Hitler launched his long-awaited offensive in the west on May 10, 1940. The Wehrmacht put Manstein's variant of Case Yellow into effect, and the Allies responded with Plan D. The result was a spectacular success for the Germans, who smashed their enemies with such speed and ease that even they were astonished. Despite adoption of the new plan, only Hitler had been completely confident of victory. The scope of Germany's overwhelming triumph and the rapid collapse of the French army stunned the people of France as well as the British, who now faced the German juggernaut alone. It also reverberated around the world and jolted the American people out of the complacency that their remoteness from Europe had fostered and triggered a new debate on whether the United States should extend aid to the hard-pressed British.
COMPARATIVE MILITARY STRENGTH
Germany's amazing victory led to the widespread belief that its forces were much stronger in numbers and equipment than those of the Allies. This was not true, at least not at the start of the campaign or in regard to all types of equipment. The Germans had 136 divisions on the western front, but they assigned 19 of these to General Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb's Army Group C, which remained in a defensive position opposite the Maginot line. This left 117 divisions, including 42 that the OKH held in reserve. Seventy-five divisions took part in the initial assault. Of these, 30 comprised Bock's Army Group B and 45 formed Rundstedt's Army Group A. Allied strength totaled 144 divisions: 101 French, 11 British, 22 Belgian, and 10 Dutch. These troops varied in quality, however, and were under four separate commands. France also tied down 36 divisions in the Maginot line, which the Germans did not attack until it was hopelessly outflanked. The Allies, nevertheless, committed 81 divisions to meet the attack.
One of the great myths, which persisted throughout the war, was the belief that Germany enjoyed vast superiority in armor. The French estimated that the Germans possessed as many as 7,500 tanks, but in reality they had only 2,500, well over half of them inferior Panzer I and Panzer II models. The remainder consisted of relatively small numbers of Panzer III and Panzer IV models and about 350 Czech tanks. France had about as many tanks as Germany, perhaps more. Many of them, especially the Somua medium tank and the Char B-1 heavy tank, were superior in armor and firepower, although they tended to be slower and had a limited range. Britain had almost 300 tanks in France, including the Matilda, which was better armed and armored than any German tank except the Panzer IV. The fatal flaw was the Allied failure to concentrate their tank units. Though the French had six divisions of armor and seven motorized divisions prepared to advance into Belgium, they were only recently organized and French doctrine did not provide for massing them in a point of main effort as the Germans did. Almost half of the French tank battalions were dispersed along the rest of the front, supporting infantry, while German tank battalions were components of the panzer divisions. Bock had three panzer divisions as well as one motorized division in Army Group B. Rundstedt's Army Group A deployed seven panzer and three motorized divisions, which formed the powerful spearhead of the German attack.
The powerful concentration of armor together with Manstein's daring operational plan and close tactical air support were the keys to the spectacular German victory. Thus, despite the Allies quantitative and qualitative superiority, Germany's brilliant use of its tactical resources resulted in a swift breakthrough and envelopment of the bulk of the Allied forces in a startlingly brief period of time. Not only did this reduce the Allies to an inferior position in strength, but the speed with which it was accomplished inflicted a profound psychological shock on them as well.
Most historians of the 1940 campaign have contended that Germany completely outclassed France in the air. It now appears that this is somewhat misleading. In fact, the French possessed a total of 4,360 planes to 3,270 for the Germans, and for the most part France's fighters and bombers were comparable to or better than those of the enemy. Unfortunately, France deployed only one-fourth of its air strength against Germany. This was due in large part to a shortage of both air and ground crews. A prolonged disagreement between leaders of the armed forces over the mission of France's air power contributed to this problem. The army insisted on close tactical support of ground troops, but the air force favored a strategic role, stressing long-range heavy bombers. Thus, when the Germans struck in 1940, the French had only 583 fighters and 84 bombers actually assigned to the front. The remainder were in the process of being reequipped or were stationed in France's colonies. Additional Allied strength, most of it British, included 197 fighters and 192 bombers. But the Royal Air Force held back the bulk of its aircraft for the defense of Britain. Under the circumstances, the Luftwaffe did enjoy a considerable advantage with 1,264 fighters and 1,504 bombers.
THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP
France also suffered from cumbersome army leadership structure. General Maurice Gamelin was the supreme commander of the land forces. Though highly intelligent, he tended to be indecisive. Gamelin also had a low regard for the potential of Germany's panzer forces. Despite his lofty position, Gamelin delegated operational control of the forces in northeastern France to General Alphonse Georges, who made most of the actual decisions. The division of authority between Gamelin and Georges created confusion, and Gamelin was often ignorant of the exact situation at the front.
Both France and Britain faced the German offensive under new political leadership. Premier Daladier had provoked a crisis in the French parliament because of his failure to aid the Finns during the Winter War and had resigned in March. His successor was Paul Reynaud, whose voice had been one of those crying in the wilderness during the 1930s regarding France's need for armored divisions. Reynaud had also criticized French foreign policy prior to the war. He had urged more vigorous measures against Germany and, as finance minister since 1938, had been largely responsible for increasing arms production. Unfortunately, Reynaud lacked a large personal following in parliament, while Daladier continued to have a strong base of support. Reynaud needed to maintain Daladier's backing and felt compelled to keep him in the cabinet as minister of war even though the two men detested each other.
In Britain, Chamberlain also ran into trouble with Parliament as a result of his handling of the Norwegian campaign and resigned on the very day that the Germans attacked in the west. The new prime minister, Winston Churchill, had been prominent in British politics for four decades and had been first lord of the admiralty early in World War I. But Churchill had spent most of the 1930s as a political outcast, at first as the result of his opposition to the government's plan to extend limited self-government to India. Later he compounded his unpopularity by his outspoken criticism of Chamberlain's appeasement policy, especially the Munich agreement. But when the policy ended in failure with the outbreak of war in 1939, Churchill won vindication, and Chamberlain appointed him to his former position at the admiralty. Blessed with boundless self-confidence and determination as well as great charisma, a quicksilver mind, and a restless imagination, Churchill clearly had the potential to be a far better wartime leader than Chamberlain.
But the circumstances that prompted the change were ironic because Churchill, more than anyone else, had favored Allied intervention in Norway and, as first lord of the admiralty, held ultimate responsibility for the Royal Navy's failure to prevent the German invasion. At first, Churchill's position was similar to Reynaud's. He had no large parliamentary following of his own, while Chamberlain actually remained leader of Churchill's Conservative party and continued in the cabinet with effective control over domestic policy until October.
Reynaud had great contempt for General Gamelin. As he put it, Gamelin "might be all right as a prefect or a bishop, but he is not a leader of men." He was so dissatisfied with the army commander's conduct of the Norwegian campaign that he tried to dismiss him early in May. But Daladier and others in the cabinet opposed this action, and Reynaud resigned in disgust on May 9. During this crisis, Gamelin learned of Reynaud's criticism, and he, too, resigned. Thus, when the Germans attacked the next day, France technically had neither a government nor an army commander in chief. Under the circumstances, both men withdrew their resignations.
SWEEP THROUGH THE LOW COUNTRIES
Hitler unleashed his Blitzkrieg in the early hours of May 10, striking the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg simultaneously and making rapid progress everywhere. The Dutch were no match for Bock's Army Group B and received little aid from the Allies. Germany completely dominated the air over the Netherlands and made extensive use of paratroops to capture bridges over the many rivers and canals, key to the Dutch defense system. Knifing through the country, the Germans forced the Dutch to capitulate within five days. An especially ugly incident occurred while negotiations were under way for the surrender of Rotterdam, the Netherlands' leading port. German bombers leveled the center of the defenseless city and killed 980 civilians. This raid became symbolic of German ruthlessness, but it now appears that due to a breakdown in communications, the Luftwaffe units involved actually were not aware that the surrender talks were taking place.
Bock's attack on Belgium encountered fiercer resistance because the Belgian army was larger and its defenses stronger than those of the Dutch. The Germans made rapid progress, nevertheless, and their capture of the supposedly impregnable Fort Eben Emael on the Albert Canal in eastern Belgium was especially impressive. An airborne force of only 85 men, transported by gliders, landed unmolested on the spacious and undefended roof of the fortress. The Belgian garrison totaled 750 men, but all of them were inside the fort. Once the Germans had consolidated their position, they used special hollow charge explosives to blow up the guns and neutralize the defenders. Soon afterward, Bock's main forces pushed through to link up with the airborne troops and then advanced to the Dyle River.
Meanwhile, French and British forces swept rapidly into Belgium to their prearranged positions along the Dyle and Meuse rivers. As a result, they had unwittingly placed themselves in a perfect position to be outflanked by Rundstedt's Army Group A. Three panzer corps, which formed Rundstedt's spearhead, slammed through Luxembourg and the Belgian Ardennes in two days against slight resistance. By May 13, each of them had crossed the Meuse in northern France and by nightfall had torn open a gap 50 miles wide in the French front. Panic on the part of some French troops and hasty orders to withdraw from the Meuse contributed to the German success. The southernmost and strongest of the panzer corps, commanded by Guderian, made the crucial crossing near Sedan. Three experienced panzer divisions attacked just one French infantry division composed of inadequately prepared and poorly equipped reservists. The French assumed that the Germans would not try to cross the Meuse until their artillery arrived. Rather than wait, however, Guderian ordered repeated attacks by medium bombers and Stukas, which pinned down and demoralized the defenders, allowing German infantrymen to cross the river in rubber boats. They secured a bridgehead, and soon afterward, engineers constructed a pontoon bridge that enabled Guderian's tanks to cross and exploit the breakthrough. Despite this success, the French 3rd Armored Division attacked Guderian's left flank, creating a dangerous threat. Unfortunately for the French, General Charles Huntzinger, commander of the French 2nd Army, ordered it to pull back. Huntzinger feared that the Germans might swing around his forces in an effort to outflank the Maginot line.
This decision relieved the pressure on Guderian's forces and enabled his armor to dash toward the sea. It reached the channel coast on May 20 near the mouth of the Somme, trapping the Allied forces in Belgium and northern France. Progress would have been even more rapid had it not been for the fears of Guderian's immediate superior, General von Kleist, that he was advancing too fast and might be cut off by French counterattacks. Kleist ordered him to halt briefly on two occasions to allow the following infantry to catch up to the panzers or at least narrow the gap. Hitler also urged caution, as did General von Rundstedt. But the French mounted little in the way of serious counterattacks, largely because of the speed of Guderian's advance and their own commitment of so many troops to Belgium and the Maginot line. They did attack with their few armored divisions but developed them on a piecemeal basis, which diluted their striking power. The Germans destroyed them one by one.
One Allied counterattack did achieve a modest success. A force of 75 British Matilda tanks and supporting troops struck against the 7th Panzer Division, commanded by the soon-to-be-famous General Erwin Rommel, near the French city of Arras on May 21. The ungainly looking Matilda had acquired its nickname because of its resemblance to the popular comic strip character Matilda the Duck. The British caught the Germans by surprise and inflicted damage sufficient to make Rommel believe that he was being attacked by a much larger force. It was not until Rommel utilized lethal 88mm anti-aircraft guns in an anti-tank role that the attack ground to a halt. This British counterattack as well as that of the French 3rd Armored Division near Sedan demonstrate what the Allies might have accomplished had they concentrated their armor and struck with greater force against the exposed German flanks. If they had done so, the outcome of the campaign might have been different.
ESCAPE FROM DUNKIRK
As Guderian closed the trap on the Allies, Bock's troops forced them to abandon the Dyle line and retreat into western Belgium. The Allies found themselves in a steadily shrinking pocket between the two German army groups. They searched desperately for some way to break through the encirclement, but all their efforts failed. Three alternatives now confronted them: surrender, continue fighting until annihilated, or attempt to evacuate as many troops as possible by sea. Ultimately, they chose the third option, largely at the insistence of General Lord Gort, the British commander, who recognized long before other Allied leaders that this was the only way to escape.
During World War I, Gort had gained a reputation for bravery that few could approach, being wounded four times and winning the Victoria Cross, Britain's highest military decoration. Nevertheless, many of his fellow officers believed that he was out of his depth in commanding a large force. But Gort proved to be the savior of the BEF when, on his own initiative and without notifying the French, he ordered his troops to fall back to the English Channel on May 23. Gort based his decision not only on the obvious German threat but also on the deteriorating position of the Belgian army, which supported his left flank. Churchill, who was slower to recognize the seriousness of the Allied dilemma, did not formally authorize a withdrawal until three days after Gort's decision to fall back toward the sea.
The Allies' chances of a successful evacuation did not appear promising. Guderian, after reaching the coast, turned north toward the French channel ports - Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk. He hoped to take all three by a quick thrust. Elements of his force rapidly surrounded Boulogne and Calais while others moved toward Dunkirk, but on May 24 Rundstedt ordered him to halt his armor less than 15 miles from his destination. Guderian, Brauchitsch, and Halder all protested, but Hitler supported Rundstedt's decision. He also assigned to Bock's troops, with their preponderance of infantry, the task of capturing Dunkirk despite the fact that they were over twice as far away from the city as Guderian's faster-moving tanks.
This decision became one of the most controversial of the entire war. Some critics have charged that Hitler halted the armor in a deliberate effort to allow the British to escape, hoping that their gratitude for this favor would result in a willingness to make peace. But this argument does not square with the facts, especially since Rundstedt, not Hitler, originated the order. It appears more likely that both Rundstedt and Hitler were convinced that the Allies could not carry out a large-scale evacuation, and thus they could not see any need to press on to Dunkirk with Guderian's armor. This is not as surprising as it might seem. The British were initially pessimistic about their chances. Even Churchill did not believe that they could hold Dunkirk for more than two days or that the Royal Navy could save more than 45,000 troops. Reynaud and his military leaders had no faith at all in an evacuation, and French forces were slow to fall back on Dunkirk. Many of them never made it. To make matters worse, the Belgian army surrendered on May 28. Rundstedt and Hitler were also concerned about the heavier tank losses that the Germans had sustained in recent days. Both men wanted to conserve their armor for the next step in the offensive, a drive southward toward Paris. Finally, Luftwaffe commander Hermann Goering insisted that German air power could destroy the Allied forces at Dunkirk, and for a time Hitler accepted this as a possibility.
By May 26, it had become obvious that Bock's infantry was making extremely slow progress toward Dunkirk, and Guderian received permission to resume his advance. But it was too late. The Allies had strengthened their defensive perimeter around the city, and the panzers could make little headway.
The Dunkirk evacuation began on May 26 and proved amazingly successful. Britain still ruled the sea, and the German navy, badly mauled in the Norwegian campaign, was not able to intervene in any substantial way. The Royal Navy recruited hundreds of small civilian pleasure craft to ferry troops from the beaches to the larger naval ships waiting offshore. Vessels of all kinds joined this strange little armada - fishing boats, motorboats, yachts, lifeboats, tugs, barges, paddle steamers, even a car ferry. Civilians from all walks of life manned them, from butchers to bankers. One of the yachts sailed with its owner, Commander C. H. Lightoller, the senior surviving officer of the Titanic disaster, at its helm. The small boats moved toward the beaches amidst great confusion, sometimes nearly being swamped by waves in the wake of naval ships. They ventured as close as possible to shore while long lines of soldiers, exhausted from days of fighting and retreat, waded out to meet them, the leading ranks up to their shoulders in water. All of this unfolded as bombs exploded and shells whistled overhead, and the buildings of Dunkirk burned in the distance. While the tenacious Allied rear guard prevented the Germans from breaking through the defensive perimeter, the Luftwaffe attempted to thwart the evacuation by bombing and strafing. Although the Luftwaffe inflicted considerable casualties, it could not prevent the evacuation. The Royal Air Force did its best to hamper the German air attacks but failed to gain control of the air over Dunkirk and the surrounding beaches. The British carried out the evacuation despite German air superiority.
When the operation ended on June 4, a total of 338,000 Allied soldiers had escaped, 224,000 of them British, but they had to leave behind or destroy all of their heavy equipment. Also left behind were many members of the gallant rear guard, now condemned to years of captivity. Despite the brilliance of the achievement, Dunkirk was certainly not a victory, as Churchill recognized, but the climax to an epic defeat. It gave Britain a badly needed psychological lift, but it did nothing to prevent the fall of France. Moreover, the British forces that escaped from Dunkirk did not contribute directly to the salvation of Britain from German invasion. Naval and air power, along with the limitations of Germany's armed forces, saved the British in the summer and fall of 1940. But it is true that had the British lost their expeditionary force at Dunkirk, this disaster might have destroyed their will to continue the war. The evacuated troops also provided the nucleus for the British army of the future.
THE CONQUEST OF FRANCE
When news of the German breakthrough at Sedan reached Paris on May 13, it caused near panic in the French government. Reynaud telephoned Churchill and sobbed, "We are beaten. We have lost the battle." Although the campaign had barely begun, Reynaud's words were prophetic. The disaster also led to Gamelin's dismissal on May 18. His successor was General Maxim Weygand, who had succeeded Marshal Petain as commander in chief of the French army in 1931 and retired four years later. Gamelin persuaded him to return to active duty in 1939 as military commander in Syria. Although 73 years old, the general remained amazingly fit and still ran wind sprints. Weygand recognized from the start that he had inherited a hopeless situation.
Another change, and a fateful one, was Reynaud's appointment of Petain, now 85, as vice premier. Reynaud took this step in order to inspire his people with memory of Petain's stirring defense of Verdun in 1916. But Petain, like Weygand, did not believe that it was possible to stop this German offensive. Instead, he used his position to undermine Reynaud and work for a separate peace.
While the fighting at Dunkirk was still in progress, Weygand tried to establish a defensive system along the Somme and Aisne rivers. But the "Weygand line" was manned by only 61 French divisions and one British, all of them infantry. At this point, the Germans did possess overwhelming superiority, both in men and armor. Weygand did not expect to stop the enemy but intended to fight one last battle to salvage French military honor. Starting on June 5, the OKH unleashed 95 divisions against the Weygand line and quickly broke through its weak defenses. Bock sent two spearheads toward Paris and another into Normandy to the northwest. Rundstedt directed his armor around the rear of the Maginot line.
As the Germans plunged deeply into the heart of France, Mussolini belatedly entered the conflict. Traditionally, historians have assumed that the Duce made the decision to stab his unfortunate neighbor in the back more or less on the spur of the moment. But it now appears that Mussolini had decided as early as April to declare war on France and Britain if and when Hitler struck in the west. He apparently expected another stalemate as in World War I and hoped for a negotiated peace in which Italy would be one of the participants. Instead, the unexpected success of the German Blitzkrieg convinced Mussolini that unless he acted, the conflict would end before Italy could claim any of the spoils. He declared war on June 10 but made no immediate attack.
Soon afterward, the French declared Paris an open city to spare it the horrors of Warsaw and Rotterdam, and on June 14 it fell to the Germans. The government fled to Bordeaux. As the situation worsened, panic gripped many French civilians. An estimated six to ten million refugees fled southward, clogging the roads and often impeding the army's retreat. They used any means of transport they could find, including bicycles, carts, even hearses. Not a few were on foot. At times, German planes bombed and strafed the roads, killing many and creating utter chaos. Meanwhile, German spearheads raced on. While Rundstedt's armor swung behind the Maginot line, General von Leeb's Army Group C attacked the line frontally. Leeb, a rather cautious and unimaginative Bavarian who was noted for his skill in defensive warfare, had commanded Army Group C since before the start of the war. His forces had remained on the defensive along the Rhine while the army groups of Bock and Rundstedt had won glory in Poland and had smashed the Allies in Belgium and northern France. But now his troops drew the unenviable assignment of testing the vaunted French defensive system, which proved exceedingly formidable. Despite heavy shelling, it held out until the end of hostilities without the loss of a single major fortress.
With the Germans rapidly overrunning the country and the French army disintegrating, France's government split on the question of further resistance. Reynaud and his supporters wanted to fight on from the French colonial empire in North Africa, but Petain and Weygand insisted on an armistice and gained the backing of a majority in the cabinet. Petain succeeded Reynaud as premier on June 16 and quickly asked for a cease-fire, but almost a week elapsed before the armistice talks convened. In the meantime, the Germans continued to push southward.
Hitler imposed his armistice in the exact spot where Germany had submitted to the Allies in 1918 - near Compeigne, to the northeast of Paris. He even ordered the same railway car, which had been the site of the earlier capitulation, moved from a museum for the occasion. After attending the preliminaries of the surrender ceremony, he journeyed to the French capital, where, in silent contemplation, he viewed the tomb of Napoleon, his great predecessor in the art of conquest. Hitler's terms provided for German occupation of two-thirds of France, including Paris and the entire Atlantic coast. The rest of the country remained under French control, as did France's colonial empire and fleet. All of these arrangements were temporary, the final peace treaty being left until the end of the war with Britain.
The fall of France marked the end of the democratic Third Republic, which had been the French form of government since 1870. Petain and a number of his colleagues disliked the republic, with its unstable multiparty system. In its place they created an authoritarian regime with Petain as head of state. They also selected the small health resort city of Vichy as the capital of unoccupied France. Vichy contained a number of large hotels and casinos that could serve as government buildings. Stunned and humiliated by the speed and thoroughness of their defeat, the French faced the future with little hope that their country could survive as anything more than a satellite of an all-powerful Germany. Still, most of the French people rallied to Petain and remained loyal to him for much of the existence of the Vichy regime. As the great hero of the defense of Verdun in World War I, he provided a link to France's glorious past. To many, he also symbolized conservative values and order. Conservatives saw Petain as a bulwark against communism and the possibility of a "Red revolution" in the wake of the army's shattering defeat. And a substantial number of the French were sympathetic to some aspects of Hitler's ideology, most notably his opposition to communism and his attitude toward the Jews. A strong strain of anti-Semitism had long been present in French society.
The divisions within the French cabinet prior to Petain's assumption of power mirrored those in French society. The far right of the political spectrum, including many military officers, had never embraced the Third Republic. Fear of the Soviet Union and the spread of communism had tended to divert attention away from the menace posed by Nazi Germany during the '30s, and this continued after the outbreak of war. To make matters worse, the French Communist party followed the line laid down by the Comintern in Moscow, making its loyalty to the republic tenuous at best. Thus, when France entered the conflict, its people were far from united. Those on the far right opposed the war, and suffered from a defeatist mentality. The Communists, after briefly supporting the war, reversed their field after the Nazi-Soviet Pact went into effect. Not all those who opposed the conflict were from the far right or far left, however. Many were simply pacifists, opposed to war on principle. Memories of the horrors of World War I also contributed to anti-war feeling and defeatism. The strange "neither war nor peace" atmosphere of the Phony War greatly increased social and political tensions and was marked by governmental repression of Communists. One historian has referred to the Phony War as "the bridge between the Third Republic and the Vichy regime."
But one Frenchman chose not to capitulate. Charles de Gaulle, who had won promotion to general during the campaign and had served Reynaud briefly as undersecretary of war, refused to accept either the armistice of the Vichy regime. Instead he escaped to London, organized his own government in exile, and pieced together a "Free French" military force, primarily from troops in France's Central African colonies, which accepted his leadership.
France had fallen in just 35 days, but German armor had actually settled the issue within the first week. The keys to German success clearly were (1) the revised plan of attack, (2) the Allied assumption that the Germans would strike through northern Belgium, and (3) the German use of concentrated armor in the thrust through the Ardennes. Had the Germans remained faithful to their original plan, the outcome might have been different. Allied superiority in tank quality might have led to a German defeat or at least a stalemate. In fact, French mechanized forces did win an early victory over German panzers attached to Army Group B in a battle fought in eastern Belgium between May 12 and 14. They knocked out 160 German tanks, most of them Panzer Is and IIs, at the cost of 105 of their own. The French also made the mistake of sending their 7th Army into the southern Netherlands as part of Plan D. Had they retained it in its original role as a strategic reserve, it would have been in an excellent position to attack Guderian's flank near Sedan. General Huntzinger also made a crucial error when he ordered the withdrawal of the 3rd Armored Division, which had been striking against Guderian's forces. This decision effectively ended any hope of blunting the German spearhead. Throughout the breakthrough in the Ardennes and the dash to the sea, many German leaders, including Hitler, remained nervous, fearing an attack on their exposed flank. But once they realized the magnitude of their victory, doubts about armored warfare vanished, and an almost blind faith in the potential of the Blitzkrieg took their place.
A SPECTACULAR SUCCESS
In a very real sense, Germany's smashing victory over France marked the peak of Hitler's success in World War II. Though more spectacular triumphs still lay ahead, none could equal the impact of this one, both in Germany and throughout the world. Despite Germany's quick conquests of Poland, Denmark, and Norway, no one expected the astonishing swiftness and utter thoroughness of its crushing victory over the great French army, which had held out for over four years in World War I and eventually emerged triumphant, despite appalling casualties. Clearly, the Blitzkrieg had made this a far different war from its predecessor. It appeared as if the German war machine were invincible. The fall of France also opened a myriad of strategic possibilities for Hitler. Achieving a negotiated peace with Britain or a cross-channel invasion of the island kingdom headed the list. But occupation of the French coast also gave Germany access to the Atlantic for its submarines and surface raiders as well as a direct link to Franco's Spain. His alliance with Italy and the collaborationist policy of Vichy France provided the opportunity to move into North Africa and the Middle East. But all of those options also posed potential problems and challenges to German strategic planning. From this point, the war was to become increasingly complicated and final victory even more elusive.