressing public necessity [World War II] may sometimes justify the existence of restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group" but added that "racial antagonism" never can justify such restrictions. The Korematsu decision has been widely criticized, particularly since few Americans of German or Italian descent were interned.
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 1943 --- PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE IN SCHOOL
The beliefs of Jehovah's Witnesses forbid them to salute the United States flag. In the patriotic climate of World War II, thousands of children who refused to salute were expelled from public schools. The Court ruled that a compulsory flag salute violated the 1st Amendment's exercise of the religion clause and was therefore unconstitutional. "No official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion."
Powell v. Alabama, 1932 --- INCORPORATION (DEATH PENALTY - REPRESENTATION)
The case involved the "Scottsboro Boys," seven black men accused of rape. The men were quickly prosecuted without counsel and sentenced to death. The Court overturned the decision, stating that poor people facing the death penalty in state courts must be provided counsel, saying that "there are certain principles of Justice which... no [state] may disregard." The case was a step toward incorporating the Bill of Rights into state constitutions.
Gitlow v. New York, 1925 --- INCORPORATION
For the first time, the Court considered whether the 1st and 14th amendments had influence on state laws. The case, involving "criminal anarchy" under New York law, was the first consideration of what came to be known as the "incorporation" doctrine, under which, it was argued, the provisions of the 1st Amendment were "incorporated" by the 14th Amendment. Although New York law was not overruled in the case, the decision clearly indicated that the Court could make such a ruling. Another important incorporation case is Powell, 1932.
Schenck v. United States, 1919 --- FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Schenck, a member of an antiwar group, had urged men who were drafted into military service in World War I to resist and to avoid induction. He was charged with violating the Espionage Act of 1917, which outlawed active opposition to the war. The Court limited free speech in time of war, stating that Schenck's words presented a "clear and present danger..." Although later decisions modified this one, the Schenck case created a precedent that 1st Amendment rights are not absolute.
Weeks v. United States, 1914 --- EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A search without proper warrant was conducted in San Francisco, and the evidence collected was used by a postal inspector to prosecute Weeks. Weeks claimed that the evidence was gained by an illegal search, and thus was inadmissible. The Court agreed, applying for the first time an "exclusionary rule" for illegally gained evidence in federal courts. The decision stated "...if letters and private documents can thus be seized and used as evidence... his right to be secure against such searches... is of no value, and... might as well be stricken from the Constitution." See also Mapp v. Ohio, 1961; Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 1984; and Nix v. Williams, 1984.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896 --- SEGREGATION ("SEPARATE BUT EQUAL")
A Louisiana law required separate seating for white passengers and black passengers on public railroads. Plessy argued that the policy violated his right to "equal protection of the laws." The Court disagreed, saying that segregation was permissible if facilities were equal. It ruled that the 14th Amendment was "not intended to give Negroes social equality but only political and civil equality..." The Louisiana law was seen as a "reasonable exercise of (state) police power..." This "separate but equal" ruling allowed the segregation of public facilities throughout the South until Plessy was overturned by the Brown v. Board of Education case of 1954.
The Civil Rights Cases, 1883 --- DISCRIMINATION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The Civil Rights Acts of 1875 included punishments for businesses that practiced discrimination. The Court ruled on a number of casesinvolving the Acts in 1883, finding that the Constitution, "while prohibiting discrimination by governments, made no provisions... for acts of racial discrimination by private individuals." The decision limited the impact of the Equal Protection Clause, giving tacit approval to segregation in the private sector.
Ex parte Milligan, 1866 --- PRESIDENTIAL POWERS DURING WAR
An Indiana man was arrested, treated as a prisoner of war, and imprisoned by a military court during the Civil War under presidential order. He claimed that his right to a fair trial was interfered with and that military courts had no authority outside of "conquered territory." The Court ordered him to be released on the grounds that the Constitution "is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and peace" and covers all people "at all times, and under all circumstances." The Court held that presidential powers in time of war did not extend to creating another court system run by the military.
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 1857 --- SLAVES ENTERING FREE STATES
This decision upheld property rights over human rights by saying that Dred Scott, a slave, could not become a free man just because he traveled in "free soil" states with his master. A badly divided nation was further fragmented by the decision. "Free soil" federal laws and the Missouri Compromise line of 1820 were held unconstitutional because they deprived a slave owner of the right to his "property" without just compensation. This narrow reading of the Constitution, a landmark case of the Court, was most clearly stated by Chief Justice Robert B. Taney, a states' rights advocate.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 1824 --- INTERSTATE COMMERCE
This case examined the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Ogden's exclusive New York ferry license gave him the right to operate steamboats to and from New York. Ogden claimed that Gibbons's federal license did not give him landing rights in New York City. Federal and state regulation of commerce conflicted. The Court strengthened the power of the United States to regulate interstate business. Federal controls on television, pipelines, and banking are based on Gibbons.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 1819 --- STATE TAXATION POWER
Called the "Bank of the United States" case. A Maryland law required federally chartered banks to use only a special paper to print money, which amounted to a tax. McCulloch, the cashier of the Baltimore branch of the bank, refused to use the paper, claiming that states could not tax the federal government. The Court declared the Maryland law unconstitutional, commenting "...the power to tax implies the power to destroy."
Marbury v. Madison, 1803 --- JUDICIAL REVIEW
Chief Justice John Marshall established "judicial review" as a power fo the Supreme Court. After his defeat in the 1800 election, President Adams appointed many Federalists to the federal courts, but the commissions were not delivered. New Secretary of State James Madison refused to deliver them. Marbury sued in the Supreme Court. The Court declared a portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 unconstitutional, thereby establishing the Court's power to find acts of Congress unconstitutional.