Although the war had ended, turmoil still afflicted much of Europe. The Austro-Hungarian Empire had vanished from the map. A jumble of small, weak states had taken its place, creating a vacuum of power. In Russia, the Bolsheviks had not been able to savor their victory over the provisional government for long. Various anti-Bolshevik forces had challenged their right to rule, and civil war had erupted during the summer of 1918. It continued to rage in the aftermath of World War I. Defeat had reduced Germany to a state of shock, bitterness, and disillusionment. And while Britain, France, and Italy engaged in victory celebrations, mourning for millions of dead, who had paid the price for this triumph, tended to restrain their joy. Now that they were free from the grim reality that had haunted them for four long years, Europeans looked to the future with both hope and uncertainty. But hatred of recent enemies persisted.
THE PEACE OF PARIS
It was mentioned in this atmosphere that the victorious Allies met in January 1919 to draft the settlement that liquidated the war - the Peace of Paris. They refused to invite either Germany or Russia to attend the conference. After four years of bitter warfare, the European Allies, especially the French, had little inclination to sit across the bargaining table from the despised Germans. Resentment over the Bolshevik government's separate peace with Germany and fear of its doctrine of world revolution prompted the decision to bar Russia from participation. The outcome of the Russian civil war was also uncertain, and the Allies hoped that the anti-Bolshevik forces would win. They had even intervened in the civil war during 1918. British and French forces had landed at Russian ports on the Arctic and Black Seas, ostensibly to prevent war material, which the Western Allies had sent to the provisional government, from falling into the hands of the Germans. But they also provided aid to the anti-Bolshevik forces. American and European units had gone ashore at Vladivostok in East Asia to help the escape of Czech prisoners of war who intended to join the Allies. With the end of World War I, the original justification for intervention was no longer valid, and the Western Allies withdrew during 1919. Japan had also sent troops to increase its influence in East Asia.
Delegations representing 27 nations convened in Paris, but the leaders of the Great Powers actually made the major decisions. They started as the Big Four, consisting of President Wilson of the United States, France's Premier Clemenceau, British Prime Minister Lloyd George, and Italian Premier Vittorio Orlando. But Orlando walked out of the conference in protest when the Western Powers refused to grant Italy the extensive compensation it had expected along the Adriatic Coast. They were not impressed with Italy's performance in the war, and Wilson was opposed to giving the Italians territory that contained predominantly South Slav populations. As a result, they agreed to grant only the Trentino, Trieste, and Istria. Although Orlando did return later, the Big Three - Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George - essentially molded the settlement.
The most important portion of the Peace of Paris was the Treaty of Versailles, which provided the settlement for Germany. It represented a compromise, essentially between the views of Wilson and those of Clemenceau. Wilson desired a peace of reconciliation that would be lenient with the Germans and, he hoped, they would accept as final. He had issued a statement of war aims - the Fourteen Points - in January 1918. His position was highly idealistic and included such unselfish aims as the creation of an international peace keeping organization, disarmament, the securing of the right of all peoples to govern themselves. He could afford to be unselfish. The United States had suffered far less from the war than had the European Allies. In fact, it had taken over markets that the European powers were not able to supply due to their concentration on the war and had achieved a highly favorable balance of trade in the process. The European Allies had also turned to the United States for loans to help them finance their war efforts. In 1919, they were all deeply in debt, whereas America had become a creditor nation on a massive scale.
Wilson firmly believed that the United States had a special calling to lead the world into a new age of peace and democracy. He looked with disapproval at the traditionally cynical attitude of European countries in the realm of power politics. Wilson wanted to build an international system based on liberal capitalism, free trade, and democracy, with a League of Nations dedicated to preserving peace as its cornerstone.
At least some of Wilson's Fourteen Points differed rather dramatically from the war aims of the European Allies. Britain and France agreed to the Fourteen Points as the basis for negotiation but not as a hard-and-fast blueprint for settlement. But the German government accepted the armistice in the belief that Wilson's proposal would be the framework for a lenient peace. Actually, the Germans were unduly optimistic about the Fourteen Points, which contained a provision for an independent Poland with access to the sea. This meant that Germany would lose territory to the new Polish state, including a corridor to the Baltic Sea that would divide Germany into two parts, something extremely unpalatable to most Germans.
Clemenceau, above all else, desired a settlement that would safeguard French security from another German attack. In pursuit of that goal, he sought to deprive Germany of some territory, dramatically reduce the size of the German armed forces, and require heavy payments for war damages. He also hoped to bind France, Britain, and the United States in a peacetime alliance that would protect his country from the possibility of renewed German aggression.
Lloyd George started out as an advocate of a harsh peace, but by the time the conference opened, he had modified his approach. He became something of a mediator between the more extreme views of Wilson and Clemenceau and performed capably in this role. As he later commented, "I think I did as well as might be expected, seated as I was between Jesus Christ and Napoleon Bonaparte."
The Treaty of Versailles, which was the fruit of the Big Three's labors, was a compromise settlement. Both Wilson and Clemenceau yielded on many points to obtain what they considered essential. Wilson won approval for his League of Nations. Clemenceau gained restrictions on Germany that he considered necessary to safeguard France's security. Certainly the treaty was not nearly as severe as the peace that the Germans would have imposed had they won the war. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk forced upon Russia in 1918 had been the first installment of that projected "peace of iron."
By comparison to Brest-Litovsk, the territorial provisions of the Versailles treaty were, for the most part, fair. As everyone expected, France regained the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Belgium also received minor border changes in its favor, and a plebiscite resulted in Denmark gaining a slice of Danish-populated territory along Germany's northern border. In the case of the coal-rich Saar, the peacemakers provided a temporary compromise settlement. Clemenceau wanted to annex the area to France as compensation for the destruction of French coal mines during the war. But Wilson and Lloyd George withheld their approval. Instead, the three men agreed to place the area under the administration of the newly established League of Nations for 15 years and provided for French operation of the coal mines during this period. But the agreement stipulated that the population, which was solidly German, would have the right to determine the permanent fate of the Saar by plebiscite in 1935.
A much more important provision concerned the Rhineland. In keeping with French war aims, Clemenceau favored its separation from Germany and the establishment of an independent Rhenish state. Again, Wilson and Lloyd George refused and secured another compromise. Under this agreement, the Rhineland remained part of Germany, but the Allies were to maintain troops there for 15 years. When this period expired, they were to withdraw their forces, and the entire area was to remain permanently demilitarized, along with a 50-kilometer-wide strip on the Rhine's east bank. The Big Three hoped that this solution would provide a buffer area that would shield France and Belgium from a possible German invasion. To reconcile Clemenceau to this compromise, Wilson and Lloyd George made a remarkable commitment to safeguard French security. If Germany attacked France, this "guarantee treaty" bound the United States and Britain to support the French militarily. It represented a significant departure from the traditional peacetime policies of both countries.
But by far the most extensive and controversial territorial changes took place in the east. In keeping with Polish national aspirations and Wilson's Fourteen Points, the Big Three agreed that Germany must surrender a substantial amount of territory to the revived state of Poland. This included the province and city of Posen (Poznan in Polish) and, most important, a strip of land that linked the major portion of the new country with the Baltic Sea to the north. Without this "Polish corridor," Poland would be a landlocked state, and its only access to the sea would be through Germany. Unfortunately, the corridor also divided the bulk of Germany from the province of East Prussia, which was certain to anger the Germans. This territory contained a majority of Poles, although large German minorities were present as well. Farther South, the industrial area of Upper Silesia also proved troublesome. Again, the population was mixed, and the Big Three ordered a plebiscite, which resulted in less than half the disputed area going to Poland.
Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George found it far less easy to justify the detachment of the large city of Danzig from Germany. Danzig's population was German, but since it was the only major port in the vicinity of the Polish corridor, the Poles coveted its harbor facilities. Another compromise provided a solution of sorts. Danzig and the surrounding area became a free state under the League of Nations supervision, but Poland received the right to unrestricted use of the port.
Separation of the smaller port of Memel in extreme northeastern Prussia also proved difficult to justify. Memel, like Danzig, was a German city, but the border strip extending to the south contained a predominantly Lithuanian population. Again, the treaty placed the entire area under League administration. But the new state of Lithuania, small though it was, took advantage of Germany's weakness to seize Memel in 1921.
The treaty also provided for the total dismantling of Germany's overseas empire and the distribution of its colonies to various Allied powers as "mandated territories" under League of Nations supervision. In theory, the occupying powers were to prepare their mandates for eventual independence. But in practice, they governed most of them as colonies. Britain and France were the principal beneficiaries in Africa, while Japan gained Germany's enclaves along the coast of China as well as the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana island chains in the Pacific. These islands were to become important Japanese bases during World War II.
France, of course, was determined to weaken Germany's ability to make war. The Allies agreed to limit the German army to a volunteer force of only 100,000 men and prohibited the existence of any kind of reserve. Tanks, heavy artillery, and other offensive weapons were banned. The Big Three also ordered the dissolution of the general staff, the war academy, and the cadet schools, which they considered breeding grounds for Prussian militarism. The German navy received bad news, too. It was to consist of only six warships, none of which was to be over 10,000 tons, and there were to be no submarines. Finally, the treaty prohibited Germany from maintaining a military air force.
To compensate Allied powers for damages inflicted by German forces during the war, the treaty provided that Germany pay reparations. This was not unusual. Germany had imposed a heavy war indemnity on France after the Franco-Prussian War and on Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Clemenceau and Lloyd George originally asked that, in addition to paying for civilian damages, reparations cover all Allied costs in fighting the war. Wilson blocked this proposal as much too extreme but did allow inclusion of the cost of war pensions for Allied soldiers. At the same time, he renounced any American claim to reparations. The peace conference did not establish the final amount.
Instead, the Big Three appointed a commission to study the problem and set the total. Germany was to pay $5 billion in cash and commodities during the interim period. The Reparations Committee announced the final bill in May 1921 as $33 billion in gold. It set annual payments of about $500 million for 66 years. American experts considered the burden to be considerably beyond Germany's ability to pay. The great British economist John Maynard Keynes agreed and attacked it in the most scathing terms, predicting that it would unhinge the postwar economy. The Germans were even more critical. Although, in proportion to values at the time, the amount was equivalent to the indemnity imposed on France in 1871, they greeted the announcement with a wave of protest.
In an effort to justify reparations, the Allied leaders inserted a clause in the treaty that became known as the "war guilt" clause, and the Germans found it highly unfair. It did not actually contain the term guilt or specifically blame the Central Powers for starting the war. But it did charge them with the responsibility for the "loss and damage" suffered by the Allies and referred to "the aggression" of Germany and its partners. The Germans interpreted this to mean guilt.
In addition to the German settlement, the treaty contained the covenant that established the League of Nations. The covenant created a League assembly to which every member nation would belong. The assembly had the right to consider all issues, but the actual decision-making power, in most cases, lay with the League council. The council would include five permanent members - Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Japan - as well as four nonpermanent members that the assembly would select for limited terms.
The covenant declared that members must submit all disputes for investigation, arbitration, and settlement. If a member ignored this obligation and went to war, the League could take action against the aggressor power. But the question of what this would entail proved difficult. Clemenceau insisted that the only way to secure meaningful collective security was the creation of an international army that could enforce League decisions. But Wilson and Lloyd George refused to agree to such a far-reaching commitment. Ultimately, the only coercive power that the League possessed was the authority to impose economic sanctions. This involved cutting off trade between League members and the aggressor power. The Big Three refused to allow either Germany or Russia to join the organization, a decision which undermined the validity of the League.
Despite Wilson's dream, the United States also did not become a member of the League. This was due to a quarrel between the president and Republican leaders in the Senate who refused to accept the League without modifications that they considered necessary to safeguard American sovereignty. But Wilson refused to compromise, and the Treaty of Versailles failed to obtain the two-thirds majority necessary for ratification. The Senate finally passed a resolution in 1921 accepting all provisions of the treaty except those establishing the League.
The British had never shared Wilson's enthusiasm about the League and now saw considerably less reason for optimism. The French had been even more skeptical of the League and viewed America's withdrawal from Wilson's commitment with alarm. Of far greater concern to them, however, was the failure of the Senate to act on the guarantee treaty, which would have provided for Anglo-American support for France if attacked by Germany. Britain subsequently used the American failure to act as grounds for abandoning its own commitment.
OTHER PEACE TREATIES
Two other treaties recognized that Austria-Hungary had ceased to exist and that a number of new countries had come into being in Central Europe. Even the Austrians and Hungarians had severed the connection between themselves and created separate states. This necessitated individual agreements - the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria and the Treaty of Trianon with Hungary.
The disintegration of Austria-Hungary led to the formation of two other new countries - Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which later became Yugoslavia. All of Czechoslovakia's territory had formerly been part of Austria-Hungary. Yugoslavia consisted of a merger of prewar Serbia and Montenegro with the portions of Austria-Hungary that had contained Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
Czechoslovakia based its independence on a union of the Czechs, who lived in the western provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, and the Slovaks, who inhabited the eastern area of Slovakia. Although the two groups were related Slavic peoples, the Czechs were considerably more numerous and more advanced politically and economically. They played the predominant role in the new state. The country also included substantial German, Hungarian, and Ruthenian minorities. The Germans were the largest and most important of these, numbering over 3 million. The bulk of them resided in the frontier areas of Bohemia and Moravia. This border region came to be known as the Sudetenland.
The Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of Yugoslavia also were related Slavic peoples. But the Serbs outnumbered the others and had previous experience governing Serbia. They dominated the new state from the start, much to the chagrin of the Croats, the second largest group, who considered themselves culturally superior to the Serbs. A religious difference also increased antagonism between the two peoples. The Serbs were predominantly Orthodox, while the Croats were Catholic.
Another national group, the Poles in Galicia, the extreme northeastern part of Austria-Hungary, joined their kinsmen in territories formerly under German and Russian domination to create the independent state of Poland. Unfortunately, eastern Galicia contained a majority of Ruthenians, who now found themselves under Polish rule. To the southeast, the Rumanians in the provinces of Transylvania and the Banat joined the prewar state of Rumania. But these areas also contained Hungarian and Yugoslav minorities. Finally, the Italians in the Trentino, Trieste, and Istria merged with Italy. Here, too, other nationalities were present - Germans in the southern Trentino, Slovenes in Trieste and Istria.
The creation or enlargement of all of these states posed major problems. Most of them were small multinational states and were not remotely strong enough to be great powers. Each of them also had internal problems. As a result of these factors much of central Europe became a "power vacuum." This posed the danger that at some time in the future stronger outside nations would attempt to move into the area and fill the vacuum. Finally, the small countries engaged in a myriad of border disputes with their neighbors. The peacemakers established commissions to help adjust borders as much as possible in keeping with national aspirations. But this proved a formidable task due to the mixed population patterns of the region, and in some cases, countries would not be economically or strategically viable if they did not include territories inhabited by minorities.
The Sudetenland, much of which contained a predominantly German population, provided the most notable example of this. It was vital to Czechoslovakia because the northern and western portions contained important industries and natural resources. Much of it also contained hilly and heavily wooded terrain that served as an easily defensible border. In view of these factors, Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George agreed that the Sudetenland must go to Czechoslovakia rather than to Austria or Germany. The Big Three also violated the principle of national self-determination in regard to Austria. Many Austrians doubted that their severely truncated state would prove economically viable and asked that they be allowed to merge with their fellow Germans across the border. Allied leaders rejected this request because they opposed any increase in Germany's size. Both decisions held the potential for trouble. By the late 1930s, most of the Sudeten Germans were unreconciled to their position as citizens of Czechoslovakia, and many Austrians continued to favor union with Germany.
The Paris Peace Conference played only a minor role in the settlement for Eastern Europe. With its defeat at the hands of the Allies, Germany had to relinquish control over the territories it had wrested from Russia at Brest-Litovsk. Since the Russian civil war prevented the Bolshevik government from retaking these areas, various national groups established independent states. These included Finland in the far north and three small countries along the shore of the Baltic - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The region inhabited by Poles became a part of the new Poland, and the people of the Ukraine established still another new state. Finally, Rumania annexed Bessarabia, an area of mixed Rumanian and Ukrainian population.
In most cases the peacemakers took no action in regard to these territories other than to recognize their independence. But the British foreign secretary, Lord Curzon, did propose an eastern border for Poland that roughly followed the linguistic division between Poles to the west and Belorussians and Ruthenians to the east. The Poles were not at all interested in the "Curzon line" and demanded restoration of their eighteenth-century boundary. This would have included most of the Ukraine as well as Belorussia just to the north. They went to war to enforce this claim in 1920 but ultimately had to settle for a line about 150 miles east of the Curzon line.
The Big Three were pleased by the changes in Eastern Europe, because the new nations were all anti-Russian, anti-Communist. It became customary to refer to this entire tier of countries as the cordon sanitaire, a barrier that helped sanitize the West from the spread of communism. But it was a weak barrier. None of the new states was strong, and all of them feared the revival of Germany and Russia, both of which dreamed of revising the Eastern European settlement. One of the fledgling countries, the Ukraine, failed to maintain its independence for long. By 1920, the Russian government had reasserted its control over Ukrainian territory.
Two additional treaties dealt with the minor members of the Central Powers - the Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria and the Treaty of Sevres with Turkey. The Bulgars lost a strip of territory along the coast of the Aegean Sea to Greece and two small border areas to Yugoslavia. The Allies forced Turkey to relinquish all of its remaining Balkan territory to Greece with the exception of the great city of Constantinople (soon to be renamed Istanbul). Greece also gained the right to administer a substantial amount of territory on Turkey's Asian coastline. Although there were Greeks in this area, the majority of the population was Turkish. The treaty also took away all of Turkey's Arab-inhabited lands. Only Saudi Arabia gained independence. France received Syria and Lebanon, and Britain won Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq, all as mandates.
Loss of territory to the Greeks was too much for Turkish nationalists. General Mustapha Kemal carried out a coup, overthrew the decrepit government of the sultan, and established a republic. Turkish troops soon began to drive the Greeks out of their Asian foothold. Stability did not return to the area until the powers reached another agreement in 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne, which deprived the Greeks of most of their original gains. It also prepared the way for a massive deportation of the Greek population from Asia Minor to Greece and the Turkish minority from Greece to Turkey.
REACTIONS TO THE TREATIES
Although Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George were all more or less satisfied with the Peace of Paris, not everyone agreed with them. Germany's new democratic government only accepted the Treaty of Versailles because it had no alternative. Germans in general, many of whom had favored extensive territorial and economic gains for their own country, considered the treaty to be an outrageously unfair and humiliating dictated peace. They believed Germany had entered the war to defend itself from the encircling Allied powers. They also found it difficult to accept that Germany had really suffered defeat. Allied troops had not reached the German border before the conflict ended. There were few signs of destruction in Germany. The armistice had provided for Allied occupation of the Rhineland and a few bridgeheads on the Rhine's east bank, but most of the country remained unoccupied.
Indeed, the story was already circulating that the German army had not actually been beaten. According to this account, the new republic had betrayed the army by hastily accepting the armistice. This "stab in the back" legend was to plague the republic throughout its existence and contributed to German refusal to accept the treaty as final. Ironically, the republic's first chancellor, Friedrich Ebert, unwittingly provided impetus to the legend when he greeted German troops arriving back in Berlin in November 1918 with the words, "As you return unconquered from the field of battle, I salute you."
Most Germans considered the "war guilt" clause to be a gross distortion of reality. Their anger over this made them highly resentful of the large reparations bill. The Germans also found the disarmament provisions unfair and degrading to a great power, especially one in which the army had enjoyed such enormous prestige. They argued that only if the Allies undertook disarmament themselves could they justify the restrictions they had placed on Germany's armed forces.
Germans also detested the territorial changes, especially the loss of Danzig and the lands to Poland as well as the separation of East Prussia from the rest of Germany due to the Polish acquisition of the Polish Corridor. They looked forward to the day when their country could revise these provisions. Both the refusal of the Allies to allow the union of Austria with Germany and the incorporation of the Sudetenland into Czechoslovakia struck the Germans as hypocritical. It seemed to them that the peacemakers were interested in the principle of self-determination only if they could use it against the Germans.
In general, the abrupt end to the war, hatred of the treaty, and the stigma of the "stab in the back" legend helped create a depressing malaise among the German people that contrasted dramatically with the apparent solidarity and confidence with which many of them had greeted the outbreak of war in 1914. It did not bode well for the future of Germany or Europe.
To the British, it also appeared that the treaty was too harsh. Many agreed with Keynes that Germany was incapable of paying the reparations bill. They came to view the French as vindictive. Opinion also turned against the prewar connection with France, which many believed had dragged Britain into the conflict at the cost of 750,000 dead and the undermining of the country's economic stability. The British were determined to avoid any kind of arrangement in the future that might have the same effect and preferred a policy aimed at reconciliation with Germany.
The war also resulted in greater independence for territories of the British Empire that had become self-governing dominions during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa had all gained control over their own domestic affairs before the war. But they had still been technically dependent on Britain in foreign affairs. All of them had joined Britain in the conflict and had suffered heavy casualties. As a reward for their services, they had each received separate representation at the peace conference as well as in the League of Nations. The dominions, henceforth, were virtually independent. This fact played a prominent role in the transformation of the empire into a Commonwealth of Nations during the postwar period and meant that Britain could not be certain of the support of the dominions in case of another war. British awareness of this changed relationship furthered the pursuit of a conciliatory policy toward Germany.
The debilitating effects of the war had also made Britain less certain of its hold over parts of the empire that had not gained the right of self-government. In some of them, most notably India, nationalist movements favored independence. This, too, contributed to the cautious British policy in Europe.
In America there appeared to be general acceptance of the treaty at first, but enthusiasm soon waned. Many became disillusioned, not only with the peace settlement but also with the war itself. To them it seemed that Britain and France had lured the United States into a typical European power struggle. It appeared that despite Wilson's idealistic rhetoric about a peace of reconciliation, the settlement represented a cynical division of spoils. With the Senate's approval to refuse entry into the League of Nations, America returned to its traditional policy of isolation from European political affairs. But it was never complete isolation. The United States continued to play an active role in efforts to solve the related economic problems of European war debts, reparations, and currency stabilization but remained totally opposed to participation in any collective security arrangements.
Despite criticism of their alleged vindictiveness from friend and foe alike, the French were not happy with the peace settlement either. France had survived, but the war had taken the lives of 1,300,000 of the nation's soldiers, in proportion to population the heaviest loss suffered by any of the Great Powers. The northern provinces lay in desolation after four years of trench warfare and massive artillery barrages. And the war had left deep psychological wounds on the national spirit. The compromise peace had not brought France the security it had sought. To the French, the peace, far from being too harsh, was much too lenient.
Not surprisingly the French feared a revival of German power and remained acutely concerned about their own security. Their wartime losses compounded the problem of a declining birth rate, which had been a source of worry even before the war. France's population in 1921 totaled only 39 million compared to Germany's 60 million. France also suffered from deep divisions between social classes, which were reflected in the republican political system. The Third Republic had come into existence in 1870 as a result of the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. Instead of a system of two major political parties, such as characterized both Britain and the United States, the Third Republic had developed a multiparty system. This made the French cabinet dependent on maintaining the support of a majority coalition of parties in parliament. Since these coalitions usually did not hold together for long, cabinets also did not remain in power for long. As a result, the system became chronically unstable, making it extremely difficult to deal with controversial issues.
The failure to achieve an alliance with Britain and the United States led the French to turn to lesser countries for help. During the early 1920s, they secured defensive military alliances with Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, all of whom shared France's dread of a revived Germany. They also made agreements with Rumania and Yugoslavia, which bound the partners to consult in case of a threat to their independence. But this system of collective security was a poor substitute for the wartime relationship between France, Britain, and America. As a result, France assumed primary responsibility for enforcing the peace settlement. It soon proved to be a task beyond the nation's capabilities.
Italy also bitterly assailed its wartime Allies for disavowing their promises regarding Italian compensation in the Adriatic, the Middle East, and Africa. A chorus of nationalistic disapproval forced Orlando out of office, and the desire to revise the peace settlement remained strong.
Russia, only marginally affected by the Paris peace settlement, harbored resentment over the territorial losses that had originated with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. But even when the civil war ended, the Russians were not in a position to do much about these changes. Nevertheless, like Germany and Italy, Russia hoped to revise this settlement sometime in the future. The Bolshevik government retained a deep distrust of the Western Powers, which had recognized the new countries of Eastern Europe. It also did not forget the Allied intervention in the civil war.
ECONOMIC REPERCUSSIONS
European recovery from World War I proved elusive during the 1920s. The continent's economy was far from healthy. The conflict had disrupted the old prewar patterns of trade, and European countries encountered difficulty regaining their former shares of the world market. To compound their problems, the United States raised tariffs on imported goods, making it more difficult for the debtor nations of Europe to sell products in the American market. They retaliated by increasing import duties to protect their own domestic industries from foreign competition. This mutual protectionist approach increased the strain on the international economy.
With the exception of Britain, the belligerent countries had financed their war efforts in large part by printing paper money that did not have gold backing. This led to serious inflation while the war was in progress, but tighter government controls managed to keep it within reason. In the postwar years, however, the inflationary spiral increased. By 1926, the French franc had fallen to 10 percent of its prewar value. In Germany, the situation was far worse. Before the war, 4.2 German marks possessed a value equivalent to 1 U.S. dollar. By January 1923, it had skidded to 18,000 to the dollar. And this was only the beginning of an even more disastrous slide.
The related problems of war debts and reparations added to the economic dilemma. The United States had refused a British and French request for a temporary suspension of war debt payments during the peace conference. But America actually demanded little more than token payments during the 1920s. The problem of reparations was more serious. The French were desirous of securing early and regular payment of reparations to aid them in rebuilding their devastated areas. But they obtained relatively little. At first, they received payment in commodities such as coal and timber, but the German government did all it could to avoid meeting its obligation. Although the French protested, the British from the start sympathized with Germany and urged France to make concessions. The British hoped that a reduction of reparations payments would aid the German economy and stimulate trade. Finally, in late 1922, Germany defaulted on its obligation altogether.
In early 1923, French Premier Raymond Poincare responded vigorously to this action. His government ordered troops into the Ruhr, Germany's most important industrial area, just to the east of the Rhineland. The French hoped to force German compliance on reparations and, in the meantime, planned to operate the mines and railroads of the Ruhr for their own use. But German workers resorted to strikes and delaying actions. The German government subsidized the workers, and the French accomplished little. This Ruhr crisis lasted for almost a year while Germany's inflation soared out of control. By November, the mark's value had fallen to the amazing figure of 4.2 trillion to the dollar. Salaries, savings, pensions, and insurance became worthless while debtors easily paid off loans and merchandise purchased on the installment plan.
Germany had no choice but to abandon its policy of promoting passive resistance, and the French agreed to submit the whole question to an international commission, chaired by the American banker Charles Dawes. In April 1924, the Dawes Commission agreed that reparations payments should be based on Germany's "index of prosperity." This had the effect of reducing payments by half with the prospect for gradual increases in the future. The Dawes plan also urged an international loan to Germany to help stabilize the currency and promote prosperity. American financiers provided more than half of the subsequent loan, which began a pattern of U.S. financial assistance to Germany during the next five years.
This influx of foreign capital contributed to a remarkable economic recovery in Germany. German leaders also introduced a new currency based officially on gold, which halted the inflation. In 1929, another committee of international financial experts, headed by the American Owen Young, scaled down the total German reparations bill to a mere $9 billion. But Germany never came close to paying this amount because the nation soon felt the impact of a far worse economic catastrophe - the Great Depression. In reality, during the 1920s the United States and, to a lesser degree, the former European Allies provided more than twice as much money to Germany's recovery than Germany paid in reparations.
POLITICAL REALIGNMENTS
The failure of the Ruhr occupation to secure German compliance on reparations led to France's realization that it could not enforce the Paris peace settlement alone. So France turned instead to cultivating better relations with Germany. Foreign Minister Aristide Briand was the architect of this policy. Germany's foreign minister, Gustav Streseman, also followed a friendlier approach to France, hoping to gain a revision of the peace settlement in the process. The chief result of their efforts was yet another treaty in 1925, negotiated in the Swiss resort town of Locarno. The Treaty of Locarno was a curious document. It merely reaffirmed the provisions of the Versailles settlement that applied to Germany's western boundaries as well as the future demilitarization of the Rhineland. But the treaty was silent on the question of Germany's eastern borders, which, in effect, indicated that Germany did not consider them permanent.
During the next few years, observers spoke of a "spirit of Locarno," which supposedly represented the beginning of a new, more peaceful era in European affairs. Other agreements followed. In 1926, Germany entered the League of Nations. In 1928, American Secretary of State Frank Kellogg and Briand drafted a treaty that renounced war as an instrument of national policy. Sixty-five nations, including Germany, eventually signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Unfortunately, it provided no means of enforcement. Finally, the Young Committee, in addition to lowering Germany's reparations bill, also provided for the end of the Rhineland occupation in 1930, five years ahead of schedule.
Meanwhile, throughout the 1920s, Germany had been violating the disarmament provisions of the peace settlement. General Hans von Seeckt, who served as chief of the army command from 1920 to 1926, led the way. Seeckt maintained the outlawed general staff in existence by dividing its functions among various governmental bodies. He also created a reserve of 70,000 men that he disguised as a special labor force and later as a security organization. Seeckt made an agreement with the Krupp munitions firm to provide designs for artillery as well as working models in the company's affiliated plants in Sweden. Other Krupp affiliates in Spain and the Netherlands produced submarine models and torpedoes.
Germany also cultivated closer relations with Russia in the early postwar period. Both countries hoped to escape from their diplomatic isolation. Seeckt started this process by making a secret agreement with the Russian general staff in 1921. It granted the German army permission to establish illegal tank and artillery units as well as aviation schools on Russian soil. Germany also gained the right to manufacture prototypes of aircraft, tanks, and artillery and to experiment with poison gas. Seeckt reciprocated by training Russian soldiers and providing a financial subsidy. In 1922, the two governments startled the world by signing a treaty of friendship in the Italian city of Rapallo. This agreement provided mutual diplomatic recognition and renunciation of war claims. Neither side really trusted the other, but both believed that they would benefit from the new relationship.
The Western Powers also came to the conclusion that their attempt to keep Russia in isolation was self-defeating. Although they feared the spread of communism, they also coveted the Russian market as an outlet for their hard-pressed economies. Britain took the initiative in 1921 by signing an agreement that reestablished diplomatic relations and trade between the two powers. Other Western countries followed a similar policy during the next few years. But despite these efforts, no real friendship blossomed, and distrust continued.
THE RISE OF JAPAN
The United States was not the only non-European power to benefit from World War I. Japan, the sole industrialized country in East Asia, had also taken advantage of the inability of European powers to supply their former markets. Japan could not match American commercial expansion because of its less well developed industry, but the island nation did improve its competitive position significantly. The Japanese also gained strategically important territories on China's coast and in the Pacific at Germany's expense.
When the war ended, few obstacles seemed to prevent still greater Japanese expansion. Russia, a longtime rival for influence in China, suffered from the accumulated effects of World War I, the revolution, and the civil war. Britain and France possessed colonies in East Asia along with economic and political interests in China. But they, too, focused their attention on recovery and the multitude of European problems that followed the war. The United States, although deeply interested in trade with China, was far away. In fact, much of Japan's relative importance was due to the nation's remoteness from other major powers.
Although some Japanese leaders looked longingly on Russia's East Asian territories, Japan's primary interest lay in China. Inferior in size only to Russia and Canada, China possessed the world's largest population as well as vast natural resources. But it had long suffered from political weakness and economic backwardness. During the nineteenth century, China fell prey to various Western powers, which forced the Chinese government to grant concessions. These included economic privileges and the right of extraterritoriality for European residents in China. This right made them immune from Chinese law and subject only to the legal jurisdiction of their respective countries. Some of the European powers also leased ports along the Chinese coast.
When Japan experienced the startling transformation to a major world power in the late nineteenth century it, too, began to encroach on China, gaining economic concessions and extraterritoriality for Japanese citizens. As a result of victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, Japan obtained control of the island of Formosa (Taiwan), strategically located off the Chinese mainland. In the aftermath of this conflict, the Japanese competed with Russia for political and economic influence in Korea and the adjoining Chinese province of Manchuria.
This rivalry led to tension between the two powers and played an important role in Japan's decision to sign a defensive military alliance with Britain in 1902. At that time Britain had not yet entered into the Triple Entente with France and Russia and was concerned about Russian expansion in East Asia. Under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Britain would remain neutral if Japan were attacked by another power and would actually aid the Japanese if they fell victim to aggression by two powers. This agreement heralded the arrival of Japan as a major factor in world power politics and encouraged Tokyo to pursue its ambitions in Manchuria and Korea despite Russian opposition. Relations between the two powers steadily deteriorated and culminated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Japanese forces defeated the Russians on land and sea. In the peace that followed, Japan replaced Russia as the predominant power in both Manchuria and Korea and took over Russian leases on the ports of Dairen (Talien) and Port Arthur (Lushun). Japan annexed Korea in 1910.
Early in World War II Japan attempted to capitalize on China's internal weakness and Western preoccupation with the European conflict to pressure the Chinese to grant a number of concessions known as the 21 Demands. These gave the Japanese a privileged economic position in China, although they were moderated to some extent in the face of American opposition.
At the Paris Peace Conference, Japan vigorously pushed for retention of China's Shantung peninsula, which it had taken from Germany during the war. To accomplish this, it needed to overcome China's insistence that it be returned to its complete sovereignty. Japan also set out to gain inclusion of a clause proclaiming racial equality in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The latter reflected Japanese concern over American discrimination against immigrants from Japan. Although the clause proposal gained a majority of the votes in the committee considering it, President Wilson, who served as its chairman, ruled that passage required a unanimous vote. In doing so, he bowed to British and especially Australian opposition.
Outraged by this humiliating defeat, the Japanese insisted on having their way in Shantung and threatened to pull out of the conference unless this were granted. In the end, they won out over violent Chinese protests and Wilson's principle of self-determination.
THE QUESTION OF CHINA
Japanese ambitions encountered opposition from a Chinese nationalist movement that had overthrown the decadent Manchu dynasty in 1911 and established a republic. But the revolution did not lead to Chinese unity or greater freedom from foreign exploitation. Rival governments came into being in the north and south and vied for authority, while warlords, who had little or no allegiance to either regime, dominated many Chinese provinces. It was not until 1928 that the southern regime, dominated by the Kuomintang party, emerged triumphant in this struggle. Led by Chiang Kai-shek, a skillful and ruthless young general and politician, the Kuomintang officially ruled most of China, but its actual control was tenuous.
The Kuomintang regime was a corrupt military dictatorship that rested on a narrow base of support among the landowning peasantry and wealthy banking and commercial interests. Landless agricultural workers, who comprised the country's largest social class and had long been subject to the merciless exploitation of the landlords, felt little allegiance to the government. Many of them found more in common with the Chinese Communist party. The Communists, under the leadership of the determined and brilliant Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), had cooperated with the Kuomintang until Chiang tried to crush them in 1927. Although some of them fell victim to this purge, Mao and many others escaped to Kiangsi province in southeastern China, where they established a Soviet-style regime in defiance of the Kuomintang.
Chiang and the Kuomintang demanded foreign recognition of China's full sovereignty as well as an end to the privileges and immunities enjoyed by other powers. They also attacked the Treaty of Versailles' assignment of Germany's possessions in China to Japan. Chiang particularly hoped to tighten his authority in the northeastern province of Manchuria, where the warlord Chang Hsueh-liang had recognized his sovereignty. But the Japanese viewed this as a direct threat to their own strong economic and political influence in Manchuria.
Western powers shared Japan's fears over China's revisionist policy. Britain grew especially concerned because, along with Japan, Britain had the largest investments in China and the most to lose from the establishment of complete Chinese sovereignty. The United States was also deeply interested in China, but for reasons that were less well grounded than those of Britain and Japan. Although its trade with China had never been extensive, the seemingly unlimited potential of the Chinese market exerted a powerful attraction. America opposed the exploitation that other powers pursued in China and remained faithful to the Open Door policy proclaimed at the turn of the century. This doctrine sought to maintain equal access to the Chinese market for all nations while maintaining China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. But America always emphasized the free trade aspects of the policy rather than defense of China's sovereignty.
SEEKING BALANCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
When World War I ended, Japan and Britain were still linked by the alliance that they had negotiated in 1902. Originally intended to resist Russian encroachment on Manchuria, the pact had also facilitated British and Japanese penetration of China. The United States disliked this agreement and opposed its renewal in 1921. America preferred multinational agreements that would maintain existing foreign interests in East Asia while upholding China's sovereignty and equal access to the Chinese market for all powers. British leaders especially desired to remain on good terms with America in the uncertain aftermath of World War I. Canada also favored such an Anglo-American relationship and pressured Britain to drop the Japanese alliance.
But American leaders were also concerned about the growth of Japanese naval power. Although Japan's navy ranked third behind those of Britain and the United States, all of it operated in East Asian and Pacific waters. The American fleet, on the other hand, divided its attention between the Pacific and the Atlantic, as did Britain's Royal Navy, which also had obligations in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. American proponents of a huge two-ocean navy demanded a great increase in battleship strength, and 15 new capital ships were already under construction. This program alarmed the Japanese, who responded by laying down the keels of eight powerful battleships. Many American leaders feared the economic and political consequences of a naval race and urged an agreement that would prevent this. Britain was still the world's leading naval power, but most of its battleships were aging. Entering into an ambitious new naval building program would place a tremendous burden on the already ailing British economy.
Mutual concern over the prospect of a ruinously expensive naval race led to the decision to convene a conference in Washington to seek limitation of battleship strength. But the Washington conference of 1921-22 also considered the questions of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and the future of China. Representatives of the United States, Britain, Japan, France, Italy, and several lesser powers attended the conference, which resulted in three treaties. The first of these, a naval agreement, placed limitations on battleships and battle cruisers. It provided for a ratio of strength of 5 to 5 to 3 to 1.75 to 1.75 for the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, respectively. This ratio reflected the size of the navies at that time. The treaty also placed limitations on total tonnage of aircraft carriers but not of cruisers, destroyers, or submarines.
In the second agreement, the Four-Power Treaty, the United States, Britain, Japan, and France vowed to respect each other's possessions in the Pacific and refer disputes to mediation. This arrangement replaced the Anglo-Japanese alliance. All the countries represented at the conference signed the final pact, the Nine-Power Treaty. This document upheld China's sovereignty and territorial integrity while recognizing the right of all nations to equal economic opportunity in the Chinese market. Britain and Japan also agreed to return their possessions on the Shantung Peninsula to Chinese control. The treaty represented formal acceptance of the Open Door policy, and the agreement to restore Shantung to Chinese sovereignty was clearly a hopeful sign.
The naval limitations treaty made sense at the time and prevented a capital ship construction race during the 1920s. But it met with bitter criticism from both U.S. and Japanese naval leaders. Japanese civilian nationalists also reacted angrily to the naval restrictions. One of them went so far as to assassinate Premier Takashi Hara who had diligently tried to enforce them. As for Britain, acceptance of parity in capital ships with the United States ended a long tradition of supremacy on the high seas, a clear indication of Britain's diminished power.
Soon after the furor over the naval limitations, a much more widespread wave of anger swept over Japan as a result of passage of the U.S. Immigration Act of 1924. Among other things, this act totally barred Japanese immigration into America. The Japanese people in general viewed it as a deliberate insult, and the government declared the date the legislation took effect to be a national day of humiliation.
Ironically, the failure of the naval treaty to agree on a formula for limiting cruiser construction opened the way for the major powers to build cruisers in large numbers. This in turn led to attempts to halt the new race, culminating in the London Naval Treaty of 1930. In this understanding, the United States, Britain, and Japan agreed to limit construction of both cruisers and destroyers. Again this agreement did not set well with many Japanese naval leaders and civilian nationalists. This time the hostility led to the assassination of Premier Yuko Hamaguchi whose government had accepted the new limitations.
A GLOOMY OUTLOOK
Despite the good intentions and positive aspects of the settlement regarding China, the long-term outlook was not promising. China remained unstable and victim to internal conflict, while rival Chinese and Japanese ambitions in Manchuria clearly posed the danger of a collision.
To be sure the late 1920s had witnessed other promising developments. Europe's economy, though far from restored to health, had at least rallied encouragingly from the dark days of the immediate postwar era. The French and Germans had abandoned their mutual hostility in favor of a policy of cooperation. In the process, Germany had escaped from its role as an outcast and had become a member of the League of Nations. The League itself, while still not tested by a major crisis, had at least won general acceptance. And despite the United States' failure to join the League, the Americans had shown their willingness to work with European countries on economic problems. The early fears of a spread of communism over the continent had proved unfounded, and the Soviet Union concentrated on internal problems. In East Asia, most of China was at least nominally under one government.
But the partial economic recovery and political reconciliation of Europe were extremely fragile, as was the great power cooperation and relative tranquility in East Asia. Gloom, anxiety, and a loss of faith in the long cherished idea of progress permeated the philosophical, literary, and artistic works of the period and cast doubt on the future of humanity. There was good reason for this pessimism. Economic catastrophe and a great wave of political extremism lay just ahead. Another and even greater war would not be far behind.