Some readers may wonder why a course on World War II begins with a chapter on World War I. There is a good reason for this, however. Without at least a brief consideration of the first conflict and its momentous effects, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to understand why World War II came to pass. The two wars were closely linked. World War I dragged on for four bloody years and resulted in enormous political and economic upheaval in Europe and, to some extent, the world. Governments and peoples struggled throughout the 1920s and 1930s to solve the many problems created by the conflict. Most of their efforts failed, and this failure contributed significantly to the outbreak of World War II.
World War I erupted directly out of a crisis triggered by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the thrones of the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary, by a Bosnian Serb terrorist on June 28, 1914. Within a month this crisis led to war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. All of the Great Powers of Europe as well as Japan soon found themselves drawn into the struggle, and eventually the United States followed their lead.
EUROPE PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I
World War I has aroused more controversy regarding its origins than any other war. Although the crisis that followed the assassination led directly to the conflict, many factors helped create an atmosphere of tension in the decades before 1914. Some historians consider these factors as more important than the crisis itself and view the war as the inevitable result of their interaction.
Among the factors that contributed to World War I was the growth of nationalism throughout the nineteenth century. This process affected not only the Great Powers - Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia - but many smaller countries as well. Early twentieth-century nationalism tended to be of a narrow, selfish, and strident type. Rabid nationalists saw their own nations as superior and looked toward other countries with contempt and hostility. To be sure, most people were not so extreme in their outlook. But many took great pride in their nation and often exaggerated its accomplishments. Governments were willing to go to the brink of war or beyond to safeguard what they considered to be "national interests" or to avenge supposed insults to national honor.
This burgeoning nationalism coincided with large-scale industrialization in much of Western and Central Europe and to a lesser extent in eastern portions of the continent. The nineteenth century also experienced a vast increase in population and the transformation of society in many countries from one that had traditionally been rural and agrarian to one that was largely urban and industrial. These changes occurred with relative speed and contributed to the erosion of traditional values, including religious beliefs, among many people. To some, nationalism became a sort of secular substitute for religion. The concentration of large portions of the population in cities and the development of more efficient communications and a popular press facilitated the dissemination of nationalistic propaganda.
The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also witnessed the growth of representative political institutions in many countries and the extension of the right to vote in parliamentary elections to the poorer classes of society. The development of a system of mass education, at least at the primary level, played an important role in this democratizing trend. But at the same time, wealth and the actual exercise of political power remained concentrated in a small percentage of the population. The landowning aristocracy, which had dominated Europe for centuries, retained its importance and tended to merge with the wealthy capitalists, who controlled large industries, and directed powerful financial institutions. Industrial society held the promise of a better life, but to the poorer classes, expectations often proved greater than achievements. Although the standard of living rose, millions still remained victims of poverty. And while countries such as Britain and France had become democracies, the political systems of Germany and Austria-Hungary had the appearance of democracy but lacked the substance. Their elected parliaments possessed only limited power, while the heads of state and their ministers controlled the formation and implementation of policy. In Russia, there was not even the appearance of democracy.
Many members of the industrial working class turned to labor unions and socialism as a way out of their dilemma. These movements opposed nationalism and appealed to the international solidarity of the workers. They also preached the need to preserve peace and opposed expenditures on armaments. Many Socialists subscribed in theory to the Marxist doctrine of revolution to overthrow the existing political and economic system. But in practice most of them were moderate and willing to work peacefully for reforms. Radical parties appealed to many from the lower middle class, especially small businessmen and independent craftsmen who felt threatened by Big Business and Big Labor. Others found solace in the emotional stimulus of nationalism, which cut across class lines.
Industrialization accelerated economic competition among European powers, which vied for markets and raw materials. But at the same time, they continued to enjoy a large volume of trade with one another. This tended to reduce the intensity of their competition. As patterns of trade became extensive within Europe and between the continent and other parts of the world, however, the economy grew more complex, international, and interdependent. Economic rivalry also provided an impetus to a new flowering of imperialism among the Great Powers in the late nineteenth century. They engaged in a scramble to acquire colonies in Africa, Asia, and other parts of the "underdeveloped world." Although imperialistic rivalry led to some heated disputes, the powers had settled most of them well before 1914. But some of them had profound and ongoing effects.
THE GROWTH OF NATIONAL RIVALRY
The development of two rival alliance systems in the years prior to 1914 proved especially critical. The first of these, the Triple Alliance, was the creation of Otto von Bismarck. As minister-president of Prussia, Bismarck had been primarily responsible for combining the various German states in a united Germany and became the country's first chancellor in 1871. The new Germany represented the greatest triumph of nineteenth-century nationalism and became the leading military and industrial power in Europe. But Bismarck had made enemies during the unification process, most notably France, which Prussia had defeated in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. This conflict eliminated French resistance to German unification and forced France to give up two provinces, Alsace and part of Lorraine, to Germany. To provide his country with security against a possible French attempt to gain revenge and destroy his achievement, Bismarck set out to acquire allies.
His quest led to the formation of the Triple Alliance during the period 1879-82. This defensive alliance linked Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. In the event that an outside power should attack one of the members of the alliance, the other two would be obligated to go to war. Bismarck also attempted to maintain a close relationship with Russia by negotiating a separate treaty with that country. But after his retirement in 1890, his successors allowed the agreement to lapse, fearing that in conflicted with Germany's other commitments. This action provided France with an opportunity to pursue friendlier relations with the Russians. These efforts culminated in a defensive alliance in 1894. Russia's need for capital to finance its industrialization program and France's willingness to provide the funds contributed to this agreement.
Britain later overcame its traditional dedication to what it called "splendid isolation" and made separate agreements with France in 1904 and Russia in 1907. Each of these agreements merely settled colonial issues that had caused problems in the past, but in the following years, Britain drew closer to both countries. This three-cornered relationship became the Triple Entente and served as a counterweight to the Triple Alliance.
The British tightened their connection with France largely because of their growing fear of Germany. The decision of the German emperor, Wilhelm II, and Admiral Alfred Tirpitz to increase greatly the size of Germany's navy, starting in 1898, contributed significantly to that concern. Britain had long possessed the world's largest navy. As an island nation dependent on massive imports of food and raw materials, it viewed any threat to its naval supremacy as a danger to its existence. But Wilhelm and Tirpitz considered a large fleet necessary for a world power and questioned Britain's right to dictate naval strength.
The rather truculent nature of German foreign policy also alarmed the British, especially in connection with two crises over the North African territory of Morocco. In the first of these in 1905, Germany challenged France's efforts to transform Morocco into a protectorate, which Britain had sanctioned in their 1904 agreement. German leaders believed that if confronted by such a crisis, Britain would desert France, and this would wreck their newly formed friendship. But contrary to German expectations, the British supported the French and even initiated military staff talks with them. During the second crisis, in 1911, Germany again pressured France over its encroachment on Morocco, and again Britain sided with the French. This time, the two powers began naval staff talks. These ongoing discussions led to the development of plans to coordinate their armies and navies in case of war with Germany. In 1914, shortly before the outbreak of war, Britain and Russia inaugurated conversations between their naval staffs.
European powers also increased their military and naval strength and devised strategic plans that they intended to put into operation in case of war. New technology facilitated the creation of weapons of increasing sophistication and destructiveness, and industrialization enabled their mass production. As in the case of their alliances, the powers contended that these military and naval forces were necessary to defend them from aggression. But their staff officers drafted strategic plans that were offensive in character. In case of war, they intended to put them into operation as quickly as possible. They considered speed to be essential. In a crisis situation, demands for swift mobilization could create intolerable pressure on civilian officials to resort to war rather than wait for the other side to strike first.
THE SEEDS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE
During the decade before 1914, the powers focused their attention to a large extent on Balkan area of southeastern Europe, where a number of crises erupted. Austria-Hungary and Russia had long been rivals for political and economic influence in the Balkans. The emergence of nationalism among the various Balkan peoples complicated this rivalry. These national groups had been subject to the rule of the Ottoman Turks for centuries. But during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottoman Empire declined to such an extent that it earned the unenviable reputation as "the sick man of Europe." The Balkan nationalities took advantage of this weakness gradually to win their independence. By 1913, the Turks had lost all of their Balkan holdings except for the predominantly Turkish area bordering the straits that linked the Black Sea with the Mediterranean.
Among the states that emerged from this long process was Serbia. Its existence posed a special problem for the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary, which was a glaring exception in an age of nation-states. It was a multinational empire, consisting of minorities that differed from one another in language, customs, historical development, and religion. In fact, the two dominant nationalities - the Austrians, who were ethnically German, and the Hungarians - comprised less than half the population. The Austro-Hungarian government had long viewed nationalism as a force that could lead to the country's disintegration into its component national parts. Among the dual monarchy's nationalities was a Serbian minority that lived in territories bordering Serbia. The Serbian government hoped eventually to absorb these kinsmen into a "greater Serbia." To complicate matters even more, Russia treated Serbia as a client state. Both the Russians and Serbs were Slavic peoples. In the early twentieth century, Austria-Hungary became obsessed by what it viewed as "the Serbian menace." This menace materialized with the creation of a secret Serbian nationalist society that took the name Union of Death or the Black Hand. It was this organization that carried out the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in 1914.
The Austro-Hungarian government responded to the assassination with outrage; however, it could not decide how it should deal with Serbia. At this critical point, Germany pledged to support whatever action the dual monarchy deemed necessary, even if it meant war with Serbia's protector, Russia. Armed with this "blank check," Austria-Hungary finally issued an ultimatum to Serbia that, if accepted, would have reduced the nation to a virtual satellite state. Although the Serbs agreed to comply with most of the ultimatum's demands, they balked at certain points that they felt were incompatible with their independence. Austria-Hungary responded by declaring war on July 28, hoping to deal with Serbia in isolation.
THE WAR SPREADS
But Russia rallied to Serbia's aid by mobilizing its reserves, an act preparatory to military action. Since the Russians assumed that war with Austria-Hungary would also mean war with Germany, they had only one plan, which provided for mobilization against both countries. Germany, taking for granted that a conflict with Russia would also embroil it in hostilities with France, issued ultimatums to both. Germany asked Russia to cease mobilization and France to declare neutrality in case of war between Germany and Russia. Neither agreed, and by August 3 Germany was at war with both powers.
Despite its close relationship with France, Britain hesitated at first but entered the conflict when Germany sent forces into tiny Belgium. This violated an agreement that the Great Powers had made in 1839 to guarantee Belgium's permanent neutrality. The British had traditionally opposed any power that attempted to seize this area because of its location across the channel from Britain. Germany justified its aggression on grounds of military necessity. Its strategic plan provided for an invasion of France by way of Belgium. The British responded to this action by declaring war on Germany.
Italy refused to support its partners in the Triple Alliance, contending that Austria-Hungary and Germany were the aggressors. Italy pointed to the fact that its only obligation was to take action in case of an attack on one of them. The Italians remained interested onlookers until April 1915, when they sided with the Allies - Britain, France, and Russia. They did so in return for Allied promises of compensation at Austria-Hungary's expense as well as in the Middle East and Africa. Japan also declared war on Germany but confined its efforts to the Far East and Pacific, where the Japanese quickly seized a number of German colonial outposts. The Central Powers - Germany and Austria-Hungary - managed to lure Turkey and Bulgaria into the conflict on their side.
The war that came in 1914 was not inevitable. To be sure, conflicting national interests and the existence of alliances contributed to the outbreak of hostilities. But the war was nevertheless the result of the inability of the powers to solve the 1914 crisis. This failure was due to human error, especially Germany's blank check, Austria-Hungary's belief that it could localize the war, and Russia's decision to mobilize. It does not appear that any of the Great Powers desired a general conflict, but once the Austro-Hungarians issued their ultimatum to Serbia, the crisis took on a momentum of its own. The necessities of mobilization and strategic plans quickly swept Europe into war.
Civilians and soldiers alike greeted the outbreak of war with nationalistic pride and enthusiasm. To them, it was a great adventure. Millions lined the streets to cheer and throw flowers to the brave warriors as they marched through Berlin, Vienna, and Paris. One young German recruit was so overjoyed when he received his uniform and weapons that he shouted, "War is like Christmas!" The mood soon changed.
MISCALCULATIONS AND ILLUSIONS
At first, none of the European powers realized the type of conflict they had unleashed. Most leaders seriously underestimated the length of the war, its costliness in lives and wealth, and its impact on the very foundations of European politics and society. They expected a short war, basing their assumption on the fact that since the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, most European wars had been brief, lasting only a few weeks or months. They also anticipated that the development and mass production of powerful new weapons in the years leading up to 1914 would give the advantage to the offense rather than the defense. It seemed obvious that the side that possessed the greatest offensive strength would win.
The Central Powers especially counted on a short war because a long conflict was almost certain to go against them. The Allied countries possessed larger manpower reserves, greater industrial strength, and access to the resources of the rest of the world. They also used their superior naval strength to impose a blockade that cut off the Central Powers from the other continents. The Allies virtually encircled their enemies, with Britain and France on the west, Russia on the east, and Italy on the south. Despite the fact that German armies operated within the borders of both France and Russia from 1914 on, the Central Powers were in effect the besieged nations, at least until the collapse of Russia late in the war.
Germany, the most powerful of the Central Powers, had taken a two-front war for granted in its long-range military planning. But the Germans realized they could not win such a conflict unless they defeated France and Russia one at a time in quick, decisive fashion. Their strategic plan, which aimed at accomplishing the first stage of this task, was not new. It was the work of General Alfred von Schlieffen, who had retired as army chief of staff in 1906. Schlieffen called for the Germans to concentrate powerful forces in the west while remaining on the defensive against Russia. He envisioned a thrust through neutral Belgium that would avoid the fortifications along France's northeastern border. German troops would then swing into France, led by an overwhelmingly power right wing that would advance to the southwest of Paris before wheeling to the east. If all went according to plan, the Germans would encircle the main enemy armies and force France to capitulate within six weeks. After this great victory, Germany would shift its strength eastward to deal with the Russians.
When the war began, General Helmuth von Moltke, who had taken over as chief if staff, put the Schlieffen plan into effect. At first, all went well, and the Germans were nearing Paris by early September. But Moltke had reduced the striking power of the right wing to strengthen his forces along the German border where he anticipated a French attack. He also shifted additional troops to the eastern front to help resist an unexpected Russian offensive. As a result, the German spearhead did not have sufficient strength to execute its turn to the southwest of Paris. Instead, it had to shorten its front and wheel to the northeast of the capital, and as it did, the French counterattacked the German flank.
In the desperate struggle that followed, the Allies forced the Germans to halt their offensive. The First Battle of the Marne proved to be the decisive encounter of the war. It denied Germany a quick victory and condemned it to fight a prolonged two-front conflict. Although Moltke received the blame for the German failure, it appears that the Schlieffen plan had little chance of success under any circumstances. It was far too ambitious and would soon have encountered such extreme supply problems that it would have failed even if Moltke had attempted to carry out Schlieffen's instructions to the letter. In fact, a stronger right wing would have compounded these logistic difficulties.
A LONG AND BLOODY DEADLOCK
As the short-war illusion faded, hostilities on the western front degenerated into a bloody war of attrition. The two sides began to dig in and gradually created opposing systems of trenches, extending across southwestern Belgium and northern France from the English Channel to the Swiss border. The front had no flanks, and thus for the next four years both the Allies and Germany tried to break the deadlock by means of direct assaults using millions of men. Unfortunately, the new and terrible weapons, which the Great Powers had developed prior to the war, proved especially well suited for defensive warfare. They included vastly improved rifles, the machine gun, and artillery of tremendous range and velocity. This concentrated firepower prevented either side from gaining a breakthrough and inflicted hundreds of thousands of casualties in each major offensive.
Another deadlock developed on the eastern front, even though this vast area provided far greater room for maneuver. After halting Russia's offensive in the Great Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914, the Germans carried out a major offensive in 1915 that drove the enemy out of much of its western territory. The Russians suffered appalling casualties, and the Germans captured over a million prisoners. But despite this demoralizing setback, Russia refused to make peace. This confronted the Germans with a dilemma. Should they continue to advance deeper into the vast expanse of Russia or halt their operations and concentrate on the western front during 1916? After considerable debate, they chose the latter solution.
The man responsible for this decision was General Erich von Falkenhayn, who had succeeded Moltke as chief of staff. Falkenhayn devised a master plan to win the war in the west during 1916. It involved a huge offensive against the French fortress city of Verdun with the purpose of inflicting such heavy losses that France would be forced to leave the war. This assault, designed to "bleed France white," began in February and continued for months. It did cost the French 375,000 casualties, but the Germans suffered 335,000 of their own, and France did not make peace.
Britain was active, too. It had started the war with a small volunteer military force but resorted to conscription early in 1916 and by the summer had created a mass army. General Sir Douglas Haig, commander of the British Expeditionary Force, opened an offensive along the Somme River in July 1916 with French assistance. But his hopes for a major breakthrough proved as illusory as Falkenhayn's dream of victory at Verdun. The Battle of the Somme continued until November. When it ended, the British had sustained 420,000 casualties, the French 200,000, and the Germans 450,000. This fearful carnage had resulted in no appreciable change in the battle line.
The Russians also returned to the offensive in the summer of 1916. Under the leadership of General Alexei Brusilov, they scored impressive early successes against the Austro-Hungarians, but, as usual, their drive eventually stalled. Again, casualties were high for both sides, the Russians suffering most with close to half a million dead, wounded, and missing and another 400,000 prisoners. Hundreds of thousands of others deserted.
The horrible events of 1916 struck the belligerent powers with stunning psychological impact. Verdun, although a French victory, left the army on the verge of rebellion. When France resorted to another suicidal offensive in the spring of 1917, large-scale mutinies actually took place. The British had to shoulder most of the burden during the remainder of the year, while the French restored order and morale among their forces. The Brusilov offensive had virtually finished both the Russian and Austro-Hungarian armies as important factors in the war. Even the proud German army was never quite the same after Verdun and the Somme and found itself stretched too thin in too many places.
On the home front, war weariness increased, and support for peace grew among the civilian populations. The winter of 1916-17 was particularly harsh, adding to the suffering. Both sides toyed with the possibility of a negotiated settlement, but neither was willing to settle for a peace without compensation.
THE RESORT TO TOTAL WAR
Instead of peace, the new concept of "total war" gradually took shape. It focused on the relationship among war and politics, technology and the economy, and the need to mobilize, not only the armed forces, but the civilian population as well in an all-out effort to gain victory. The ability to achieve this goal varied considerably from country to country. The Western Allies and Germany gained the most success in this endeavor. They also resorted to stronger leadership completely dedicated to victory. In Britain, David Lloyd George, a fiery Welshman, became prime minister in December 1916. The equally combative Georges Clemenceau, who had earned the nickname "the Tiger," took over as premier of France in 1917. The governments of both countries assumed virtual dictatorial power and subordinated everything to their war efforts, but at least civilian officials remained in charge.
In Germany, the military increasingly dominated the government. Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg succeeded Falkenhayn as chief of staff after the failure at Verdun. He and General Erich Ludendorff pressured Chancellor Theobold von Bethmann-Hollweg out of office in 1917 when he appeared too receptive to a negotiated peace. Bethmann's successor, Georg Michaelis, proved to be little more than a puppet for Hindenburg and Ludendorff.
The governments of all three countries concentrated their economies almost totally on the war effort. They allocated resources as well as labor and coordinated production to an unprecedented degree. Their achievements were remarkable. The war's insatiable demand for manpower on the battlefield quickly led to a shortage of male workers in munitions plants. Women in accelerating numbers took their place, especially in France and Britain. This pattern was to be repeated in World War II. The task of large-scale economic mobilization proved far more difficult for Austria-Hungary, Italy and Russia. Their less well developed economies and weaker governmental structures left them more dependent on aid from their allies. Again women replaced many male workers in war industries. Russia's isolation from the Western Powers also sharply limited the amount of assistance it could receive. All the warring countries appealed to their peoples for support and continued sacrifice.
The European powers had blundered into the conflict so unexpectedly in 1914 that they initially had few, if any, clear war aims. All of them believed they were fighting in defense of their national independence or at least national interests. None of them considered itself to be the aggressor. Of the major powers, only Italy entered the war with definite aims. Soon after hostilities began, however, other belligerents formulated specific war aims. With the realization that the struggle was going to be long and bloody, leaders and important segments of the public concluded that it must result in gains that would help justify the terrible slaughter and the strain on their economies.
THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE
On the Allied side, France hoped from the start to regain the Alsace-Lorraine. But as time passed, French leaders began to covet Germany's coal-rich Saar, a small area bordering France on the northeast. They also favored removing German control over the Rhineland, the region to the west of the Rhine River, and establishing an independent Rhenish state. This would create a buffer between France and Germany. The French also hoped to weaken Germany to such an extent that it would be unable to make war on France in the future. And they hoped to acquire German colonies in Africa as well as Turkish possessions in the Middle East. Britain had no territorial ambitions in Europe, but, like France, desired colonial compensation at the expense of Germany and Turkey.
Russia expected to oust Turkey from control of the straits. This cherished dream had long been contrary to the interests of both Britain and France, which had desired to keep Russian naval power out of the Mediterranean. But in 1915, fearing that Russia might make a separate peace, the Western Powers conceded to Russia control over the straits after the war. Italy had entered the conflict to obtain territory along the Austrian border - the Trentino on the north as well as the port city of Trieste and the peninsula of Istria to the east. Italy also desired a sizable strip of Austria's coastline along the Adriatic Sea.
As for the Central Powers, Austria-Hungary had been confused from the start about what it expected to gain from the conflict. In fact, Hungarian leaders had agreed to war only on condition that Austria-Hungary would not acquire any Serbian territory. They believed that the absorption of additional Serbs would only create greater internal problems. And the Austro-Hungarians immediately suffered defeats at the hands of not only the Russians but the Serbs as well. This ominous beginning seemed to indicate the wisdom of seeking a quick end to the war. Instead, they continued to persevere, and Germany came to their rescue with the 1915 offensive, which drove the Russians deep into their own territory. The Germans also directed a campaign in which their troops joined with those of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria to crush Serbia. But this salvation ultimately proved fatal to the dual monarchy because the war became more and more unpopular with the subject nationalities, kindling desires for independence. Austria-Hungary's increasing reliance on its ally also transformed the empire into a German satellite. As the war continued, its primary aim came to be one of self-preservation.
By far the most extensive aims were those of Germany, although these fluctuated according to the fortunes of the war. They provided for absorption of an additional iron-rich slice of French Lorraine as well as Luxembourg and either annexation of Belgium or its conversion into a satellite state. The Germans harbored far greater ambitions in Eastern Europe. These included acquisition of almost all of Russia's western territory - the provinces bordering the Baltic Sea, Poland, and the vast area of the Ukraine. Germany's intentions in these areas are not clear, but it certainly planned some annexations and the establishment of satellite states. The Germans also anticipated establishing a sphere of influence in the Balkans. They visualized creating a German-dominated European customs union that would make them economically supreme. In addition to this vast increase of German power in Europe, they also proposed to take over a number of French, British, and Belgian colonies in Africa.
REVOLUTION IN RUSSIA
As the war continued, the pressures on each of the powers increased steadily. Russia was the first to crack under the strain. Although the Russian economy had experienced some industrialization in the years prior to 1914, it still remained primitive compared to those of Germany and Britain. It proved quite inadequate to supply the needs of both the armed forces and the civilian population. Shortages of all kinds developed early and became more pronounced as the conflict continued. The Russian transportation system also broke down under the unprecedented demands of modern warfare. To make matters worse, the government of Tsar Nicholas II was inefficient, corrupt, and unpopular. War weariness grew steadily.
Early in March 1917, a revolt broke out in Petrograd, the capital. It started as demonstrations against the food shortage that soon became riots. Workers showed their sympathy by going on strike. The government ordered the city's army garrison to put down the unrest, but the soldiers deserted to the rebels. Revolution spread rapidly to other cities, and it soon became apparent that virtually no one was willing to defend the discredited regime. Within a week, Nicholas II had bowed to increasing demands for his abdication, ending the 300-year rule of the Romanov dynasty.
The weak Russian parliament now established a provisional government to lead the country until a constituent assembly could draft a constitution for a permanent political system. But the provisional government was reluctant to hold elections for the assembly in the unsettled atmosphere and also refused to seek a negotiated peace. This obstinate policy eroded the government's support. Its failure to enact a land reform program also alienated the peasants. Workers and soldiers increasingly rallied to the Bolsheviks, a revolutionary Marxist Socialist party.
Under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin, the Bolsheviks sought to win control of the soviets, councils that workers and soldiers had organized early in the revolution. The soviets had remained in existence despite the formation of the provisional government and represented a threat to its rule. By October, the Bolsheviks had gained a majority in the soviets in Petrograd, Moscow, and several other industrial cities. In early November, they moved against the provisional government and quickly gained control of much of European Russia.
Lenin had promised to secure peace if the Bolsheviks came to power and now set out to fulfill that pledge. It proved difficult because the Germans insisted on exceedingly harsh terms. It was not until March 1918 that the Bolsheviks finally agreed to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This settlement, required Russia to give up most of its Baltic provinces, much of Russian Poland, and the Ukraine, as provided in the German war aims. Germany also extracted such far-reaching trade concessions that Russia became a virtual economic dependency.
THE WAR OUTSIDE EUROPE
Although Europe remained its epicenter, the conflict was, nevertheless, a "world war" with hostilities in far-flung theaters of operations. In addition to Japan's seizure of German possessions in East Asia and the Pacific, Allied forces conquered Germany's colonies in Africa and engaged in an ill-advised, long, bloody, and unsuccessful attempt to seize the Turkish straits linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. They also drove the Turks out of Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia (later Iraq) with long-lasting repercussions.
The Allies also received helped from their overseas empires. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, which had become self-governing dominions within the British Empire, all contributing troops. India, which did not enjoy dominion status, also provided soldiers. In addition, both Britain and France utilized colonial contingents from their possessions in Africa. Not surprisingly, these contributions kindled expectations among the peoples of both empires that they would gain concessions from London and Paris after the war.
THE U.S. ROLE
Meanwhile, the United States had entered the war on the side of the Allies in April 1917. Many Americans had been sympathetic to the Allied cause from the start of the war. They had much more in common with democratic Britain and France than with the more authoritarian regimes of the Central Powers. They also were appalled by the German shooting of Belgian hostages in reprisal for civilian attacks on soldiers, the shelling of the beautiful Gothic cathedral at Reims, France, and the sinking of the British ocean liner Lusitania with the loss of over 1,000 lives, including 128 Americans. Allied propaganda proved especially effective at portraying the Germans as barbaric "Huns." And American loans to Allied powers created an economic stake in their victory.
But the primary factor that brought the United States into the war was Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare, which resulted in the sinking of several American ships in early 1917. The policy was a calculated risk designed to force Britain out of the war. The Germans realized that the British were dependent on large-scale imports of food and other supplies. They hoped that they would be able to starve Britain into submission by sinking large numbers of both Allied and neutral ships in the waters around the British Isles. The gamble failed. Not only did it bring the United States into the war, but also the British were able to combat the submarine menace and continue the struggle.
Despite a large population and great economic resources, America was a negligible military power in early 1917, with only 110,000 men under arms. Before the United States could help in the actual fighting, it had to raise a mass army through conscription, train it, and transport it to France. This new and powerful force was not ready for action until the summer of 1918. In the months that followed Russia's departure from the war, Germany attempted to defeat the British and French before America became a factor. The Germans unleashed a series of offensives between March and July 1918, but the Allies managed to hold out, and during the last offensive, fresh American divisions began to make a major contribution. After stopping the final German drive, the Allies took over the offensive and applied unrelenting pressure. On August 8, "the black day of the German army," the whole enemy front began to fall back. German military leaders realized that they had lost the war.
AN END TO THE NIGHTMARE
Soon afterward, dramatic events unfolded far to the southeast. An Allied army had been encamped in northern Greece since 1915, when it had arrived too late to prevent neighboring Serbia from being overrun by the Central Powers. But in September 1918, it went over to the offensive. By the end of the month, it had forced Bulgaria out of the war. Turkey, now isolated to the southeast, capitulated a month later as Allied troops pushed into Serbia.
In late October, Italian forces also won a major victory over the Austro-Hungarians in the Battle of Vittorio Veneto. Confronted by these two critical developments, Austria-Hungary's army disintegrated, and the various subject nationalities began to declare their independence. The dual monarchy signed an armistice on November 4. Soon afterward, Charles, the last emperor of the Hapsburg dynasty, which had ruled Austria since 1267, abdicated.
Germany's position was now hopeless. With its army in full retreat and its allies gone, morale began to crack. Naval mutinies and sporadic civilian revolts broke out. Demand for an end to the war and even the monarchy grew ever more insistent. Emperor Wilhelm II, realizing the weakness of his position, abdicated and fled into exile in neutral Holland. On November 11, a new republican government accepted an armistice.
The long nightmare was over. But although the Allies had defeated the Central Powers, in a larger sense none of the European belligerents had really won. The war had cost the lives of at least 10 million soldiers and had left another 20 million wounded. There were few families that did not mourn the loss of loved ones. An atmosphere of gloom and uncertainty persisted long after the fighting stopped. The war had also seriously disrupted the European economies. Overseas markets were gone, and all the belligerents were deeply in debt. Devastation abounded in many parts of the continent. And although peace had returned, wartime hatred lingered. So did the questions. How could it have happened? How could the leaders have allowed it to continue for so long? What did it accomplish? Could anything be worth the price? Among the casualties was the old confident Europe, long the focal point of the world. It was gone, perhaps forever.