The tide of battle in the Pacific began to turn when Japan suffered a series of setbacks between May and December 1942. The most spectacular of these took place at sea - the Battle of the Coral Sea in May, the Battle of Midway in June, and a series of bitter engagements in the waters off the Solomon Islands from August to November. Japanese fortunes on land also began to fade during the same period - on New Guinea and on Guadalcanal in the Solomons. By the end of the year, the balance had clearly shifted against Japan. But the United States had only tentatively taken the initiative. Many more months of bitter fighting and painfully slow progress lay ahead as Japan struggled to regain the upper hand. Not until late 1943 did the tide turn irrevocably against the Japanese. The key factor was America's far greater industrial base, which by then was in high gear and was producing an ever increasing flow of ships, planes, and other kinds of war materiel that had not been available earlier. Japan, with its much weaker industrial capacity, could not even approach this remarkable achievement. Nevertheless, the first steps in the turning of the tide took place in 1942.
JAPANESE STRATEGY
Most of the first steps originated, not from American planning, but from Japanese initiatives that the army and navy high commands agreed to carry out only after a heated and prolonged debate over strategy. These arguments took place while Japan was winning victories in early 1942 and focused on proposals for possible operations in the late spring and early summer. Army leaders, who had insisted that Japan go to war with the United States in 1941, now were reluctant to engage in any major new offensives against America or Britain. They were more interested in an attack on the USSR if, as they expected, Germany's projected summer offensive dealt the Soviets a mortal blow.
Naval leaders, who had been much more reluctant to go to war with America, now were eager to extend Japan's domination. But they did not agree on where to strike. Some argued the conquest of Ceylon, which would enable Japan to control the Indian Ocean and threaten India. Others preferred to thrust southward toward Australia. Still others insisted on striking eastward to seize Midway, an atoll over 1,000 miles northwest of Pearl Harbor. Admiral Osami Nagano, chief of the naval general staff, favored the second alternative. Admiral Yamamoto much preferred the third. Nagano was Yamamoto's superior and possessed the authority to overrule him. He had opposed Yamamoto's plan to attack Pearl Harbor, but after its success, he was reluctant to challenge him again.
Yamamoto won the argument, and Nagano agreed to an operation against Midway. He also abandoned thoughts of an invasion of Australia, but nevertheless decided to seal off that continent partially before the Midway undertaking. He planned to accomplish this by capturing Port Moresby, on the southeastern coast of the island of New Guinea, and Tulagi in the southern Solomons. Japanese forces had landed at various points along the northern coast of New Guinea during the winter and spring and had seized the Admiralty Islands, New Britain, and New Ireland to the northeast as well as the northern islands of the Solomon chain. Once in control of New Britain, they took advantage of the outstanding natural harbor at Rabaul to build a powerful naval base. By extending their domination over the airfield at Port Moresby, the Japanese could protect Rabaul from air attack while securing a base from which to bomb northern Australia. By establishing a seaplane base on Tulagi, they could patrol the eastern waters of the Coral Sea between the Solomons and both New Guinea and Australia.
AMERICAN OPERATIONS
Meanwhile, American leaders had reorganized the U.S. Navy's command structure. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Ernest J. King became commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet, and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz took over as commander of the Pacific Fleet. King was a brilliant planner and administrator, but he was also arrogant and aloof. A veteran of the Spanish-American War, he had served as chief of staff in the Atlantic Fleet during World War I. While in this position, he developed a strong dislike of the British that, unfortunately, he never lost. King had commanded the Atlantic Fleet with distinction during 1941. The admiral viewed the war from a narrow focus that favored the navy's interest. He disagreed with the "Europe first" strategy and urged greater emphasis on the Pacific. Such an approach would certainly enhance the navy's role because naval power was the key to victory over Japan. Just as obviously, the army would be of primary importance in Europe. Indeed, King's insistence on the significance of the Pacific contributed greatly to the fact that it never became as secondary a theater of operations as Roosevelt and others had originally planned.
Nimitz, by contrast, was easygoing, well liked, and a team player. Roosevelt chose him over 28 senior officers to lead the Pacific Fleet, certainly one of his most inspired decisions. Nimitz's first task was to revive the fleet's shattered morale after the Pearl Harbor disaster, and he achieved this with remarkable speed. He did so largely by refusing to dismiss most of the members of Kimmel's staff and instead expressed complete confidence in them. They in turn gave him their complete loyalty. Nimitz proved to be a brilliant leader of men as well as a skilled strategist and tactician.
The new commander faced the awesome responsibility of holding a line from Midway to Australia against further Japanese encroachments with the relatively meager forces remaining after the Pearl Harbor attack. Their chief strength lay in the carriers Saratoga, Lexington, Enterprise, and Hornet. But a Japanese submarine damaged Saratoga in January 1942 and forced it to return to the U.S. West Coast for repairs. As its replacement, Nimitz received Yorktown from the Atlantic Fleet. Fortunately for him, the Japanese navy was busy in the waters off Southeast Asia in the first few months of 1942 and made no move against his fleet.
Nimitz soon came into possession of another weapon that proved of tremendous value in the upcoming operations: Navy cryptanalysts had broken the Japanese naval code. By May, Nimitz possessed detailed information that made it clear that the Japanese intended to attack Midway as well as Port Moresby and Tulagi. Starting in the summer of 1942, it became standard practice to refer to information derived from the Japanese naval codes by the British name, Ultra. When the Americans broke the enemy's army code in the spring of 1943, this source of intelligence also came under the Ultra umbrella. The name Magic applied only to diplomatic ciphers.
While the Allies were suffering their depressing series of defeats during the first few months of 1942, Nimitz carried out minor offensive operations against the Japanese, with little success. Carrier-based planes from a task force commanded by Admiral William Halsey raided Wake and islands in the Caroline chain during February and Marcus Island, less than 1,000 miles from Tokyo, in March but inflicted only minor damage.
By far the most ambitious undertaking during this period was a daring attack by 16 army air force B-25 bombers on April 18. This force, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle, took off from the carrier Hornet 700 miles to the southeast of Japan and bombed Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. Most of the planes continued on to China where they either landed or crash landed. One wound up in the Soviet Union. Doolittle had already won fame for his daring peacetime exploits as a pilot and at one time held the world's record for air speed. His attack on Japan soon made him a national war hero. Although the raid did little damage, it provided a much needed psychological lift for the American people. It also came as a shock to the Japanese leaders and people, who had seen their sacred homeland violated by the enemy for the first time. Among those affected was Yamamoto, who feared that the raid indicated a gap in Japan's defenses that must be plugged. Roosevelt had quipped that the attack had originated from a secret base called "Shangri-La," a reference to a mythical land that was the setting for the popular 1933 novel and 1937 film Lost Horizon. Yamamoto suspected erroneously that Midway might be Shangri-La. This belief reinforced his determination to strike at Midway and destroy the U.S. carriers.
BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA
Japanese leaders began their operations against Port Moresby and Tulagi in early May. They allotted strong naval forces to cover the landings, but this time the Americans were in a position to challenge them. Once his cryptanalysts had alerted Nimitz to the Japanese plan, he ordered a task force, under the command of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, to contest the enemy attempt to take Port Moresby. Fletcher's forces included the carriers Yorktown and Lexington. Fletcher had no experience with carriers or airplanes before the war. He had this shortcoming in common with many of his colleagues, however, and it did not prevent him from gaining command of a carrier task force. Although popular with his fellow officers, he encountered criticism for poor seamanship and indecision during the abortive attempt to relieve Wake Island. One of Nimitz's staff officers later referred to him as "a big, nice, wonderful guy who didn't know his butt from third base."
The Japanese occupied Tulagi without opposition on May 3. Meanwhile, the major invasion expedition headed southward from Rabaul toward Port Moresby under protection of the light carrier Shoho and other naval units. At the same time, a more powerful task force converged on the Coral Sea from the Japanese base of Truk in the Carolines. It included the heavy carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku. The overall commander of the operation was Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye, whose Fourth Fleet had attacked Guam and Wake in December. Inouye expected American naval units to intervene but assumed that his slightly stronger force would prevail. The Battle of the Coral Sea followed on May 7-8. It was the first naval engagement in history in which the opposing ships never came within sight of each other. Carrier-based planes provided all the firepower. The Japanese lost Shoho, and Shokaku sustained severe damage. On the American side, Lexington survived the effects of Japanese torpedoes and bombs but succumbed when a spark from a generator ignited gasoline fumes and caused a series of explosions. Japanese planes also seriously damaged Yorktown.
Tactically, the battle was a draw because the opposing fleets inflicted roughly equal punishment. But the United States won a strategic victory because Inouye became so concerned about his losses that he called off the landing at Port Moresby. Even more important, both Shokaku and Zuikaku had to return to Japan, the former for extensive repairs and the latter for fresh planes and pilots. Neither was available when Yamamoto's forces steamed for Midway. The Battle of the Coral Sea was not decisive, but it clearly marked a shift in momentum, one that continued.
BATTLE OF MIDWAY
The really crucial battle came at Midway. Yamamoto assumed that American naval forces would intervene in strength if Japan threatened Midway. This would provide the opportunity for the Combined Fleet to finish the job it had started with the Pearl Harbor attack - the destruction of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, especially its carriers. Yamamoto based his strategy on the premise that Japan would not be secure until it had eliminated the Pacific Fleet. His thinking was undoubtedly sound, but his plan was faulty.
Its most serious flaw was the provision for too many objectives. This diluted Japanese strength. Yamamoto called for a secondary assault on two of the Aleutian Islands, Attu and Kiska, which lay many hundreds of miles to the west of Alaska. Although he hoped this operation would divert U.S. ships and planes away from the Midway area, it shifted Japanese strength from the major objective as well. And his insistence on the occupation of Midway also distracted attention from the main purpose of the plan: to lure the Pacific Fleet into a showdown battle. His forces could accomplish this by their mere presence in the waters near Midway.
Yamamoto also failed to concentrate the strength he had earmarked for the Midway operation. His plan provided for Admiral Nagumo's carrier striking force to perform two missions: an air strike against Midway's land-based aircraft and an attack on the Pacific Fleet when it intervened. Yamamoto was convinced that U.S. forces would not move westward until after the Japanese had taken Midway. But if the Americans should intervene earlier, they might catch Nagumo's force while his planes were assaulting Midway and his carriers were most vulnerable to air attack. Other Japanese naval units were to provide close support for the Midway invasion force. Meanwhile, Yamamoto himself planned to remain far to the rear with what he referred to as the Main Body, consisting of three battleships and supporting vessels. He intended to bring this force into action against the Americans when the opportune time came. But he placed the Main Body so far to the west that the showdown battle might be over before it could act.
Nagano and his naval staff pointed out many of these weaknesses. They discounted the importance of occupying Midway and warned that it was unlikely that the Japanese could again catch the Americans by surprise. But Yamamoto enjoyed such massive prestige that his plan won approval. The navy set early June as the target date for the attack on Midway. Yamamoto and other Japanese naval leaders also suffered from what they later described as "victory disease." They had grown so accustomed to winning one great triumph after another that they became arrogant and assumed that they would overcome all obstacles. Even the members of the naval staff who criticized Yamamoto's plan most vehemently never doubted that their forces would succeed.
Despite the flaws in Yamamoto's plan and the breaking of the Japanese naval code, Nimitz's forces were considerably weaker than those of the enemy. Yamamoto's total strength included four heavy carriers - Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, and Soryu - and two light carriers as well as seven battleships, 15 cruisers, and 44 destroyers. To counter this huge armada, Nimitz had three carriers, eight cruisers, and 15 destroyers under the command of Admiral Fletcher. Two of the carriers, Enterprise and Hornet, formed the core of a task force under the command of Admiral Raymond Spruance. The hastily patched-up Yorktown provided the nucleus of a second small task force under Fletcher's direct control.
Nimitz had selected Spruance as a last-minute replacement for Halsey, who had to be hospitalized because of a severe skin condition. At first glance, Spruance might seem a poor choice. His prior sea experience had been as commander of destroyers, cruisers, and a battleship. He was, thus, a member of what naval aviators referred to disparagingly as the "gun club." Unlike the effervescent Fletcher and Halsey, Spruance had gained a reputation among other officers as cold and humorless. But he remained calm and cautious in action while demonstrating a flair for making the right decisions and taking advantage of opportunities. His performance in the forthcoming battle ended any doubts as to his ability.
Whereas Nimitz was aware of Japanese intentions and deployed his strength accordingly, Yamamoto was ignorant of the location of the Pacific Fleet. He assumed that Nimitz knew nothing of his plans and would not be able to intervene until after Midway had fallen. The Japanese also incorrectly believed that they had sunk Yorktown in the Battle of the Coral Sea, and Yamamoto expected to face, at most, two American carriers. His plan called for Japanese submarines to provide early warning of the Pacific Fleet's westward movement. However, due largely to the misconceived certainty that the Americans would not move prior to the Midway attack, the submarines were slow to take up their designated positions to the west of Oahu. When they finally did, U.S. naval forces had already passed far beyond that point and were waiting to ambush the enemy carrier striking force from the northeast.
Nagumo's fleet penetrated within 250 miles of Midway on June 4. It launched an attack on the atoll while sending out reconnaissance planes to search for any U.S. ships that might be in the area. But the Japanese carried out their search with neither a sense of urgency nor their usual efficiency, and hours elapsed before they discovered the presence of American vessels. Meanwhile, Japanese planes damaged installations on Midway and destroyed 17 aircraft. They were preparing for a second attack when a search plane finally spotted elements of the Pacific Fleet. Before Nagumo could react to this unwelcome news, wave after wave of American torpedo planes attacked the Japanese carriers. But they failed to damage their targets and fell victim to Japanese Zero fighters and withering aircraft fire. They managed, nevertheless, to disperse the Zeros, and when U.S. dive bombers pressed home their attacks soon afterward, they scored several direct hits on Soryu, Akagi, and Kaga, turning them all into blazing hulks.
Only Hiryu remained, and its planes took off in search of the American carriers. They found Fletcher's flagship, Yorktown. The first wave of divebombers scored three hits, and the second assault by torpedo bombers added two more. Even now Yorktown might have survived, but two days later, enemy submarine I-168 fired another pair of torpedoes into its side. This time there was no escape. But Hiryu was doomed, too. American dive bombers attacked and set it ablaze. Within a short time, the last of Nagumo's heavy carriers joined the three others on the bottom.
When Yamamoto received news of the Japanese disaster, he belatedly attempted to intervene with the battleships of his Main Body. He hoped to attack the Pacific Fleet in a night engagement. The Japanese had proved themselves masters in this type of encounter. But Spruance, who had succeeded to operational control of the Pacific Fleet when Fletcher had to abandon Yorktown, refused to risk his carriers and withdrew to the east. When Yamamoto discovered this, he, too, reluctantly pulled back. His Main Body, which had not fired a shot, might just as well have remained in Japanese waters.
Midway was a crucial victory for two reasons. It had foiled Yamamoto's second attempt to destroy the Pacific Fleet, and it had reduced Japan's overwhelming numerical advantage in carriers. Not only had the Japanese squandered four carriers, but they had lost 253 planes and their skilled pilots. Neither their carrier force nor their naval air power were ever the same after this demoralizing defeat. Nevertheless, the Japanese navy still remained powerful and for some time numerically superior to the Pacific Fleet. In the months that followed, the two enemies would struggle for supremacy on both land and sea, while the strategic initiative hung in the balance.
SMALL VICTORIES, BIG DEFEATS
Yamamoto's only success was the capture of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians, but this was a dubious achievement. The Japanese forces, which occupied these remote and desolate northern islands, faced an ominous future after the defeat at Midway.
On land, the Japanese continued to hold the initiative, but their days of ascendancy were dwindling. After the failure of their plan to capture Port Moresby by a seaborne operation, they attempted to take it by land. This was no easy task. It involved pushing southward along a narrow, perpetually muddy trail, known as the Kokoda Track, which ran from Buna on New Guinea's northeastern coast across the rugged, rain-swept, and jungle-choked Owen Stanley Mountains. The Japanese pushed southward from Buna in late July and by August 26 had penetrated to within 30 miles of Port Moresby. But their drive bogged down due to supply problems, the difficult terrain, and stiffening resistance from Australian troops. In mid-September, they abandoned their attempt to take Port Moresby.
The Australians launched a counteroffensive on September 28 but encountered ferocious Japanese resistance and did not reach the Buna area until mid-November. Australian and American troops now slowly hammered away at skillfully constructed enemy defenses, featuring bunkers made from coconut tree logs. The Japanese fought with fanatical determination, preferring suicide charges to surrender, but eventually the Allies prevailed. Buna fell on January 2, 1943. It was now clear that the tide had turned against Japan in New Guinea.
BATTLES FOR THE SOLOMON ISLANDS
Even before the Japanese drive on Port Moresby had halted on the Kokoda Track, American forces had launched their first offensive in the southern Solomon Islands. Initially, U.S. leaders had merely intended to take Tulagi and neighboring Gavutu. But when they discovered that enemy troops had landed on nearby Guadalcanal and were constructing an airstrip there, they decided to attack it as well. Although Guadalcanal had been somewhat of an afterthought, this little-known island became the site of a desperate struggle that lasted for six months.
Admiral Robert Ghormley, the U.S. naval commander in the South Pacific, held overall responsibility for the invasion. The site of Ghormley's headquarters was Noumea, on the French island of New Caledonia, which had sided with de Gaulle. Although Noumea lay 900 miles to the southeast of Guadalcanal, it was the nearest deep-water port with reasonably adequate facilities. Noumea was also almost 6,500 miles from San Francisco. Its remote location from both the source of suppliers and the fighting front, along with a chronic shortage of shipping, created a highly difficult logistic situation.
Ghormley had to make do with land and sea forces that were so slender and so hastily assembled that Operation Watchtower earned the nickname "Operation Shoestring." Eleven thousand marines, under the command of General Alexander Vandegrift, landed on Guadalcanal on August 7. Vandegrift was a quiet, modest man known for his fatherly concern for his troops. When first informed of his mission, he confessed that he had no idea as to the location of Guadalcanal. Smaller forces invaded Tulagi and Gavutu and by the next day had overcome the fierce resistance of their tiny garrisons. The Guadalcanal landing surprised the meager Japanese defenders, and they offered no opposition but withdrew into the jungle. They even abandoned their airstrip, which the Americans seized and christened Henderson Field after Major Loften R. Henderson, a marine pilot who had died at Midway.
Once Japanese leaders recovered from their initial shock, they set out to drive the marines into the sea and immediately dispatched reinforcements to Guadalcanal under the command of General Kiyotake Kawaguchi. A veteran of the Philippine campaign, Kawaguchi immediately recognized that Guadalcanal would become a vital point in the Pacific war and was determined to dislodge the Americans.
In the following weeks and months, Japanese troop transports and supply ships repeatedly made night runs down the narrow channel separating the western Solomons from the eastern islands in the chain. The Americans called this body of water "The Slot" and referred to the nocturnal Japanese naval missions under Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka as the "Tokyo Express." Although the defeat at Midway had seriously weakened their carrier force, the Japanese still had a considerable advantage in battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. They used these vessels to escort their transports and supply ships as well as to bombard Henderson Field. At times they also attempted to interdict American reinforcements and supplies that converged on Guadalcanal during daylight hours.
The struggle for Guadalcanal became largely one of supply, and the side that maintained its flow while cutting off the enemy's would ultimately win. The issue remained in doubt for months. Kawaguchi's troops launched savage attacks against marines defending Henderson Field. During the night of September 13, they tried repeatedly to break through a position that became known fittingly as Bloody Ridge. The marines repulsed them each time, killing over half the attacking force while suffering heavy casualties themselves. Early in October, General Harukichi Hyakutake, the Japanese commander of the Solomons, took personal control of the battle. But he was no more successful than Kawaguchi.
Guadalcanal was an abominable place to fight a war. Most of it consisted of rugged mountains, dense jungles, and malaria-ridden swamps. The heat and humidity were constant and oppressive. Both sides suffered from the appalling conditions and from some of the most ferocious fighting of the entire Pacific war. Despite continued fanatical Japanese attacks, which often featured suicide banzai charges, the marines held out night after night, week after week, month after month. Fresh army forces finally relieved the exhausted garrison in December.
Meanwhile, the rival fleets fought a series of six major naval engagements and many minor ones between August and November in an effort to gain control of the sea and win the battle of supply. Most of these encounters took place at night and involved primarily cruisers and destroyers. The Japanese continued to demonstrate their mastery of night fighting, utilizing trained night vision and searchlights, and took a heavy toll on American ships, although they, too, suffered serious losses. But two of the clashes occurred in daylight and featured attacks by carrier-based aircraft. Savo Sound, the body of water between Guadalcanal and Tulagi, claimed so many ships from both fleets that the Americans nicknamed it "Ironbottom Sound," because this large concentration of submerged metal skewed magnetic compasses, creating a navigation problem.
The first of these encounters, the Battle of Savo Island, unfolded on the night of August 8-9, soon after the marine landings. It gained its name from the volcanic island at the entrance to "Ironbottom Sound" and ended in a Japanese victory. A Japanese cruiser squadron overwhelmed a somewhat makeshift Allied force, sinking one Australian and three American cruisers and severely damaging another as well as several destroyers. The Japanese lost only one cruiser to a submarine attack after the battle ended. It was one of the worst defeats ever suffered by the U.S. Navy. But the Japanese missed an opportunity to destroy the American transports off Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Instead, with the approach of dawn, Admiral Gumichi Mikawa withdrew his ships because he feared air attacks by carrier-based planes. But Admiral Fletcher, who had led U.S. forces in the Coral Sea and at Midway, had already pulled back his three carriers - Saratoga, Enterprise, and Wasp - because he feared a Japanese air strike. Their departure left the transports completely exposed to an attack, which fortunately never came.
Fletcher was less timid in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons later the same month. His carrier planes intercepted enemy supply convoy and its supporting carrier force. They sank the light carrier Ryujo, but Japanese aircraft damaged Enterprise. Marine planes from Henderson Field also destroyed an enemy cruiser and a supply ship. Their losses convinced the Japanese that daylight runs were too risky, and they returned to the night-time Tokyo Express. But Japanese submarines remained a constant menace. Torpedo attacks mortally wounded Wasp and put Saratoga and the battleship North Carolina out of action until November.
In the Battle of Cape d'Esperance on the night of October 11-12, U.S. warships used radar to detect the approach of an enemy convoy off Guadalcanal's northwest coast. They sank a destroyer and a cruiser while losing a destroyer. Soon afterward, Admiral Nimitz concluded that the Guadalcanal operation required more aggressive and inspiring leadership than Admiral Ghormley was able to provide. He replaced him with Admiral Halsey.
The new commander was a man of action in the swashbuckling naval tradition, preferring to act quickly and boldly without too much thought for the consequences. He believed in carrying the fight to the enemy with unrelenting persistence. Unlike most of the leading admirals at this time, Halsey was an aviator. When the war began, he was America's most experienced task force commander. He was exceptionally outgoing and enjoyed the respect and love of his men. While Spruance, the victor of Midway, earned renown as "an admiral's admiral," Halsey was clearly "a sailor's admiral."
Halsey decided to bring the carriers into action again in an effort to gain the initiative. The result was another daylight encounter near the Santa Cruz Islands to the east of Guadalcanal on October 26. Aircraft from a task force commanded by Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, a veteran of the Battle of the Coral Sea, attacked and damaged the Japanese carriers Zuiho and Shokaku. But the Americans paid a heavy price as enemy planes sent the carrier Hornet to the bottom and damaged Enterprise's flight deck. The battle ended in a tactical victory for the Japanese, but their heavy losses in planes and pilots tended to nullify their advantage.
The fifth and decisive clash, the Battle of Guadalcanal, took place on November 12-15 near the entrance to Ironbottom Sound. A large Japanese force tried to protect a landing of reinforcements and supplies on Guadalcanal. A much smaller U.S. squadron rashly steamed forward to engage the enemy at close range. It crippled the old battleship Hiei and sank two destroyers while losing one cruiser and four destroyers. At this point both forces withdrew, but the following day the Japanese submarine I-26, which had already sunk the Wasp, torpedoed the light cruiser Juneau, which went down with the loss of 600 men, including the five Sullivan brothers. Torpedo planes from the carrier Enterprise finished off the Hiei the same day. That night Japanese cruisers bombarded Henderson Field, but on the 14th, navy and marine pilots sank a heavy cruiser and no fewer than seven troop transports. In the evening, the Japanese returned with the battleship Kirishima, four cruisers, and nine destroyers. This time they encountered two new American battleships - Washington and South Dakota - and four destroyers. At midnight, another savage engagement followed as searchlight beams and the flashes of big guns illuminated the sky. The Japanese sank three destroyers and crippled South Dakota, but Washington, with its radar fire control sank Kirishima. Soon after, the Japanese withdrew once again, leaving the U.S. Navy in control of the waters around Guadalcanal. At dawn on the 15th, American land and carrier-based planes destroyed the remaining four enemy transports.
Japanese forces tried again to land supplies on November 30, precipitating the sixth and final major battle. It took place off Guadalcanal's Tassafaronga Point. This time the Americans outnumbered the enemy. But again the Japanese demonstrated their skill in night fighting. They outmaneuvered the U.S. ships, sank a cruiser, and inflicted serious damage on three more at the cost of only one of their own destroyers. Despite this victory, Japanese leaders concluded that their navy could not continue to absorb losses like those they had been suffering since August and reluctantly agreed to abandon Guadalcanal. In early February 1943, they gradually and skillfully evacuated their forces despite U.S. naval superiority. By February 9, the Americans controlled the entire island.
Guadalcanal was in many respects as pivotal a victory as Midway. The United States had forced the Japanese out of the bitterly-contested island and before long would take the offensive up the Solomon chain. Although it had suffered heavy losses at sea, the U.S. Navy was able to obtain replacements and continued to press the attack in the following months. Japan was not so fortunate. The Japanese had staked a great deal on stopping this first Allied offensive and had failed. In the process, they had lost their reputation for invincibility in land warfare, and their naval power, so badly shaken at Midway, had suffered still another setback.
A WAR OF SAVAGE HATRED
The grim struggles on New Guinea and Guadalcanal also increased American hatred of the Japanese, which had been growing since the start of the war. The Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor, which the Americans invariably referred to as a "sneak attack," was the most important factor in the prevailing view of the Japanese as treacherous and devoid of all decency. The Bataan Death March and reports of atrocities that accompanied Japanese conquests in East Asia and the Pacific also contributed significantly to the American image of the Asian enemy. Americans were especially outraged when a Japanese court condemned eight U.S. airmen to death for their participation in the Doolittle raid on Japan. These men had been captured after they crash landed in occupied China. Only three were actually executed, however, while the sentences of five others were commuted to life in prison. The film The Purple Heart, released in 1944, presented a dramatic and sensational account of this trial.
These examples of Japanese brutality combined with a long tradition of American racial prejudice toward Asians created a hatred far more virulent than that toward the Germans and Italians. Despite the enormity of German crimes against Jews and other peoples, Americans tended to distinguish between good and bad Germans rather than brand the entire population as brutal or degenerate. Such was not the case with their perceptions of the Japanese. They saw them as far different from other people - savage and bloodthirsty. Cartoonists habitually portrayed them as monkeys or apes. Virtually all Americans, both military personnel and civilians, called them "Japs," although marines in the Pacific often preferred "Japes." Hollywood films presented them as far more inhuman, sadistic, and treacherous than their German or Italian counterparts. In 1944, Newsweek quoted Admiral Halsey as contending that the "only good Jap is one who's been dead for six months." Ernie Pyle, the revered correspondent, who covered the war at close range both in Europe and the Pacific, after seeing a few Japanese prisoners, admitted that "they give me the creeps."
Despite the American belief that only the enemy committed atrocities, some U.S. marines and soldiers in the Pacific shot Japanese wounded and prisoners and kept body parts as souvenirs, sometimes even fashioning necklaces and bracelets from their teeth. To be sure, Japan's military code, with its insistence on fighting to the death, banzai suicide charges, prohibition of surrender, and generally brutal treatment of prisoners and wounded contributed to this, as did the Japanese practice of booby-trapping their dead and wounded.
Hatred was a two-way street, however. Japanese soldiers and civilians tended to look upon their American enemies as self-indulgent, greedy, and bent on exploiting the peoples of Asia as well as opposing Japan's right to do the same thing. They also bitterly resented American opposition to Japan's proposal for a racial equality clause in the League of Nations Covenant as well as U.S. immigration policy with its anti-Japanese bias. Japan was not as overly racist in its wartime propaganda as was the United States, however. Instead, official government policy stressed the supposedly unique qualities of the Japanese people, contending that they were more virtuous than Westerners because of their alleged descent from the gods as well as the purity and continuity of their ethnic blood and culture. Nevertheless, the Japanese media did seek to dehumanize the Americans, and their cartoons portrayed them as monsters or demons.
Nevertheless, the animosity between Japanese and Americans pales when compared to the unprecedented ferocity of the European war on the Eastern Front. There, of course, the conflict became a war of ideologies in which both sides participated in mass murder of prisoners of war and civilians alike on a regular basis. And, despite their mutual dislike, the Americans were able to adopt enlightened occupation policies in Japan when the war ended, and the Japanese accepted their fate with surprising resignation.