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Hacking

Nearly 500 million LinkedIn users' details posted for sale online

The hacker included 2 million records as proof that they have what they claim

Dev Kundaliya
07 April 2021

Millions of LinkedIn users' personal details have allegedly been leaked on a popular hacking forum.

According to CyberNews, a data archive apparently scraped from 500 million LinkedIn profiles has been put up for sale online.

To prove that the data is legitimate, the poster has included nearly 2 million records as a sample, which forum members can view for $2 worth of forum credits.

The leaked records include user names, phone numbers, email addresses, links to other social media profiles and users' workplace details. The data, however, does not appear to contain credit card details, legal documents or other financial information that could be used for fraud.

The hacker who posted the data is asking for a minimum "four-digit" sum for access to the full 500 million-user database.

CyberNews confirmed that the data in the sample was scraped from LinkedIn, although it is still unclear if the leaked files contain up-to-date information, or if it was taken from a previous breach.

The lack of financial information in the leaked database does not mean that it is not dangerous. Hackers could use the data to create detailed profiles of potential victims and then conduct targeted phishing or social engineering attacks. They could also use the information to spam emails and phone numbers, or brute-force the passwords of LinkedIn profiles and associated email addresses.

Researchers are advising users to take precautionary measures to protect their accounts and data from hackers. Users who suspect that their LinkedIn profile data might have been compromised should immediately change the password of their LinkedIn and email accounts, and remain vigilant for potential phishing emails.

This is not the first time that a data breach has affected LinkedIn users. In 2012, hackers were able to steal password hashes of nearly 170 million LinkedIn users. The data initially stayed in private hands before eventually appearing on the dark web in 2016.

The newest LinkedIn leak comes days after the personal details of half a billion Facebook users had leaked online. The exposed data contained the personal details of more than 533 million Facebook users from 106 countries, including over 44 million records on users in Egypt, 39 million in Tunisia, 32 million in the USA and 11 million in the UK.

CHRONOLOGY

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmprivi/662/66213.htm

Neutral Citation Number: [2013] EWCA Crim 1026

Case No: 2013/02883

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)

ON APPEAL FROM SOUTHWARK CROWN COURT

The Hon Mr Justice Saunders

T2012/7351

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

28/06/2013

B e f o r e :

THE RT. HON. LORD JUDGE, LORD CHIEF JUSTICE

LORD JUSTICE LLOYD JONES

and

MR. JUSTICE OPENSHAW

____________________

Between:

____________________

Clare Montgomery QC & Alison Macdonald for the Appellant Coulson

Andrew Edis QC, Daniel Beard QC, Rebecca Chalkley and Ligia Osepciu for the Crown

Hearing date: Friday 14th June, 2013

____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT.

____________________

1. Lord Judge, Lord Chief Justice:
2. This is the judgment of the Court. The major responsibility for its preparation was undertaken by Lloyd Jones L.J.

Andrew Coulson, supported by Stuart Kuttner, appeals against a ruling on a point of law made by Fulford L.J. during a preparatory hearing on 28 May 2013. That ruling was endorsed by Saunders J. on 3 June 2013 on which occasion he also granted leave to appeal.
The appellants are charged with conspiring unlawfully to intercept communications in the course of their transmission without lawful authority contrary to section 1(1) Criminal Law Act 1977. Under section 1(1)(b) Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 ("RIPA"), it is an offence intentionally to intercept, without lawful authority, any communication in the course of its transmission by means of a public telecommunications system. The underlying allegation against the defendants in the proceedings below, who worked at the News of the World as editors or journalists where they were employed by News International, is that they in different permutations conspired, without lawful authority, to intercept mobile telephone voicemail messages.
The appellants made dismissal applications on a ground which raises the true construction of sub-sections 2(1), 2(2) and 2(7) RIPA. Expressed in general terms, the issue turns on when the course of transmission of a voicemail message ends and, in particular, whether a voicemail message which is saved by the recipient on the voicemail facility of a public telecommunications system remains in the course of transmission. The central point taken on behalf of the appellants is that the words "in the course of transmission" in section 1(1) RIPA do not extend to cover voicemail messages once they have been accessed by the intended recipient. The decision of Fulford L.J., endorsed by Saunders J., is that section 2(7) RIPA extends the concept of transmission to include the period when the transmission system stores the communication, in such a manner that enables the intended recipient to have access to it, whether or not it has previously been received by the intended recipient.
1. Jurisdiction
Before we turn to the merits, we should deal with a preliminary point, which was raised by the Criminal Appeal Office, that there might not be jurisdiction to hear the appeal at all. There is, of course, no appeal from a judge's decision to reject an application to dismiss the case (R v Thompson and Hanson [2007] 1 Cr App R 15). Such an application takes place before arraignment and indeed did take place before arraignment in this case. But this appeal is not directed against that decision but against the ruling of law that Saunders J. made in the course of the preparatory hearing. In accordance with section 30, Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, the appellants should have been arraigned before the start of the preparatory hearing. Indeed Part 15.6 of the Criminal Procedure Rules requires that:

1. "At the beginning of a preparatory hearing, the court must:
2. (a) announce that it is such a hearing; and
3. (b) take the defendant's plea (unless already done)."
4. In fact the defendants were arraigned at some stage during that hearing and it is obviously sensible, and in accordance with the overriding objective, to hear this appeal now despite that fact that there was not scrupulous observance of Part 15.6 at the time.
5. The History of the Provisions

RIPA replaced the Interception of Communications Act 1985 ("ICA 1985"), which had previously governed the interception of electronic communications in the United Kingdom. In 1997 the European Parliament and Council had issued Directive 97/66/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector ("the 1997 Directive"). It is clear that one purpose of RIPA was to implement Article 5 of the 1997 Directive, which required Member States to safeguard the confidentially of communications. Following the enactment of RIPA, in 2002 the European Parliament and Council adopted Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector ("the 2002 Directive") which repealed the 1997 Directive.

1. The Statutory Provisions

Section 1 Criminal Law Act 1977 provides:

1. "1.— The offence of conspiracy.
2. (1) Subject to the following provisions of this Part of this Act, if a person agrees with any other person or persons that a course of conduct shall be pursued which, if the agreement is carried out in accordance with their intentions, either—
3. (a) will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence or offences by one or more of the parties to the agreement, or
4. (b) would do so but for the existence of facts which render the commission of the offence or any of the offences impossible,
5. he is guilty of conspiracy to commit the offence or offences in question.
6. (2) Where liability for any offence may be incurred without knowledge on the part of the person committing it of any particular fact or circumstance necessary for the commission of the offence, a person shall nevertheless not be guilty of conspiracy to commit that offence by virtue of subsection (1) above unless he and at least one other party to the agreement intend or know that that fact or circumstance shall or will exist at the time when the conduct constituting the offence is to take place".

The relevant substantive offence is contained in section 1(1) RIPA which provides:

1. "1.— Unlawful interception.
2. (1) It shall be an offence for a person intentionally and without lawful authority to intercept, at any place in the United Kingdom, any communication in the course of its transmission by means of–
3. (a) a public postal service; or
4. (b) a public telecommunication system."
5. This provision follows closely the language of section 1(1) of ICA 1985 which RIPA replaced.
6. Section 2(1) defines "telecommunication system" as follows:
7. "telecommunication system" means that any system (including the apparatus comprised in it) which exists (whether wholly or partly in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) for the purpose of facilitating the transmission of communications by any means involving the use of electrical or electro-magnetic energy."
8. Section 2(2) provides:
9. "(2) For the purposes of this Act, but subject to the following provisions of this section, a person intercepts a communication in the course of its transmission by means of a telecommunication system if, and only if, he–
10. (a) so modifies or interferes with the system, or its operation,
11. (b) so monitors transmissions made by means of the system, or
12. (c) so monitors transmissions made by wireless telegraphy to or from apparatus comprised in the system,
13. as to make some or all of the contents of the communication available, while being transmitted, to a person other than the sender or intended recipient of the communication."
14. At the heart of this appeal is the effect of section 2(7) which provides:
15. "(7) For the purposes of this section the times while a communication is being transmitted by means of a telecommunication system shall be taken to include any time when the system by means of which the communication is being, or has been, transmitted is used for storing it in a manner that enables the intended recipient to collect it or otherwise to have access to it."
16. Systems used to transmit voicemail messages

The provisions of sections 1 and 2 RIPA are intended to apply to a number of different technologies. In this appeal we are concerned only with voicemail messages left for an identifiable recipient on the voicemail facility of his or her private mobile telephone which is operated by a cellular network service provider and is part of a public telecommunication system to which the phone is connected.
For present purposes, it is convenient to adopt the description of such a system provided by the Crown and with which the appellants have not taken issue.
1. 1. (1) The mobile handset operates as a radio transmitter/receiver.
  2. (2) Calls and messages sent to it are sent over the provider's standard network which is a public telecommunications system in the United Kingdom and routes communications to and from the phone through local transceiver base stations (cell sites).
  3. (3) That network is connected to other similar networks operated by other public telecommunications providers.
  4. (4) Calls and messages to the phone number are intended for the subscriber who is the sole user.
  5. (5) In the event that a voice call goes unanswered, the network automatically diverts the call to a voicemail facility, which is housed at switching level within the system, and on which the caller leaves a digitally recorded voice message, the presence of which is later automatically notified to the subscriber.
  6. (6) The subscriber may then access the recorded message by calling his voicemail facility, in practice with the use of a speed dial facility on his own handset but in fact by dialling a mobile phone number, which causes the network to route his call to his voicemail box. This can also be done from another telephone, subject to the use of a PIN code security feature. This call is automatically answered by the network and, by selecting options, he is able to listen to some or all of the recorded message. By selecting further options he may listen again, save or delete the recorded message. Unless he positively acts to delete the message, the recording remains stored within his voicemail box until either he later deletes it or the maximum period for retention is reached in which case it is deleted automatically.
  7. (7) The relevant interception conduct ("hacking") involves remotely accessing the voicemail box by dialling, from another telephone, the telephone number relating to it and bypassing any security feature, so as to be able to listen to the content of the message, without the knowledge or consent of the subscriber, at a time when the recorded message is stored there, not yet having been deleted.
  8. (8) It may be the case that the message either has or has not previously been heard in whole or in part by the subscriber. This will not be known by the hacker when the hack takes place and is outside his control.
  9. (9) The hacker therefore achieves access to the message by "impersonating" the intended recipient. If the message is inaccessible to the intended recipient, it cannot be hacked. Whether before or after it has been listened to by the intended recipient, it will only be capable of being intercepted if it is stored in the system in a manner which means that the intended recipient has access to it.

1. The competing submissions

The appellants submit that, save in the particular circumstances provided for in section 2(7), the references in RIPA to the course of transmission in the context of the use of a telephone system should be understood as meaning that the transmission ends when the signal delivered to the handset is converted back into sound waves or the call is terminated. They accept that section 2(7) effects an extension of the "course of transmission" but submit that the ordinary meaning of "transmission" contemplates conveyance from one person or place to another and that therefore the extension is limited to covering the transient storage of electronic communications before receipt. They submit that section 2(7) will apply to periods of transient storage that arise as a consequence of the use of modern electronic communications, as well as communications such as e-mail and voicemail when the intended recipient was not immediately available. However, they submit that that is the limit of the extension effected by section 2(7).
The Crown submits that there is no warrant for the restrictions which the appellants seek to impose on section 2(7). The Crown does not maintain that the course of transmission necessarily includes all periods during which the transmission system stores the communication. However, it does submit that it does apply to those periods when the system is used for storage "in a manner that enables the intended recipient to collect it or otherwise have access to it".
The issue to be determined therefore is whether, on the proper construction of section 2(7), the period of storage referred to comes to an end on first access or collection by the intended recipient or whether it continues beyond such first access for so long as the system is used to store the communication in a manner which enables the intended recipient to have subsequent or even repeated access to it.

1. Authorities

In support of the appellants' proposed reading of section 2(7), Miss Montgomery QC has referred us to a number of authorities. It is clear that RIPA should be construed, if possible, so as to comply with Article 8, European Convention on Human Rights and the relevant Directives. (R v E [2004] 2 Cr App R 29 per Hughes J. at para 37). However, beyond this, the authorities to which we have been referred cast no further light on the issue for decision.
Miss Montgomery relies on the decision of the Divisional Court in R (NTL Group Limited) v Crown Court at Ipswich [2003] QB 131 where Lord Woolf CJ, delivering the judgment of the court observed:

1. "Sub-section (7) has the effect of extending the time of communication until the intended recipient has collected it. It is essential on the evidence in this case that if NTL are to preserve the material, they take action before the intended recipient has collected the e-mail. Sub-section (7) means that we are here concerned with what happens in the course of transmission." (at para. 19)
2. In that case the Divisional Court was considering an application by police officers for the production of the contents of e-mails that were said to be relevant to a fraud investigation. Compliance with a production order, made under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, required the company to interfere with the operations of its system so as to divert a copy of the e-mail message to a second e-mail address before it was downloaded or otherwise collected by the intended recipient. Accordingly, the case was concerned solely with the period before the e-mail was made available to the intended recipient and the observations of Lord Woolf cited above were made in that context. The court was not addressing the situation under consideration in the present case and, as Fulford L.J. observed, it is unsustainable to suggest that the case is authority for the proposition that, once the intended recipient has collected the communication, "transmission" has necessarily ceased. Furthermore we note, as did Fulford L.J., that the Divisional Court in NTL did not consider the effect of the words "or otherwise to have access to it" in section 2(7). We agree with the judge that it would be impossible to reach a proper determination of the issue raised on the present application without addressing the impact of those words.

In support of the contention that "interception" has to occur between two defined points which are the beginning and the end of a "transmission" the appellants rely on R v E [2004] 2 Cr App R 29 where this court said:

1. "In our view the natural meaning of the expression "interception" denotes some interference or abstraction of the signal, whether it is passing along wires or by wireless telegraphy, during the process of transmission." (at para. 20)
2. The issue in that case was whether the use of a covert listening device placed in the appellant's car which recorded words spoken by the appellant, including words spoken when he was using a mobile phone, constituted an interception of the call. The Court of Appeal decided that it was not, because what was recorded was not the transmission but the appellant's words taken from the sound waves in the car. Accordingly the case says nothing about when a transmission ends by reference to section 2(7).

The same is true of R v McDonald (unreported 23 April 2002, Astill J., Woolwich Crown Court) where the judge held that the offence is committed by intercepting a transmission as it is carried in the system and that the system begins at point A, with the start of the transmission of electrical or electromagnetic energy into which the sound waves of the speaker have been converted, and ends at point B, when the energy ceases on being converted into sound waves by the receiver. However, once again, the court was here concerned with telephone calls recorded by external microphones and not with communications received by interference with the system which transmitted them. Accordingly the case is not in point.
R v Effik [1995] 1 AC 309 is a decision on the Interception of Communications Act 1985. The House of Lords was there concerned with whether a cordless telephone was a public or a private system. The ICA 1985 lacked any provision resembling section 2(7) and the reasoning has no bearing on the present issue. For the same reason Thomas Porter v H.M. Advocate [2005] SCCR 13 is not in point.
In R v Hardy [2003] 1 Cr App R 30 this court held that a tape recording by undercover officers of telephone conversations with the Appellants was not an interception of the communication in the course of its transmission within the meaning of section 2(2) RIPA, but was the same as the secret recording by the officer of the conversation whilst meeting the suspect face to face. The decision casts no light on the scope of section 2(7).

1. Reference to Hansard

On behalf of the appellants, Miss Montgomery sought to rely on certain passages in Hansard, in particular the debate on the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill in Standing Committee F on 16 March 2000. The circumstances in which it is permissible for the courts to refer to Hansard for the purposes of statutory interpretation are not present in this case. Even if section 2(7) could be considered ambiguous or obscure, there is certainly no clear statement by the promoter of the legislation which casts any light on the issue before us. (Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593). Rather, the issue falls to be decided on the usual principles of statutory interpretation.

1. The statutory language

Concentrating on the provisions themselves, section 2(7), which has no counterpart in the ICA 1985, was clearly intended to extend the scope of the course of transmission. Miss Montgomery contends, however, that this is limited to periods of transient storage that arise as a consequence of the use of modern electronic communications as well as when the intended recipient is not immediately available. We accept that if section 2(7) is to make effective provision for the mischief of unlawful interception of voicemail communications such an extension is necessary. However, we can see no justification for limiting the extension to such situations. There is nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that section 2(7) should be read in such a limited way.
Miss Montgomery draws attention to the speech of Lord Oliver in R v Effik [1995] 1 AC 309 at p.318 where he observed, in relation to section 1(1) of the ICA 1985, that to constitute the offence under that section the interception must occur "in the course of" the transmission of the communication which he considered could mean no more than during the transmission of the communication. She submits that it was therefore possible that without any further definition, communications in transient storage might not be treated as being in transmission at that point and therefore interception of the transient store might not be regarded as taking place during transmission. We agree that section 2(7) makes effective provision for that particular mischief. However, in our view that is not a reason for limiting the extension to that situation. Furthermore, there is an element of circularity in Miss Montgomery's submission to the extent that it seeks to invoke a suggested plain meaning of "the course of transmission". Section 2(7) is intended to extend that concept by deeming certain identified situations to be in the course of transmission. It is no answer to say that they would not in normal usage be considered to be in the course of transmission, a proposition which in any event we are unable to accept.
Fulford L.J., in accepting the Crown's submission as to the effect of section 2(7), considered that voicemails are not "collected" in the same way as e-mails in that the latter are downloaded from the internet service provider's server to the computer of the subscriber, whereas voicemail messages are "accessed" when they are listened to. Accordingly he considered that the act of listening to voicemails happens at a time when the system by which the message has been transmitted is being used for storing the recording and the intended recipient is enabled to have access to it. In doing so he expressly approved the following submission on behalf of the Crown:

1. "The use of the word "collect", no doubt in the sense of "fetch" or "obtain", suggests picking something up and taking it somewhere else. This is what occurs when an e-mail is downloaded from the service provider's server to the computer of the subscriber causing it to be deleted from the ISP's server. By contrast, the use of the words "to have access to it" can only mean, in the case of a voicemail, "listen to it". Voicemails are not "collected" they are "accessed". This is especially so when one considers the whole phrase "…enables the intended recipient to collect it or otherwise to have access to it". The addition of the last words appears positively to indicate a different kind of activity from collection, especially having regard to the use of the word "otherwise". "

Miss Montgomery seizes on this distinction and submits that it follows from this reasoning that RIPA would provide different levels of protection depending on the form of communication used. She submits that Parliament cannot have intended that communications should be treated differently depending on the method of communication used and whether that communication was subsequently "collected" or "accessed". It seems to us that in each case it would be necessary to examine the incidents of the particular technology used in order to determine whether an interception occurred "in the course of transmission". What may constitute "the course of transmission" may differ according to the technology. Here, one limb of the formulation in section 2(7) may be more appropriate than the other to describe the position depending on the means of retrieval. However, for present purposes what matters is whether the events fall within one or other limb of the extended concept of the course of transmission. Furthermore the fact that the different terms may be more or less appropriate to address the features of different technologies is in no way inconsistent with the Government's stated intention to provide a single legal framework regardless of the means of communication.
We agree with the conclusion of Fulford L.J. that there is nothing in the words "for storing it in a manner that enables the intended recipient …. otherwise to have access to it" which suggests that this opportunity is limited by time or that it can only occur on a single occasion. On the contrary, the words suggest to us a continuing state of affairs. There is no basis for reading into the statutory language a limitation restricting it by reference to the first occasion when the intended recipient has access to it.
On behalf of the appellants, Miss Montgomery draws attention to the expression "intended recipients" in section 2(7) and submits that this provides further support for the view that the extension of protection effected by that sub-section is not intended to extend beyond the point of first access. However, we agree with Fulford L.J. that these words are not meant to limit the ambit of this provision to the period prior to first access; rather, they are simply intended to identify the person to whom it is addressed and who was entitled to have access to it.
The scope of the provision is put beyond doubt, in our view, by the reference in section 2(7) to the system by means of which "the communication is being, or has been, transmitted". The words "has been transmitted" are totally inconsistent with the appellants' suggestion that the extension is limited to transient storage prior to first access. These words make entirely clear that the course of transmission may continue notwithstanding that the voicemail message has already been received and read by the intended recipient.
In our view these words in their natural meaning are entirely apt to cover a situation, such as that presently under consideration, where a message having been initially received by the intended recipient is stored in the communications system where the intended recipient may thereafter have access to it by playing back the message. In this regard it is significant that the intended recipient cannot gain access to the voicemail message without resort to the telecommunication system, but is totally dependent on the system. In these circumstances, there is no good reason why the first receipt of the communication should be considered as bringing the transmission to an end nor is there any support for this within the statutory language. We consider that it is readily apparent from the plain words that it was the intention of Parliament that section 2(7) should extend the course of transmission to include this situation.
Furthermore, we are led to the same conclusion on the application of the mischief rule. As Fulford L.J. put it:

1. "I accept, therefore, that the period of storage covered by the section does not come to an end on first access or collection by the intended recipient, but it continues for so long as the system is used to store the communication, and whilst the intended recipient has access to it in this way. In a comprehensive fashion, this covers the vice that in my view the provision was intended to address, namely unauthorized access to communications, whether oral or text, whilst they remain on the system by which they were transmitted. As the prosecution submits, unlawful access and intrusion is not somehow less objectionable because the message has been read or listened to by the intended recipient before the unauthorized access takes place."
2. The European Directives

One purpose of the enactment of RIPA was to implement Article 5 of the 1997 Directive. Directives are binding on Member States as to the result to be achieved, but leave to national authorities the choice of form and methods. In applying national law and, in particular, in interpreting the provisions of national law introduced in order to implement Directives, the courts of Member States are required to interpret their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive in order to give effect to EU law. (Case - 14/83 Von Colson v Land Nordrhein-Westfallen [1984] ECR 1891, 1909). In Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-4135 Court of Justice observed, at para 8:

1. "It follows that, in applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted before or after the Directive, the national court called upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the Directive in order to achieve the results pursued by the latter and therefore comply with the third paragraph of Article 189 of the Treaty." (emphasis added)
2. It follows therefore that in interpreting RIPA courts must do so, as far as possible, so as to achieve the results pursued by both the 1997 and the 2002 Directives.

The 1997 Directive provides:

1. "Article 1
2. Object and scope
3. 1. This Directive provides for the harmonisation of the provisions of the Member States required to ensure an equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data in the telecommunications sector and to ensure the free movement of such data and of telecommunications equipment and services in the Community. …"
4. Article 2(c) defines "public telecommunications network":
5. "'public telecommunications network' shall mean transmission systems and, where applicable, switching equipment and other resources which permit the conveyance of signals between defined termination points by wire, by radio, by optical or by other electromagnetic means, which are used, in whole or in part, for the provision of publicly available telecommunications services"
6. Article 5(1) provides:
7. "Article 5
8. Confidentiality of the communications
9. 1. Member States shall ensure via national regulations the confidentiality of communications by means of a public telecommunications network and publicly available telecommunications services. In particular, they shall prohibit listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance of communications, by others than users, without the consent of the users concerned, except when legally authorised, in accordance with Article 14 (1)."
10. Article 6(1) provides:
11. "Article 6
12. Traffic and billing data
13. 1. Traffic data relating to subscribers and users processed to establish calls and stored by the provider of a public telecommunications network and/or publicly available telecommunications service must be erased or made anonymous upon termination of the call without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4."

The 2002 Directive repeals the 1997 Directive and provides:

1. "Article 1
2. Scope and aim
3. 1. This Directive harmonises the provisions of the Member States required to ensure an equivalent level of protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data in the electronic communication sector and to ensure the free movement of such data and of electronic communication equipment and services in the Community.
4. Article 2 includes the following definitions:
5. "(d) 'communication' means any information exchanged or conveyed between a finite number of parties by means of a publicly available electronic communications service. …
6. …
7. (h) 'electronic mail' means any text, voice, sound or image message sent over a public communications network which can be stored in the network or in the recipient's terminal equipment until it is collected by the recipient."
8. Article 5(1) provides:
9. "Article 5
10. Confidentiality of the communications
11. 1. Member States shall ensure the confidentiality of communications and the related traffic data by means of a public communications network and publicly available electronic communications services, through national legislation. In particular, they shall prohibit listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of interception or surveillance of communications and the related traffic data by persons other than users, without the consent of the users concerned, except when legally authorised to do so in accordance with Article 15(1). This paragraph shall not prevent technical storage which is necessary for the conveyance of a communication without prejudice to the principle of confidentiality."
12. Article 6(1) provides:
13. "Article 6
14. Traffic data
15. 1. Traffic data relating to subscribers and users processed and stored by the provider of a public communications network or publicly available electronic communications service must be erased or made anonymous when it is no longer needed for the purpose of the transmission of a communication without prejudice to paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of this Article and Article 15(1)."

Miss Montgomery submits that the more limited interpretation of section 2(7) for which she contends is supported by the Directives. She submits that it corresponds with the plain meaning of the Directives which distinguish between stored communications and the automatic, transient and intermediate storage of a communication for the purposes of transmission.
With regard to the 1997 Directive, she submits that Article 5(1) has to be read in conjunction with Article 6(1) which requires that traffic data must be deleted subject to certain qualifications. She draws attention to the fact that the obligation to erase arises upon termination of the call. She also draws attention to the fact that the definition of "public telecommunications network" in Article 2(c) refers to the conveyance of signals "between defined termination points".
With regard to the 2002 Directive, she points to the new provisions made for the technological storage of communications for the sole purpose of transmission. Thus Article 5(1) provides in its last sentence that the duty to ensure the confidentiality of communications shall not prevent technical storage which is necessary for the conveyance of the communication. In this regard she also relies on recital 22 which distinguishes the "automatic, intermediate and transient storage" required for transmission.

1. "(22) The prohibition of storage of communications and the related traffic data by persons other than the users or without their consent is not intended to prohibit any automatic, intermediate or transient storage of this information insofar as this takes place for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission in the electronic communications network and provided that the information is not stored for any period longer than is necessary for the transmission and for traffic management purposes, and that during the period of storage the confidentiality remains guaranteed."
2. She submits that these provisions provide the key to understanding the scope of section 2(7) which was intended to extend the scope of the statutory protection only to communications in automatic, intermediate and transient storage for the purposes of transmission.

While we accept that the 2002 Directive does make provision for technical storage of communications and is not intended to prohibit any automatic, intermediate and transient storage for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission, we do not accept that this limits the reading of section 2(7). No doubt section 2(7) achieves that result. However, if it had been the intention simply to ensure that such technical storage necessary for the conveyance of the communication was not prohibited, we would expect section 2(7) to say so in terms. In fact the language employed in section 2(7) is far wider and, for reasons we have already explained, extends the protection of a voicemail message beyond the point of first receipt. In particular, the words "is being, or has been, transmitted" are totally inconsistent with a reading limited to automatic, intermediate and transient storage for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission.
However, there is a further issue on the Directives, namely whether it was open to the United Kingdom, consistently with its obligations in EU law, to enact a provision of the breadth for which the Crown contends. It was common ground between the parties below that Parliament, in enacting section 2(7), had gone beyond the duty in EU law to implement Directives and had afforded protection to communications in circumstances beyond those required by the Directives. Fulford L.J. came to the same conclusion:

1. "In the result, the words of section 2(7) of RIPA should be interpreted as extending the concept of transmission in this context so as to include any period during which the transmission system itself stores the communication. Undoubtedly, this protection goes further than that seemingly envisaged in Directives 1997/66/EC or 2002/58/EC, but it is entirely a matter for Parliament to decide whether or not to provide a scheme which provides greater protection than that indicated by the European Parliament and Council in a particular Directive, for instance in order to ensure that an individual's right to privacy, when viewed broadly in this context, is substantively upheld…"

On this appeal Mr. Edis QC on behalf of the Crown has submitted for the first time that the reading of section 2(7) for which the prosecution contends is in fact required by the Directives. With regard to the 1997 Directive he submits that Article 5(1) protects the confidentiality of "communications" and therefore requires Member States to prohibit, inter alia, "listening" to such communications by persons other than their intended recipients. He submits that the question is whether mobile phone voicemail messages stored on a public telecommunications network are "communications by means of a public telecommunications network". He submits that although there is no specific definition of "communications" in the 1997 Directive, a voicemail message stored on a mobile network plainly falls within the natural meaning of "communication by means of a public telecommunications network". With regard to the 2002 Directive he submits that it is clear from Article 5(1) that the Directive protects the privacy of "communications" and therefore requires prohibition of "listening" to such communications by persons other than their intended recipients. He submits that the only relevant question is therefore whether mobile phone voicemail messages stored on a public telecommunications network fall within "communications" under this Directive. The 2002 Directive does include a definition of "communications" in Article 2(d). Mr. Edis submits that voicemail messages stored on a mobile telecommunications network plainly satisfy each of the three requirements of the definition so as to fall within the protection conferred by Article 5(1): they contain information, they are conveyed between a finite number of parties and they are conveyed by means of an electronic communications service because they are stored on a communications network rather than on an answering device attached to or incorporated in the recipient's handset.
In response, Miss Montgomery submits that the obligation imposed by the Directives in this regard is limited to transmission and that ends with the first receipt by the intended recipient of the voice message. Here she relies in particular on Recital 27 to the 2002 Directive which states:

1. "(27) The exact moment of the completion of the transmission of a communication, after which traffic data should be erased except for billing purposes, may depend on the type of electronic communications service that is provided. For instance for a voice telephony call the transmission will be completed as soon as either of the users terminates the connection. For electronic mail the transmission is completed as soon as the addressee collects the message, typically from the server of his service provider."
2. However, we do not derive much assistance from this provision. First, Recital 27 is concerned with a different matter, the definition of the exact moment of the completion of transmission for the purposes of provisions concerning the erasure of traffic data and so, at best, can only be relevant by way of analogy to the scope of the protection conferred by Article 5(1). Secondly, as the recital itself points out, the precise point of completion of transmission for this purpose may depend on the type of service provided. That is clearly correct. This Recital does not specifically address voicemail messages. In addition in this regard, the appellants rely on the definition of "electronic mail" in Article 2(h) of the 2002 Directive which employs the concept of ability to be stored "until it is collected by the recipient". Article 2(h) clearly includes a voice message. However, this provision is not a definition of "transmission" nor does it necessarily indicate the point at which transmission ceases.

In any event, it is not necessary for us to decide whether the wider meaning of section 2(7), which we consider was intended by Parliament, goes beyond what is required by the Directives because it is clear that even if it does, it is not prohibited by EU law.
Miss Montgomery submits that the Directives provide for the harmonisation of national legislation in order to avoid obstacles to the inter-State market in telecommunications. Here she relies on the reference in Article 1(1) of the 2002 Directive to harmonization "to ensure the free movement of such data and of telecommunications equipment and services in the Community". She submits that if the wider interpretation of section 2(7) were accepted, the obligations for communications service providers in the United Kingdom would be more onerous that in other Member States.
In this regard, Miss Montgomery also draws attention to Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communication networks. This Directive modifies the 2002 Directive. In particular she draws attention to Recital 6 of the preamble which states:

1. "(6) The legal and technical differences between national provisions concerning the retention of data for the purpose of prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences present obstacles to the internal market for electronic communications, since service providers are faced with different requirements regarding the types of traffic and location data to be retained and the conditions and periods of retention."

One of the purposes of the 2002 Directive was undoubtedly to bring about harmonisation in relation to free movement of data, goods and services in the electronic communications sector. However, Recital 8 makes clear that harmonisation in this regard is intended to be limited. It states:

1. "(8) Legal, regulatory and technical provisions adopted by the Member States concerning the protection of personal data, privacy and the legitimate interest of legal persons, in the electronic communication sector, should be harmonised in order to avoid obstacles to the internal market for electronic communication in accordance with Article 14 of the Treaty. Harmonisation should be limited to requirements necessary to guarantee that the promotion and development of new electronic communications services and networks between Member States are not hindered."
2. We are not concerned here with exhaustive regulation by the EU of the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector. Rather, this is a case of minimum harmonisation leaving Member States free to maintain more stringent regulatory standards than those required by the Directives, provided they are otherwise compatible with EU law. The Directives prescribe minimum standards, but it is open to Member States to set higher standards for the protection of privacy of electronic communications, provided that those additional obligations are compatible with EU law.

We are totally unable to accept that section 2(7) could give rise to any concerns as to its effect on inter-State trade. In particular, the obligation to ensure the confidentiality of voicemail messages after their first receipt cannot possibly subject undertakings operating in the United Kingdom to any competitive disadvantage. Our conclusion on this point is, moreover, entirely consistent with the protection afforded by Article 5 of the 2002 Directive, whatever its scope, and no question of derogation under Article 15 arises. Finally, in this regard, we note that the 2006 Directive is concerned with a different matter, namely the harmonisation of obligations on service providers to retain data for the purposes of the investigation and prosecution of crime, a matter to which very different considerations apply.

1. Legal certainty

On behalf of the appellants, Miss Montgomery submits that the conduct alleged in these proceedings comes within the provisions of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the Data Protection Act 1998. She draws attention to differences between these Acts and RIPA, in particular to the fact that under section 55(2)(d) Data Protection Act there is a public interest defence which is not available under RIPA. She submits that adopting the broader interpretation of section 2(7) RIPA for which the Crown contends risks creating parallel offences which do not provide the same defence. The same conduct could potentially be lawful under one Act and unlawful under another. She submits that this violates the principle of legal certainty.
It is often the case that given conduct may constitute a criminal offence under more than one statute. The offence contrary to section 1(1) RIPA, unlike the offences protecting computers under the Computer Misuse Act or data under the Data Protection Act, is committed only while the communication is in the course of transmission by means of a public telecommunication system. Parliament has clearly concluded that that system requires particular protection and that there should be no public interest defence in respect of such "hacking" activities. Contrary to the submission on behalf of the appellants, the resulting situation is not lacking in legal certainty.

1. Admissibility of evidence

Miss Montgomery draws attention to section 17 RIPA which excludes material from legal proceedings and submits that the wider reading of section 2(7) for which the Crown contends could have far-reaching implications for law enforcement agencies and criminal procedure. However, while section 17 excludes from evidence intercept material obtained under warrant or obtained unlawfully, stored communications are admissible in evidence if obtained by means of a production order under section 1(5)(c) RIPA or with consent. Accordingly, the wider reading of section 2(7), which we find to be its intended meaning, need have no damaging consequences so far as the admissibility of evidence is concerned.

1. Conclusion

For these reasons the appeal will be dismissed.

7 April 2021 St Mark Cleopatra St Heliopolis Coptic Orthodox Church

st 55.23

https://suscopts.org/readings/

Luke 1:26-38

Now in the sixth month the angel Gabriel was sent by God to a city of Galilee named Nazareth, to a virgin betrothed to a man whose name was Joseph, of the house of David. The virgins name was Mary. And having come in, the angel said to her, "Rejoice, highly favored one, the Lord is with you; blessed are you among women!" But when she saw him, she was troubled at his saying, and considered what manner of greeting this was. Then the angel said to her, "Do not be afraid, Mary, for you have found favor with God. And behold, you will conceive in your womb and bring forth a Son, and shall call His name JESUS. He will be great, and will be called the Son of the Highest; and the Lord God will give Him the throne of His father David. And He will reign over the house of Jacob forever, and of His kingdom there will be no end." Then Mary said to the angel, "How can this be, since I do not know a man?" And the angel answered and said to her, "The Holy Spirit will come upon you, and the power of the Highest will overshadow you; therefore, also, that Holy One who is to be born will be called the Son of God. Now indeed, Elizabeth your relative has also conceived a son in her old age; and this is now the sixth month for her who was called barren. For with God nothing will be impossible." Then Mary said, "Behold the maidservant of the Lord! Let it be to me according to your word."And the angel departed from her.

And Glory be to God forever

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Showing 1-5 of 5 results for calunius

pp2139-12 01- calunius article on allianz 4 january 2012.pdf

Feb 19, 2018, 9:17 PM by Custodian of Information

on page

Additional Resources (replication Dropbox 12 10 23 in Resources Apr 2, 2013, 7:00 PM)

Additional Resources

(replication Dropbox 12 10 23 in Resources Apr 2, 2013, 7:00 PM)

‎>‎ pp2139-12 01- calunius article on allianz 4 january 2012.pdf

pp1442 12 01 04 cs - calunius article on allianz reasons to stop litigation funding.pdf

Feb 19, 2018, 8:39 PM by Custodian of Information

on page

Additional Resources (replication Dropbox 12 10 23 in Resources Apr 2, 2013, 7:00 PM)

Additional Resources

(replication Dropbox 12 10 23 in Resources Apr 2, 2013, 7:00 PM) ‎

>‎ pp1442 12 01 04 cs - calunius article on allianz reasons to stop litigation funding.pdf

" "Will you walk into my parlour" said the spider to the fly?" " The failed attempt by Ed Brittain JLT Specialty to shift risk to Allianz Legal Protection ("ALP", trading name of Allianz Group Plc, Mira Makar v Allianz Group Plc & Ors 2012 Folio 336) on 29 January 2018 which risk he had dumped on AVIVA in September 2014 (keeping its records to himself-no policy number) in both cases in order to sell lucrative litigation funding to numbered individual thieves (no VAT number) and pocket percentage by converting offences to payouts by wrappered "professional negligence" insurance. Alistair Fulton before JCR SMS May 2017:" Aviva! Aviva! Aviva!" TRD paid mobile

Aug 25, 2020, 5:44 PM by Custodian of Information

... CHIP RETAIL CUSTOMER BASE Run-off "transferred" to a manager off balance sheet branded Calunius Capital as reported 4 January 2012. When asked, he confirmed that: (1) that he did ...

" "Will you walk into my parlour" said the spider to the fly?" " The failed attempt by Ed Brittain JLT Specialty to shift risk to Allianz Legal Protection ("ALP", trading name of Allianz Group Plc, Mira Makar v Allianz Group Plc & Ors 2012 Folio 336) on 29 January 2018 which risk he had dumped on AVIVA in September 2014 (keeping its records to himself-no policy number) in both cases in order to sell lucrative litigation funding to numbered individual thieves (no VAT number) and pocket percentage by converting offences to payouts by wrappered "professional negligence" insurance. Alistair Fulton before JCR SMS May 2017:" Aviva! Aviva! Aviva!" TRD paid mobile

19 February 2018

Dec 3, 2020, 1:28 AM by Custodian of Information

... 19, 2018, 8:39 PM Custodian of Information attached pp1442 12 01 04 cs - calunius article on allianz reasons to stop litigation funding.pdf to Additional Resources Feb 19, 2018 ...

19 February 2018

19-23 February 2018

Dec 3, 2020, 1:26 AM by Custodian of Information

... Resources Feb 19, 2018, 9:17 PM Custodian of Information attached pp2139-12 01- calunius article on allianz 4 january 2012.pdf to Additional Resources Feb 19, 2018, 9:17 ...

19-23 February 2018

UNRAVELLING

The above is highlighted to help Simon Hobbs ( /Freeths) extricate AMF et al from the pickle he/they got him/them into, and let Allianz battle it out with the secret broker and stack.

The most efficient way for Allianz to do this is to give the secret stack their recovery path. This recovery path is from Markel Corporation. The communications with their Andrew Bailey and others are fully documented from May 2011. These are available for Allianz Group Plc in the exceptional circumstances in which it finds itself.

The Markel notification was done by Kingston Smith LLP in June 2010. The written notification to Kingston Smith is on this website.

Markel admitted they did not know that the Baker Tilly partners had been excluded from ICAEW by 7 January 2005.

Markel had paid out (25 September 2008) for the partners on the tax evasion case known as the "Guy Hands Case" (claiming relief to which there was no entitlement). They set themselves up to lose when the investors had already refunded the tax to HMRC. BT partners received an embargo'ed judgment that triggered the insurance, without the reputation damage of it being delivered and therefore public. BT partners had earlier asset-stripped their business in advance, so they did not have any estate at risk. They had learned from watching Herbert Smith suing for Guy Hands and others as "professional negligence" and omitting to freeze the estate.

Any insurer, under-writer or litigation funder is outside those permitted access to embargo'ed materials.

It was not until the first week in May 2011 that ICAEW finally revealed the sanctioning of the partners by exclusion in January 2005, a decade of retaliation has ensued.

BT partners were fronted by Barlow Lyde & Gilbert (Clyde & Co) in the above transactions in court.

Barlow Lyde & Gilbert were also hired by PwC in 2006 to front contraventions of court orders dated 9 October 2006 to deliver up by 16 October 2006. Delivery up means to give to Burges Salmon (for MM) her papers. Burges Salmon is the supplier to Allianz. From the perspective of Allianz, MM is "the Insured". See further exchange with Burges Salmon LLP Dec 2006, included in 17-page fraud report filed in court 5 December 2013, provided to government crime teams 10.58am 6 December 2013 and heard before Christine Derrett on or around 11.22am that same day with Joseph Wigley of the Oxford Brigade and Jonathan Wyles, RPC, referrer to FRP.

PwC through Barlow Lyde & Gilbert said that MM could have her documents if she paid £9,000 photocopying plus entered an undertaking through solicitors Burges Salmon that i) she would not use the documents to make a claim against PwC and ii) that she would not use them to cause PwC reputation damage.

In 2011, NEB pitched in to help PwC by giving them the Short Form Agreement, when it was designated private and by court order could not be used. Had AMF not carried on the silent treatment from March 2011, he would have realised this (by allowing himself to be informed and not presuming MM lies whenever she opens her mouth.)

The Guy Hands transaction was heard before Andrew Smith J November 2012. This includes the fact that in that case there were three claim forms issued each on behalf of certain investors in the Commercial Court and the trial took place by squatting in Chancery Division, without being referred to Queens Bench for a division to division transfer. In other words the court was simply being used to give justification to the pay-out by Markel. This validated the efficacy of the product which had been sold, because the investors suffered no net loss even though they had claimed relief to which they had no entitlement, and there ought properly to have been some sort of retribution in respect of at least the product wholesaler, retailer and manufacturer.

This was the sort of activity which resulted in the BT partners being excluded together with their role in BetonSports. This was floated in July 2004 on AIM, and collapsed in July 2006 with UK investors losing £100m and US gamblers and the DoJ recovering £43m. The AIM float of FRP can be seen as part of a continuum from this, with Markel the main protagonist. So PKF Littlejohn, the IPA's auditor, is caught up and Mazars, who are the ones holding the "bomb" when it went off.

KPMG, Freeths' auditor, is both auditor of RSA and user of its secret instruments. KPMG has blocked access to the individual partner whose duty it was to warn Freeths in the same way as BDO ought to have warned AMF and others. They chose not to.

updated 1400, 8 April 2021

WRAPPERED PRODUCT

Kingston Smith were caught because Laurence Longe et al (Baker Tilly internal lawyers and partners) did not tell them (Kingston Smith) nor Markel (same insurer, horizontally integrated), in September 2007 when properly he ought to have done. BT used a ghastly wrappered product from Markel which allowed notification to be delayed from the event or potential event, to a "claims made" basis. That means that the benefit of the insurance continues even if the insured is causing great damage and doing no damage mitigation or error correction.

This wrappering turns "insurance" into litigation funding. By not notifying, the surety assumes risk, ie. it finances. Surety does not then pay until sued. The assumption of risk is synonymous with source of funding.

MM has already sued Allianz (MM v Allianz group Plc & Ors, 2012 Folio 336). This was on the advice of FoS and City of London Police. This means that no further claim form needs to be issued. Allianz admitted the relevant events in February 2006 and no further vetting is required by it.

Allianz needs to determine its path for limiting liability. This means giving Freeths' insurance stack their path for recovery.

TRIAD GROUP PLC: INTEREST IN THE AVIVA BOND

The mobile phone used by AMF to inform MM she is a "shit", in front of JCR and SMS, within earshot of MM's late Mum, uses a VODAFONE SIM card paid for by TRD. MM used that line to inform the identity of AVIVA and AMF repeated the identity of AVIVA three times.

This means TRD has an interest in the AVIVA bond, at least to ward off Part 20 Contributory Damages and the consequences of interference in the operations of SME Alliance Ltd from September 2014 (MM co-founder). This AVIVA bond is a corporate bond sold to FRP and others, not individuals. It continues self-certification protocols, ie the insurer assumes risk totally blind.

MM v Kingston Smith LLP 2012 Folio 336 default judgment is on this site.

KS is included in 2011 emails also for these reasons (notice and Markel updates).

MM Thur 8 April 2021 12.30pm update 12.50 13.05

further to:

Simon Hobbs (Freeths LLP) opening comms Tuesday 6 April 2021 17.28

AVIVA (formerly Norwich Union, including CGU merger)

suppliers to JCR / MM executed and notarised by A&O

1999 - 2005 incl

both supplier and customer (see Supermarket of Funds TRD brochure)

Docs AMF would have had in May 2017,

to facilitate rapid collection from AVIVA via Peter Watson A&O

who was ready and waiting

A&O reps joined TRD entertain NU at Monza

Vince Ballister and Richard Weir are holders of 1 share each in TRD

and attended AGM 31 October 2005 in support

MM Thur 8 April 2021 16.15

further to:

Simon Hobbs (Freeths LLP) opening comms Tuesday 6 April 2021 17.28

Events indemnified by ALLIANZ GROUP PLC

w.e.f. February 2006

(contract terms give ALLIANZ benefit of all documents, records, evidence and access to privilege including litigation privilege and legal privilege. Allianz is on the "other side" to Freeths on Herbert Smith, which it is (co) funding but cannot collect £21m until stolen share certificate is returned and bed & breakfast can complete.

There has been extra delay due to prolonged obstruction of access and refusal to communicate from June 2006 and further 12 July 2006 fire at A&O. AMF asked to co operate in meeting 22.9.16, rather than continuing "semi detached"

Evidence Filed In Court Already - Released Friday 9 April 2021 14.30 pm to facilitate:

1) exit path for AMF and others, recognising damage to him, TRD, chosen scapegoat NEB, all those named by Lavender particularly that adverse publicity three times on BAILII and once on Williams Lea platform is perverse (trading as "Gazette") (Williams Lea already admitted re blocking 2012 Folio 336 notice 15 January 2014, and being Farringdon and other bond operators, blocking proper notices so the world is informed and replacing by indemnified agents of creditors - their notes of telephone conference with late SSRM refer)

In November 2006, MM agreed that an application to strike out her evidence could be withdrawn without penalty or publicity. Allianz backed the move, under a contract it had concluded with Burges Salmon. She received an apology for distress on the RNS.

The inference of the events from December 2018 (let alone those from 2016) is that the apology in November 2006 was not sincere.

It is perverse in the extreme that, having attained the benefit of MM agreeing that the application to strike out could be withdrawn in November 2006, AMF should choose to be in headlights in 2021, taking a plethora of others with him associated with MM.

This includes those attending on 12 Feb. 2019 with DMH Stallard (recorded by City of London as 333 Cromwell burglars and the government as the money laundering platform using Client Monies.).

Stallard were renting out their infrastructure on commission. FRP Advisory LLP is named as Client on DMH Stallard LLP bills. (Nick Carter Pegg BDO). It ceased in February 2020, with the AIM exit, operators pocketing £80m, the risk having come full loop back to Markel.

2) damage mitigation by causing to be removed three BAILII postings starting with the one referring to "subject to error correction" referencing DMH Stallard LLP and Reuben Comiskey as well as Williams Lea (Gazette). These are a complete set: there is no advantage to Freeths LLP insurance stack to connect to Reuben Comiskey and DMH Stallard LLP (before Nicholas Briggs April 2021, to be uploaded when there is time.

3) ensuring that those named and disadvantaged by these events properly understand

(i) that judicial standing attaches to a person and they carry it with them whenever they step in court or their name is quoted;

(ii) they brought this with them on each event and the longer they carried on the more was building up to be disinterred (term used in courts meaning that if you build on quicksand your collapse is inevitable;

(iii) only one mis statement is needed to demolish witness credibility (AGM 31.10.05 - not knowing who members are before disenfranchising them for a decade, when they signed in). Once that goes, there is no position;

(iv) (technical) because Allianz (MM is "the Insured") (Allianz Group Plc is the entity) is principal and in court already, its interest is that :

(1) it sold Freeths a product allowing delayed notification by them;

(2) it fronts the anonymised insurance stack and broker, making them reliant on it including for timely alert;

(3) ALLIANZ is in any event in court against Freeths (Herbert Smith) with evidence effectively its own, with a contract with Burges Salmon and can do nothing to upset Burges Salmon's letter to RPC, identifying Catherine Kewish as a liar in saying MM had told her RPC could have TRD / AMF/ et al files from 2005, 2006, and had waived privilege. These were additional to files that had not been returned (letter 11 April 2007) and ought to have been. The burglary of 333 Cromwell Tower was on referral by RPC to FRP. Thereafter Boodle Hatfield stole Land Reg protection etc (indemnified Chief Land Reg, BEIS).

(4) Freeths are responsible as Kimbles for obstruction, knowing MM's email address in these events and blocking its use from Feb 2005 until broadcasting her private one on BAILII without Hamilton's statement that he is witness to using mira.makar@triadgroup.plc.uk at least on 2 and 3 February 2005 and this has been filed in court after AMF AJL and Lander had hacked MM's email and receipt of privileged legal advice : anonymous stack and broker ought to focus on admitting claim (fraud by partner on partnership 2004 - 2021), and recovering entirely from Markel Corp (including vicariously its parent) .

(5) AMF et al exit frees Freeths to focus on exiting Allianz at £3m to BS, and giving secret stack the recovery from Markel. You tube recordings are public.

(4) AMF was told by MM in September 2017 that Freeths' contract was hopeless and gave no protection plus she had already notified Allianz the previous week. That covers AMF TRD et al. Until this group is out, there is not the freedom to protect Allianz.

FILED IN COURT UNDER A&O FILE REF FOR MM RECORDING COMPANIES COURT JURISDICTION AND DATE BY WHICH (9 DEC 2005) OBSTRUCTION HAD TO STOP: FREETHS LLP COULD NOT ENTER COURT IN AMF/TRD/NEB NAMES WITHOUT THIS EVIDENCE DOC

(2012 Folio 336) NOR REMAIN RELIANT ON HIDING IT

MM Fri 9 April 2021 14.25

further to:

Simon Hobbs (Freeths LLP) opening comms Tuesday 6 April 2021 17.28

MM Fri 9 April 2021 14.55

further to:

Simon Hobbs (Freeths LLP) opening comms Tuesday 6 April 2021 17.28

Freeths LLP ought properly to have informed secret insurance stack by now that they have filed in court already late SSRM's email prior to 23 August 2017 at which they were present through Jonathan Hambleton, whose attendance whilst not being a shareholder was kept secret from members, after which the 2016 proxy poll voting cards that Chris Attwood, Equiniti had taken with him, were destroyed without authorisation from members, scanning, record of destruction. Freeths ought to have advised on making an insurance claim on Equiniti but did not, leaving AMF believing, erroneously, they were more than an outsourcer hired by him, using members' funds.

The late SSRM warned that unless orderliness were brought the evidence on the tiscali accounts (already in court) would inevitably come out.

They will have to explain to the anonymised stack their interception of these comms and use against the deceased. Not until the stack accepts they have a problem will minds start to focus on recovery path from Markel.

Evidence shows JR telling Burrows what he requires, no witnesses, no recording, and him as captured "note taker"

AMF must explain allowing this to happen and why neither he nor NEB did not put into evidence from 2019, for which Freeths LLP carries full procedural liability,

and why "letting sleeping dogs lie" was not good enough from 2016, or earlier when SMS refused to sign any more accounts after 2015 (an executive function), after the first proxy poll voting results (2015) were issued since 2005.

There has been hacking into BDO comms from 2015 recording MM's reasons and thanking Anna Draper for agreeing to attend the members' meeting. Freeths have put the outputs of this hacking private comms into court and now must retrieve the situation .

MM Fri 9 April 2021 15.40

further to:

Simon Hobbs (Freeths LLP) opening comms Tuesday 6 April 2021 17.28

Evidence filed in court by A&O showing MM private comms being sent to shareholders, incl JR, other principal shareholder, whose state of awareness from Lander triggered AMF's clandestine participation, not explained until Oct 2006.

Mark Mansell is notorious for his work for Harvey Weinstein and been before Parliament to be questioned on it. ET3 was issued in his name, signed by NEB.

Unless AMF decides that comms addressed to him will be kept to him and privacy respected, no-one has an exit path. Freeths need to learn to say "it was addressed to you, you reply, we cannot take it."

If they get no joy, they will have to inform the stack late SSRM notes for meeting 22.9.16 are public and AMF has not provided a statement with his hand written notes and will have to, however long it takes.

At the least, having seen those notes, SQH can confirm to secret insurance stack, AMF did not ask MM whether she was bankrupt and told her on 15 December 2016, he had heard nothing from Equiniti, day after the TRD register was hacked involving FRP, introduced by RPC.

MM Fri 9 April 2021 17:15

further to:

Simon Hobbs (Freeths LLP) opening comms Tuesday 6 April 2021 17.28

STATUS: Approaching close of business Friday 9 April 2021, there is no sign that Freeths have had removed from BAILII (and secret subscription services) the three damning perverse publications using TRD and others named particularly in the third.

These include references to those aspiring to be TRD main market public company directors but who have not as yet demonstrated any protective attitude but the opposite which does not inspire confidence.

Particularly they sit under a cloud of public reference to AJL's lunch gathering in Cote Brasserie in the Ben Jonson House building in Barbican. Those present, and informed by them, know that MM told TJE "you know you are a witness to the 31 October 2005 AGM of TRD." This was the start of the decade of disenfranchisement of members.

TJE, hostile to TRD from 3 February 2005, on his own account already filed in court, is witness to the fact that when he asked MM not to contact him again (May 2005) she did not do it (May 2005 - April 2021 inclusive).

His filed statement records that he does not tell the truth and told MM at the time that he had been instructed not to communicate with her, Deputy Executive Chairman, FD (Chief Financial Officer) and Group CEO. As CFO MM had the right to be heard at Audit Committee Meetings. The terms of reference of the AC were file by A&O in the court and again by RPC in QBD in 2009.

Filed in court are Adam Blake's notes from 24.1.05 the last page of which records that the First Report to the AC was not read in the A&O meeting. This record from a solicitor contradicts AMF's statement 2006. There are witnesses to DHW coming to the room in A&O used by MM and TRD team after the meeting ended to report "they have gone to Balls Brothers." IMH had been brought along by AMF/ JR to the meeting, without explanation.

As a result the AC did not convene either on that day or any day thereafter.

TJE has to ask himself what the outcome might have been had he stayed on 3.2.05 or not gone on vacation on 4.2.05, or made contact at any point thereafter before May 2005.

Jonathan Hambleton has to ask himself the same question.

Where they are now they have publicised MM's requirement to TJE to recall his evidence 31.10.05 notice of which he was given on 27.2.20.

This is that the door records of the private shareholders meeting have been the subject of hacking helped by whoever gave them to A&O and, despite being private, have been filed in court with reference number by A&O.

He is witness to the fact that the TRD AGM was infiltrated by four members of A&O who are not members plus NEB who was also not a member.

He is witness to the commitment of principal members and the board severally to proxy poll voting (announced on the RNS and scanned and retained by TRD/its outsourcer) and the omission to hold polls and publish for a decade followed by same 10 August 2016.

He is witness to the fact that MM has not communicated with him from May 2005, until she accidentally found him lunching with AJL and put him on notice of his omissions from before 18 December 2018, when Freeths asked the court to issue claiming AMF did not know the members attending or represented by proxy on 31 October 2005 and MM was harassing employees. TJE knows neither statement is true and he has been under a duty to the court to testify.

Once he has done that of his own choice, he can give it to Freeths and they can rely on it to withdraw BAILII, other subs services, Williams Lea (Gazette) and stop further exposure that has been most hurtful and depressing to NEB at least according to his statement filed in court. He will have to be seen right.

MM Fri 9 April 2021 18:00

further to:

Simon Hobbs (Freeths LLP) opening comms Tuesday 6 April 2021 17.28

Added to TJE statement that Freeths can rely on:

1) whether he knew that Fiona Kelsey, Jonathan Hook, Alistair Hamilton (PwC) had come into the 31.10.05 AGM; whether he knew who they were; and evidence that Fiona Kelsey had told members in the private members meeting that PwC had not sought a "letter of representation" from MM because she "would not give it" and, after making that statement, turning to MM to ask her whether she would or would not.

2) whether he knew at the time or since that a letter dated 5 September 2005 addressed to Tim Pope, PwC, (evidence Mark Harwood June 2009, now 2009/1711 - Head of Risk and Legal), was obtained from PwC by NEB scanned and sent to JR, at Tiscali, shareholder. - 13 October 2005

3) what he thinks of information relating to a public company, protected by statutory confidentiality being taken and given to A&O to be disseminated publicly and throughout the judicial system?

4) Whose job does he think it was to protect it and who is responsible for having taken it and given it to A&O and further allowed them to file it in court as well as allowingPwC to use it (2012 Folio 885)?

5) If he now knows that "going into court" means taking this in with him, does he really want to be there, dragging everyone else, knowing he is the witness who could help Freeths bring it to an end.

MM Fri 9 April 2021 18:30

further to:

Simon Hobbs (Freeths LLP) opening comms Tuesday 6 April 2021 17.28

STATUS: As at close of business Friday 9 April 2021, there is no sign that Freeths have had removed from BAILII (and secret subscription services) the three damning perverse publications using TRD and others named particularly in the third nor the Williams Lea Gazette notice citing TRD name (relied on to embezzle £38k from MM and block her access to the banking system in COVID).

Page 2 of attendance sheet at private members' meeting 31 October 2005, that ought to have remained private and governed by statutory confidentiality.

Would have been seen by AMF on signing in as he signed in on page 3 or after sheets completed when unbeknown to members and his board, A&O were allowed to remove them and use them adversarially in the judicial system.

Evidence AMF knew, or ought to have known, late SSRM was member and her proxy was Phil Haberman, senior partner EY, now independent.

Duty of Freeths LLP as "solicitors to the court" to have witness proofed AMF and checked with MM before asking the court to issue, based on an edifice, supported by AMF testimony, he "does not know who SSRM is or was".

Freeths LLP have not served AMF well and ought to have warned him that his credibility would be blown on this point alone and before he gave further evidence, assuming he did not withdraw first.

MM spared him the public humiliation by not replying to the claim form thereby taking the consequential flack and interrupting for over two and a half years her work as co founder of SME Alliance Ltd and other public based commitments.

PHILIP HABERMAN: PROXY FOR LATE SAMIA MAKAR, MEMBER, TRIAD GROUP PLC, AGM 31 OCT 2005

Philip Haberman is one of the top accounting experts in international arbitration and UK litigation, having first given expert evidence more than 25 years ago. He has been actively involved in over 300 matters including commercial and contractual disputes, investment treaty disputes, transaction-related disputes, competition matters, disputes arising out of accounting and financial irregularities, and valuation disputes.

Philip has given oral evidence and been cross-examined on more than 60 occasions before tribunals including the UK Courts (High Court, Competition Appeal Tribunal, County Court), international arbitration (LCIA, ICC, ICSID, SIAC and ad hoc) and overseas. He has carried out expert determinations to resolve disputes, has advised clients in CEDR-led mediations, and is a successful mediator.

Philip has dealt with consequential loss claims and valuations (of securities, companies, and projects) in a wide variety of industries and circumstances, located all over the world. His experience in investment treaty disputes (under ICSID, ICC and UNCITRAL rules) includes acting for claimants and respondents, in cases involving Barbados, Croatia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Georgia, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela.

Philip has a degree in Mathematics from Cambridge University. He is a Fellow of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, a Member of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, a founder member of the Expert Witness Institute, a Professional Member of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, and a CEDR-accredited mediator. He is also a Trustee of the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, and a member of the Board of the LCIA.

INSERT NOTE: Real members (2005) v phantom members (2016 to date)

Picture of late SM, former university lecturer, taken October 2005 between colleagues from adult tertiary education,.

This picture proves that she existed and was not a phantom TRD holder. She paid real money £5 per share at 25 million in issue.

She was represented by Phil Haberman (proxy) Senior Partner Ernst & Young, Head of Forensics and Expert Witness.

He was introduced by ICAEW and was leading the EY team assisting TRD in 2005, particularly reviewing the cash drain through the undocumented BACS systems and that PwC would seek to cover and exit.

This team included Fiona Younger who attended an "accounts inspection" at A&O on 25 September 2005.

AMF did not turn up.

JCR with NEB did.

JCR suggested going to lunch instead of inspecting the books and records as they had not much to show.

NEB said he had planned an electronic link from A&O into TRD systems in Godalming and MK, but had not worked out in advance whether such a thing were even feasible. In fact it could not be done.

This uninformative event made it essential to file in the Companies Court as it amounts to obstruction, a statutory offence. The filing dead line for the 31 March 2005 accounts in Companies House loomed fast.

Had AMF attended on 25 September 2005 with MM, he would have seen at once that an electronic link into the systems was not feasible (AMF says he knows about technology but has not provided evidence, including in respect of this event, details of which are filed in the Companies Court).

In any event, there was no point in penetrating the systems, if MM was blocked from access to knowing what had happened, so was prevented from starting the preparation of books and records.

AMF would have needed to recall these events to tell Freeths why he was in the Companies Court, together with reasons he was no-show on 25 September 2005, at A&O, his preferred venue for contact with MM, but novel. He would have had to tell Freeths why it was that even though the late SM did turn up to AGM, was not a no-show, he did not notice, or look at the attendance sheet at the front desk.

He should have known about this because he authorised it to be filed in court by A&O (despite being private). Similar applies to the proxy poll voting cards as receipted to members by Lloyds TSB Registrars (including late SM, publicly accessible) and later Equiniti. (also public unless shredded before scanning as happened for the 10 August 2016 AGM).

In cross-examination, counsel for MM would have had Mr Haberman attend (rather than Reuben Comiskey with DMH Stallard) to give evidence as to who the late SM was.

AMF's testimony would have automatically been struck out for want of credibility.

In October 2006 AMF applied to strike out MM's testimony including evidence of bullying violence and denigration of faith. AMF would have been required to reveal this application and statements going with it as they are already filed.

The application was withdrawn, as AMF pulled out (November 2006). The inference would be that he did not want it heard. The recording of the hearing on 1 November 2006 would be played, when leading counsel recorded perjury being in point, the formal finding of which was to be dealt with as a preliminary issue before TRD set foot in court. Allianz is fully informed and has rights over all the court files and evidence under the terms of its contract with MM, Burges Salmon, RJW, DWF, Fleet Solicitors, direct access counsel etc.

Unfortunately AMF did not read the short form agreement nor file the RNS in Companies House, as TRD committed. AMF has kept TRD in a protracted state of breach of contract ever since.

The late SM listed making good this omission in the agenda for MM's meeting with AMF on 22.9.16.

However he has to date withheld his hand written notes from evidence.

AMF needs to think about the position he is in and learn from JCR's wise decision to pull out from publicity in 2006, the confidentiality of which MM with her family has fought doggedly to preserve.

AMF has yet to demonstrate that he understands the extent to which he has been protected or to indicate any recognition or appreciation for the efforts made by many.

insert note drafted Sunday 11 April 2021 19:00

MM Fri 9 April 2021 19:00

further to:

Simon Hobbs (Freeths LLP) opening comms Tuesday 6 April 2021 17.28

STATUS: After close of business Friday 9 April 2021, there is no sign that Freeths have had removed from BAILII (and secret subscription services) the three damning perverse publications using TRD and others named particularly in the third nor the Williams Lea Gazette notice citing TRD name (relied on to embezzle £38k from MM and block her access to the banking system in COVID).

AMF evidence filed in court he was present at the AGM 31.10.05 , knew, or could have found out, who was there (entitled and obliged), should have known who late SSRM was and committed with JR to proxy poll voting published on RNS, with the voting cards retained as being property in members' estates.