World War II, far more than World War I, deserves to be called a global conflict. Although the 1914-1918 war involved operations in Africa and the Middle East, in East Asia, and on the high seas, Europe remained its focus from start to finish. Europe also felt the war's impact much more profoundly than any other part of the globe. But World War II really consisted of two parallel though interconnected conflicts of major proportions - one in Europe and the Atlantic, the other on the Asian mainland and in the Pacific.
The earlier war plainly began in 1914; the start of the second struggle is not as easy to determine. Most accounts state that it commenced with the German invasion of Poland in September 1939. But others contend that it really began when Japan and China launched their prolonged hostilities in July 1937. Still others move the date as far back as September 1931, when the Japanese embarked on the conquest of Manchuria. Clearly, the European hostilities led to far greater immediate complications and the eventual joining of the two conflicts. Just as certainly, the first shots were fired in East Asia at least two years before.
It is also clear the Germany's aims in the conflict differed considerably from those of Japan. The Japanese operations in Manchuria and China were more traditional in their motivation than the grandiose and apocalyptic vision that motivated Hitler. They were in keeping with the imperialistic policies that, not only Japan, but European powers as well pursued in the period before World War I - territorial expansion and economic exploitation. To be sure these were also present in the aims of Hitler. Indeed his appetite for expansion was prodigious. But he added an ideological dimension that was missing from the Japanese approach - intense racism, reflecting his hatred of the Jews and contempt for the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe. This became the cornerstone of his expansionist policy and ultimately led to genocidal action against both Jews and Slavs. This is not to say that the Japanese were not guilty of appalling atrocities against those peoples who fell under their domination, but they never carried this to the extremes employed by the Nazis, and their crimes were not part of an overriding ideological concept such as that fashioned by Hitler.
A DECADE OF CRISES
The decade of the 1930s witnessed a long series of crises that marked the world's gradual descent into war, both in East Asia and in Europe. These crises unfolded against a background of economic distress created by the Great Depression and the rise of political extremism that was to a large extent a result of these economic problems. Hitler rose to power primarily as a result of the disastrous condition of the German economy in the early 1930s. He promised that he and the Nazis would revive the economy, and revise the peace settlement in Germany's favor. After coming to power, he set out to do just that. The Japanese military leaders exploited the economic turmoil in Japan to push for ever greater penetration into China in pursuit of raw materials and a huge market for Japanese goods.
The other major powers also wrestled with the demoralizing effects of the depression and, although concerned about the German and Japanese threats to the status quo, were divided and uncertain on how to deal with the troubling developments of the 1930s. And, for good measure, all of the Western powers as well as Germany and Japan feared the spread of communism under Soviet leadership. Britain and France were reluctant to pursue policies that might embroil them in another world war. Memories of the ghastly loss of life in World War I as well as the economic, social, and political upheaval that followed in its wake were still fresh. And, although the German people also did not look forward to another conflict, their Fuhrer saw war as the ultimate key to his expansionist dreams.
JAPANESE AGGRESSION IN CHINA
The first crisis, which jarred the world out of what was left of the fragile hopes of the 1920s, began when soldiers of the Japanese Kwantung Army blew up a small section of railway track near the Manchurian capital of Mukden. This incident triggered Japan's escalating involvement in the mainland of Asia, which ultimately led to the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific.
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Japanese military leaders grew concerned about the northward expansion of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang regime in China. They were especially distressed when the Manchurian warlord Chang Hsueh-liang recognized the Kuomintang's authority over Manchuria. Manchuria officials had even gone so far as to boycott Japanese goods and interfere with the activities of Japanese citizens. The Chinese had also built railroads that challenged the monopoly on rail transport that Japan had enjoyed in Manchuria since the end of the Russo-Japanese War.
All of this clearly threatened Japan's political and economic position in Manchuria at the same time that the Great Depression had unhinged the economy at home. Officers of the Kwantung Army, which defended Japanese interests in Manchuria, believed that drastic measures were necessary. But the war ministry hoped to secure Japanese interests through diplomacy. When this failed, the Kwantung officers decided to take matters into their own hands.
After blowing up the railway track, they blamed Chang's troops for the blast and used the incident to attack his forces. These actions represented a classic example of gekokujo and were taken without the war ministry's approval. The Japanese government quickly moved to put an end to the incident and received the army high command's support. But the Kwantung Army ignored instructions to cease operations and continued to advance. When confronted by this defiance, the army leaders in Tokyo gave in and approved the actions in Manchuria. The cabinet now realized that it had no choice but to go along with the army.
With all restraints removed, the Kwantung Army completed the conquest of Manchuria by January 1932. It was an easy victory because the Chinese did not seriously resist. Instead, Chiang reserved most of his troops for a showdown with the Chinese Communists. Although Chiang was not oblivious to the threat posed by the Japanese, he considered it less serious than the internal challenge of the Communists. He also recognized that his own control over Manchuria was tenuous at best and that his army was weak. Chiang preferred to invoke the support of the League of Nations, but the League merely called upon the Japanese to withdraw their troops. It avoided sanctions of any kind, although it did create a commission to investigate the situation. The United States, Britain, and France deplored Japan's aggressive actions, although they agreed that Chinese encroachments on Japanese treaty rights in Manchuria had provoked this extreme response. The Soviet Union was concerned about these developments on its eastern border but was in the midst of the internal struggle with the kulaks and in no condition to intervene.
In September 1932, the Japanese established a puppet state in Manchuria, which they renamed Manchukuo. Japan retained control over the country's military and foreign affairs. Soon afterward, the League commission issued its report, which called for an autonomous Manchurian government under Chinese sovereignty but with safeguards for Japan's special interests. Although the report was quite moderate, Japan withdrew from the League in protest. Almost simultaneously, the Kwantung Army moved into China's Jehol province, southwest of Manchuria. Again the Chinese government offered no serious resistance, and the Japanese incorporated Jehol into Manchukuo. In May 1933, Kwantung forces invaded China's Hopei province, and Chiang, with his attention focused on the imminent start of a new military campaign against the Communists, agreed to a truce. Under this arrangement, China recognized Japanese control over Manchuria and Jehol and also granted Tokyo extensive rights in Hopei. The failure to prevent Japan's conquest of Manchuria and Jehol represented a severe blow to the League's prestige and clearly revealed its basic weakness.
During the next four years, East Asia was relatively quiet, but remained tense. Chiang continued to view the Communists as the primary enemy and tried repeatedly to eliminate their stronghold in Kiangsi province. Although these efforts failed, they weakened Mao's forces. The Communist leader feared that another offensive would be fatal, and in 1934 he ordered his troops to seek refuge in the northern province of Shensi. To accomplish this, the Communists carried out an agonizingly difficult fighting withdrawal of 6,000 miles. Only 20,000 of the 90,000 men who started this legendary Long March reached Shensi, but once there, the mountainous terrain shielded them from Chiang's forces.
Many Chinese nationalists believed that Chiang was prepared to sacrifice the country to Japanese domination while he pursued his obsessive desire to crush communism. The forces of Chang Hsueh-liang, which had fled from Manchuria in 1931, were especially resentful. Reports of this dissatisfaction alarmed Chiang and prompted him to visit Chang's headquarters in December 1936 to seek a reconciliation. While he was there, a group of Manchurian officers took him prisoner. In return for his release, Chiang reluctantly agreed to end his anti-Communist crusade and cooperate with Mao Tse-tung to strengthen China against the Japanese. Chiang was never really committed to this agreement, however, and continued to be reluctant to risk war with Japan.
War came nevertheless. It began in July 1937 with a skirmish at the Marco Polo Bridge south of the major city of Peiping (now Beijing) in Hopei province. Although it is not clear which side actually initiated hostilities, neither government really desired a full-fledged conflict at that time. But heavy fighting followed, and the war quickly escalated. By the middle of August, the Japanese were in control of Peiping. Soon afterward, they besieged the great port city of Shanghai at the mouth of the Yangtze River far to the south. After a bitter struggle lasting seven weeks, Shanghai fell, and the Japanese advanced up the Yangtze Valley. In December, they captured Nanking, the Kuomintang capital, which lay virtually defenseless. General Iwane Matsui, the Japanese commander, ordered his troops to treat the Chinese people with kindness and respect in an effort to gain their trust and cooperation. The soldiers, deaf to his entreaties, engaged in what became known as "the rape of Nanking" instead. They killed 20,000 men of military age by machine gun fire, by bayoneting, and even by dousing some with gasoline and them setting them afire. They raped, murdered, and mutilated 20,000 women and for good measure robbed and killed many other civilians. When the horror finally ended, one-third of the city lay in ashes and at least 200,000 persons had lost their lives, perhaps as many as 300,000.
Alarm increased in the West as it became clear that the Japanese intended to dominate China, a development that threatened European and American economic interests. Japan also aroused disgust by the bombing of open cities and especially the rape of Nanking. Tension mounted in December as the Japanese seized a British gunboat and sank the American gunboat Panay, both on the Yangtze River. Although London and Washington protested, they were reluctant to take any steps that might lead them into war.
Japan hoped to force Chiang to accept a dictated peace, but when these efforts failed, Japanese troops seized China's remaining seaports in 1938 and continued their offensive up the Yangtze. Despite these setbacks, Chiang refused to capitulate and moved his government to the ancient city of Chungking much farther up the Yangtze. Chungking was so remote and surrounded by such rugged mountains that the Japanese realized an advance in its direction was impractical. Chiang now prepared to wait until the enemy agreed to negotiate a reasonable peace or other powers came to China's aid. By the end of 1938, Japan held almost all of China's major cities and the railroads that linked them. But it could not control the vast countryside, where Communist guerillas became active. Clearly, the Japanese had embarked on a task that was beyond their capabilities. They could neither destroy the enemy nor end the war through negotiation.
Meanwhile, relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists deteriorated. Despite the 1930 agreement, there was little cooperation, and frequently armed clashes broke out between the two rival forces. As the years passed, the Kuomintang regime became more corrupt, and its army did little actual fighting against the Japanese. At the same time, Mao's troops increased in strength and offered considerably more resistance to the invader. While the war dragged on into 1939, 1940, and beyond, the Chinese people, no strangers to suffering, continued to endure the horrors of enemy occupation and intermittent fighting. Many of them were homeless, destitute, and victims of recurring famine. The economy was in disarray, and the traditional structure of Chinese society and civilization began to break down.
HITLER'S PLANS FOR EUROPE
Despite the importance of the violent events unfolding in East Asia, to a large extent world attention during this period focused on Europe, where another drama was taking shape and led to the outbreak of war in 1939. Although many factors contributed to the coming of this conflict, the foreign policy of Hitler's Germany was the catalyst. Some historians contend that Hitler had no long-range foreign policy goals and was essentially an opportunist who took advantage of the weakness of other countries and the lack of resolve and unity of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union. They dismiss the views that he expressed in Mein Kampf as daydreams not to be taken seriously. Relatively few observers agree with them. The signs of continuity between Mein Kampf and Hitler's later policies were simply too great. Indeed, the Nazi leader reaffirmed and elaborated on his Mein Kampf program in a second book manuscript, which he wrote in 1928 but never published. Its existence came to light only after the war, when it appeared under the title Hitler's Secret Book. Numerous statements, which the Fuhrer made to Nazi officials both before and during the war, also remained faithful to his original statement of intent.
To be sure, Hitler was an opportunist and a skilled liar. If it served his immediate purpose, he would make agreements with countries he ultimately planned to destroy. He also repeatedly assured the Western Powers that he merely desired a revision of the peace settlement to correct injustices to Germany. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that he planned from the start to dominate Europe, to create Lebensraum for the German people in Eastern Europe, and to accomplish this ultimately by resorting to war. He also planned to solve the "Jewish question," although the ultimate nature of that solution does not appear to have taken final form until well after the outbreak of the war.
Hitler was violently anti-Semitic. His anti-Semitism was reinforced by a strong belief in the superiority of the Aryan race. In his view, only the Germanic peoples possessed pure Aryan blood, and he warned that they must not interbreed with inferiors, particularly the Jews but also the Slavs. He was less certain about the Latins (the French, Italians, Spanish, Portuguese, and Rumanians). He considered them to possess some Aryan blood. but unfortunately, the mixture of other blood lines had seriously reduced the Aryan content.
Closely identified with Hitler's racism was his view that the meaning of history lay in a struggle for existence among peoples or nations. He saw the object of this struggle as the acquisition of land, which was both limited and necessary to sustain the nation. Although he was certain that the Aryan Germans were the strongest nation and would ultimately win this struggle for Lebensraum, he saw the Jews as a potential obstacle. Hitler considered the Jews to be a special case because they were a people with no territorial base of their own, no real homeland. Thus, they were international in outlook rather than nationalistic. In Hitler's view, they sought to denationalize the world through the process of interbreeding with and the bastardization of other peoples. He saw this as an interference with the struggle for existence, and if history were to unfold as he thought it should, it was necessary to crush the Jews. This would enable the German people to pursue their struggle for Lebensraum to a victorious conclusion.
The concept of Lebensraum had been present in the aims of some German nationalists during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was also in keeping with the traditional German interest in expansion to the East that had existed for centuries. Hitler's interest in Lebensraum found much of its inspiration in geopolitics. Geopolitics, which involves the application of geographic principles to political problems, became quite influential in the early twentieth century. Hitler took special interest in the theory of Karl Haushofer, which stressed the importance of the Eurasian landmass. Haushofer believed that the nation that controlled what he referred to as the "heartland" of that vast area would be the dominant power in the world. The heartland included most of the Soviet Union.
Hitler believed that Germany was in a highly vulnerable position because of its location in the center of Europe, with a hostile France to the west and the Soviet Union on the east. Although he considered the Slavic Russians to be Untermenschen (subhumans) and much inferior to the Germans, he believed that they were capable of using German technology and organizational methods to strengthen the Soviet Union. This, combined with the USSR's enormous landmass and huge population, would eventually enable the Soviets to crush the German people, with their limited population and territory. To prevent such a catastrophe, Hitler insisted that Germany must greatly increase its population, but he warned that there was a limit to the number of people that the country could support within its present borders.
Thus, Germany had to expand its geographic base. The first step would involve taking over bordering territories that contained ethnic Germans - Austria, the Sudetenland, Danzig, Memel, and the areas ceded to Poland. Hitler assumed that to carry out even this limited expansion, it would be necessary to wage war against France. The Fuhrer hoped to persuade Britain to remain neutral or even to entice the British into friendship with Germany. He also desired an alliance with Italy, despite its dubious Latin racial credentials. But Hitler contended that Germany's ultimate salvation lay in the expansion eastward into the USSR. The Germans must colonize this area while enslaving most of the Slavs and deporting or exterminating the remainder. He also visualized the ouster - possibly the liquidation - of the Jews from both Germany and the areas to be conquered.
How could he accomplish this grandiose scheme in view of German weakness? Obviously, Germany would have to rearm in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. But if Britain and France intervened militarily to prevent this, the result would be disastrous. Hitler felt confident that they would not resort to such drastic action, however, and for a long time his optimism proved well founded.
REACTIONS OF OTHER POWERS
The British and French were far from united in their attitude toward Hitler and Nazi Germany. Indeed, their own peoples were not in agreement on this question. In both countries, substantial numbers saw Hitler as a bulwark against the spread of communism and westward expansion by the Soviet Union. In France, many conservatives, including army officers, looked with special concern at the development of a large Communist party in their own country. And although the French government viewed any increase in German power as a threat to national security, they remembered the failure of their unilateral intervention during the Ruhr crisis in 1923. They were reluctant to undertake any similar action without British cooperation, but they realized that there was little chance of obtaining this. In fact, many members of the dominant British Conservative party sympathized with the German desire to revise the peace settlement and did not believe that this could be avoided for long.
A strong current of pacifism was also present in both countries, stemming largely from haunting memories of the horrors of World War I. The ghastly losses it had inflicted on their youth were hard to forget. Both nations hoped above all else to prevent another bloodbath, and this would play a major role in their response to Hitler's aggressive actions.
The pressing economic problems created by the Great Depression also distracted the British and French. Although Britain began to make a partial recovery in 1933, France, with a more diversified economy, did not really feel the full impact of the depression until 1934, and recovery did not start until late 1938. The governments of both countries were reluctant to embark on rearmament programs that would be enormously expensive and would place a tremendous strain on the financial stability of their governments. Britain was especially sensitive to the wishes of the self-governing dominions, which also suffered from the depression and wanted desperately to avoid war. The Western Powers also knew that they could not count on the United States to contribute to the collective security of Europe.
At first, the Soviet Union followed a policy of aloofness from European affairs but when the Russians did offer to cooperate with the West, starting in 1934, they made little progress. Britain and France were dubious about the seriousness of the Soviet commitment to collective security and were not certain that they wanted to ally themselves with Moscow under any circumstances. Stalin, for his part, continued to fear the possibility of a deal between the Western Powers and Hitler that might turn Germany's ambitions eastward at the USSR's expense. When Stalin launched his great purges in the mid-1930s, the British and French looked on with horror. Italy appeared a much better prospect for an alliance in the early 1930s. Mussolini feared the possibility of German expansion into Austria and the Balkans, where the Italians also had interests. But Italy's ambitions in Africa soon turned Mussolini away from the Western Powers and toward closer relations with Germany.
British and French leaders also misinterpreted Hitler's intentions. They tended to believe that he merely desired to end the restrictions that the peace settlement had placed on Germany. It was not until 1939 that they began to comprehend that his ambitions went beyond this and that he actually might contemplate the domination of Europe.
PLOYS AND COUNTERPLOYS
The first major problem that confronted Hitler in foreign affairs was the question of how to circumvent the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. An international conference had convened in Geneva in 1932 to consider the possibility of general disarmament. After coming to power, Hitler set out to sabotage this conference by demanding the end of all restrictions on German armaments. When France refused to agree, he withdrew Germany's delegation from the conference in October 1933. He used the same occasion as a pretext for terminating German membership in the League of Nations. Up to this point, Hitler had been reluctant to engage in rearmament on a large scale because he feared French opposition, but when the Western Powers reacted meekly to his withdrawal from the disarmament conference and the League, he became less cautious.
He secretly ordered a sharp increase in arms production during 1934 and by 1935 was finding it difficult to disguise these violations. Early in March, Hitler decided to gamble by announcing that Germany already had an air force in being. A week later, he revealed his intention to reintroduce conscription and increase the German army to 550,000 men. The French and British could have responded by sending troops into Germany or by imposing an economic blockade. They did neither. Instead, they merely protested and took the matter before the League of Nations, which condemned Germany for violating the treaty but took no further action.
Even before Hitler announced rearmament, the first cracks began to appear in France's system of collective security in Eastern Europe. Polish leaders were concerned about their country's precarious geographic position between Germany and the Soviet Union and questioned France's willingness to honor its commitment to Poland if a crisis should arise. They decided that Poland would benefit from better relations with Germany while maintaining the French alliance. Hitler welcomed the opportunity to weaken the Franco-Polish alliance. In January 1934, Germany and Poland signed a ten-year nonaggression pact.
Hitler looked forward to the eventual union (Anschluss) of his native Austria with his adopted Germany. But prospects were not bright. Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, who had established a dictatorship in March 1933, strongly opposed Anschluss. He was also antagonistic to the Austrian Nazi party, which had close ties to its German namesake. France was certain to be hostile to any attempt at union, and it was by no means certain that Britain would approve. Italy looked on Austria as a client state, and also opposed Anschluss.
Despite these obstacles, the Austrian Nazis attempted to overthrow the government in July 1934. Although the putsch failed miserably, it did result in the assassination of Dollfuss. It is not clear to what extent Hitler was actually involved in the plot, but once it failed, he denied any complicity. The assassination outraged Mussolini, who dispatched troops to the Austrian border as a deterrent to any German attempt to intervene. Hitler now recognized that Anschluss must be postponed. Kurt von Schuschnigg succeeded Dollfuss as chancellor and continued his predecessor's dictatorship as well as his dedication to maintaining Austrian independence.
Contrary to their initial passive response to Hitler's rearmament announcements, Britain, France, and Italy soon took steps toward what appeared to be a system of collective security. Representatives of the three powers met in the Italian resort town of Stresa in April 1935 and agreed to work together to oppose future treaty violations. Observers spoke of a "Stresa front" against Hitler.
The situation looked even more encouraging when France and Russia signed a defensive military alliance in May 1935, but Franco-Russian solidarity was more apparent than real. French foreign minister Jean Louis Barthou had launched negotiations for the alliance in 1934 and had tried to breathe new life into France's Eastern European alliance system, with the USSR as the chief bulwark. But he had fallen victim to assassination in the fall of 1934. His successor, Pierre Laval, was not enthusiastic about close relations with the Soviets. He made the pact virtually inoperable by adding stipulations that required the approval of the League of Nations as well as Britain and Italy before France could take action in cooperation with the Soviets. In this form, the pact never became a factor of any importance.
Russian willingness to make an alliance with France was indicative of a new Soviet policy that Stalin put into effect in 1934. Hitler's ruthless treatment of the German Communist party and his nonaggression pact with Poland had convinced Stalin that Nazi Germany posed a threat. He now attempted to build a collective security system that would seek to block German aggression. As the first step, the Soviet Union accepted membership in the League of Nations, and Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov became an outspoken advocate of collective security. In addition to the Franco-Russian alliance, Russia signed a mutual defense pact with Czechoslovakia in 1935. But the Soviets revealed their distrust of the French by stipulating they were only obligated to aid the Czechs if France honored its alliance with Czechoslovakia first. The Comintern also instructed Communist parties in Western Europe to cooperate with the socialists and liberals in "popular fronts" against the Nazi menace. In 1936, popular front governments came to power in both France and Spain.
Despite these promising developments, Britain weakened prospects for a meaningful system of collective security by making a naval agreement with Germany in June 1935 without consulting either France or Italy. The British hoped to limit Germany's naval construction, which they expected Hitler to accelerate along with his military and air power. Under this arrangement, Britain recognized Germany's right to build up to 35 percent of British surface tonnage and 60 percent of British submarine strength. But in view of German naval weakness, Germany could not reach either level for years and, thus, in the meantime, could build without any limitations. Although the agreement applied only to naval strength, in a broader sense it essentially sanctioned German rearmament.
THE END OF THE STRESA FRONT
Mussolini's expansionist ambitions dealt the Stresa front a fatal blow. Continuing economic problems and increasing working-class unrest contributed to his decision to seek a cheap victory in Africa. He hoped that this would distract attention away from internal discontent. The Duce had been planning an invasion of the East African country of Ethiopia since 1932. Italy had attempted to conquer Ethiopia in 1896 but had suffered a humiliating defeat. The memory of this disgrace had rankled Italian nationalists for 40 years. In late 1935, Mussolini sent his troops across the border from neighboring Italian Somaliland and Eritrea. The ensuing Italo-Ethiopian War ruined relations between Italy and the Western Powers and opened the door to Italian cooperation with Germany.
Initially, the British government of Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin and Premier Laval's French cabinet supported sanctions by the League of Nations against Italian aggression. But they did not relish a breakdown of relations with Italy, and British foreign secretary Sir Samuel Hoare and Laval worked behind the scenes to arrange a solution acceptable to Mussolini. The Hoare-Laval plan proposed that Ethiopia cede territories along the borders of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland to Italy and grant significant economic concessions as well. But when news of this proposal leaked to the press, it triggered an outburst of popular indignation in both countries. Hoare and Laval felt compelled to resign soon afterward. Sobered by this experience, Britain and France reaffirmed their support for the League's policy of sanctions. Unfortunately, these sanctions did not extend to the sale of such vital commodities as oil and proved inadequate to prevent the Italians from completing their conquest of Ethiopia in 1936.
Mussolini reacted angrily to what he considered a breach of faith on the part of Britain and France. Hitler had been cool to Italy's invasion, but at least he had not participated in sanctions. Perhaps even more important in Mussolini's mind was the feeble quality of Anglo-French opposition, which cast doubt on their strength as allies. All of this contributed to a reappraisal of Italian foreign policy, and in February 1936 Mussolini informed Hitler that the Stresa front was dead. The failure of sanctions also delivered a serious blow to the League's prestige. Little faith remained in its ability to deter aggression.
Hitler believed that with their attention focused on Ethiopia, Britain and France would be less inclined to resist a German attempt to remilitarize the Rhineland. He knew that Italy would not interfere. Accordingly, he sent troops into the Rhineland on March 7. The Fuhrer pointed to the French parliament's ratification of the Franco-Russian alliance in late February as justification for his action. He contended that the pact was a direct provocation. His generals had advised him against the operation. They felt certain that the French, who were still militarily superior to Germany, would resist. But France did not intervene. French army leaders, who were in a strongly defensive frame of mind, advised the government against military action. They believed that the German force was much stronger than it really was and insisted that France would have to mobilize a million reservists if it were to intervene. The cabinet was reluctant to resort to such a drastic measure as mobilization. Britain opposed military intervention, considering it out of the question to prevent the Germans forcibly from occupying their own territory. The British and French contended themselves with referring the matter to the League, which again condemned Germany for its treaty violations but took no further action. Hitler's gamble had succeeded.
It probably would have been more difficult for France to oust the Germans from the Rhineland than was once believed, and such an attempt would likely have meant war. But the French were certainly strong enough to have accomplished the task. Vigorous military action on their part also could have dealt a serious blow to Hitler's prestige. By failing to act, the French conceded Germany a victory of crucial importance. The occupation of the Rhineland deprived France of a buffer zone against German aggression and badly undermined faith among France's allies in French determination to resist German aggression. Shortly afterward, Belgium renounced its defensive treaty with France and declared neutrality.
CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN
Four months after the Rhineland occupation, civil war erupted in Spain. Revolutionaries had overthrown the Spanish monarchy in 1931 and had established a democratic republic. But the new republic encountered some of the same problems that democracy had faced in Italy and Germany - lack of a democratic tradition, economic problems, and an even more chaotic array of political parties, complete with extremists on the left and the right. When a "popular front" Socialist-Communist coalition took power in 1936, a revolt in Spanish Morocco by troops under the command of General Francisco Franco triggered the civil war.
Oddly enough, Franco had little in the way of strong political convictions and was a latecomer to the military conspiracy that fostered the revolt. He had seen action against Moroccan rebels and gained a reputation for bravery as well as caution. Although originally shy, introverted, and unpopular, he rose rapidly in rank, becoming one of the youngest generals in Europe and eventually chief of staff. His decision to assume command of the revolt was due to his growing concern over the breakdown of order under the popular front government and the growth of radical leftist activity.
Franco's hopes for the conquest of Spain depended on the availability of aircraft to transport his troops across the Strait of Gibraltar. He appealed for aid to both Mussolini and Hitler, who, recognizing the advantage of another dictatorship on France's southern flank, agreed to supply the necessary planes. Although Franco hoped to extend his power rapidly over all of Spain, the republic proved stronger than he had expected. Franco's Nationalist troops managed to gain control over roughly the western half of the country while Republican forces held the remainder. Both Italy and Germany soon contributed manpower and other aid to the Nationalists. By early 1937, almost 50,000 Italian troops were serving in Spain. Hitler sent the so-called Condor Legion, which consisted primarily of planes and pilots, and some soldiers and tanks. Hitler deliberately limited aid to Franco in an effort to prolong the conflict. He wanted to keep British and French attention focused on Spain while he built up his military strength at home. To some extent, the war did provide the opportunity for Germany to test new weapons in combat, including bombers and dive bombers as well as the use of both high-explosive and incendiary bombs in combination.
Stalin countered Hitler and Mussolini by dispatching aid to the popular front government. But he sent no troops, only military advisers and equipment, including tanks and aircraft. The Comintern also sponsored the creation of volunteer units from various countries, which came to be known as international brigades. At their peak, these forces may have reached 18,000. The largest influx of Soviet assistance came during 1936 and early 1937. But in late 1938, Stalin terminated his efforts, apparently sensing the defeat of the Republicans. Britain and France refused to support either side. Despite the fact that a French popular front government had come to power in May, it was split over the question of aid to the republic. Baldwin and his British colleagues were totally opposed to intervention, although they actually favored the Nationalist caused and feared the leftist tendencies of the republic. Britain and France also opposed Soviet aid to the republican government. This increased Stalin's growing suspicion that the Western Powers were not really serious about resisting Hitler and Mussolini and, in fact, were more hostile to him. To prevent escalation of the war, Britain and France sponsored the Nonintervention Committee. This organization consisted of representatives from 27 countries, including Italy and Germany, which cynically participated despite their policy of aid to Franco. The committee accomplished little and became a symbol of hypocrisy.
Although the Republican forces fought gallantly against increasing odds, they lost ground steadily during most of 1938, and their last strongholds capitulated in March 1939. Franco had benefitted greatly from Italian and German support, but his interests did not necessarily coincide with those of Hitler and Mussolini. During the conflict, he had identified his regime with the Falange, a fascist party that had sided with the Nationalists. But this connection was never more than a disguise for what was essentially a traditional authoritarian government. Franco was also determined to maintain his freedom of action in foreign affairs.
GERMANY ON THE OFFENSIVE
The Spanish civil war inevitably brought the Germans and Italians into closer cooperation. Hitler had expected the conflict to make Italy more dependent on Germany, and his assumption proved correct, although Mussolini still hoped to make his way without becoming too closely tied to Berlin. It was the Duce, nevertheless, who promoted the drafting of a vaguely worded agreement in October 1936 that provided for cooperation between the two countries in the future. On November 1, Mussolini referred publicly to the existence of a "Rome-Berlin Axis."
Hitler also moved in the direction of closer relations with Japan in 1936. Despite the obvious fact that the Japanese were not Aryans, the won the Fuhrer's admiration. He viewed them as a people in quest of Lebensraum on the Asian continent and respected their opposition to communism and antagonism toward the Soviet Union. In November 1936, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, binding the two countries to benevolent neutrality if one of them became involved in a war with the Soviet Union. A year later, Italy adhered to the pact.
During 1937, Hitler made no aggressive moves, other than to continue his aid to Franco. But in November, he informed Foreign Minister Konstantine von Neurath and his chief military leaders that his long-range goal was the creation of Lebensraum in Eastern Europe and warned that this would eventually mean war with France and Britain. He indicated that his first goals were Anschluss with Austria and the destruction of Czechoslovakia.
Hitler's bluntness worried Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, the war minister, and General Werner von Fritsch, the commander in chief of the army. Both men pointed out that Germany was far from strong enough to provoke a war, and Neurath also expressed doubts. Their lack of enthusiasm disturbed Hitler, and early in 1938 he replaced Neurath with Joachim von Ribbentrop. A member of the Nazi party since 1932, Ribbentrop was slavishly devoted to the Fuhrer's ideas. He had started his career as an importer of wine and spirits and had no training in foreign affairs. But he endeared himself to Hitler because of his knowledge of languages and air of self-assurance. With the exception of Hitler, virtually all German leaders detested Ribbentrop.
Blomberg and Fritsch also gave up their posts under intense pressure. Hitler abolished the war ministry and replaced it with the High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wermacht, abbreviated OKW). General Wilhelm Keitel headed the OKW with General Alfred Jodl as his chief of staff. Keitel, a particularly spineless individual, had earned the contempt of his fellow officers, who referred to him as a lackery and a lickspittle. Jodl was a man of considerable ability who fell under Hitler's spell. As Fritsch's successor, the Fuhrer chose another officer who was not likely to stand up to him - General Walther von Brauchitsch.
It was also in February 1938 that Hitler invited Austrian chancellor Schuschnigg to his retreat at Berchtesgaden in the Bavarian Alps. At this meeting, he subjected Schuschnigg to unbearable pressure and threats, demanding that he appoint a number of pro-Nazis to his cabinet. The most important of these, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, would become minister of the interior with control over the police. Schuschnigg realized that this would be a prelude to a Nazi takeover of Austria but finally yielded. After his return to Vienna, he resorted to a desperate gamble that he hoped might foil Hitler's plans. On March 9, he announced his intention to hold a plebiscite four days later in which the Austrian people could vote for or against Anschluss. Schuschnigg expected the plebiscite to result in a sizable majority in favor of continued independence.
Hitler apparently agreed and realized that such an outcome would undercut any contention that the Austrians desired absorption by Germany. The Fuhrer reacted quickly and decisively. His first step was to promote demonstrations by Austrian Nazis. He also demanded Schluschnigg's resignation and the appointment of Seyss-Inquart to the chancellorship. The alternative would be an immediate German invasion. Schluschnigg, realizing that he had lost his gamble, complied. Seyss-Inquart became chancellor and, in his first official action, requested that Germany send troops into Austria to assist in the restoration of law and order. German forces crossed the border on March 12, and Hitler annexed Austria to Germany the following day.
These ruthless actions confronted British and French leaders with an accomplished fact. They could only change the situation by war and were not willing to resort to such drastic measures. In fact, both had assumed for some time that Anschluss would come eventually. The British believed that there was nothing intrinsically wrong with the merger of the two German peoples, but they were not happy with the tactics Hitler had employed.
Soon after the Anschluss, Hitler turned his attention to his next victim, Czechoslovakia. The issue, at least initially, was the German minority that lived in the Sudetenland. On March 28, he instructed Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten German party, to seek talks with the government in Prague on the question of autonomy for the Sudeten Germans within the Czech state. Henlein's party shared the Nazi goal of uniting the Sudetenland with Germany. Hitler did not want these talks to culminate in an agreement but planned to use them to create a crisis. He instructed Henlein to keep increasing his demands if the Czechs offered concessions. Once Henlein had convinced President Eduard Benes and the Czech government to begin negotiations, Hitler launched an elaborate propaganda campaign that charged that the Czechs were mistreating the Sudeten Germans. He inferred that if this continued, Germany would have no choice but to intervene. In May, Hitler told his top generals of his "unalterable decision to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future." In June, he selected October 1 as the day of reckoning.
THE DILEMMA OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The crisis posed serious problems for the Western Powers and the USSR. Both France and the Soviets had military alliances with Czechoslovakia. Britain had no obligation, but British leaders feared that if war came, they would become involved on the side of France. Both of the Western Powers considered the possibility of war with the utmost reluctance. They had little faith in Czechoslovakia's ability to repel a German invasion, despite the fact that the Czechs possessed a strong defensive line in the Sudetenland as well as an army of 35 divisions. Of greater importance to them was the ominous fact that since the Anschluss, German territory flanked Czechoslovakia on three sides.
France, as the power with the most definite commitment to Czechoslovakia, felt a special sense of dilemma. It was still suffering from the belated effects of the depression and was in poor condition to embark on a major rearmament program. French generals also indicated that the army would not be able to undertake offensive action against Germany for another two years.
Premier Edouard Daladier, who came to power in April 1938, was convinced that France could not undertake a war without British support and had little faith in the possibility of such aid. Daladier had been premier twice before and had served as war minister since 1936, a position he continued to hold as premier. He had earned the reputation for possessing greater skill as a politician than as a statesman.
Daladier was quite right in expecting no help from Britain. Neville Chamberlain, who had succeeded Baldwin as prime minister in May 1937, favored a policy of appeasement. The British had been highly conciliatory toward Hitler's early violations of the peace settlement. But it was only with Chamberlain's advent to power that appeasement took on the guise of a thoroughgoing policy. A veteran of several cabinets, Chamberlain had little experience in foreign affairs, but he was determined personally to mold Britain's policy toward Hitler. He approached his task with a self-confidence bordering on arrogance.
The prime minister and most of his cabinet felt that the peace settlement had artificially relegated Germany to the role of a third-rate power and that Hitler was merely attempting to restore his country's former greatness. They also sympathized with his desire to absorb fellow Germans into the Reich. In fact, when Chamberlain first came to power, he had been willing to negotiate a general agreement that would have given Hitler a virtual free hand in Austria, the Sudetenland, and Danzig. He believed that the states in question were not vital to British interests and thus hardly a suitable cause for war. He also did not want to jeopardize Britain's partial recovery by approving huge defensive expenditures. British service chiefs also produced gloomy appraisals of the country's military and naval capabilities and greatly exaggerated German strength.
As for the USSR, soon after the Anschluss, Litvinov appealed to Britain and France to cooperate with the Soviet Union in case of continued German aggression. But the Western Powers declined. They were suspicious of Soviet intentions, particularly because the USSR did not border either Czechoslovakia or Germany. The Russians could aid the Czechs only by moving troops through Poland, but the Poles, who also had territorial claims to Czechoslovakia were hardly likely to grant permission.
Ironically, German generals dreaded the prospect of war and believed that France was far superior militarily to Germany. They also feared the formidable Czech defenses in the Sudetenland. When it became clear that Hitler planned to take military action, General Ludwig Beck, chief of staff of the Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres, abbreviated OKH), protested in the strongest terms. He even tried to persuade his colleagues to join in a general strike if the Fuhrer persisted. Although Brauchitsch, the army's commander in chief, shared Beck's misgivings, he was not the man to challenge Hitler. In July, Beck resigned in frustration. General Franz Halder, who succeeded him as chief of staff, also was appalled by the prospect of war. Halder joined with Beck and several other generals in a conspiracy to arrest Hitler if he carried out his war plans and if the Western Powers resisted. To what extent the conspirators were determined to act will never be known because the necessary prerequisite, Western intervention on behalf of Czechoslovakia, did not materialize.
Negotiations between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans dragged on throughout the spring and summer. But matters came to a head in early September, when the British pressured Czechoslovakia to grant autonomy to the Sudeten Germans. Hitler now changed his strategy. He ordered Henlein to break off the talks and delivered a speech in which he denounced the Czechs and emphasized his willingness to go to war to settle the Sudeten issue.
At this point, Chamberlain attempted to reach a settlement with Hitler through personal diplomacy. He flew to Germany and asked the Fuhrer what he really desired. Hitler for the first time specified German annexation of the Sudetenland. Chamberlain agreed to this in principle and returned to London, where he gained the support of his own government. Next he persuaded Daladier and the French cabinet to agree. Benes, recognizing that a refusal would leave Czechoslovakia to confront Germany alone, also reluctantly consented. Chamberlain returned to Germany to report the good news to Hitler, but the Fuhrer had now decided that this generous settlement was not enough. He insisted that the Czechs must also satisfy Polish and Hungarian demands for border revisions as well as a Slovak request for autonomy. Finally, he required the immediate German occupation of the designated areas.
Chamberlain's first response was anger, but by the time he had returned to London, he had decided to accept Hitler's terms, however insulting they might be. But his foreign secretary, Lord Halifax, believed that Britain could not ask the Czechs for any additional sacrifices. Daladier also insisted that France would not accept these demands, and a number of British newspapers attacked Chamberlain's policy. With his support dwindling, the prime minister reluctantly agreed to aid France militarily if that nation honored its commitment to Czechoslovakia. War appeared imminent.
But Chamberlain had not abandoned his efforts. He now sought Mussolini's help in arranging another conference. The Duce realized that Italy was not prepared for war and was more than pleased to play the role of peacemaker. Hitler also had second thoughts and reluctantly decided that it would be best to accept a bloodless conquest. This time, a four-power meeting convened in Munich on September 30, with Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain, and Daladier all in attendance. Neither Czechoslovakia nor the Soviet Union received an invitation. During the conference, Chamberlain and Daladier essentially accepted Hitler's original demands. They approved German annexation of the Sudetenland with a brief postponement of the actual occupation of some of the territory. Czechoslovakia had no choice but to accept the agreement. Hitler had won total victory; in addition to absorbing 3 million Germans, he had occupied important natural resources and industrial centers, including the huge Skoda armament works. Soon after the Munich agreement Benes resigned as president and went into exile in Britain. The aged Dr. Emil Hacha succeeded him.
A CHANGE OF POLICY IN THE WEST
Upon his return to London, Chamberlain jubilantly told a cheering crowd that he had secured not only "peace with honor," but "peace in our time." Winston Churchill, a dissident member of the prime minister's own party, was not so sure. He glumly proclaimed that "We are in the midst of a disaster of the first magnitude." As it turned out, Chamberlain had only postponed the coming of war for 11 months. Hitler had no intention of allowing the rump Czecho-Slovak state to survive and merely waited for the right opportunity to strike. It came in March 1939 in the form of squabbling between the Czechs and the Slovaks. Hitler urged Slovak extremists to demand independence and pressured President Hacha to agree to this as well as to accept a German protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia. The alternative was an immediate invasion. Hacha gave in on March 15, and German troops quickly occupied the two provinces. Hitler now recognized the independence of Slovakia, which agreed to become a German protectorate. Hitler also granted Ruthenia, the extreme eastern portion of Czechoslovakia, to Hungary. The Czecho-Slovak state had ceased to exist, and Hitler had fallen heir to vast quantities of military equipment that substantially augmented his still incomplete rearmament program.
By ruthlessly destroying the remnant of Czechoslovakia, Hitler clearly revealed that his goal was not merely to absorb fellow Germans into the Reich. He increased tension still more by seizing Memel from Lithuania on March 23. Chamberlain now reluctantly changed his policy, and on March 30 Britain extended a guarantee to Poland that assured the Poles that if Germany attacked them, they could count on British support. France joined in this guarantee and also reaffirmed its original alliance.
Chamberlain's action represented a startling reversal in British policy. The prime minister was convinced that Britain must take a much firmer approach to Hitler. But he had not ruled out the possibility of a negotiated settlement over Danzig and Poland. It appeared to him that a show of determination would be more likely to bring Hitler to the bargaining table. But if such an approach were to have any chance of success, it required significant preparations for war and immediate efforts to coordinate military planning with the Poles. Little of this followed. Although the British introduced conscription on a limited basis, and both Britain and France strengthened their forces, they took only the most halting measures to cooperate with the Poles. None of this was sufficient to persuade Hitler that they were really serious.
Actually, Hitler had originally hoped to achieve an alliance with Poland for use against the USSR. He had broached such an agreement as early as 1935 and again in 1937. In return for concessions to Germany on Danzig and the Polish corridor, he held out the prospect of territory for Poland in the Ukraine. The Poles declined. They feared both Germany and the Soviets were reluctant to become too closely associated with either. Instead, they tried to maintain a precarious balance between the two.
Ribbentrop, the Nazi foreign minister, revived this proposal in October 1938 and again in January 1939. He requested Polish approval for German annexation of Danzig and the construction of an extraterritorial road and railway across the Polish corridor to link East Prussia with Germany proper. He also asked that Poland adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Poles refused, fearing that acceptance would convert their country into a German satellite. In April, soon after the Anglo-French guarantee to Poland, Germany brusquely renewed these demands. Again the Poles refused. This signaled the start of a new crisis, which continued throughout the spring and summer while the Germans launched another propaganda barrage, accusing the Poles of mistreating the German minority in Poland. In April, Hitler ordered preparations to begin for an invasion of Poland in September.
CRISIS OVER POLAND
Hitler looked to Mussolini for support as German relations with Poland and the Western Powers deteriorated. Although the two dictators had grown closer since the outbreak of the Spanish civil war, the Duce had attempted to improve relations with Britain as a counterweight to the Rome-Berlin Axis, but nothing substantial came from his efforts. The Italian dictator also resented Hitler's escalating importance and his own relegation to junior status in the Axis. On April 7, 1939, Italian forces seized little Albania, across the Adriatic Sea from southern Italy. This change was less dramatic than it appeared because the Italians had exercised strong political and economic influence over Albania since 1926.
Despite Mussolini's dream of pursuing a middle course in foreign policy, he concluded an actual alliance, the "Pact of Steel," with Germany on May 22. This agreement bound the two partners to provide full assistance to each other in case of war, regardless of the circumstances. But Mussolini recognized that Italy would not be ready for war until 1943, and his foreign minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, had so informed Ribbentrop during the negotiations. But the text of the pact made no reference to this. Hitler apparently assumed that Italy would enter the war when he attacked Poland, even though he kept his ally in the dark regarding his plans until late in the crisis. When he did finally confide in the Duce that a military showdown was imminent, Mussolini surprised him with the news that Italy could not join in hostilities for the foreseeable future.
With the deepening of the Polish crisis, the role of the Soviet Union loomed especially large. As Poland's neighbor on the east, the USSR was in a position either to aid the Poles in the defense of their country or to side with the Germans in its destruction. Britain and France recognized that an alliance with the Soviet Union would be the best way - perhaps the only way - to deter Hitler from attacking Poland.
They began diplomatic discussions with the Soviets in April, but these proved indecisive. Military staff talks did not start until early August and quickly took on an aura of unreality. Both Britain and France found it difficult to abandon their distrust of the Russians, and Stalin was perhaps even more suspicious of the Western Powers. He was far from impressed with their military strength and feared a possible Western deal with Hitler which would enable Germany to crush Poland and then turn against Russia without interference from Britain and France. The memory of the Munich agreement was still fresh in his mind. The whole question of an alliance became moot when Poland announced that it would not allow Soviet troops to enter its territory. The Poles feared Russia at least as much as they feared Germany.
It now appeared to Stalin that a deal with Hitler provided his best option, at least for the present. It offered security from a German attack in the near future as well as the possibility of pushing the USSR's borders farther to the West, thus providing a buffer zone against an invasion, if and when it finally came. In fact, Stalin had considered an agreement with Hitler even before the start of talks with the Western Powers. He made his first approach to Berlin in April and in May replaced Foreign Commissar Litvinov with Vyacheslav Molotov, his oldest and closest associate. Litvinov, a Jew with an English wife, symbolized Soviet support for collective security. Molotov, blessed with nerves of steel and an imperturbable temperament, was devoted to Stalin.
Despite his aversion to the Soviet Union and communism, Hitler could also see the obvious benefits to be gained from an agreement. In late May, talks began on economic issues and culminated in an agreement on August 19. Under its terms, the Soviets were to supply the Germans with raw materials, and Germany would extend credits to enable Russia to purchase German capital goods and war material. But what Hitler wanted most was a political arrangement, and he pressed Stalin to receive Ribbentrop on August 23 to discuss such an understanding. The result was the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, which Ribbentrop and Molotov drafted that same day. Under its terms, the two powers vowed to remain neutral if either of them became involved in a war. They also concluded a secret protocol that provided for German occupation of the western half of the country while the Soviets claims the eastern portion. Germany also recognized the predominance of Soviet interests in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and the Rumanian province of Bessarabia, reserving Lithuania for its own sphere of influence.
When Germany and the Soviet Union announced the signing of the nonaggression pact, the news created a sensation throughout the world and came as a great blow to the British and French. It meant that Hitler would be free from the need to fight a two-front war once he had defeated Poland. But despite this great advantage, Hitler viewed the pact primarily as a mechanism for assuring the neutrality of Britain and France. Without Soviet support, he expected the Western Powers to back down and desert Poland as they had abandoned Czechoslovakia. This would enable him to deal with the Poles in a localized war. Much to his surprise, however, the British and French did not back down. Despite this inconvenience, at dawn on September 1 Hitler sent his forces into Poland. The Western Powers declared war on Germany two days later. The conflict, which Hitler had hoped would be an unequal struggle between Germany and Poland, had become World War II.