If the German military disaster in Russia were not enough, at the very time that the Red Army unleashed its massive counterstroke, Hitler committed his second blunder. He declared war on the United States, opening the prospect of a really serious two-front conflict. Hitler's decision marked the culmination of steadily deteriorating relations between the two countries since the outbreak of the war. This process of erosion unfolded at the same time that Japan and America had embarked on a collision course that led to hostilities in the Pacific.
FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT
The administration of President Franklin Roosevelt had grown increasingly supportive of Britain in the struggle against Nazi Germany. But the president was reluctant to push matters too far, especially without assurance that American public opinion would be receptive to his policies. This approach was characteristic of Roosevelt's keen political instincts, which had been largely responsible for his unusually successful career. A member of a wealthy New York state family and a distant cousin of former President Theodore Roosevelt, he possessed boundless charm, good looks, and an effective speaking style. Roosevelt had served as assistant secretary of the navy during Woodrow Wilson's administration and had the misfortune of being the Democratic party's vice presidential candidate in the disastrous election of 1920. Despite an attack of polio that left both his legs crippled, he became governor of New York in 1928 and gained reelection by a landslide margin two years later. His great success earned him the Democratic presidential nomination in 1932, and he scored an overwhelming victory over President Herbert Hoover.
His administration gained congressional approval of a vast array of legislation designed to bring about recovery from the Great Depression while not interfering too greatly with the capitalistic economy. Although the country did recover to some extent, the depression continued throughout the 1930s. Roosevelt won reelection in 1936 by a huge majority.
In foreign policy, the president looked with concern at the expansion of German and Japanese power as well as Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia but followed a cautious policy toward all three. The growth of American isolationism contributed to his reluctance to undertake any measures that might be interpreted as threatening to lead the country into war. For a time he attempted to win congressional acceptance of his right to impose embargoes on the sale of arms and other strategic materials to aggressor nations. But ultimately he accepted a series of three neutrality acts that Congress passed between 1935 and 1937. This legislation called for an immediate embargo on arms sales to all belligerents. The Neutrality Acts were the fruit of one of the supposed lessons of World War I. Those favoring their passage hoped that, by prohibiting arms sales, the country could avoid being gradually drawn into another European war. Hitler's seizure of Bohemia and Moravia and Mussolini's occupation of Albania in 1939 alarmed Roosevelt, and he made appeals to both dictators to refrain from further aggression. His attitude toward neutrality legislation also changed.
A CAUTIOUS APPROACH
When the European war broke out in September 1939, the American Neutrality Act of 1937 went into effect, placing an immediate embargo on arms sales, much to the distress of Britain and France. Their blockade prevented Germany from buying arms from the United States, but the embargo had the same effect on them. Roosevelt recognized this and appealed to Congress to revise the Neutrality Act. Congress responded in November by repealing the embargo provision and authorizing the sale of arms on a "cash and carry" basis. This action allowed the Allies to buy arms and munitions and transport them in their own ships. But it barred U.S. vessels from carrying war materiel to Allied ports in an effort to avoid German submarine attacks on American shipping such as those that had brought the United States into World War I.
The fall of France and the German threat to Britain in the summer of 1940 caused many Americans to fear that Germany might attack the United States if the Nazis should defeat Britain and gain control of the British and French fleets. This concern led to a growing support for the extension of aid to Britain. Hundreds of young men even joined the Royal Air Force to fight the Germans in the skies over Britain. But many still favored an isolationist approach and urged a policy of scrupulous neutrality. Very few Americans actually favored U.S. entry into the conflict, but the isolationists feared that by extending aid to Britain, American would eventually stumble into war. This difference in opinion led to a spirited debate between interventionists and isolationists.
Isolationists were far from a monolithic bloc. They ranged from idealists, who opposed war on moral grounds, to fascist organizations, with many gradations in between. Among the most outspoken were the demagogue Catholic priest, Father Charles Coughlin, who preached a pro-fascist line, and Charles Lindbergh, Jr., whose first solo flight across the Atlantic in 1927 had made him an international hero. While living in Europe during the 1930s, Lindbergh became deeply impressed by the strength of German airpower. After the fall of France, he was convinced that Britain would lose the war and insisted that America should avoid involvement in a hopeless cause. In one speech he proclaimed that he would rather be allied with Nazi Germany than with communist Russia. A number of pro-Nazi organizations came into being and tried to gain the support of German Americans. Among them, the German American Bund, led by Fritz Kuhn, was the most notable. Members of the Bund wore uniforms and gave the Nazi salute. They also sang songs of hate against the Jews. The America First Committee, founded in the fall of 1940, attempted to unite all the disparate groups. In Congress, a group of die-hard isolationists opposed all legislation designed to aid Britain or bolster U.S. defensive preparations. Interventionists organized the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies and the Fight for Freedom Committee to counter isolationists. Meanwhile, the bulk of Americans looked on with interest and not a little confusion as this debate persisted. Roosevelt agreed with the interventionists that the United States should extend aid to Britain and increase its own defensive preparations. But he continued to be extremely cautious and did not take the lead in these matters. Instead, interventionists in Congress secured passage of a whole series of measures to strengthen the armed forces, including a bill that would roughly double the size of the navy. This legislation culminated in the establishment of the first U.S. peacetime draft in the fall of 1940.
America also extended aid to Britain. Roosevelt and Churchill, who had met briefly during World War I, began to correspond soon after the outbreak of war. Their friendship became closer in the following months. The first fruit of this transatlantic relationship came when Roosevelt agreed to provide Britain with 50 overage U.S. destroyers for convoy duty. In return, Britain granted 99-year leases for American naval and air bases in British possessions in the Western Hemisphere, ranging from Newfoundland to British Guiana. This arrangement actually had limited immediate impact because many of the destroyers required repair before they were serviceable for convoy duty. The British also lacked experienced crews to operate them. But the agreement had great symbolic importance because it signified the start of closer cooperation between the United States and Britain.
Roosevelt reverted to a highly cautious approach during the presidential election campaign of 1940. But after winning reelection to an unprecedented third term, he felt able to offer greater aid to Britain. The key to this approach was the Lend-Lease Bill, which Congress passed in March 1941 over bitter isolationist opposition.
The British had been buying war materiel from the United States since the fall of 1939, but by the end of 1940, it appeared that they would soon exhaust their financial reserves. The Lend-Lease Act came to the rescue by authorizing the president to lend or lease arms and munitions to Britain with payment deferred until after the war.
The immediate impact of lend-lease was not spectacular. It accounted for only 1 percent of the arms and munitions used by Britain during 1941, although America provided much needed shipments of food, fuel, and other supplies. But ultimately the program extended $27 billion in assistance. The United States also authorized aid to the Soviet Union soon after the start of the German invasion. Again the immediate impact of aid to Russia was not great, but it steadily increased and by 1943 played an important role in the Soviet war effort. A rising flow of trucks and Jeeps was especially vital, providing the Red Army with much greater mobility in their later offensives. Vast quantities of food, strategic raw materials, clothing, medical supplies, and heavy machinery were also important as was war materiel such as aircraft, guns, and ammunition. This aid, of course, came at the expense of arms and equipment that could have been used by American forces. Lend-lease was consistent with the attitude of a majority of Americans. In January 1941, a public opinion poll indicated that 70 percent favored aid to Britain, even at the risk of war.
While the debate over lend-lease took place, American planners revised their strategic priorities in case of war. As early as June 1939, a joint army-navy board had formulated the so-called Rainbow plans to provide for various contingencies in case of war. These included Rainbow 5, which covered the possibility of U.S. involvement on the side of Britain and France in a war against Germany. Shortly after Roosevelt's reelection in 1940, navy planners drafted Plan Dog, which contended that America's chief priority was the defeat of Germany. This document stated that U.S. intervention in the European war was necessary to achieve this aim. At the same time, it insisted that American forces would have to assume a defensive stance against Japan in the Pacific. Both the president and the army accepted the navy proposal.
GROWING U.S. SUPPORT FOR BRITAIN
In January 1941, American military and naval leaders met with their British counterparts in Washington to explore contingency plans in case the United States should enter the war. These American-British conversations (ABC) took place in the greatest secrecy and lasted for two months. They came to the same conclusions as Plan Dog and emphasized the importance of the Atlantic lifeline between America and Britain. Officially, the ABC-1 agreement concerned only hypothetical developments, but it forged still another link in the tightening relationship between the two countries. It also contributed to the transfer of U.S. naval units from the Pacific to the Atlantic.
Throughout the summer and fall of 1941, America's role in support of Britain increased significantly. In April, U.S. forces occupied the Danish territory of Greenland after an agreement with the Danish ambassador in Washington. In July, American troops also took over Iceland, another Danish possession. They relieved British troops, which had occupied the island soon after the German seizure of Denmark. Both Greenland and Iceland became bases from which U.S. air and naval units could patrol the Atlantic.
In August, Roosevelt and Churchill met in a secret rendezvous on the British battleship Prince of Wales, off the coast of Newfoundland. There they drafted the Atlantic Charter, which, as a joint declaration of policy by a belligerent power and a technically neutral nation, was a remarkable document. Its idealistic terms upheld the right of all peoples to choose their own governments, affirmed Anglo-American dedication to peace "after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny," and rejected any territorial aggrandizement as a result of the war. The Atlantic Charter was important because it symbolized growing Anglo-American solidarity. It also had propaganda appeal to the conquered peoples of Europe, encouraging them not to lose hope.
During July 1941, Roosevelt ordered U.S. naval and air units to patrol the Western Atlantic to warn Britain of the presence of German submarines, again hardly a neutral act. Although Hitler instructed his submarine commanders not to retaliate against American ships, some of them became so outraged by the effectiveness of these patrols that they did respond in anger. Early in September, a German U-boat became involved in an engagement with the U.S. destroyer Greer, which had been tracking the submarine for several hours. It is not clear which vessel actually initiated hostilities, but neither suffered any damage. Roosevelt, nevertheless accused the Germans of a deliberate attack. Describing a U-boat as a "rattlesnake poised to strike," he authorized U.S. destroyers henceforth to employ a "shoot on sight" policy. In October, U-boats attacked two destroyers on convoy escort duty, damaging the Kearny and sinking the Reuben James with the loss of 115 lives. Roosevelt responded this time by persuading Congress to authorize the arming of U.S. merchant ships and allowing them to carry cargoes to Allied ports. Clearly, by the fall of 1941, the United States was, for all intents and purposes, a participant in the war, although on a limited basis. And each incident in the North Atlantic increased the likelihood of a full-fledged American commitment.
U.S.-JAPANESE TENSION
War came to America not through developments in the Atlantic but because of growing friction between the United States and Japan in the Pacific. It was the culmination of a long history of fluctuating tension that began with the advent of the United States as a world power during the Spanish-American War in 1898. IN the ensuing peace settlement, America forced Spain to cede Guam in the Central Pacific and the Philippines in East Asia. The acquisition of the Philippines created an American presence close to China, which at the time appeared to be at the mercy of the European powers and Japan. The United States feared that these countries would bar American commercial interests from China. In response to this concern, in 1899 Secretary of State John Hay formulated the Open Door policy, which sought to maintain U.S. access to the China market and, as modified in 1900, to preserve China's territorial integrity and independence.
At first, America viewed Germany and Russia as the chief threats to the Open Door, but when Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Japanese loomed as the greater peril. In 1911, U.S. leaders demonstrated their concern about the possibility of a conflict with Japan when they drew up War Plan Orange. This provided for American forces to hold out in the Philippines against a Japanese attack until the navy steamed across the Pacific to provide relief. The plan remained the basic U.S. strategy for a potential war with Japan until the adoption of the Rainbow plans in 1939. But even then it continued in existence in a modified form as Rainbow 3. Unfortunately, it failed to give sufficient consideration to the enormous logistic problems posed by the huge distances involved in such an operation. Its prospects became even more dubious when the Japanese seized the Carolina, Mariana, and Marshall islands from Germany during World War I. Japan's presence in the Central Pacific posed a serious threat to American lines of communication with the Philippines.
The establishment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 also alarmed the United States. This agreement allowed Britain to shift most of its East Asian naval ships to their home base, and with the destruction of the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan held the dominant position in Asian waters. In 1915, the Japanese took advantage of this situation to issue its "Twenty-One Demands," which would have transformed China into a virtual Japanese dependency. But strong American and British pressure forced Japan to back down on the most stringent of its demands, much to Tokyo's irritation. Japanese leaders found it puzzling that America was so fixated on access to the Chinese market when its trade with Japan was so much greater than with China. American immigration policy angered the Japanese even more, both in regard to its refusal to go along with Japan's cherished proposal for a racial equality clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the detested Immigration Act of 1924, which barred Japanese immigration into the United States. This humiliation remained vividly lodged in the Japanese collective memory.
Although relative tranquility prevailed in U.S.-Japanese relations during the 1920s, Japan's conquest of Manchuria in 1931 and invasion of China proper in 1937 caused growing American concern. Brutal incidents such as the rape of Nanking and the attack on the U.S. gunboat Panay also increased tension, as did Japanese interference with American and European trading rights. America extended some aid to China in the form of loans, arms sales, and eventually lend-lease supplies. The Chinese also won the hearts and minds of numerous Americans, especially the pressure group that came to be known as the China Lobby. Comprised of persons involved in the Far Eastern trade, politicians, missionaries, and various admirers of the Chinese, this group pressured Congress to increase support for the Kuomintang regime. But until 1940, Washington tried to avoid any action that might lead to war with Japan, particularly in view of the deteriorating situation in Europe.
When the European war began, Japan had been fighting China for over two years, and hostilities continued there while Hitler won his victories in Poland, Norway, and Western Europe. With the conquest of the Netherlands and the fall of France, Japan set out to take advantage of these countries in Southeast Asia, where Dutch authorities continued to rule the East Indies (now Indonesia) and the Vichy French administered Indochina. The Japanese pressured the Dutch to grant trade concessions and demanded that the French close supply routes through Indochina to China. They also gained Churchill's temporary agreement to prohibit aid from reaching Chiang's forces through Burma (now Myanmar), the British colony that bordered China on the southwest. The United States viewed these actions as a prelude to greater Japanese penetration into Southeast Asia and adopted a much tougher policy. In July, America imposed an embargo on exports of aviation fuel and the highest grades of iron and scrap steel to Japan. The Japanese refused to be deterred by these measures, however, and in September they extorted the Vichy regime's reluctant agreement to the stationing of Japanese troops in northern Indochina. The U.S. responded by imposing a complete embargo on the export of all grades of iron and steel scrap to Japan.
Washington's alarm increased still more when Japan joined Germany and Italy in signing the Tripartite Pact in September. This agreement provided that the three powers would assist each other "with all political, economic, and military means" if one of them were attacked by a power not involved in the European war or the Sino-Japanese conflict. The three powers specifically exempted the Soviet Union, which still enjoyed friendly relations with Germany at that time, from the terms of the pact. It appeared that Hitler regarded this stipulation as a cover to disguise his growing interest in attacking the Soviets. But however the Fuhrer may have viewed the pact, other governments saw it as a deterrent to America's entry into the war, either in Europe or Asia.
Japan continued to encroach on Indochina and established a protectorate over the entire colony in July 1941. This action clearly posed the likelihood of Japanese expansion into other parts of Southeast Asia and led to the most serious crisis to date in U.S.-Japanese relations. Roosevelt, acting on the recommendations of his top advisers, froze Japan's assets in the United States and enforced a trade embargo that went far beyond the 1940 restrictions. Britain and the Dutch took similar measures. Most important, the embargo cut off oil exports, which hit the Japanese particularly hard because they imported 88 percent of their oil. Without this vital commodity, Japan's war machine would grind to a halt. But Japan could solve this problem by gaining control of the Dutch East Indies which contained rich oil fields. If they seized British Malaya as well, they would gain four-fifths of the world's rubber supply and two-thirds of its tin.
JAPANESE INTENTIONS IN ASIA
The Japanese believed that they would have to choose one of three alternatives: (1) abandon their ambitions in Southeast Asia and perhaps China as well; (2) work out a compromise with the United States that would involve resumption of trade at the price of some Japanese concessions; or (3) attack Dutch and British possessions in Southeast Asia and, probably, American bases in East Asia and the Pacific. If they struck at the Dutch East Indies and Malaya without neutralizing the Philippines, their supply lines would be vulnerable to air interdiction by U.S. bombers based on the principal Philippine island of Luzon. It thus appeared that the third option would necessitate attacks on the Philippines as well as the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on Oahu in the Hawaii Islands.
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, insisted that if Japan were to have any chance of success in a war with the United States, it must destroy the Pacific Fleet by a surprise assault. There was a precedent for such an attack. At the start of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, Yamamoto's hero, Admiral Heihachiro Togo, had dealt a severe blow to a Russian fleet at Port Arthur, destroying two battleships and several cruisers. This operation had been the prelude to an even greater victory, the Battle of Tsushima, in which Togo's forces devastated a second Russian fleet. Yamamoto, who had lost two fingers in that struggle, was among the first Japanese naval officers to recognize the importance of airpower. He had overcome resistance from more conservative admirals to the development of aircraft carriers and now proposed use of carrier-based planes to attack American naval power in the Pacific.
Ironically, Yamamoto had long been an opponent of war with the United States. He had studied at Harvard University and served as a naval attaché in Washington, and he clearly recognized America's enormous industrial potential. But he believed that aggressive Japanese policies made war inevitable. Thus, he considered a lightning stroke to destroy the Pacific Fleet absolutely mandatory. He believed that this would secure a period of six months during which Japan could establish a powerful position in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. This should convince American leaders that they could dislodge the Japanese only through a long, bloody struggle. Yamamoto did not think the Americans would have the stomach for the sacrifices necessary to accomplish this and would seek a negotiated peace. This would confirm Japan's dominant position in East Asia. His plan was initially much too bold for most of the other top Japanese naval leaders, but he eventually won them over by persuasion and several threats to resign if he did not get his way.
The Japanese army favored war, but Premier Fumimaro Konoye preferred negotiations with the United States. Konoye was a member of an influential family and was a close friend of Emperor Hirohito. Konoye had served as premier at the time of the Japanese invasion of China but had resigned in 1938. He formed a second cabinet in the summer of 1940. Although generally considered a moderate, Konoye recognized the army's dominant influence over the government and shared its desire for Japanese hegemony in East Asia but doubted that war with America would facilitate this. The army leaders agreed to let Konoye seek a diplomatic solution, but only with the stipulation that if diplomacy did not secure a settlement by mid-October, Japan would resort to hostilities.
In return for American relaxation of the trade embargo, Konoye offered to withdraw Japanese troops from Indochina after conclusion of the war with China. He did not specify any terms for ending the conflict but did propose a meeting with Roosevelt to discuss a general settlement. His overtures inspired little enthusiasm in the American government, and both Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Secretary of War Henry Stimson favored a hard line, fearing that any sign of weakness would only encourage Japan in its expansionist designs.
A former Tennessee lawyer, congressman, and senator, Hull had gained his position in Roosevelt's cabinet largely because of his popularity with southern Democrats and his influence in Congress. Stimson had served as President Taft's secretary of war early in the century and as Hoover's secretary of state at the time of the Manchurian crisis. A Republican, he had received his appointment in 1940 as a result of Roosevelt's desire to gain bipartisan support for his foreign policy. Washington responded to Konoye's initiative on October 2 by informing Japan that a meeting between the president and the premier would be possible only after the Japanese had clarified their obligations under the Tripartite Pact. The Americans also asked for a clear-cut indication of Japan's intent to withdraw troops not only from Indochina but from China as well.
Konoye's diplomatic initiative had failed, and when the army's time limit for negotiations expired on October 15, he resigned. The war minister, General Hideki Tojo, became premier. Although his personality was far from magnetic, Tojo was hardworking and intelligent. Indeed, the sharpness of his mind so impressed his fellow officers that they called him "the Razor." But he tended to view issues from the perspective of the army only, and had little knowledge of the rest of the world, a low regard for the United States, and a willingness to take risks. Before becoming war minister in 1940, he had served as chief of staff in the Kwantung Army and had been a brigade commander in the Sino-Japanese War. Unlike many generals, Tojo had no use for gekokujo and believed that junior officers should remain under the firm discipline of their superiors. This attitude won him the respect of conservative generals and civilian leaders alike. But not all members of the Japanese hierarchy were pleased with his appointment as premier. Yamamoto complained that he tended to act in an overly bold manner without a clear idea of the dangers that a conflict with America would pose for Japan.
Tojo favored war, but Emperor Hirohito insisted that the government "go back to blank paper" in its continued pursuit of an agreement with the United States. The cabinet bowed to his request and approved a new two-step approach. The first step, Plan A, called for a long-range agreement to guarantee economic equality for all powers, not only in China but throughout the world. It also offered to interpret the Tripartite Pact defensively if the United States refrained from taking advantage of this to enter the European war. Finally, the Japanese agreed to withdraw their forces from Indochina and parts of China. If the United States rejected Plan A, Japan would resort to the short-term Plan B, which proposed suspension of American aid to China and an end to the economic sanctions. In return, Japan would refrain from any more aggressive actions in Southeast Asia, would withdraw its troops from southern Indochina, and would launch peace talks with China. After reaching a settlement with the Chinese, Japan would withdraw all its troops from Indochina. Army leaders only agreed to withdrawing troops from southern Indochina after bitter debate and considered this a major concession. If the United States rejected this offer, Japan would consider war the only option.
AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC REACTIONS
Both Roosevelt and Hull reacted cooly to Plan A. Hull also disliked Plan B, but the President was more receptive to it and suggested a response indicating willingness to continue negotiations, if for no other reason than to gain time to strengthen U.S. forces in the Pacific. Indeed, both General George C. Marshall, the army chief of staff, and Admiral Harold Stark, chief of naval operations, warned of the inadequacy of American forces and urged that the United States make a counterproposal.
Marshall, a graduate of Virginia Military Institute rather than West Point, had served as a staff officer on the western front in World War I. He became chief of staff in 1939 and proved a masterful organizer with special skill in the difficult but vital art of logistics. Cold and aloof with few personal friends and almost no sense of humor, Marshall possessed an exceptionally keen mind. Although willing to listen to the views of his subordinates, once he decided on a course of action, he adhered to it with steadfast determination. Among his many strong qualities was his ability to choose the best people for key positions. He had no patience with failure but was unusually loyal to those who produced results.
Stark became chief of naval operations the same year that Marshall assumed his post. He had held a number of command positions, both on the high seas and as a staff officer in Washington. Stark was an excellent planner but tended to be indecisive and lacking in forcefulness. He had two major achievements to his credit, however - drafting Plan Dog and securing congressional approval of a substantial increase in funding for the navy.
Hull drew up a counter proposal to Plan B based upon Roosevelt's wishes that offered economic concessions in return for Japan's withdrawal from threatening positions and a halt to all aggressive action. Hull accordingly scrapped it in favor of a much tougher proposal, the so-called ten point demand of November 26, that called for Japan to withdraw from both Indochina and China as a prerequisite for American agreement to unfreeze Japanese assets and resume trade. The Japanese viewed this as an ultimatum and on November 29 made their final decision for war.
American leaders had stiffened their attitude toward Japan during the summer and fall of 1941 in large part because they had obtained information from U.S. cryptanalysts who had broken Japan's top diplomatic cipher system, code-named "Purple," and were, thus, able to intercept secret messages. As a result, Roosevelt and his advisers were aware of Japanese proposals well before they received them officially. They also knew that Japan intended to go to war to achieve its aims if the United States did not accept Japan's terms. The process of intercepting and deciphering Japanese messages was code-named Magic. Unlike Ultra, Magic could only reveal diplomatic secrets. The Americans had not yet broken Japan's naval and military ciphers. Roosevelt, Stimson, and especially Hull grew increasingly cynical about the possibility of negotiating a settlement as a result of the information they obtained from Magic. They became convinced that war was virtually inevitable when they read a particularly ominous message that pinpointed November 29 as the final deadline for negotiations and added that thereafter, "things are automatically going to happen."
In retrospect, the United States might have made a serious mistake by making China such a major factor in its approach to this diplomatic crisis. It is highly questionable whether China was vital to U.S. interests despite traditional American support for the Open Door policy and sympathy for the suffering of the Chinese people at the hands of the Japanese. This was especially true in view of the increasing likelihood that America would be drawn into the European war because of the volatile situation in the North Atlantic. And, as Plan Dog and the ABC1 agreement stated, Germany was the primary enemy. Moreover, much of U.S. naval strength was tied down in the Atlantic, and a Pacific war by its very nature would be a naval war. Both naval and army leaders were quite aware of this as well as America's overall military weakness and the need to build up strength. Marshall and Stark informed Roosevelt on November 25 that "the essential thing now is to gain time." Moreover, the U.S. was in no position to liberate China, and despite widespread belief in America that China should be treated as if it were a great power, the reality was quite different. The Kuomintang regime was corrupt, weak, and unpopular, while the Communists dominated much of the countryside, not to mention the presence of powerful Japanese occupying forces. Acceptance of Japan's Plan B as the basis for continued negotiations might have averted or at least delayed a two-front war. Indeed, Roosevelt initially was willing to respond to the proposal in this manner, but opposition from China and Britain persuaded the more rigid Hull to insist on Japanese withdrawal from, not only Indochina, but all of China as well as a prerequisite for resumption of economic relations. The Japanese were especially alarmed by this because they intercepted it to mean withdrawal from Manchuria as well as China proper. This was apparently not Hull's intent, but he failed to make this clear. After the war several Japanese leaders involved to the decision-making process insisted that had they known that Manchuria was excluded, negotiations probably would have continued. The Japanese army's growing fervor for war and its dominant position in the power structure obviously complicated matters, but as long as the diplomatic process continued, at least the possibility of a negotiated settlement remained.
PREPARATIONS FOR WAR IN THE PACIFIC
The key factors in the forthcoming conflict in the Pacific were air and sea power, especially the ability to launch air strikes from aircraft carriers and attacks by submarines against enemy shipping. Although the British had used carrier-based planes against the Italian navy in the Mediterranean, the full extent of the revolution that air power posed for naval warfare did not become clear until the outbreak of the Pacific conflict. The Japanese had ten aircraft carriers, while the enemies had only three available in the Pacific, all U.S. carriers based at Pearl Harbor. In other aspects, the combined American, British, and Dutch naval forces in the Pacific nearly matched Japan's strength, but they were under three different commands and widely dispersed, and many of the Allied ships were inferior in quality. American and British remoteness from East Asia also made it exceedingly difficult for them to supply and reinforce their garrisons.
By far the strongest Allied naval force was the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. In addition to its three carriers, it contained eight battleships, including the old Utah, which had been converted to a target ship, seven heavy cruisers, and numerous smaller craft. If the Japanese could destroy this force, especially the carriers, they would gain naval supremacy in the Pacific. Their plan also called for simultaneous attacks on other Allied strongholds - the U.S. outposts of Wake Island and Guam in the Pacific and the British possessions of Malaya and Hong Kong on the Asian mainland. Additional attacks would follow against the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and the British colony of Burma.
To deliver the blow against Pearl Harbor, Japanese planners provided a striking force of six carriers with a complement of 360 planes. These consisted of high-level bombers, dive bombers, torpedo bombers, and fighters. Tow battleships, three cruisers, and eight destroyers escorted the carriers. Admiral Chuichi Nagumo commanded this formidable armada. Nagumo had received the honor by virtue of seniority despite the fact that he had no previous experience with air power. Ironically, Nagumo had initially opposed the Pearl Harbor attack as too reckless. Indeed, Yamamoto's plan contained extremely dangerous elements. It required the striking force to travel 3,500 miles, without being discovered, according to a rigidly precise timetable. To avoid detection, the Japanese imposed absolute radio silence and charted the approach to Hawaii through a vast, lonely expanse of sea far from inhabited areas and regular shipping routes.
The Japanese also adopted certain technical innovations that they hoped would enhance their prospects for success. One of these arose out of concern over the shallow 40-foot depth of Pearl Harbor. They feared that torpedoes might sink so low that they would detonate on the bottom. To prevent this, the Japanese borrowed a method developed by the British - the use of more buoyant wooden fins, which prevented torpedoes from falling too far below the surface. They also attached fins to armor-piercing naval gun shells, which they substituted for bombs. The fins made the shells fall like bombs, but the shells could pierce the armor of warships much more effectively than bombs.
When the Japanese unleashed their attack on Pearl Harbor and nearby air and military installations on December 7, they took the Americans completely by surprise. This led to the birth of a conspiracy theory that still has its adherents who contend that Roosevelt and his associates deliberately provoked Japan into attacking the United States. These critics claim that by pursuing a hardline policy during the summer and fall of 1941, American leaders gave the Japanese no option. They also charge that the president and his top advisers had access to Magic-intercepted messages, as well as other sources of information, indicating that Pearl Harbor was a likely target. However, according to this scenario, they refused to warn naval and military leaders in Hawaii because they wanted the attack to succeed. Proponents of this "back door to war" thesis insist that Roosevelt hoped the attack would create a wave revulsion among the American people that would enable him to bring the United States into the war not only against Japan but, via the back door, Germany as well. The president supposedly pursued this devious policy because of popular opposition to America's entry into the European conflict by way of the Atlantic front door.
There is little evidence to support this conspiracy thesis. It is true that Roosevelt was becoming more actively involved in the Atlantic and in support of the British and Soviet war efforts. By late 1941, he also probably thought American entry into the European conflict was necessary, but it is likely that incidents in the Atlantic would have accomplished this eventually without help from Japan. It also is true that messages intercepted by Magic showed clearly that Japanese attacks were likely in early December, but the question was where. Naval intelligence had also begun to penetrate the Japanese navy's cipher well before the attack on Pearl Harbor. But U.S. cryptanalysts were able to decipher only about 10 percent of intercepted messages at the time. They did not complete the breaking of the cipher until early 1942. Various pieces of information, if considered in isolation, hinted of Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor, but they were too few and too unspecific to indicate that the Pacific Fleet was a Japanese target. Roosevelt and his aides instead considered the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Hong Kong, and the Philippines to be in the prophetic targets. Reports of a large Japanese buildup in Indochina bolstered this belief. If Nagumo had difficulty accepting the boldness of Yamamoto's plan to attack Pearl Harbor, it is not surprising that American leaders did not anticipate such a daring stroke.
But the fact that the Japanese caught Pearl Harbor completely by surprise does reflect negatively on American leaders. This is especially true with regard to their rigidly secretive attitude toward Magic. Intercepted messages were available only to the 10 highest-level civilian and military leaders. To maintain security, these leaders kept the breaking of the Japanese cipher secret from even Admiral Husband Kimmel, commander of the Pacific Fleet, and General Walter Short, the army commander in the Hawaiian Islands. They did issue several communications to Kimmel and Short that warned of the general possibility of war, but they sent the last of these messages on November 27. Marshall and Stark feared that the dispatch of still more warnings might be too much like the boy who cried wolf. But Marshall did issue one final alert to Short on the morning of December 7, when Magic revealed Japan's intention to break diplomatic relations. Washington viewed this as a preliminary to war. A delay in transmission prevented this message from reaching its destination until after the attack on Pearl Harbor, however.
The roles of Kimmel and Short in preparing the naval and military forces in Hawaii for possible attack have also stirred controversy. Both men had taken over their commands in February 1941. Kimmel had earned a reputation for efficiency and discipline, though without noteworthy imagination or creativity. Navy leaders thought to highly of Kimmel that they selected him to command the Pacific Fleet despite the fact that he was junior to many other admirals. Short had served in the infantry for almost 40 years. His fellow officers considered him capable and highly conscientious rather than brilliant.
Although coordination between the two commanders appears to have been less than satisfactory, Kimmel did undertake long-range aerial reconnaissance of the waters off Oahu, but he directed his efforts primarily to the west and southwest of the island. This was in keeping with intelligence reports indicating that, if the Japanese attempted an attack, it would likely come from that direction. He also sent some patrols north of the island but lacked sufficient long-range aircraft to carry out this mission on a daily basis. Unfortunately, December 7 was one of the days this could not be done. Kimmel's predecessor, Admiral James O. Richardson, had not provided anti-torpedo nets for the warships anchored at Pearl Harbor because he feared that they would impede the fleet's ability to move quickly. When Kimmel succeeded Richardson, the navy department informed him that it also considered such defenses unnecessary because the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor would prevent a successful Japanese torpedo assault, a decision that proved disastrous. Kimmel did fail to issue a general alert after the U.S. destroyer Ward reported that it had attacked a Japanese submarine near the entrance to Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7. He believed that the incident was not serious enough to warrant such an action. Finally, Short's radar system was understaffed and lacked experienced personnel. Whatever their mistakes, it now appears that both men may actually have been primarily victims of bad luck rather than negligence. But both ultimately were held responsible for the disaster and relieved of command.
THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
On the morning of December 7, 1941, two enlisted men, who were operating a mobile radar unit on the north end of Oahu, detected an unusually large number of aircraft approaching from the northwest. But when they reported their finding to the information center, an inexperienced lieutenant told them not to worry. He assumed that the planes were a flight of 13 U.S. B-17 bombers scheduled to arrive from California later that morning. Within a half hour, the first wave of Nagumo's aircraft descended on Pearl Harbor. As they swooped in, Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, leader of the striking force, radioed Nagumo, "Tora! Tora! Tora!" (Tiger! Tiger! Tiger!), indicating that they had achieved complete surprise.
The Japanese had launched their planes from a point 220 miles northwest of Oahu, and their attacks were devastating. This was especially true of the first wave of torpedo bombers. Of the seven U.S. battleships in "Battleship Row," the Japanese sent four to the bottom and severely damaged the others. They sank three destroyers, the target ship Utah, and four small vessels. They also inflicted damage on three light cruisers, destroyed 160 aircraft, and disabled 128 others. Short had ordered the planes to be drawn up in tight formation on the airfields to make them less susceptible to sabotage. Unfortunately, this disposition left the aircraft much more vulnerable to Japanese bombers, which caught most of them on the ground. More than 2,400 American personnel lost their lives. Japanese losses totaled only 29 planes destroyed, along with their crews, and 70 planes damaged.
Pearl Harbor was a disaster for the Americans, but it could have been far worse. Nagumo's planes had put much of the Pacific Fleet out of action, but the three American carriers were not among the stricken ships. Two of them, Lexington and Enterprise, had left for other destinations, and Saratoga was undergoing repairs on the West Coast. Seven heavy cruisers were also at sea. Had the cruisers and especially the carriers been destroyed or seriously damaged, Japan would have won total supremacy in the Pacific. Of the stricken battleships, only two - Arizona and Oklahoma - were beyond hope of salvage. The shallowness of Pearl Harbor was largely responsible for this; the ships were merely grounded, not sunk. The Japanese also failed to destroy the navy's submarine base, fuel storage tanks, and repair and maintenance facilities. The loss of the fuel would have been especially disastrous.
When it became apparent that the American carriers were absent from Pearl Harbor, Commander Minoru Genda, Nagumo's air staff officer, urged the admiral to pursue additional operations. Unlike Nagumo, Genda was an expert on air power and an ace fighter pilot. Genda believed that Nagumo should locate the carriers at sea and destroy them. He also pressed for a follow-up raid on the fuel storage tanks and dockyards at Pearl Harbor. But Nagumo was overjoyed with his success and feared losses to his own carriers. As a result, he refused to take any more risks and ordered his striking force to return to its home base.
Japan had won a remarkable tactical victory, but it had not scored the great strategic triumph Yamamoto had gambled on. The admiral had gained time for Japan to establish a dominant position in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. But instead of convincing America of the futility of a long war, the attack on Pearl Harbor had the opposite effect. It united the government and the people in the determination to pursue the conflict to a victorious conclusion. Roosevelt went before a joint session of Congress on December 8 to deliver a grim but stirring speech. He referred to the previous day as "a date which will live in infamy" and called for a declaration of war. The House responded 388 to 1 in favor, the Senate unanimously.
THE UNITED STATES AT WAR
But war had come only with Japan. Despite the "back door to war" thesis, Roosevelt had not asked for a declaration of war against Germany. To have responded to a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor with such a request would have aroused considerable opposition both in Congress and among the American people. It was Hitler who decided the issue. During the summer and fall of 1941, the Fuhrer had become increasingly concerned that Japan might work out an agreement with the United States, thus fearing America to intervene in the European war. In an effort to prevent such an occurrence, Hitler had encouraged Japan to attack U.S. bases in East Asia and the Pacific. This would deflect American forces to that part of the world. He had even gone so far as to assure Japan that Germany would respond to such a Japanese initiative with a declaration of war against the United States. He also pressured Mussolini into extending a similar guarantee. These pledges of assistance went far beyond the obligations of either Germany or Italy under the Tripartite Pact. Hitler was ignorant of the fact that Japan intended to attack the United States, even without German support, because the Japanese did not see fit to inform him. Obviously it was to their advantage to keep him in the dark until he had committed himself to enter the struggle against America. But they refused to take him into their confidence even after he had given them his assurance.
Japan's assault against Pearl Harbor, thus, caught Hitler as much by surprise as it did the United States. But when the Japanese asked him to honor his pledge soon afterward, he complied without hesitation. On December 11, both Germany and Italy declared war. Hitler's decision provided the United States with the option of concentrating its strongest forces against either Japan or Germany. Roosevelt and his advisers chose Germany because they considered it to be the more formidable enemy, though of necessity they earmarked much of the navy for the Pacific.
It is quite remarkable that Hitler honored his commitment to Japan. He had certainly violated agreements in the past, and by ignoring this one he might have avoided a clash with America while the Japanese tied down U.S. forces in the Pacific. Apparently he declared war because he still expected the United States to concentrate its primary effort against Japan. It also appears that he anticipated American entry into the conflict in Europe in the near future because of escalating incidents in the Atlantic. Thus, from his perspective, it did not seem that he was actually risking much by a declaration of war. Some historians have argued that Hitler took this step because he underestimated the United States potential strength, in part because of his belief that the Americans were a mongrel people. But this argument is not convincing in view of Hitler's insistence that German submarine commanders avoid any kind of provocation to the United States in the Atlantic and his efforts to embroil America with Japan in the Pacific.
However he rationalized his decision, it was still a blunder, second in importance only to his attack on the USSR. He had brought the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union into a coalition against him. This alliance virtually assured that Germany would lose the war - provided that the Allies could overcome political and strategic differences, which soon appeared, and lingering distrust, especially between the Soviets and the Western powers.