Pearl Harbor was only the beginning. A series of even more disastrous Allied defeats followed in rapid succession. Yamamoto had promised that his surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet would gain six months for Japan to establish an impregnable position in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The extent to which the havoc the Japanese had created a Pearl Harbor was responsible for their subsequent conquests is debatable. Nevertheless, their success did continue for almost six months. But Japan's newly won position did not prove impregnable. Once the United States had recovered from the shock of Pearl Harbor, it began to bring its enormous war-making potential into play. American resources were far greater than those of the Japanese, and ultimately enabled the United States to turn the tide.
But the first six months belonged to Japan. Her victories were reminiscent in some respects of Germany's Blitzkrieg triumphs. They came with amazing speed and remarkable ease. Like the Germans earlier, the Japanese seemed invincible. The Allied response was also similar to the abortive efforts of Britain and France in the early months of the war - too little, too late.
JAPANESE MILITARY STRENGTH
Even more than Germany, Japan won victories with forces that were not particularly large. The Japanese army in December 1941 contained only 51 active divisions. In all, Japan's available forces totaled 1.2 million men, and the military could draw upon an additional 2 million reservists, many of whom had seen service against the Chinese. But much of the army remained in China, leaving only 11 divisions for operations against Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The army also had its own air force, which included 2,000 first-line planes.
Japan's navy contained a formidable nucleus of ten carriers, six of which took part in the Pearl Harbor mission. Its 11 battleships included Yamato, whose 70,000 tons and nine 18.1-inch guns made it the world's largest and most powerfully armed ship. Yamato was so huge that each of its gun turrets was as large as a destroyer. Construction on a sister ship, Musashi, was nearing completion. Eighteen heavy cruisers, 21 light cruisers, 100 destroyers, and 63 submarines were also available. The navy possessed an air force of 3,000 planes. Although most Japanese aircraft were not of outstanding quality, the Mitsubishi A6M fighter, which the Japanese called the Zero, was exceptional and saw service with both the army and the navy. During the early months of the war, it outclassed Allied fighters, but unfortunately for the Japanese, it remained their standard fighter long after the Allies had developed superior models.
The Japanese army differed greatly from the German. It had no armored divisions and emphasized light tanks, small guns, and mortars. These weapons suited the amphibious operations that characterized Japan's war effort in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The Japanese also enjoyed the benefit of local air supremacy and the element of surprise as well as far greater experience and superior training. Allied blunders and slowness to respond to Japanese initiatives played important roles, too, as did the Allies' marked tendency to underestimate the ability of Asiatic troops to stand up against Western forces.
WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
In an effort to create some coordination among the widely dispersed Allied forces in East Asia, General Marshall urged the creation of a unified command structure. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to his request at the Arcadia Conference in Washington during December. This was their first meeting since the entry of the United States into the war. With the help of their military staffs, they appointed General Wavell to direct the American, British, Dutch, and Australian Command (ABDA-COM). The area under Wavell's jurisdiction included the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines. In reality, he had almost no control of the Philippines, which remained under the continued command of American General Douglas MacArthur. By the time Wavell reached his headquarters in the Dutch East Indies on January 10, 1942, the outlook was gloomy to say the least.
Japan struck at numerous other targets on the same day as the assault on Pearl Harbor. These attacks included air raids on Wake Island and the Philippines and land operations against Guam, Hong Kong, Malaya, and the Philippines. Guam was the first outpost to fall. Its close proximity to the powerful Japanese base on the island of Saipan in the Marianas made its position hopeless. After two days of air attacks, the Japanese landed and quickly overwhelmed its defenders.
Over 1,000 miles to the east, Wake Island proved much harder to subjugate. Its tiny garrison of 447 marines, commanded by Major James Devereux, along with 75 naval and army signal corps personnel, fought valiantly with the help of a handful of marine fighter planes and a few 5-inch coastal defense guns and antiaircraft guns. Japanese planes and warships subjected the island to three days of bombing and shelling, starting on December 11. The Japanese also planned to land on Wake the same day, but their warships were greeted by heavy fire from the American coastal batteries and bombing attacks from the few surviving marine aircraft. Two Japanese destroyers were sent to the bottom and three other ships were damaged. This remarkable setback required the Japanese to send for reinforcements, including two of the carriers that had taken part in the Pearl Harbor raid.
Admiral Kimmel, who still commanded the U.S. Pacific Fleet at that time, countered by ordering a task force, centered around the carrier Saratoga, to relieve Wake. But soon after its departure, Admiral William Pye succeeded Kimmel temporarily as fleet commander. Pye feared the possibility of losing Saratoga and called off the operation on December 23. The Japanese landed on Wake the same day and encountered savage resistance from the outnumbered marines before finally forcing them to surrender. They marked their victory by machine-gunning wounded in the island's hospital and utilizing the able-bodied as slave laborers. The failure of the Wake relief expedition, coming so soon after the Pearl Harbor debacle, represented another severe blow to the U.S. Navy's morale although the heroism of Wake's garrison won the admiration of the American people and even became the subject of a Hollywood film in 1942.
Hong Kong, still another isolated Allied base, fell before the end of December. Consisting of a group of islands and a small and a small peninsula on the Chinese mainland adjacent to Japanese-held territory, Hong Kong's position, like Guam's, was hopeless. Japanese forces struck on December 8 and quickly drove the defenders off the mainland. They followed with an invasion of Hong Kong Island on December 18, captured its water supply and split the garrison into two pockets. One of them surrendered on Christmas, the other the following day. Japanese soldiers, flushed with victory and angry over the casualties they had suffered, now plunged into an orgy of savagery, killing prisoners and raping nurses as well as civilian women.
Japan faced a more formidable task in the Philippines. Allied ground forces there were fairly numerous but varied in quality and were poorly equipped. General MacArthur led 31,000 regular troops, including 12,000 Filipinos, who served as part of the U.S. Army, and the inadequately trained Philippine army of 102,000. The so-called U.S. Asiatic Fleet contained only a few surface ships and 29 submarines.
MacArthur was a controversial figure before the war and has remained so ever since. The son of a Civil War hero, he won several decorations for bravery during World War I and became the youngest American general to command a division. He served as army chief of staff from 1930 to 1935. During the lowest point in the Great Depression, MacArthur committed a major public relations blunder when he led troops, using tear gas and tanks, to oust 2,000 World War I veterans from Washington. These men had been demanding early payment of their war service bonuses. In 1935, the general received an appointment as military adviser to the Philippines, which had become a commonwealth of the United States with limited self-government. He still held that post when Roosevelt recalled him to active service in 1941. MacArthur was intensely ambitious, extremely vain, and ardently fond of publicity. He habitually wore a gold braid-encrusted cap, carried a riding crop, and smoked a gigantic corncob pipe, all of which made him a prime target for photographers. MacArthur badly underestimated the Japanese as opponents and expressed great confidence that his forces could repulse any invasion. He did not expect the Japanese to strike before the spring of 1942.
Concern over American airpower on the main Philippine island of Luzon had been one of the primary reasons for Japan's decision to attack the United States. Actually, it was far less formidable than American leaders had intended. They had planned to station 165 heavy bombers on Luzon, but only 35 B-17 Flying Fortresses had arrived by the time the Japanese struck. A total of 104 P-40s, which were inferior to the Zero, and some obsolete models provided fighter support. Weak as it was, this airpower remained the key to U.S. plans to hold the Philippines as well as to attack Japan's supply lines. But the Japanese quickly eliminated this threat through a combination of their own initiative, American mistakes, and fortunate timing.
THE PHILIPPINE DEBACLE
No one has ever satisfactorily explained why this disaster occurred. Since the war, the principal American actors in the drama - MacArthur, his able but domineering chief of staff, General Richard Sutherland; and the air commander, General Lewis Brereton - have all contradicted each other as to who was actually to blame. It is clear that all three men had received ample warning of the Pearl Harbor attack. It is also certain that on that same day, Brereton planned to stage a bombing raid against Japanese bases on Formosa and attempted to obtain permission to do so from MacArthur. But Sutherland refused to allow him to see the general, contending that MacArthur was too busy. This caused a delay, and the raid never took place.
Instead, when Japanese planes struck targets in northern Luzon, the bombers at Clark Field near Manila went aloft to avoid being caught on the ground. The main fighter force attempted, unsuccessfully, to intercept the enemy. When the U.S. aircraft returned to refuel, enemy planes did catch them on the ground, destroying 18 B-17s and 53 P-40s. This calamity took place even though radar had warned of the Japanese approach. Despite the confusion over this unfortunate series of events, ultimate responsibility lay with MacArthur as commander of all forces in the Philippines. He failed to take the initiative in protecting his aircraft, and neither he nor Sutherland responded to Brereton's entreaties for prompt action. But it is also true that Brereton should have based his aircraft in Mindanao in the southern Philippines, where they would have been beyond the range of Japanese aircraft.
More raids followed during the next few days, and by December 17 only a handful of American fighters remained, while the surviving B-17s sought refuge in Australia. Japan had won total air supremacy in the Philippines. Japanese air attacks also devastated naval installations in Manila Bay and forced the flight of much of the Asiatic Fleet to Australia and the Dutch East Indies.
Japanese troops executed their first landings on Luzon's northern coast on December 8, but the main invasion did not come until December 22 at Lingayen Gulf, 150 miles north of Manila. General Mashaharu Homma commanded the invading force, which consisted of only two divisions. Homma was an unusual Japanese general. His interests were much broader than those of most of his fellow officers, extending to the arts. He was even an amateur playwright. Homma also shared Yamamoto's opposition to war with America, an attitude tantamount to heresy in the Japanese army. Nevertheless, he carried out the invasion with considerable skill.
The prewar American defensive plan called for a withdrawal to the Bataan Peninsula, which flanked Manila Bay on the west. But MacArthur had anticipated a landing at Lingayen Gulf and hoped to defeat the Japanese on the beaches. He also expected Washington to send a major relief expedition to his aid. MacArthur badly overestimated the ability of his own troops, especially the Philippine army. And clearly, after the Pearl Harbor disaster, any relief expedition to the Philippines was out of the question. The Philippine forces defending northern Luzon proved quite incapable of repelling the Japanese. By Christmas, the enemy was preparing to drive on Manila. The Japanese also made another major landing on the southeast coast of Luzon, which MacArthur had not anticipated. Manila now faced powerful Japanese invaders from both north and south.
MacArthur had only two options: withdraw into the mountains to concentrate on guerilla activity or adopt the original plan and make a stand on Bataan. He chose the latter and ordered a fighting withdrawal. Despite great obstacles, his forces completed their retreat by early January 1942. But they were now bottled up on Bataan and the fortified islands near the entrance to Manila Bay. MacArthur's misguided decision to defend the beaches at Lingayen Gulf also created severe logistic problems. Instead of shifting food, medicine, and other supplies to Bataan, as stipulated in the prewar plan, he sent them north to the gulf. Most were lost, and the supplies that reach Bataan were inadequate. The defenders of the peninsula soon found themselves on half-rations, and many of them fell victim to malaria and other tropical diseases.
MacArthur's troops made their initial stand near the northern end of the peninsula along a line anchored on the forbidding peaks of an extinct volcano. Homma's forces attacked this position on January 11, and two weeks of desperate fighting raged in appalling conditions. For a time the Americans gallantly repulsed repeated Japanese assaults, including suicide charges. But by January 26 the Japanese threatened to cut off the defenders near the coast. MacArthur ordered a retreat and was able to stabilize the front 20 miles to the south. Malaria and other diseases now decimated the Japanese, who also received orders to divert a division to take part in operations against the Dutch East Indies. By early March, Homma had only 3,000 men in the line and feared a counterattack. But the Americans failed to detect the extent of the enemy's weakness and were so plagued by illness and hunger themselves that they were in no condition to take offensive action. Instead, Japanese reinforcements arrived later in the month and rescued Homma from his dilemma.
MacArthur had been less than successful in his handling of the Luzon campaign. The disaster at Clark Field, the unfortunate decision to contest the beaches, and the problems it created for his forces when they reached Bataan provided ample justification for his dismissal. But he did not share the fate of Kimmel and Short. Instead, he emerged as a hero. The ability of his troops to hold Bataan for over three months contrasted vividly with the succession of defeats that Allied forces suffered elsewhere. His publicity-oriented staff magnified his role, and the mass media widely disseminated news of his achievements. Roosevelt and Marshall even recommended him for the Congressional Medal of Honor. The American people, thankful for any relief from the persistent gloom of the weeks after Pearl Harbor, eagerly accepted him as a larger-than-life figure.
Clearly, under the circumstances, dismissal and retirement were out of the question. To leave him to face capture and imprisonment seemed equally impossible. Instead, on March 12, Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to leave the Philippines and make his way to Australia. After a perilous journey by sea and air, he reached his destination and announced dramatically, "I came through and I shall return." General Jonathan Wainwright, an old cavalryman who had directed the retreat from Lingayen Gulf, succeeded MacArthur as commander, but his prospects were grim. Disease and constantly declining rations had sapped the energy of his men, who had been reduced to virtual walking skeletons. A growing sense of hopelessness had also eroded their morale. MacArthur, who was well fed and safely ensconced on the fortified island of Corregidor, had paid only one visit to Bataan since December 24 and had grown highly unpopular with his troops. They referred to him sarcastically as "Dougout Doug." His departure did nothing to enhance his standing with them and weakened morale still more. On April 3, Homma opened his final offensive and quickly gained a breakthrough as Allied resistance disintegrated. Fighting on Bataan ceased on April 9. But Wainwright continued the struggle from Corregidor until May 5.
One of the most horrible incidents of the Pacific war followed immediately after the surrender of Bataan - the Bataan Death March. It resulted in part from a breakdown of Japanese arrangements for transporting and feeding the captured Allied troops. They had expected to take no more than 25,000 prisoners, but the actual number was over 75,000. As a result, many of the captives, already weakened and starving, had to walk the entire 55 miles to a railhead, where the Japanese directed them into overcrowded boxcars to complete the trip to the prison camp. Japanese treatment of the prisoners varied greatly. Some showed kindness, but many others resorted to brutality, beating stragglers and bayoneting or beheading those who had fallen. Over 7,000 died on the journey, more than 4,000 of them Filipinos. This manifestation of brutality in part reflected Japanese contempt for troops who chose to surrender rather than die in battle or commit suicide. But brutality was also a way of life to Japanese soldiers, whose superiors often treated them savagely. Not surprisingly, they responded with even more violent treatment of those who fell under their jurisdiction.
THE CONQUEST OF MALAYA
Long before the end of resistance on Bataan and Corregidor, the Japanese had administered a defeat to the Allies that was far more devastating to their hopes and prestige: the conquest of Malaya and Britain's island fortress of Singapore at its southern tip.
British leaders had decided to build a naval base at Singapore in 1922, shortly after the Anglo-Japanese Alliance expired. They intended to base a fleet there as a deterrent to Japanese ambitions in Southeast Asia. To safeguard Singapore, they provided it with defenses that would repel any attack from the sea. But they built no fortifications on the north side of the island, despite the fact that this area offered little in the way of natural obstacles and lay across the narrow and shallow Strait of Johore from Malaya. The British did not consider such fortifications necessary. They assumed that the Japanese would not be so reckless as to try pushing their way through the supposedly impassable jungle of Malaya. Britain also established a number of airfields in Malaya that they intended to use as bases for the defense of Singapore. Unfortunately, funds were in short supply during the 1920s and 1930s, and with the outbreak of war in 1939, primary British concern focused on Europe and Britain. When Italy entered the conflict, the Middle East got second priority, leaving Singapore and Malaya a poor third on Britain's list of commitments.
Although British military leaders had asked for over 500 planes to defend Malaya and Singapore, only 158 were available when the Japanese struck, and most of them were obsolete. Despite their designation of Singapore as a naval base, the British were unable to supply it with a permanent fleet. As war approached in late 1941, the only ships they could spare were the battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse. But without a carrier or adequate land-based aircraft, these ships were dangerously vulnerable to air attack. The Admiralty opposed the decision to send the ships to Singapore. But Churchill stubbornly insisted, and they reached their destination shortly before the Japanese attacked Malaya. Their commander, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, known as "Tom Thumb" diminutive stature, had a long and distinguished career. Unfortunately, he had little recent sea experience, and perhaps even more ominous, he continued to insist that "bombers were no match for battleships."
Despite the obvious inadequacies of the British position, the myth developed that Singapore, the "Gibraltar of the Pacific," was impregnable, and nowhere was this belief stronger than in Singapore itself. The effect of the Singapore myth was not unlike that of the "Maginot mentality" in prewar France. The British also badly underestimated Japanese military capabilities. But not all British leaders were blind to Singapore's vulnerability to an attack from the north. General W. G. S. Dobbie, the army commander in Malaya during 1937-38, and his chief of staff, General Arthur Percival, insisted that the real danger to Singapore would come from Japanese landings in Malaya. Their appreciation led to a decision to extend the defense of Singapore to the whole of Malaya, but little was done to provide adequate defensive positions other than to build the airfields. Percival became commander in Malaya during the spring of 1941. Percival had led troops in World War I with considerable bravery and served in France during the debacle of 1940. Upon his return to Malaya, he recognized the weakness of his position. Although he possessed 89,000 troops, they were deficient in training and lacked modern weapons. Of these, only 20,000 were British; the rest of the force consisted of 37,000 Indians, 17,000 locally recruited soldiers, and 15,000 Australians. Given the vulnerability of the British position, they probably would have been wiser to focus on the defense of Johore state at the southern end of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore itself rather than all of Malaya.
Percival's opponent in the struggle for Malaya and Singapore was General Tomoyuki Yamashita. Yamashita was perhaps the best general in the Japanese army. He was also highly controversial. Some suspected him of complicity in the 1936 coup that had attempted to seize the government. Tojo had long regarded him as a dangerous rival. Yamashita deployed 70,000 troops, but a shortage of sea transport limited his initial force to only 17,000 men. They were among the best in the Japanese army, however, and possessed superior equipment.
In December 8, Japanese troops landed on Malaya's northeast coast. The first landing actually preceded the Pearl Harbor attack by more than an hour, because Malaya lay well to the west of the International Dateline and, thus, was a day ahead of Pearl Harbor time. Late that day, Admiral Phillips made the fatal error of moving north without air cover. Japanese high-level bombers and torpedo bombers attacked the British squadron on December 10 and sent both Prince of Wales and Repulse to the bottom, along with Phillips and 800 crewmen. With one blow, the Japanese had won supremacy in the waters off Southeast Asia.
On land, Yamashita's troops pushed southward with remarkable speed despite the heavy jungle and mountainous terrain. British commanders overestimated Japanese strength and were so fearful of being outflanked they frequently ordered retreats before they were really necessary. The Japanese quickly captured the northern airfields, turning the supposed key to Singapore's defense against the British and assuring Japanese supremacy in the air. One Japanese column knifed southward along the east coast, while two others moved along the western shore. They consistently outmaneuvered and outwitted the enemy by infiltrating around their positions and carrying out a series of landings behind British lines. To facilitate their mobility, many of the Japanese sped southward on bicycles. When their tires suffered blowouts from the intense heat, they simply continued to ride on the rims. In fact, the clattering noise of the rims caused panic among some retreating Allied soldiers, who assumed that tanks were pursuing them. By January 31, the Japanese had driven the British out of Malaya and into Singapore.
Even after the disasters in Malaya, Percival still had 85,000 troops to defend the island. But morale was low, and many of the troops and much of the leadership were of questionable quality. The Japanese, by contrast, displayed their usual dash and enjoyed domination of the air. Percival also mistakenly thought that the Japanese would land on the northeast coast and thus placed his strongest force there. Instead, on February 8, they crossed the strait and quickly established a large beachhead on the northwestern shore. Although the defending force was twice as large as the attackers, the Japanese again outmaneuvered and outfought their opponents. They captured the island's main water supply and penetrated the suburbs of Singapore itself.
The Japanese were now experiencing a shortage of ammunition, and Yamashita feared that if forced into street fighting to take the city, they would lose the battle. To prevent this, he brazenly demanded that the Allied forces surrender. At first, Percival wanted to continue the fight, but his principal subordinate commanders urged capitulation in view of the loss of reservoirs. When confronted by the specter of fire, sickness, and death as a result of the water shortage, Percival agreed, and fighting ceased on February 15. The surrender was a humiliating end for the "Gibraltar of the Pacific." It also dealt a mortal blow to British and, indeed, Western prestige among the peoples of Southeast Asia. Singapore had become such a symbol of European power in Asia that its fall shattered the myth of Western invincibility. Another wave of atrocities followed as Japanese soldiers bayoneted prisoners, including the wounded, and massacred many Chinese residents.
THE EAST INDIES: DUTCH NO MORE
The Dutch East Indies did not feel the sting of invasion until well after the initial assaults on the Philippines and Malaya. Japanese leaders recognized that the Dutch were far weaker than the Americans and British and concentrated on their stronger opponents first. But by early January 1942, the campaigns in the Philippines and Malaya were clearly progressing toward victory, and the Japanese felt secure enough to strike at the East Indies and seize the long-coveted oil fields. They executed their first landings on January 11 on the northeastern coast of Borneo and a day later on the northern beaches of Celebes. In mid-February, Japanese troops landed on northern Sumatra. By the end of February, Japan controlled much of all three islands and had set the stage for an assault on Java, the principal island.
An Allied fleet of five cruisers and nine destroyers attempted to intercept the invasion convoy in the waters north of Java on February 27. The hastily assembled force included Dutch, U.S., British, and Australian ships and had no common tactical doctrine or signal code. It fell afoul of the enemy convoy's naval escort, consisting of four cruisers and 14 destroyers. Much of the ensuing Battle of the Java Sea took place after dark, and the Japanese were masters of night fighting. They sank two cruisers and three destroyers while suffering damage to just one of their own destroyers. The remaining three Allied cruisers managed to escape, only to succumb to other enemy naval units in the Battle of Sunda Strait off northwestern Java during the next two days. Japan had gained total supremacy in the waters around the island. Japanese troops landed at two points on Java's northern coast on March 1 and quickly overwhelmed the few defenders. Hostilities ended on March 8.
THE FALL OF BURMA
While Japan was overrunning Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies, its forces were also engaged in the conquest of Burma. This Texas-size British colony was strategically important because it bordered northern India on the east and contained the supply line to Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese forces. This route extended by rail and road from Rangoon, the capital and chief port, to Lashio 600 miles to the north and from there, via the Burma Road, to China. Japan's first penetration into Burma came as early as December 10 from neighboring Thailand. An independent country, Thailand had offered no resistance to the entry of Japanese troops two days earlier. Bu the main invasion of Burma began 400 miles farther north on January 20 with a thrust toward Rangoon. Although Japanese forces were scanty, the British, Indian, and Burmese defenders were even weaker. Once again, the Japanese fought masterfully in the jungles, outmaneuvered the Allies and encircled Rangoon. But the defenders were able to escape through a gap in the Japanese forces. Rangoon fell on March 6.
The Japanese received reinforcements later in March and pursued the Allies northward up the country's three great river valleys. Chinese forces arrived in early April to help the British make a stand 150 miles south of Mandalay in central Burma. But a rapid Japanese advance up the Irrawaddy River and its tributary, the Chindwin, prevented this. Another Japanese column dashed to Lashio. Allied forces now had no choice but to fall back toward the border of India, while the Japanese advanced up the Chindwin in an effort to cut off their withdrawal. The Allies won the race and reached the sanctuary of India by the middle of May, ending their 1,000-mile retreat from Rangoon.
As the Japanese advanced from Rangoon to Mandalay, their navy carried out a raid against the British naval base of Trincomalee on the island of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) off the southeastern coast of India. Ceylon was vital strategically. If it should fall, the Japanese would menace not only southern India but also British supply lines around the southern tip of Africa to the Middle East, India, and Australia. To prevent this, Britain protected Ceylon with a substantial naval force, including three aircraft carriers and five battleships. Early in April, Admiral Nagumo led a Japanese task force, which featured five carriers and four battleships, into the Indian Ocean. He hoped to repeat his Pearl Harbor success, but British patrol planes warned Ceylon of the enemy approach. Although Nagumo's aircraft damaged port facilities and sank two cruisers and light aircraft carrier Hermes, most of the British fleet withdrew to safety.
The raid nevertheless convinced the British that their fleet at Ceylon was vulnerable to Japan's superior strength, and they diverted their ships to bases on the west coast of India and as far away as East Africa. They also feared that the Japanese might send naval forces into the western Indian Ocean and threaten South Africa. To guard against such a possibility, they seized the port of Diego Suarez on French Madagascar in May and occupied the remainder of the island in September. The Japanese never again ventured even as far west as Ceylon.
By May 1942, Japan had reached the zenith of its power. Japanese forces dominated Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. They threatened the Indian Ocean, Australia, and the Central Pacific. They had proved more than a match for their Western adversaries. But their days of victory were almost at an end.