Triad Group Plc Leading IT Delivery: Electronic Handling of Data Subject to Privacy and Copyright: Supplemental Authority Privacy and Infringement of Copyright - HRH The Duchess of Sussex -v-Associated Newspapers Limited [2021] EWHC 510 (Ch) - Warby J -5 March 2021

Neutral Citation Number: [2021] EWHC 510 (Ch)

Case No: IL-2019-000110

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

CHANCERY DIVISION

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LIST

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

05/03/2021

B e f o r e :

THE RT HON. LORD JUSTICE WARBY

Sitting as a Judge of the High Court

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Between:

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Ian Mill QC, Justin Rushbrooke QC, Jane Phillips and Jessie Bowhill (instructed by Schillings International LLP) for the Claimant

Antony White QC, Adrian Speck QC, Alexandra Marzec, Isabel Jamal and Gervase de Wilde (instructed by Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP) for the Defendant

Hearing date: 2 March 2021

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HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT

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1. Covid-19 Protocol: This judgment was handed down by the judge remotely for circulation to parties' representatives by email and release to Bailii. The date of hand-down is deemed to be as shown above.
2. Lord Justice Warby :
  1. Introduction
3. This is a claim for misuse of private information, breach of data protection rights, and copyright infringement. Details of the claims are contained in previous judgments of mine and need not be rehearsed here.
4. This judgment deals with matters consequential on my judgment on the claimant's application for summary judgment on her claims in misuse of private information and infringement of copyright.

I heard argument on that application on 19 and 20 January 2021.

On 11 February 2021 I handed down my reserved judgment ("the Summary Judgment" [2021] EWHC 273 (Ch)) and made an order that summary judgment should be entered for the claimant on liability for misuse of private information and, to the extent indicated in the Summary Judgment, on liability for copyright infringement.

1. This process was carried out remotely, without attendance from the parties.

A date had already been fixed to deal with consequential matters, whatever the outcome of the application. The hearing was fixed for Tuesday 2 March 2021, with a provisional time estimate of 1 hour. Again, this was a remote hearing.

1. The written skeleton arguments were filed on Monday 1 March 2021. They made clear that this was to be a hearing involving a good deal more than the usual argument on costs and permission to appeal. An email from the defendant's solicitors suggested that in the light of this, as much as half a day might be needed. I agreed to allow half a day, to include time for judgment. There was still some room for manoeuvre, as my next appointment was not before 3.30pm.
2. In the event, the hearing ended at 3.25pm. It had lasted for a full 4 hours, of which 3 ½ were taken up by Counsel's arguments. There was enough time for me to announce my decisions, and to give some reasons. But it proved necessary to reserve my decisions on some of the detail, and my reasons on some of the issues. Hence this judgment.
  1. The Summary Judgment
3. The Summary Judgment is detailed, and runs to some 29,000 words, but in short I found that

(1) the claimant was entitled to summary judgment on liability for misuse of private information; the defendant had no real prospect of successfully defending that claim, and there was no other compelling reason for a trial of that claim;

(2) the claimant was entitled to summary judgment on the issues of subsistence and infringement of copyright, though some issues remained to be tried.

1. Those remaining issues arose from the defendant's contention that the claimant is not, or might not be, the sole owner of any copyright that subsisted in the Electronic Draft of the letter which is the subject of the claim.

The putative co-author was Jason Knauf, of the Kensington Palace Communications Team, who was said to have been "involved" in the drafting process. The possibility was raised that this, coupled with his official role, might mean that there was a separate Crown copyright. I said this (at [166] and [168]):

- 1. "The defendant's factual and legal case on this issue both seem to me to occupy the shadowland between improbability and unreality.
  2. The case is contingent, inferential and imprecise.
  3. It cannot be described as convincing, and seems improbable.
  4. It lacks any direct evidence to support it, and it is far from clear that any such evidence will become available.
  5. It is not possible to envisage a Court concluding that Mr Knauf's contribution to the work as a whole was more than modest.
  6. The suggestion that his contribution generated a separate copyright,
  7. as opposed to a joint one is, in my judgment at the very outer margins of what is realistic.
  8. …
  9. I am not, however, persuaded that the need to try these issues carries with it the need for a trial of all the issues, notwithstanding the conclusions I have already expressed. That would not be consistent with the overriding objective.
  10. The trial will be the trial of limited issues within the copyright infringement claim, not a trial of the whole claim. The outcome could have consequences as to the extent to which the claimant can establish infringement of her copyright, and the remedies she can recover.
  11. But these in substance and reality are matters that go only to remedies, and are capable of resolution by case management.
  12. They are not a compelling reason for a trial of other issues on liability in this part of the claim. There is no room for doubt that the defendant's conduct involved an infringement of copyright in the Electronic Draft of which the claimant was the owner or, at worst, a co-owner."

1. I summarised my overall conclusions on the copyright aspect in this way (at [169]):
  1. "The claimant is entitled to summary judgment on the issues of subsistence and infringement. She is bound to prove that she was the or an owner of the or a copyright in the literary form of the Electronic Draft which copyright was infringed by the defendant, and the defences advanced would be bound to fail. There remain for resolution by way of a trial the issues - of minor significance in the overall context - as to whether the claimant was the sole author or whether the involvement of Mr Knauf -whatever it proves to have been – made him a co-author; and if so, what consequences that has as on the extent of the infringement of which the claimant may complain, and on the remedies available."
  2. The consequential issues
2. I read and heard argument on four main issues.

- 1. (1) What are the remaining issues in the action, and what is the most appropriate procedural mechanism for dealing with them?
  2. (2) What remedies are appropriate at this stage? This issue raised a number of sub-issues. These are whether the claimant is entitled to:
  3. (i) a declaration as to her rights;
  4. (ii) injunctive relief to restrain repetition of the acts complained of;
  5. (iii) an order for publication and dissemination pursuant to Article 15 of the Enforcement Directive and PD63;
  6. (iv) an order for delivery up and/or destruction of infringing copies of the Electronic Draft;
  7. (v) an account of profits for copyright infringement; and/or
  8. (vi) damages for misuse of private information.
  9. (3) What order should be made as to costs.
  10. (4) Whether the defendant should be granted permission to appeal.
  11. Some context

1. The claimant sought all the remedies I have listed at 9(2) above. She made clear that she was willing to waive her right to disclosure before making an election between damages and an account of profits for copyright infringement.

Her position in relation to damages for misuse of private information was that, subject to certain conditions, she would agree to accept an award of nominal damages. She describes this as setting a "cap" on her damages.

The claimant seeks directions that this matter be dealt with at the further hearing which all agree is required. This was presented by the defendant as the claimant effectively abandoning all her pleaded claims of damage.

1. This is a familiar posture, often adopted by publishers in defamation cases where the claimant offers to accept an apology and costs, or modest damages, in order to compromise a claim.

I do not see it that way. Of course, the claimant cannot adopt this position and seek findings of fact in respect of any of the matters she has pleaded in support of her case on harm. But that is not the same as accepting that the pleaded case on harm is untrue. I accept the explanation provided on the claimant's behalf: that she is seeking to adopt a sensible and proportionate approach to the next stages of this case. The defendant's submission on this point does not seem to me to belong to the real world of this litigation.

1. That brings me to the conditions under which the claimant stated she was willing to accept only nominal damages for misuse of private information.

These were two: that an order was made for an account of profits for copyright infringement, and that there should be no successful appeal against my decision.

The defendant's position was that the claimant's reduced claim for damages should be assessed forthwith.

It was then argued that it was not permissible for the claimant to seek simultaneously both damages (even nominal damages) and an account of profits, as to do so would violate the principle against approbating and reprobating the same act.

I was referred to Ramzan v Brookwide Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 985 [2011] 2 P & C R 22.

That is a case aptly described by Arden LJ as "a remarkable case which involves the assessment of damages and interest resulting from the misappropriation by the appellant …. of a room forming part of a property owned by Mr Ramzan, then a bankrupt." One of the issues was whether the judge had been inconsistent in awarding the claimant compensatory damages for the profits he would have made from the use of the room, and damages for breach of trust.

The Court concluded that there was a single wrong, and hence the dual award was internally inconsistent: see [49-57].

1. All of this conjured up the possibility that the defendant might escape liability for an account of profits by submitting to a damages award of a few pounds or a few hundreds of pounds, which it would then portray as a climb-down by the claimant, and a win for the defendant, or at best a Pyrrhic victory for the claimant.

Mr Mill QC for the claimant was undeterred. He stood his ground in relation to damages for misuse, and pressed on with the application for an account of profits, submitting that Ramzan was of no assistance here. In this case, he argued, the defendants committed two separate wrongs and there is nothing inconsistent in awarding damages for the one, and an account of profits for the other.

1. I could see no reason why the claimant should not be entitled to opt for an account of profits as her remedy of choice in respect of the copyright infringement, and I so ordered. Whilst I can see the force of Mr Mill's submission on the inconsistency issue, my conclusion was that this potentially difficult question did not require resolution at the present stage. It would be better to defer it. One reason for that is the complexities arising from the claimant's second condition.
2. I do not consider that an appeal would have any real prospect of success and for that reason I have refused the defendant's application for permission to appeal. But of course, this is not my decision alone. The defendant is entitled to seek permission from the Court of Appeal, which may take a different view. If there is an appeal, it is entirely possible that the outcome will remain unknown by the time this case completes its further stages, unless those stages are held in abeyance meanwhile. I do not consider that they should be. An appeal does not operate as a stay, and I see no good or sufficient reason to impose one. On the contrary, it is desirable for this case to proceed with greater speed than it has to date.
3. That leaves me unclear as to how the question of damages for misuse of private information can properly be dealt with if the claimant maintains her current position and – as is entirely possible – uncertainty persists as to whether there will be an appeal and, if so, what the outcome will be. It is of course desirable that a decision on permission be made promptly. I can and will indicate as much in the form refusing permission that I have to complete. But I have granted an extension of time for filing papers with the Court of Appeal. The workload of the Court of Appeal means that these matters do take time in any event. And the outcome cannot be predicted. In the meantime, questions will arise (for instance) about what, if any, disclosure should be given in respect of damages. I do not think the damages issue can be left in abeyance indefinitely. If the question of an appeal remains live then, at some stage, it seems to me, the claimant will have to make a definitive decision.
4. Before the hearing, the claimant also made clear that she did not seek to pursue the two remaining aspects of her pleaded claims for liability in copyright infringement: her claim in respect of the Letter, as opposed to the Electronic Draft, and for infringement by authorising acts of reproduction by third parties. This stance was unconditional. At the hearing, Mr Speck QC argued that the claimant could not do this. Neither Mr Mill QC nor I could identify any reason of principle why the claimant should not decide to drop aspects of her claim. Mr Mill, on her behalf, offered to amend the claim by deletion if necessary. That, in my judgment, is how the matters should be dealt with.
5. The claimant's Skeleton Argument set out her position in respect of the data protection claim. This was that she was prepared in principle not to pursue that either, and she offered an undertaking not to do so. Her contention was, and is,

that the claim would be bound to succeed, and in any case would add nothing to the misuse claim. But the defendant was not prepared to accept that position.

It called on the claimant to discontinue the claim (with the usual costs consequences) or to pursue it.

1. Mr White QC submitted that this was not just shadow boxing as a cover for points about costs. He said that the data protection claim includes a claim for substantial compensation which would be affected by the claimant's contingent reduction of her damages claim. And there is a claim for cessation of processing. For these reasons, he submits, it is not just the mirror of the privacy claim. These did not strike me as obviously powerful points. But the upshot was that the claimant withdrew her proposed abandonment of the data protection claim. She proposed to seek summary judgment on that claim also. In the circumstances, all that I was required to do was to lay down an appropriate procedural regime.
  1. My conclusions
  2. Procedural matters
2. The conclusions that I announced at the hearing are, in summary, as follows:

- 1. (1) There should be a hearing ("the Further Hearing") on a date to be fixed, to determine the remaining issues of copyright ownership, the profits to which the claimant is entitled for the defendant's acts of infringement, and what order should be made for payment of the sum found due on taking such an account.
  2. The Further Hearing would also determine, to the extent these issues remain live, (a) what if any financial remedies should be granted to the claimant in respect of her claim for misuse of private information and (b) the data protection claim.
  3. (2) In case they can be used for the purposes of the Further Hearing, the dates in October 2021 that are currently fixed for the trial of the action will be retained with the time estimate reduced to 7 days.
  4. (3) A hearing will take place to determine what directions should be given to ensure the case is ready for the Further Hearing. That hearing ("the Directions Hearing") will be on a date to be fixed between 20 April and 21 May 2021, with a provisional time estimate of 2 hours. The parties must keep that estimate under review and advise the Court as soon as they consider it to be inadequate.
  5. (4) At the Directions Hearing the Court will address, in particular,
  6. (a) the question of what form of financial remedy for misuse of private information may be pursued by the claimant at the Further Hearing;
  7. (b) the future management of the remaining issues in the copyright claim;
  8. (c) the further conduct of the data protection claim, including any application for summary judgment; and
  9. (d) the timing and time estimate for the Further Hearing, including the question of whether the October 2021 dates are suitable for that purpose.
  10. (5) In the meantime,
  11. (a) the defendant must state its case on the issue of ownership, and provision will be made for the notification and joinder of any person alleged to be an owner or co-owner of copyright in the Electronic Draft; the directions to this end are agreed;
  12. (b) any application by the claimant for summary judgment on the data protection claim must be filed and served promptly, and in any event by no later than 4pm on 16 March 2021; and
  13. (c) by no later than 4pm on 23 March 2021, the claimant must re-state her position in respect of the financial remedies she wishes to pursue in respect of misuse of private information (it being understood that she may simply reiterate her present stance).
  14. (6) The Anonymity Application (that is to say, the defendant's application to vary my order granting anonymity to the Five Friends) is stayed with liberty to apply in the event of a successful appeal.
  15. (7) I also resolved a dispute about the wording to be used in the recitals to the order.
  16. Relief

1. In addition to my order for an account of profits and related directions,

I made the following decisions:

- 1. (1) I should grant a declaration in the form sought or substantially that form.
  2. (2) I should grant a final injunction to restrain misuse of private information.
  3. This will have a limited public domain carve-out to ensure that it does not prohibit publication of a fair and accurate report of the judgment (or for that matter commentary on the judgment).
  4. (3) I should not at this stage grant a final injunction to restrain infringement of copyright in the Electronic Draft. The issue is reserved until after judgment on the remaining copyright issues.
  5. (4) I should not grant an interim injunction against infringement of copyright in the Electronic Draft.
  6. (5) I should make a limited order for publication and dissemination pursuant to the Part 63 PD, the detail and the reasons to be given in the reserved judgment.
  7. (6) I should not make any order for delivery up or destruction at this stage. The issue may be revived at the Directions Hearing if the parties have not by then agreed; and, for that purpose, this aspect of the application is adjourned.
  8. Costs

1. The argument proceeded on the shared assumption that no change would be made to the allocation of costs that had already been the subject of an order. I determined that the claimant should recover:
  1. (1) her costs of the Anonymity Application;
  2. (2) 90% of her costs of the summary judgment application, the allocation of the remaining 10% to be reserved to await the determination of the remaining copyright issues following the Further Hearing;
  3. (3) her costs of the liability issues in the misuse claim, with the exception of those relating to the issue raised by paragraph 9(9) of the Particulars of Claim (an allegation that was not pursued for the purposes of summary judgment); the costs of quantum issues in respect of misuse of private information are reserved, in accordance with my reservation of the issue of what the damages claim is going to be; and
  4. (4) her costs to date of the liability issues in respect of copyright, with the exception of the following, as to which the order will be costs reserved (a) any costs relating exclusively to copyright in the Letter, as opposed to the Electronic Draft; and (b) any costs relating to the possibility that one or more persons other than the claimant is a joint or concurrent owner of the or a copyright in the Electronic Draft.
2. I ordered the defendant to make a payment on account of the costs identified in paragraph 22 above, in the sum of £450,000, within 14 days.

- 1. Permission to appeal

1. The defendant submitted a ten-page document containing ten grounds of appeal, with succinct argument in support. As already indicated, I refused permission. I did so because I did not consider that there is any real prospect that the Court of Appeal would reach a different conclusion as to the outcome of the claim for misuse of private information, or as to the issues I decided in the copyright claim. It was not suggested that there was or could be any other compelling reason for an appeal, and I could not identify one.

- 1. Reasons

1. As just indicated, I gave some reasons for some of the decisions I have listed above, and I consider those reasons to be sufficient to enable the parties and the public to understand my thinking on those issues. That applies to most of the procedural decisions, and to my decisions on costs and permission to appeal. What follows are reasons for those decisions that I do not see as falling into that category. Some supplementary reasons for refusing permission to appeal will be given in the form that I have to complete for that purpose, which will be filed at the same time as this judgment is handed down.

- 1. The Anonymity Application

1. The purpose of this application was to enable the defendant to seek third-party disclosure in the United States, in support of its case that the Five Friends were authorised by the claimant to make disclosures to and in People magazine.

On 7 December 2020, I made an order adjourning the application until after judgment on the summary judgment application, observing that if the application was successful the Anonymity Application would "fall away – at least unless and until an appeal has been brought and upheld".

1. At the hearing on 2 March 2021, the defendant latched onto those final words and suggested that there should be no order on the application, with permission for the defendant to re-apply should it be successful in an appeal against the entry of summary judgment. The claimant's position was that I should dismiss the application, arguing that "an appeal does not operate as a stay and the court manages proceedings before it on the basis of the rulings it has made, not on the basis of hypothetical outcomes."
2. I viewed these rival contentions as essentially to do with costs, and it seemed to me that the costs outcome would be the same whatever means I adopted of disposing of the application itself. The Anonymity Application was part of the defendant's procedural approach to defending what I have held to be the indefensible. It was inevitable that it must pay the costs. But I concluded that the appropriate course was the stay I have identified. The application became pointless and redundant in the light of my decision, but I had not adjudicated on its merits. The defendant can embrace complaint about this in its appeal papers, if so advised.
  1. Declaration
3. The claimant applied for a declaration in the following terms:-

- 1. "The Defendant has misused the Claimant's private information and infringed her copyright in the Electronic Draft by publishing the extracts of the Letter that it did in The Mail on Sunday and in Mail Online."

1. A declaration is a discretionary remedy which has been described by Birss J (as he then was) as "an important part of the court's armoury of powers to do justice between the parties to a dispute":

Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd v Apple Inc [2012] EWHC 2049 (Pat) [9]. It is a remedy that can be convenient as a clear and authoritative distillation of what the court has decided, to be elaborated or explained, if necessary, by reference to the Court's judgment. But the Court will not make orders that are pointless, or which may lead to complications that would not otherwise arise.

1. For the claimant it was argued that the defendant's behaviour since judgment was handed down makes it important to have a formal statement from the court that is succinct and incapable of misinterpretation.

The behaviour relied on includes what the claimant describes as a refusal to accept that she has succeeded in her claims, and the continued publication of the articles complained of.

The defendant continued publishing these on MailOnline despite the hand-down of the Summary Judgment. It continued doing so until shortly before the hearing, a period of over two weeks.

All that was said about that decision, when it was communicated to the claimant's side by email at 17:18 on Monday 1 March 2021 is that "As part of its consideration of the position following the judgment" the defendant had decided it should take the articles offline "pending either the trial of the remaining copyright issues or the outcome of an appeal (if permission is given)".

I am invited to infer that this belated action is merely strategic, designed to bolster the defendant's position at this hearing. Mr Mill and Mr Rushbrooke also pointed to the way in which the Summary Judgment has been reported by the defendant and others, suggesting that this has been to an extent inaccurate and misleading.

1. The defendant objected to the grant of a declaration, submitting that it was contrary to principle, procedurally inappropriate, and unnecessary. Mr Speck advanced a general argument against the grant of this, or any, final relief at the present stage. He pointed out that I have not granted summary judgment on the copyright claim but only on issues within that claim, and he submitted that there is a very real difference between the two. For that reason, he argued, it is wrong in principle to grant any remedies at this stage; the stage for doing that is in the future. More generally, he submitted that there is a fundamental difficulty in granting relief or remedies in copyright unless and until you have identified what is or are the copyright work or works to be enforced. He pointed out that I have concluded that the proposition that there are or may be separate and distinct copyrights is not fanciful.
2. Further, submitted the defendant, there is no pleaded claim for a declaration. Moreover, the claimant is not now pursuing substantial damages, and it is hard to see what useful purpose could be served by such relief, in particular given the fact that the outcome has been widely reported.

That submission about useful purpose stems from and reflects the words of Neuberger J in FSA v Rourke [2001] EWHC 704 (Ch) [2001] C P Rep 14:

- 1. "… when considering whether to grant a declaration or not, the court should take into account justice to the claimant, justice to the defendant, whether the declaration would serve a useful purpose and whether there are any other special reasons why or why not the court should grant the declaration."

1. I do not believe the defendant's formal objection has any weight. If necessary, I will grant permission to amend the claim form to add a claim for this relief, which does not involve a separate cause of action and raises no issues about limitation.

As a matter of substance, the defendant had ample notice of the claim and has been able to present full argument in response.

1. In my judgment, there is no real room for doubt or reasonable debate about the substance of the outcome here. But the Summary Judgment is long, and detailed.

Court judgments, as opposed to summaries provided by reporters and others, are not often read in full by ordinary newspaper readers. I doubt that Mr White is right to submit that the Summary Judgment is "one of the most widely read public judgments of recent years". But wherever it stands in that league table, the figures provided to me for hits on the judiciary website tell me that on the day it was handed down and posted on the judiciary website there were 4,652 overall views of the judgment, and a Judicial Office tweet sharing the link was retweeted 121 times. It goes without saying that these figures pale by comparison with the readership of the Mail on Sunday and MailOnline, and other media outlets that covered the story.

1. The reality is that what the vast majority of people learn about judgments comes (understandably) from whatever news sources they choose to use. For most people those news sources do not include the judiciary website devoted to the full text of the Court's reasoned decision, or www.bailii.org, where the full text of judgments is published by the British and Irish Legal Information Institute. Indeed, although practice appears to be developing in this respect, it is by no means standard practice for online news reports to provide readers with even a link to the text of the judgment that is being reported or commented upon. In these circumstances, I see the force of the submission that there is real value in a short and pithy formal summary of its effect, which carries the authority of the court, and is not open to misinterpretation.
2. News reporting is a different thing from the writing of judgments, and it is important not to be over-critical of the way in which the media report what is said and done in court. Inevitably, this involves summary and précis. A good degree of leeway must be allowed before condemning a report as inaccurate or misleading. A great deal of latitude must be given to commentary on the merits of a decision, or on the conduct of the litigants, if based on a sufficiently accurate account of the facts. Viewed in that light, I consider the claimant's criticisms of newspaper reports and commentary about the Summary Judgment are overstated.
3. But the fact is that there has been just one short article on an inside page of the Mail on Sunday and two articles in MailOnline. There is something to be said for the claimant's argument that the coverage of the case in MailOnline has not been very informative about the issues in the case and how they were resolved. The coverage could be read as suggesting that judgment in the claimant's favour on privacy "WITHOUT a trial" (sic) is a startling and unusual one, and that the entire question of whether the claimant owned any copyright was to go to trial. (The article said, "Mr Justice Warby ruled the issue over ownership of copyright of the letter she wrote to Mr Markle can be decided at trial".) There was a sentence in the article inviting readers to "read the [Summary Judgment] in full here", with a link to the full text on the judiciary website. But this was far from conspicuous. It came at the very end of a long article, running to over 1,100 words, which contained reporting and criticism of the judgment, and reports on other features of the litigation. Until guided to it by Counsel, I had failed to spot the link when reading the MailOnline article. There was no link to the two-page summary of the Summary Judgment that I prepared, which was also on the judiciary website, the purpose of which was to help readers follow its structure and easily identify and understand my conclusions.
4. I also place some weight on the fact that the defendant saw fit to continue the publication on MailOnline of articles that I had held to be a misuse of private information and an infringement of copyright, making them accessible (so it appears) to anyone from anywhere in the world. This cannot be accidental, or an oversight. In the absence of any explanation, I am tempted to infer that it is a form of defiance. But I do not need to make a finding. Whatever the reasons, this conduct could easily suggest - certainly to the casual reader - that the Court has taken a different view from the one I expressed in the judgment. That point is given added weight by the defendant's current stance in relation to (a) the claimant's position on damages for misuse, and (b) my decision on copyright. The claimant is entitled to say that justice to her supports the conclusion that the Court should place on record in a few words the substance of the outcome of the Summary Judgement.
5. The defendant has not identified any "special reason" against the grant of a declaration. It has not pointed to any form of harm or detriment to itself or to the public interest if I grant a declaration. It is not suggested that it would be unjust to grant it. I have not identified any other legitimate interest of the defendant in resisting the grant of this relief. In my judgment, therefore, the balance comes down in favour of granting this simple and effective form of formal relief. As for the form of the declaration, it might be said that the claimant's draft is open to a criticism opposite to the one I have identified above: it could imply that the claimant has unequivocally won her copyright claim. But in my judgment, this wording reflects the substance of my decision with greater and sufficient accuracy.
  1. Injunctions
6. The claimant has established that the publication complained of infringed her civil right to protection against the misuse of her private information.

The grant of an injunction does not follow as a matter of course; it is a matter of judgment and discretion. But in my judgment, it cannot in all the circumstances be said that damages would be a sufficient remedy. That will rarely be the case in a privacy claim, and in this one it is not an available conclusion. Nor has the defendant argued that it is. I proceed on the basis that this was a significant interference with the claimant's rights.

There is also a sufficient basis for concern that, unless restrained by injunction, the defendant might further publish the information at issue, or some part of it, without the consent of the claimant. There are multiple factors which, taken together, suggest that this is a risk. Among them are the exceptionally vigorous way in which the case has been defended; the continued publication despite the terms of the judgment; the lack of any explanation for that continued publication; the absence of any offer of an undertaking; the fact that the email explaining why the articles are being taken offline implies that they could be restored after the trial of the remaining copyright issues; and the fact that at the hearing before me it was submitted for the first time that an injunction should not be granted in privacy on, as I understood it, public domain grounds.

1. Mr White made the point that the Summary Judgment contains all the words complained of, and more.

That is true. It was something I considered unavoidable if my decision was to be transparent and comprehensible to those who chose to read it; and the claimant did not object when the draft was circulated.

Judgments are public documents, and there is no restriction on reporting of this one. It follows that it would be wrong to grant an injunction that would have the effect of restraining reporting of the content of the Letter for the purposes of reporting the Summary Judgment.

For that purpose, the carve-out I have mentioned will be necessary. That will mean that it will not be a contempt of court to publish the information in the Letter, in the context of a court report.

1. It does not follow, however, that the information in the Letter has become public domain information such that the claimant can no longer seek to protect it. It is not the case that the inclusion of text in the Summary Judgment means that the defendant or anyone else has a licence to continue publishing or to repeat the publication complained of, in whatever fashion they choose. As I said at the hearing, the carve-out will not allow snippets of the information in the Letter to be reproduced in any other context. I do not need to say more about the other exceptions proposed by the defendant, to the extent these are agreed by the time the order is drawn up. Any remaining disputes over those exceptions will be resolved at the Directions Hearing.
2. But for the issue about ownership, I would not have hesitated to grant a final injunction in copyright. The reason for not doing so is that the defendant objected to an order that restrained it from infringing copyright which may not belong to the claimant. That would not be an objection in principle if the copyright is jointly owned. It would arise only in the event of a several (ie separate) copyright.

That, as I have previously stated, seems highly improbable. But it is not impossible.

1. The option of an interim injunction in copyright is one that I had contemplated,

and raised with Counsel. My thinking was that even if such an order went beyond the parameters of the rights the claimant ultimately establishes, that would not be wrong in principle or otherwise objectionable.

It is permissible for an injunction to go beyond the limits of the right in question, and even to restrict otherwise lawful activity, where that is necessary in order to achieve effective relief: Canada Goose UK Retail Ltd v Persons Unknown [2020] EWCA Civ 303 [2020] 1 WLR 2802 [78], [82(5)].

Here, it seemed arguable that this was so. It is not, after all, suggested that the defendant has the licence of the other putative copyright owner(s) to reproduce whatever part of the Electronic Draft may be their original authorial literary work. And any putative owner will be given an opportunity to be joined in the action.

But Mr Speck objected to an interim order.

He made two main points: there was no application and hence no preparation had been undertaken to meet such issues, and there would have to be an undertaking as to damages.

Having taken instructions, Mr Mill made clear that he had no instructions to seek an interim order.

- 1. An order for publication and dissemination

1. The form of order sought by the claimant's draft order is a direction that within 7 days the defendant shall at its own expense do the following:
  1. "(a) publish in The Mail on Sunday: (i) the Notice that appears at Annex B hereto on page 5, and in a font and size no smaller than appeared in the Articles defined at (1) in Annex A; and (ii) the Statement that appears at Annex B hereto on the front page of The Mail on Sunday, such Statement to appear in a font and size no smaller than appeared the wording "Meghan's shattering letter to her father" on the front page of The Mail on Sunday dated 10 February 2019; and
  2. (b) post the Notice in a font and size no smaller than Arial size 12 on the home page of the MailOnline for a period of not less than 6 months, together with a hyperlink to the Judgment."
2. "The Notice" and "the Statement" are defined terms, and Annex B reads as follows:

- 1. "The Notice
  2. 'Notice
  3. Following a hearing on 19-20 January 2021, the Court has given judgment for The Duchess of Sussex on her claims for misuse of private information and copyright infringement arising out of articles published in The Mail on Sunday and posted on Mail Online. The Court found that Associated Newspapers misused her private information and infringed her copyright by publishing extracts of her private handwritten letter to her father in The Mail on Sunday and on Mail Online'.
  4. The Statement
  5. 'The Duchess of Sussex wins her legal case for breach of privacy and copyright against Associated Newspapers for articles published in The Mail on Sunday and posted on Mail Online – see page 5.'"

1. The relevant law is contained in Directive 2004/48/EC ("the Enforcement Directive") and in the Part 63 Practice Direction. Article 15 of the Enforcement Directive provides as follows:-

- 1. "Publication of judicial decisions
  2. Member States shall ensure that, in legal proceedings instituted for infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities may order, at the request of the applicant and at the expense of the infringer, appropriate measures for the dissemination of the information concerning the decision, including displaying the decision and publishing it in full or in part. Member States may provide for other additional publicity measures which are appropriate to the particular circumstances, including prominent advertising."

1. It is common ground that this must be interpreted and applied in the light of the policy objectives recorded in Recital 27, which states:

- 1. "To act as a supplementary deterrent to future infringers and to contribute to the awareness of the public at large, it is useful to publicise decisions in intellectual property infringement cases."

1. Paragraph 26.2 of PD63 provides as follows:-

- 1. "Where the court finds that an intellectual property right has been infringed, the court may, at the request of the applicant, order appropriate measures for the dissemination and publication of the judgment to be taken at the expense of the infringer."

1. This wording indicates that where the Enforcement Directive applies, the court has a discretion to grant this form of relief.

I have been referred to authorities on how the Court should approach the exercise of this discretionary power (Guccio Gucci SpA v Dune [2010] EWHC 153 (Ch), (Norris J), cited with approval in 32Red Plc v WHG [2011] EWHC 665 (Ch) [31-32], [35] (Henderson J), and to illustrative examples of the exercise of this jurisdiction

(in addition to the above,

Vestergaard Frandsen A/S v Bestnet Europe Ltd [2010] FSR 2 [114],

Samsung Electronics (UK) Ltd v Apple Inc [2012] EWCA Civ 1339,

[2013] ECDR 2 [50-51], [69], [71], [83-84],

Cosmetic Warriors Ltd v Amazon.co.uk Ltd [2014] EWHC 1315 (Ch) [30-41] and Enterprise Holdings Inc v Europcar Group UK Ltd [2015] EWHC 300 (Ch) [42-46]).

1. These authorities indicate that it is common practice to make such orders in IP litigation, and that policy favours doing so, in view of the difficulties which owners of IP rights face in identifying and successfully pursuing infringers.

The court will take account of all the circumstances, but the following factors may count in favour of making such an order:

(a) deterrence of the infringing defendant;

(b) that publication of the result would be a deterrent to other infringers.

Factors that may count against the grant of such an order include the strength of the policy grounds on the particular facts of the case, and any procedural or practical obstacles to making an effective and proportionate order. The applicant will need to present the court with a precise form of order, and a workable solution. The solution will need to identify appropriate platforms or publications for the notice. It may include a notice, with a hyperlink to the main judgment.

1. The case for the claimant is that the order sought would

(1) act as a deterrent to future infringers; and

(2) contribute to public awareness, and in particular awareness among readers of the Mail on Sunday and MailOnline. It is submitted that these considerations are bolstered by the prominence and sensationalist terms of the infringing Articles; the fact that the defendant failed to take the articles down until weeks after the Summary Judgment; the extensive publication by the defendant about this litigation; the limited and in some respects unsatisfactory terms of the articles published about the Summary Judgment. It is also submitted that it would not be difficult for the defendant to comply. This is not a case in which the defendant needs to secure third-party co-operation to achieve what is sought; it owns the mechanism required to make the publication.

1. For the defendant, Mr Speck argued that the application for such an order is wrong in principle, as it goes beyond the copyright claim.

In relation to that claim, he relied on the general objections to relief at this stage that I have summarised above.

He argued that the application is premature, because (as demonstrated by the wording of the relief sought), it is based on the false premise that the claimant has succeeded on the claim, as opposed to issues within the claim for copyright infringement.

Mr Speck further submitted that it is clear from Article 27 that there are only two legitimate purposes for which such an order may be made:

(1) as a "supplementary" deterrent to future infringers and

(2) to contribute to the awareness of the public at large.

Neither purpose applied here.

There is no need for the former, and the latter is amply satisfied by the publicity already given to the Summary Judgment.

1. Mr Speck argued, in addition, that the real purpose of Article 15 is to facilitate effective relief in claims for the infringement of commercially valuable IP rights.

It is not apt for deployment in a media context such as the present.

Media litigation such as this is "not what these orders are about", he argued.

Discursive remedies of any kind are unusual in defamation and privacy actions.

I should at the very least approach the application with considerable caution.

He drew attention to the observations of Nicklin J in Monir v Wood [2018] EWHC 3525 (QB) [239-240], about the care required in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by s 12 of the Defamation Act 2013, which allows the court to order publication of a summary of its judgment.

Nicklin J pointed out that orders under that section are "not to be made as any sort of punishment of the defendant", and involve an interference with Convention rights, requiring justification.

Counsel went so far as to suggest in writing that in this case this remedy is "intended more as a species of punishment or retribution, rather than as a necessary and proportionate measure in the interests of the claimant or the public". The submission was repeated in oral argument.

1. I accept of course that this remedy should not be granted as a punitive measure, or with a view to humiliating a defendant. I would not do so. I do not consider that the defendant is justified in suggesting that this application is motivated by punitive considerations. Two points are relied on to justify the inference that this is the position: "the invasive nature of the remedy itself and the lack of any proper justification put forward for the making of the Order in the Claimant's evidence".
2. The use of the term "invasive" is unusual. The notion of invading someone's private life is well understood; but I have not previously come across a complaint by a publisher that a court order giving effect to a judgment is "invasive". I take it to be a way of saying that – as I accept - a discursive remedy of this kind is an interference with the defendant's autonomous control over what it puts in the Mail on Sunday and MailOnline.
3. I also accept, as is obvious, that such an order represents an interference with freedom of expression which requires to be justified as a measure that is in accordance with law, and necessary and proportionate in pursuit of a legitimate aim. Here, the legitimate aim is plain and obvious: it is the protection and vindication of the rights of the claimant, whose civil rights have been infringed by the defendant's publication. That is a compensatory aim. There can be no doubt that interferences with freedom of expression for such a purpose can be justified. Otherwise, provisions such as Article 15 of the Enforcement Directive and s 12 of the 2013 Act would be incompatible with the Convention. That this is not so is clear from Strasbourg authorities such as Wegrzynowksi v Poland Application no 33846/07, Judgment of 16 August 2013 [59], [66]. Also relevant is the Editors' Code of Conduct, to which the defendant is a subscriber ("the Code"). This contains an "invasive" provision that., by clause 1(iv), subject to some immaterial exceptions, "A publication must report fairly and accurately the outcome of an action for defamation to which it has been a party …"
4. The real issues for consideration are twofold. First, whether the interference is prescribed by law and secondly, whether on the particular facts of this case it is necessary and proportionate.
5. The first issue is my way of framing the question of whether the remedy can lawfully be applied to a claim in misuse of private information. That seems to me to be debatable. I doubt that such a claim falls within the scope of the term "intellectual property" in the Enforcement Directive or PD63. That leaves open the question of whether the court nonetheless has a discretion, where breach of an IP right has been established, to grant an order that includes wording such as that which I have quoted above. That, in my view, is arguable.
6. If the power does extend that far, I can see good arguments for being ready to use it in media cases, where appropriate, and with due caution. The grant of discursive remedies has so far been relatively unusual in this category of litigation, and there is no coherent scheme governing their availability. But there are some powers, they have been used, and they are not inherently inappropriate. In my judgment, they can be a valuable tool. The editors of Gatley on Libel and Slander 5th edition say this about s 12 of the 2013 Act: "orders under s 12 may be expected to become standard when judgment is given in favour of the claimant" (para 9.46). That has yet to happen, but in Shakil-Ur-Rahman v Ary Network Ltd [2016] EWHC 3570 (QB) Sir David Eady granted a s 12 order, observing that many of viewers of the defendant's TV output would not otherwise know what had actually happened in the case. There are powers in the data protection legislation that allow the court to grant similar relief, where appropriate: see the discussion in Aven and ors v Orbis Business Intelligence Ltd [2020] EWHC 1812 (QB) [188-190]. It would seem anomalous if claims for misuse of private information should be the exception to the rule.
7. The different nature of the causes of action may mean that different considerations apply. Most privacy claims relate to information that has not been published, or which has received limited publication, and publicity for the outcome may not be helpful. Even so, since 2011 the Part 53 Practice Direction has made provision for public statements in open court, where a claim in misuse of private information has settled, and the norm appears to be that permission should be granted for such a statement, if sought: Webb v Lewis Silkin LLP [2016] EWHC 1225 (Ch), Richard v BBC [2017] EWHC 1648 (Ch) [2017] EMLR 25, Hemsworth v Department for Work and Pensions [2018] EWHC 1998 (QB) [41-42]. In Hemsworth, I said at [43] that "where private information about an individual has been widely publicised, in the media or otherwise … it would be understandable for a claimant to want publicity for his victory, and one can see that a SIOC would be fitting".
8. Factors that might carry weight, in some instances, include the fact that many newspapers' internet archives - and indeed some other newspaper archives - are readily accessible sources of information for members of the public. More generally, there is often an inequality of power over the means of publication. In a sense, anyone can be a publisher now. But it remains the case that commercial publishers have greater access and greater influence than most. And where the wrong consists of publication to the public at large in a newspaper or online medium, redress via the same medium and to the same audience appears intrinsically appropriate. The discussion above makes clear that it is not, in itself, an objectionable or disproportionate interference with free speech to require a newspaper that has made a wrongful publication to publish a supplementary statement, be it a correction or a reference to the court's judgment. A publication requirement that imposed a disproportionate financial burden would be impermissible (see Kurski v Poland, Application no 26115/10, Judgment of 5 July 2016 [57]) but that is not likely to be an issue when it comes to major national newspaper publishers such as the defendant in this case.
9. It is unnecessary for me to resolve the question of principle on this occasion, as Mr Mill has indicated that his client would be content with lesser versions of the Notice and Statement, limited in scope, as follows:
  1. "Following a hearing on 10-20 January 2021, the Court has given judgment for The Duchess of Sussex on her claim for copyright infringement. The Court found that Associated Newspapers infringed her copyright by publishing extracts of her handwritten letter to her father in The Mail on Sunday and in Mail Online".
  2. "The Duchess of Sussex wins her legal case for copyright infringement against Associated Newspapers for articles published in The Mail on Sunday and posted on Mail Online – see page 4".
10. I think this is a preferable approach, given my reservations about the scope of the powers that have been invoked. It also seems to me more targeted and better fitted to the circumstances of the case. There is some force in the defendant's contention that the media coverage of the case (copies of which are before me in the hearing bundle) has given wide publicity to the claimant's unequivocal success on the privacy claim. The criticisms of the defendant's own coverage relate to what it has said or not said about the copyright claim. Further, the reality is that anyone who followed the link to the judgment to find out more would swiftly learn about the privacy claim and its fate.
11. A decision on whether to grant this remedy, and in what terms, is one that engages not only Article 10 of the Convention but also section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998. I was not addressed specifically on this, but I remind myself that s 12(4) requires that I should have particular regard to three matters: the extent to which information is or is about to enter the public domain; the extent to which it would be in the public interest; and "any relevant privacy code" – in this case, the Code. In Sicri v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2020] EWHC 3541 (QB)[68]ff I considered s 12(4), albeit in a different context. In the present case the main points that emerge seem to me to be that I must pay particular attention to the extent of the publicity that the Summary Judgment has already received. I should bear in mind that the defendant has reported the outcome of this case, although the Code does not require this. I should also have particular regard to whether there is any public interest in the publication by the defendant of a further statement, and if so the weight of that public interest.
12. I do not consider I should attach any great weight to the absence from the Code of any provision requiring the publication of a fair and accurate account of the outcome of a privacy action, or claim in copyright, or harassment, or data protection. I do not believe this is the result of a conscious policy decision. The provisions of what is now para 1(iv) have been in place for a very long time; I believe they were in the original Editors' Code in the time of the Press Complaints Commission, before the Human Rights Act 1998. Over the intervening years, the landscape of media litigation has changed. The tort of misuse of private information has emerged and other torts I have mentioned have gained prominence. I do attach real weight to the fact that the defendant has published reports of the outcome of the case. But among the other factors that come into play here are those I have discussed at [60-62] above.
13. In my judgment it is appropriate in all the circumstances of this case to make an order pursuant to PD63 that reflects the claimant's success on the specific issues in the copyright claim that I have resolved in her favour. It would have a genuine utility. I consider that the revised form of order sought falls within the scope of Article 15, which refers to the court's "decision". I also consider that it falls within the scope of the Part 63 PD, which may be more limited as it refers to a situation where "the court finds that an intellectual property right has been infringed." Such an order would serve both of the purposes identified by Mr Speck. It would also tend to deter the defendant itself, which I consider to be a purpose firmly within the scope of Article 27 and thus Article 15. I do not accept that the limited publication by the defendant itself renders this process unnecessary or superfluous.
14. As to proportionality, the defendant devoted a very considerable amount of space to the infringing articles, which it continued to publish for over 2 years. It has devoted a very considerable number of further column inches, and many hundreds if not thousands of words, to coverage of earlier stages of this litigation and commentary upon them. The wording sought is modest by comparison, and factual in nature.
15. But I am not persuaded of the case for prolonged publication, nor am I persuaded that all the detail of what is proposed is necessary and proportionate. There is some force in Mr Speck's submission that the form of relief sought does not reflect what the Court has actually decided. There is room for some refinement and adjustment of the detail, and I have given the defendant time to put in representations about practicalities. But the form of order I intend to make is for the following publication:

- 1. (1) In the hard copy Mail on Sunday, on a single occasion: a Statement on the front page in the revised terms proposed by Mr Mill, save that it refers to page 3. The Notice will appear above the fold on page 3, in these terms.
  2. "The Duchess of Sussex
  3. Following a hearing on 10-20 January 2021, the Court has given judgment for The Duchess of Sussex on her claim for copyright infringement. The Court found that Associated Newspapers infringed her copyright by publishing extracts of her handwritten letter to her father in The Mail on Sunday and in Mail Online.
  4. There will be a trial of the remedies to which the Duchess is entitled, at which the court will decide whether the Duchess is the exclusive owner of copyright in all parts of the letter, or whether any other person owns a share."
  5. (2) The order will make provision as to the font size of the Notice and Statement, by specific reference to a previously published article in The Mail on Sunday.
  6. (3) On MailOnline, for a period of one week, a Notice in the above terms, but with these additional words at the end of the first paragraph, hyperlinked to the judgment and summary: "The full judgment and the Court's summary of it can be found here."
  7. (4) The order will make specific provision as to the format of this version of the Notice, appropriate to the online medium and the particular context.

1. In my judgment these are measured incursions into the defendant's freedom to decide what it publishes and does not publish, that are justified in pursuit of the legitimate aim I have identified, and proportionate to that aim. They will involve little if any additional expense, and certainly nothing approaching the scale of the expense that has been lavished on this litigation.

- 1. Delivery up or destruction

1. It seems very likely that the claimant will prove to be entitled to an order for delivery up of infringing copies of the Electronic Draft, subject to certain exceptions. But the defendant resisted this on the basis I have already identified: that it is premature to make orders predicated on copyright ownership, when the scope of those rights has yet to be finally determined. As indicated, I accept the force of that, in some contexts. I do not see a reason why it should inhibit the taking of an account of profits, as the process depends on what the defendant made out of exploitation of the Electronic Draft. It will be the same or substantially the same whether or not there is a co-owner or a separate copyright. It is, as I have said before, essentially a matter of case management. But in the context of injunctions and in the present context, the complexities of orders that might go beyond the scope of the claimant's rights are sufficient to put me off, for the time being. With some regret, I accept Mr Speck's submission that this remedy should not be granted at this stage. I will adjourn that issue.
2. That makes it unnecessary to address the defendant's case as to some exceptions that should be made to any delivery up order, such as retention of copies for the purposes of litigation and redaction of privileged material. I believe the parties were close to agreement on the scope of such exceptions and they may in future reach agreement. But the issue is not ripe for determination.

- 1. The form of order

1. I make clear that although I have decided the issues of principle, some matters of drafting remain to be completed. The orders I have identified will not take effect until they have been reduced to writing in final form and issued by way of a formal order of the Court.

- 1. A footnote: the data protection claim

1. While this judgment was under preparation, the parties agreed informed the Court that they had agreed that claimant's data protection claim could be dealt with in the manner originally suggested by her draft Order. Accordingly, the claimant will not be making an application for summary judgment, and the order will not need to contain he related directions referred to at [20] above.

PRIVACY - MISUSE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION - CONFIDENTIALITY- BREACH OF CONFIDENCE

25 March 2011 (AMF) - March 2021

extending

January 2005 - 14 January 2011

enforcement v PwC 2010 Folio 885

recovery of personal private information

withheld 2006 in contravention of delivery up orders

9.10.06 for 16.10.06 - public interest disclosure act

(now 2012 Folio 336, issued for limitation reasons)

PLACEHOLDER:

Certificate of Destruction

Proxy Poll Voting Cards

TRD AGM 10 August 2016

Cards held by TRD (shadow) officers / concert parties in Outsourced Safe-Custody

for its (Disenfranchised) Members until destroyed prior to scanning

(Mis-use of Private Information)

2016 -2020 proxy poll voting results as voted not yet published on TRD RNS

Dividends per 2016 register not paid 2016- 2021

PLACEHOLDER

Despite the judgment delivered by Warby J

on 11 February 2021 ("the Summary Judgment" [2021] EWHC 273 (Ch) on the misuse of private information

those informed of the true position from 1988-2021

carried on dealing.

They were signatories to the Prospectus March 1996 (AMF, CJD)

Indemnifiers of Sponsor (AMF, CJD)

Signatory for TRD (AMF) on MM's contract with TRD

For this contract, MM had agreed to suspend her resignation such that no market notification needed to be made of her resignation with reasons

(Nov 2002):

(information kept confidential to this day, 12 March 2021)

MM expended time, money (£430k) and effort to achieve the turnaround and the "buy" recommendation for TRD December 2004.

There has been a protracted breach of contract with loss of opportunity over 18 years as well as protracted obstruction of all conceivable forms of damage mitigation throughout this period without respite.

Friday 05 March, 2021

Triad Group Plc

Director/PCA Dealings

RNS Number : 3649R

Triad Group Plc

05 March 2021 4pm

Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) No. 213800MDNBFVEQEN1G84

Triad Group Plc

("Triad" or "the Company")

Director/PCA Dealings

Triad Group Plc, has been notified on 5 March 2021 of the following share purchases of, and transactions in, the Ordinary Shares of the Company.

Alistair Fulton, Senior Non-Executive Director, has purchased a total of 50,000 Ordinary Shares at an average price of 116.25 pence per share into his ISA. Following the above transactions, Mr Fulton has a total beneficial interest in 315,200 Ordinary Shares, representing 1.97% of the current share capital of the Company, excluding Ordinary Shares held by Eileen Fulton.

Eileen Fulton, a person closely associated with Senior Non-Executive Director, Alistair Fulton, has purchased a total of 50,000 Ordinary Shares at an average price of 116.25 pence per share.

Chris Duckworth, Non-Executive Director, has purchased 8,647 Ordinary Shares at a price of 116 pence per share. Following the above transaction, Mr Duckworth has a total beneficial interest in 22,026 Ordinary Shares, representing 0.14% of the current share capital of the Company.

The information below, set out in accordance with the requirements of the UK Market Abuse Regulation, provides further detail on shares acquired.

Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities / person closely associated

Name

Alistair Fulton

Reason for the notification

Position/status

Initial notification /Amendment

Senior Non-Executive Director

Initial

Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant, auction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor

Name

LEI

Triad Group Plc

213800MDNBFVEQEN1G84

Details of the transaction(s): section to be repeated for (i) each type of instrument; (ii) each type of transaction; (iii) each date; and (iv) each place where transactions have been conducted

Description of the financial instrument, type of instrument

Identification code

Nature of the transaction

Price(s) and volume(s)

Aggregated information

- Aggregated volume

- Price

Date of the transaction

Place of the transaction

Ordinary Shares of GBP 0.01 par value each

ISIN: GB0009035741

Direct purchase of shares

Price(s)

£1.125

£1.20

Volume(s)

25,000 (on 2 March 2021)

25,000 (on 4 March 2021)

50,000

£1.1625

2 and 4 March 2021

London Stock Exchange

Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities / person closely associated

Name

Eileen Fulton

Reason for the notification

Position/status

Initial notification /Amendment

PCA of Senior Non-Executive Director, Alistair Fulton

Initial

Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant, auction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor

Name

LEI

Triad Group Plc

213800MDNBFVEQEN1G84

Details of the transaction(s): section to be repeated for (i) each type of instrument; (ii) each type of transaction; (iii) each date; and (iv) each place where transactions have been conducted

Description of the financial instrument, type of instrument

Identification code

Nature of the transaction

Price(s) and volume(s)

Aggregated information

- Aggregated volume

- Price

Date of the transaction

Place of the transaction

Ordinary Shares of GBP 0.01 par value each

ISIN: GB0009035741

Direct purchase of shares

Price(s)

£1.125

£1.20

Volume(s)

25,000 (on 2 March 2021)

25,000 (on 4 March 20210

50,000

£1.1625

2 and 4 March 2021

London Stock Exchange

Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities / person closely associated

Name

Chris Duckworth

Reason for the notification

Position/status

Initial notification /Amendment

Non-Executive Director

Initial

Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant, auction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor

Name

LEI

Triad Group Plc

213800MDNBFVEQEN1G84

Details of the transaction(s): section to be repeated for (i) each type of instrument; (ii) each type of transaction; (iii) each date; and (iv) each place where transactions have been conducted

Description of the financial instrument, type of instrument

Identification code

Nature of the transaction

Price(s) and volume(s)

Aggregated information

- Aggregated volume

- Price

Date of the transaction

Place of the transaction

Ordinary Shares of GBP 0.01 par value each

ISIN: GB0009035741

Direct purchase of shares

Price(s)

£1.16

Volume(s)

8,647

N/A

3 March 2021

London Stock Exchange

For further information, please contact:

Triad Group Plc James McDonald - Finance Director and Company Secretary 01908 278 450

Arden Partners plc Richard Johnson Benjamin Cryer 020 7614 5900

This information is provided by RNS, the news service of the London Stock Exchange. RNS is approved by the Financial Conduct Authority to act as a Primary Information Provider in the United Kingdom. Terms and conditions relating to the use and distribution of this information may apply. For further information, please contact rns@lseg.com or visit www.rns.com.

RNS may use your IP address to confirm compliance with the terms and conditions, to analyse how you engage with the information contained in this communication, and to share such analysis on an anonymised basis with others as part of our commercial services. For further information about how RNS and the London Stock Exchange use the personal data you provide us, please see our Privacy Policy.

END DSHBDGDXSSGDGBU

B National Audit Office Evidence 2015-2016-INSOLVENCY SERVICE ACCOUNT-WORKED EXAMPLE (2nd)

View

27 August 2005:

Daily Mail correctly

makes public ownership of, and rights in, Triad Group Plc;
tells the world that holdings are MM 30% JR 30%;
labels these joint principal shareholders as a "high flying duo";
informs that for years they were known to be the closest of friends;
posits that MM "is distancing herself from suggestions that she will call an egm to bring the row to a head. …"

http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-135551900.html

Triad Group Embroiled in Bitter Row over Accounts

Daily Mail (London)

August 27, 2005 | Copyright

Permalink

Byline: BRIAN O'CONNOR

A BITTER row involving an Egyptian ex-ballerina is clouding the future of IT consultant Triad Group.

Mira Makar (pictured right), who gave up dancing to qualify as an accountant and form a highflying duo with entrepreneur John Rigg, is demanding an investigation into accounting issues at Triad, where she was abruptly suspended in February. Both sides have retained lawyers.

Complicating the issue is the fact that Makar and Rigg hold 30pc stakes in Triad, which sells software and systems consultancy to government and top companies such as Tesco, Sainsbury and Barclays. Another twist is that the two were for years the closest of friends.

Makar, who led the company during its most successful years, is distancing herself from suggestions that she will call an egm to bring the row to a head. …

As as March 2021:

ownership of, and rights in, Triad Group Plc are unchanged for JR / MM (minor JR purchases cannot be entered in the register of disenfranchised members and phantom others);
holdings remain MM 30% JR 30%;
MM has not sought to "bring the row to a head"
MM has remained true to her commitment to Timothy James Eckes that "I shall not trouble you further" having been told by him (untruthfully) that he had been ordered not to communicate with her (his (indirect) boss) by person or persons not identified. £1.5m shareholders funds deployed to November 2006, to generate witness statements as this (EAT).
Daily Mail has not been sued by TRD, JR, MM or anyone else.
Daily Mail wrote its own article: it was not the result of a mandatory injunction to publish text created by judiciary.

1995 - 2005

15 April 1995

Alistair and Eileen Fulton invite the "high flying duo" and "closest of friends" to share celebrations of their twenty - fifth wedding anniversary. This was long before the start of the silent treatment from January 2005. Comms became solely through DHW (A&O) to mira.makar@triadgroup.plc.uk from the time of AMF's secret visit to Fiona Kelsey, PwC decoy, on 20 January 2005.

2005 - 2015

TRD lost capacity as its board ceased to meet - Newey LJ holder one share TRD AGM 31 October 2005, after which members disenfranchised for the next decade to 2015.

A Cromwellian Declaration: Puritan Sermon or High Court Judgment?

Lord Justice Warby’s latest tract – Robin Callender Smith

MARCH 13, 2021 / INFORRM / 0 COMMENTS

There are portions of Lord Justice Warby’s most recent judgment in the litigation between Meghan Markle and Associated Newspapers [2021] EWHC 510 (Ch) that read as if he was dealing with a contempt of court case. So trenchant are the phrases he uses to deploy the novel remedy of an enforced publication on the front page and page 3 of The Mail on Sunday and similar for its online relative MailOnline that the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment”springs to mind.

“Cruel” because, as he states at [70]:

In my judgment these are measured incursions into the defendant’s freedom to decided what it publishes and does not publish, that are justified in pursuit of the legitimate aim I have identified and proportionate to that aim. They will involve little if any additional expense, and certainly nothing approaching the scale of the expense that has been lavished on this litigation.

The “legitimate aim” he identifies at [57] as being

….plain and obvious: it is the protection and vindication of the rights of the claimant, whose civil rights have been infringed by the defendant’s publication. That is a compensatory aim.

He dismisses the argument that this remedy is not just unusual but “invasive” by characterising it as “discursive” [56].

“Unusual” because he admits to the novelty of this remedy at [60]:

….I can see good arguments for being ready to use it in media cases, where appropriate, and with due caution. The grant of discursive remedies has so far been relatively unusual in this category of litigation and there is no coherent scheme governing their availability….It would seem anomalous if claims for misuse of private information should be the exception to the rule.

“Punishment” is refuted in the judgment. Referring to the use of the power to order publications of a summary of court judgments in s.12 of the Defamation Act 2013, and comments made on this by Mr Justice Nicklin in a 2018 case, Lord Justice Warby states [55]:

….Counsel [Mr Speck] went so far as to suggest in writing that in this case this remedy is ‘intended more as a species of punishment and retribution rather than a necessary and proportionate measure in the interests of the claimant or the public’. The submission was repeated in oral argument. [56] I accept of course that this remedy should not be granted as a punitive measure, or with a view to humiliating the defendant. I would not do so. I do not consider that the defendant is justified in suggesting that this application is motivated by punitive considerations.

The phrases underlined immediately above are unusual at this level of judicial consideration by a Judge, now a member of the Court of Appeal, to an experienced QC.

He offers further justification for the novel remedy at [68]:

As to proportionality, the defendant devoted a very considerable amount of space to the infringing articles, which it continued to publish for over 2 years. It has devoted a very considerable number of further column inches, and many hundreds if not thousands of words, to coverage of earlier stages of this litigation and commentary upon them. The wording sought is modest by comparison, and factual in nature.

The ability of newspapers generally and, in particular, the defendant’s publications, to summarise to the Judge’s satisfaction the burden and content of his earlier decision on 11 February 2021 in Duchess of Sussex v Associated Newspapers [2021] EWHC 273 (Ch), evidently irked him.

He comments on it at [31]:

For the claimant it was argued that the defendant’s behaviour since judgment was handed down makes it important to have a formal statement from the court that is succinct and incapable of misinterpretation….

and at [36]:

The reality is that what the vast majority of people learn about judgments comes (understandably) from whatever news source they choose to use. For most people those news sources do not include the judiciary website devoted to the full text of the Court’s reasoned decision [ www.judiciary.uk ] or www.bailii.org …. I see the force of the submission that there is a real value in a short and pithy formal summary of its effect, which carries the authority of the court and is not open to misinterpretation.

And finally [40]:

The defendant has not identified any ‘special reason’ against the grant of a declaration. It has not pointed to any form of harm or detriment to itself of to the public interest if I grant a declaration. It has not suggested that it would be unjust to grant it. I have not identified any other legitimate interest of the defendant in resisting the grant of this relief.

Note to Sub Editors: add hyperlinks to court judgments where possible to escape judicial wrath and to be able to claim in aid – to reinforce fair and accurate reporting – something that was never available to me in the 1960s as a journalist and regular court reporter relying on my Pitman’s shorthand. As a separate plea for Open Justice, would that all courts everywhere would (if it was made possible) render hyperlinked judgments so that the public had access to at least something.

In conclusion, this 20-page judgment reads more like Oliver (not Thomas) Cromwell declaring a New Model Media Law. It appears to sermonise in a way not previously seen in such judgments. The new regime is now one where it will be the inevitable goal of all claimants’ lawyers and advocates to gain control of the defendants’ printing presses, websites, and editorial desks for the publication of their authorised “story” of the result of any success. And woe unto the claimants’ proprietors if resources are spent resisting this.

A final thought: this is not a “hacking” case, for which there could be no excuse, but one relating to media scrutiny given to the actions and activities of a former member of the royal family.

Dr Robin Callender Smith is Honorary Professor of Media Law at Queen Mary, University of London’s Centre for Commercial Law Studies. He sat as a First Tier Information Rights Tribunal Judge for ten years until retirement in 2017 and is the author of Celebrity and Royal Privacy, the Media and the Law (Sweet & Maxwell 2015).

Obligation Of MoJ To Publish Apology to Mira Makar

DRAFT APOLOGY TO MIRA MAKAR REQUESTED TO BE DISPLAYED ON MoJ WEBSITE

CONCERNING ITS FALSE AND INTIMIDATING POSTING,

ALSO UNDERMINING OF MM'S CREDIBILITY

TO BE RETAINED FOR TWO YEARS FROM DATE OF UPLOAD

From: Mira Makar <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Subject: APOLOGY DRAFT FOR MOJ WEBSITE - Fwd: 13 10 14-URGENT DAVID THOMPSON REPLACEMENT TO FRIDAY LETTER with 4 attachments

Date: 22 October 2013 at 18:05:01 BST

To: XXXXXXXXXX@hmcts.gsi.gov.uk>

Cc: Mira Makar User <mira.makar@btinternet.com>, mark.field.mp@parliament.uk

Dear XXXXXXXX

Please pass this draft on to Mr XXXXXXXX for urgent action. I shall reply to XXXXXXXX's letter when I have time.

Many thanks

Mira

APOLOGY BY HMCTS, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

TO MISS MIRA MAKAR

A damaging allegation was recklessly made by email against Miss Mira Makar to the Ministry of Justice communications team which controls the Ministry of Justice web-site, which was not true, and which has intimidated Miss Makar and undermined her credibility publicly.

This false allegation was displayed on the Ministry of Justice web-site from 13 January 2013 until its removal on xxx. It was otherwise set to remain there until December 2014.

This apology, after the removal of the defamatory allegations, which replaces the offending material, will remain on the Ministry of Justice web-site until at least the end of October 2015.

HMCTS wishes to apologise to Miss Makar for the stress and distress caused to her from this matter.

HMCTS also wishes to record publicly the accolades of Andrew Smith J towards Miss Makar on 19 November 2012 in the Commercial Court of the Queen’s Bench Division:

“ …firstly no one can doubt Miss Makar’s sincerity; secondly, I have already commented how carefully she observed the time limits that I requested of her; thirdly, in the case of each of the default judgments she was entitled to enter judgment and no complaint can be made about that; and, fourthly, she put forward documents before the court. They were extensive but she did not labour them. Fifthly, throughout she has addressed the court with courtesy.”

A full investigation into these unfortunate and regrettable events is underway in accordance with HMCTS operations guidelines. No further announcements will be made.

David Thompson, HMCTS, Royal Courts of Justice and the Rolls Building

Date: October 2013

David Thompson was the Director of the RCJ and Rolls, responsible for falsehood posted on MoJ website, just as AMF remains responsible for the lies about MM he posted on the Regulated News Service of the London Stock Exchange in the good name of Triad Group Plc on 28 April 2017.

This was after 23 March 2017, MM's birthday, when the late SSRM wrote to the government about their obligations under international law to remove falsehood about MM within a short time of being alerted to their error (9.3.14).

This advertised MM's flat 333 Cromwell Tower, leading to its burglary taking court files, evidence, TRD confidential property and computer, the address for service of 2010 Folio 885; 2012 Folio 336; HQ12XO3512 etc, blocking enforcement. AMF has now supplemented this with MM's address at 218 Ben Jonson, registered address for MM's 4,507,951 shares, leading to the door being broken, lock removed and flat rendered uninhabitable, leaving MM homeless and vulnerable in time of COVID. There is no construct that excludes intent.

uploaded 23rd March 2021 © Emily Buchanan

AMF using judiciary and police

procures the smashing of the lock of

218 Ben Jonson House

rendering the safe haven and place of shielding

for an elderly resident unfit and insecure

whilst demonstrating commitment

to his terror and harassment campaign

started in January 2005 and

maintained without respite ever since.

"Thuggery and disorder by a minority will never be tolerated."

Secretary of State Home Office 21 March 2021

using TWITTER to communicate from which MM been excluded from 12 December 2018, events for which AMF ought to have had an explanation when he turned up on 12 February 2019 (RCJ), looking for his kick-back. He brought friends and family to present Reuben Comiskey hired by DMH Stallard LLP, burglars of 333 Cromwell Tower (evidence City Comptroller, Security, Police)

This thuggery by AMF followed pre-meditated blocking of MM's Nationwide bank account, stealing some £38k, so neither she nor dependents could meet survival expenses. She would be left excluded from the banking system.

AMF relies on having had this address advertised on BAILII, Bloomberg, other places, to disassociate himself, having already planted a false notice on the Regulated News Service of the London Stock Exchange in the good name of Triad Group Plc in March 2019, in which, without MM's knowledge or consent, her unblemished name went up, weeks after being posted on 3 January 2019 also without her knowledge or consent.

The second offensive posting wrongly asserted MM's shareholding, in circumstances in which AMF knew the correct figure, having published poll voting results in August 2015, and having published MM's dissent to his "remuneration report" 2016 in TRD's March 2017 accounts. Had AMF paid attention on 9 August 2016 the proxy poll voting results for the AGM for 10 August 2016 would have reflected MM's 4,507,951 shares.

AMF published the proxy poll voting on TRD's website, rather than the RNS, took them down, had the proxy poll votes themselves destroyed, blamed the outsourcer, but saying they were right, then blamed NEB, and MM for appointing NEB to the TRD board.

AMF remained immovable when the Companies House record was sent to him showing he was responsible for NEB's appointment in October 2009, while RPC, Boodle Hatfield, RBC were being obstructive, while attention was on saving the late SSR, court hearings vacated finally for the last time, by consent. Nobody watched what AMF was up to, having removed AJD, TRD Company Sec., in March 2008, leaving himself with the job of post opening and maintenance of the register. He has yet to blame MM for that.

Marking the decade 16 March 2011 - 16 March 2021

Alistair McIntyre Fulton:

decision to join and take his lead from Tim Manning (TM)

Senior Partner Boodle Hatfield

Claim by TM that they were acting under the instructions of Royal Bank of Canada, when:

they replaced "Mira Makar" by "Royal Bank of Canada" in judicial system (Dec 08)
they created a second secret agreement substituting the late SSR for RBC
they "consented" in MM's name effectively by this substitution, in giving up MM's judicial standing and immediately cancelling three vital hearings, including undoing the freezing of her HSBC bank accounts, groomed for laundering bribes, and then being shut; in the costs court dealing with Client Monies, for the account of £2/3m, in circumstances where there were no bills and no books or Client Monies Account (court order 23.7.07 confirmation 8 August 2007);
they stole MM's papers for an appeal (4.1.09) for which she had permission, that she was bound to win, as she had instructed counsel to accept Circuit Judge Trent's request to "take it on appeal". This related to forgeries planted at the Land Registry (Angus McNicol Foot Anstey, Jamie Smith, Ben Wood, RJW, Slater & Gordon LLP Edward Cooper, Blandy & Blandy LLP, Jonathan Gater, Fleet Solicitors H. Davey) for which David Williams, property partner A&O, had accepted instructions to invoke rectification provisions but had not got round to finishing the work, deflected by the fact the A&O fire had taken the leases (July 2006), and getting copies from the Barbican estate office as well as being slowish in filing protection at Land Reg finally done in name of nominee and safe-custody company Damor Investments Ltd, Jersey, holding securities but with no bank account or employees of its own. This was under joint instructions from the Royal Bank of Canada, legally liable for the omission from 1 November 2005, with whom A&O had a global framework agreement, and the late Siham Sami Raouf and her late sister.

This was in connection with the fact that the operations of the court were eighteen years in arrears of the law (used to be the first to the Land Registry got the benefit whether right or wrong) and the judge considered that if the point were taken "on appeal" the court would align itself with the law prospectively without facing accumulated arrears of claims. The manoeuvre by Boodle Hatfield stopped correction of this wrong practice by the courts.

Manning: "we do not act for you or on your behalf" i.e. we are hostile to you in the judicial system despite not being on the record for any named party.

16 March 2011 16:16

Tim Manning to Alistair McIntyre Fulton; Stephen Mark Sanderson; NEB (Triad Group Plc)

Claim MM v Royal Bank of Canada heard 22 December 2014 Rider C

Manning: p8 and p9 - 16 March 16.16: "I do not intend to correspond with you further

on these matters."

REFUSAL TO COMMUNICATE AGREED BETWEEN THOSE ATTENDING QBD 12 FEB 2019 FROM SAME TIME 2011 AT LEAST -

FICTION OF "PLEDGE" UNCHALLENGED AND MM NOT INFORMED - PROTECTION FROM DEED OF COUNTER-INDEMNITY RECORDED AS "CHARGE" I.E. PRIORITY, SO ASSETS ARE NOT IN PLAY.

AMF HAD EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO CONTACT MM HIMSELF BY 16 MARCH 2011 AND/OR TURN UP ON 18 MARCH 2011 BUT DID NOT. NONE OF THESE COMMS HAVE BEEN FILED AS HIS EVIDENCE IN COURT, EXPLAINING WHY HE IS A DECADE LATE, AND WHY HE WAS NOT SO CONCERNED ABOUT HIS REPUTATION AND A KICKBACK TO ATTEND ON 18 MARCH 2011 WITH EXPLANATION AS TO WHAT HAS CHANGED BEYOND CARNAGE, VANDALISM AND TRAGEDY. TRD SHARE REGISTER FROZEN.

From: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Subject: Re: Your Voicemail of yesterday

Date: 16 March 2011 at 11:07:22 GMT

To: "Steven Sanderson (Private)" <steven.m.sanderson@ntlworld.com>

Cc: david.eagle@bdo.co.uk, Alistair Fulton <amfulton@compuserve.com>, mira.makar@btinternet.com, Nick Burrows <Nick.Burrows@triad.co.uk>

Hi Steve!

You told me that he asked for the specific issue to be dealt with in writing, I presume so that there can be no misunderstanding I thought.

John cannot block comms on this subject or any other and I very much doubt that he would want to. The directors are worse off without information than with it.

As matters stand, I am awaiting to hear that the appropriate minute has been passed and the entry made in the register, and so is RBC. It seems that, from what Burrows said, that he made no enquiries at the time. I am afraid that if he does not enquire, he won't find out, and the time from July 2009 to now is very long.

If you had not blocked comms, you would have been prepared to find out the true picture. The current status is that:

TRUNCATED: FULL TEXT SHOULD BE OBTAINABLE FROM AMF BUT HE WON'T PROVIDE IT

From: Steven Sanderson (Private) <steven.m.sanderson@ntlworld.com>

Subject: Your Voicemail of yesterday

To: "M MAKAR" <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Date: Wednesday, 16 March, 2011, 8:10

Dear Mira

I confirm receipt of your Voicemail of 1.49pm yesterday.

As you know, XXXXXXXX has instructed me not to speak to you whilst the issue of the charge/equitable pledge over your shares is ongoing, which it still is.

Can you please pass on to me by email details of the approach you have received, including any contact details? I shall then raise this matter at the next Board meeting of Directors, which is scheduled for next week and we shall then take this forward as necessary.

Best regards

Steven Sanderson

XXXXXX-XXXXXX (mob)

QBD Hearing 18 March 2011: last chance ever for anyone with any claim v MM to turn up and say what it was and try to stop enforcement against PwC, due from 14 January 2011 (2010 Folio 885, heard QBD 23.12.10 Holdroyde LJ)

No-one turned up including Herbert Smith on notice indicating claim dropped formally (HQ06XO1803) (agreed counter claim to be sorted out of court 2006/7)

AMF did not turn up nor enquire either what it was about and its value to TRD.

Instead he waited to 25 March after the event to write, copying Tim Manning's style, indicating "get lost, don't bother looking to me to recover your belongings or be able to get on with your life free of me" and proceeding to reject Ken Booty's attempt to get him and Lander off the Headway register as it meant no-one would either back the business or hire it. It was forced to "mothball".

AMF : "I do not intend to communicate further on the contents of your email."

2016: "You will have to send this email of mine, I have not kept my records, they need to be restored by the computer shop after my summer holidays"

2016 - 2021 : members disenfranchised as they had been 2005-2015

Despite AMF's refusal to provide personal data (delivery up) and fully informed of the misuse of private information, those informed of the true position from 1988-2021 carry on dealing including exactly one decade after aligning themselves with Tim Manning and Boodle Hatfield - openly hostile to MM in and out of the judicial system, to the detriment of all those interested (incl. TRD) yet to the benefit of none.

16 March 2011 - 16 March 2021

Add to Alerts list

Tuesday 16 March, 2021

Triad Group Plc

Director/PCA Dealings

RNS Number : 4452S

Triad Group Plc

16 March 2021 3pm

Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) No. 213800MDNBFVEQEN1G84

Triad Group Plc

("Triad" or "the Company")

Director/PCA Dealings

Triad Group Plc, has been notified on 16 March 2021 of the following share purchases of, and

transactions in, the Ordinary Shares of the Company.

Alistair Fulton, Senior Non-Executive Director, has purchased a total of 21,840 Ordinary Shares at an

average price of 141.87 pence per share. This purchase includes 13,690 shares into his ISA at the

price of 140.00 pence per share and 8,150 Ordinary Shares at the price of 145.00 pence per share.

Following the above transactions, Mr Fulton has a total beneficial interest in 337,040 Ordinary Shares

, representing 2.1% of the current share capital of the Company, excluding Ordinary Shares held by

Eileen Fulton.

Eileen Fulton, a person closely associated with Senior Non-Executive Director, Alistair Fulton, has

purchased a total of 21,840 Ordinary Shares at an average price of 141.87 pence per share.

The information below, set out in accordance with the requirements of the UK Market Abuse

Regulation, provides further detail on shares acquired.

1 Day * | 1 Week | 3 Months | 1 Year

Gain: 0.80%

Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities / person closely associated

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16-Mar-2021 04:02 PM

Market Movers - Top risers and fallers between 15:00 and 16:00

Overall Market ... ...

16-Mar-2021 04:00 PM

Market Movers - Top risers and fallers at 16:00

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Market Movers - Top risers and fallers between 14:00 and 15:00

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16-Mar-2021 02:33 PM

Essensys launches digital infrastructure platform

16-Mar-2021 02:17 PM

Cranswick appoints non-exec director

»Market Movers - Top risers and fallers between 13:00 and 14:00 »Market Movers - Top risers and fallers at 14:00 »Sabre Insurance Group reports 'resilient performance' »Wood reaches settlement with Scottish authorities on Unaoil investigation »Tesco completed sale of Tesco Polska »Market Movers - Top risers and fallers between 12:00 and 13:00 »Market Movers - Top risers and fallers at 13:00 »Market Movers - Top risers and fallers between 11:00 and 12:00 »Market Movers - Top risers and fallers at 12:00

More headlines

Company finder

Forthcoming announcements

Name

Alistair Fulton

Reason for the notification

Position/status

Initial notification /Amendment

Senior Non-Executive Director

Initial

Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant, auction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor

Name

LEI

Triad Group Plc

213800MDNBFVEQEN1G84

Details of the transaction(s): section to be repeated for (i) each type of instrument; (ii) each type of transaction; (iii) each date; and (iv) each place where transactions have been conducted

Description of the financial instrument, type of instrument

Identification code

Nature of the transaction

Price(s) and volume(s)

Aggregated information

- Aggregated volume

- Price

Date of the transaction

Place of the transaction

Ordinary Shares of GBP 0.01 par value each

ISIN: GB0009035741

Direct purchase of shares

Price(s)

£1.40

£1.45

Volume(s)

13,690 (on 11 March 2021)

8,150 (on 15 March 2021)

21,840

£1.4187

11 and 15 March 2021

London Stock Exchange

Latest directors dealings

Details of the person discharging managerial responsibilities / person closely associated

Name

Eileen Fulton

Reason for the notification

Position/status

Initial notification /Amendment

PCA of Senior Non-Executive Director, Alistair Fulton

Initial

All directors dealings today

Details of the issuer, emission allowance market participant, auction platform, auctioneer or auction monitor

Name

LEI

Triad Group Plc

213800MDNBFVEQEN1G84

Details of the transaction(s): section to be repeated for (i) each type of instrument; (ii) each type of transaction; (iii) each date; and (iv) each place where transactions have been conducted

Description of the financial instrument, type of instrument

Identification code

Nature of the transaction

Price(s) and volume(s)

Aggregated information

- Aggregated volume

- Price

Date of the transaction

Place of the transaction

Ordinary Shares of GBP 0.01 par value each

ISIN: GB0009035741

Direct purchase of shares

Price(s)

£1.40

£1.45

Volume(s)

13,690 (on 12 March 2021)

8,150 (on 15 March 20210

21,840

£1.4187

12 and 15 March 2021

London Stock Exchange

For further information, please contact:

Triad Group Plc James McDonald - Finance Director and Company Secretary 01908 278 450

Arden Partners plc Richard Johnson Benjamin Cryer 020 7614 5900

This information is provided by RNS, the news service of the London Stock Exchange. RNS is approved by the Financial Conduct Authority to act as

a Primary Information Provider in the United Kingdom. Terms and conditions relating to the use and distribution of this information may apply.

For further information, please contact rns@lseg.com or visit www.rns.com.RNS may use your IP address to confirm compliance with the terms and

conditions, to analyse how you engage with the information contained in this communication, and to share such analysis on an anonymised basis with

others as part of our commercial services. For further information about how RNS and the London Stock Exchange use the personal data you provide

us, please see our Privacy Policy.

END

DSHBDGDXIDBDGBL

Marking the decade 16 March 2011 - 16 March 2021

Protective Notice To Boodle Hatfield (Tim Manning)

(stated by them on 16.3.11 to be (i) agents for Royal Bank of Canada;

(ii) hostile; (iii) active in and out of the courts; (iv) supplier of papers to RPC)

on behalf of those interested

including Triad Group Plc, minorities and creditors

17 March 2011 for QBD Hearing 18 March 2011

From: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Subject: BOODLE HATFIELD in COURT TO MORROW

Date: 17 March 2011 at 15:23:39 GMT

To: tmanning@boodlehatfield.com

Cc: Christopher.Semken@NewSquareChambers.co.uk,

nigel.tristem@bakertilly.co.uk,

sally.baker@bakertilly.co.uk

Dear Mr Manning

I have just been informed that Mr Christopher Semken, barrister, is representing you to-morrow in court as acting for Siham Sami Raouf Order of the Republic (deceased), a lady that Jane Howard of RPC and Mr Semken were pursuing while alive to pay them a substantial amount of money to "go away". They have cited a number of companies in the Royal Bank of Canada Group and you say you act for RBC.

A large number of documents it is said emanating from you and based on evidence from you is in the court. These materials were, on the advice of the SFO, reported to the Jersey police.

Please will you kindly confirm by return that you have agreed that your firm has agreed that Mr Semken may represent Boodle Hatfield and use your documents and information? He is otherwise acting for RBC's opponents Baker Tilly that seeks to dislodge RBC contrary to creditor preferment rules and notice periods.

Your silence will be taken as acquiescence and that you have knowingly agreed to any mischief currently going on. You are warned that notice has not been given to those prejudiced including the Company and the creditors and that your firm will be held fully liable for all damages and consequential damages including taxation, and legal costs of defending claims and prosecutions.

Yours faithfully

Mira Makar MA FCA

00 44 (0)7768 610071

pp1128 - 11 12 29-DOUBLE STANDARDS FROM DAVID FORSDICK -ISSUED- Trading standards.pdf

16 March 2011 16:58

Rebuttal to Tim Manning including on behalf of those interested: amongst records in AMF's back ups

not restored until after June 2016 and summer vacation

but available for meeting 22 September 2016

From: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Subject: Re: Your false allegations

Date: 16 March 2011 at 16:58:13 GMT

To: Tim Manning <tmanning@boodlehatfield.com>

Cc: CIreton@kingstonsmithw1.co.uk,

david.eagle@bdo.co.uk,

Cameron Scott <c.scott@frc-aadb.org.uk>,

fraud@sra.org.uk,

DS Jeremy Phillips <j.phillips@jersey.pnn.police.uk>,

Alistair Fulton <amfulton@compuserve.com>,

Steven Sanderson <steven.m.sanderson@ntlworld.com>,

Anita Matthews <a.matthews@jerseyfsc.org>,

Nick Burrows <Nick.Burrows@triad.co.uk>,

Simon Rylatt <srylatt@boodlehatfield.com>,

Sofie Hoffman <SHoffman@boodlehatfield.com>,

David Johnson <DJohnson@boodlehatfield.com>,

Richard Maughan <rmaughan@boodlehatfield.com>

Dear Mr Manning

You do not act for the Royal Bank of Canada. If you did then you would have provided an address for acceptance of service and been served with 21 days notice of proceedings. You would not have been entering clandestine comms with a public Company and not their lawyers A&O.

You have told me in writing that you act for the trustees of the Siham Sami Raouf Trust. They are not party to these proceedings and may have never even heard of you. You have no presence in any action save the false statements you have made in my name and on my behalf. You were required in December 2008 to desist and provide my records and those of my family. You refused.

You can explain yourself to your regulator. I require you to desist, co-operate with any questioning, return my documents and remove the false and stolen documents belonging to the Royal Bank of Canada that you have splayed in the Court.

You cannot blame a reputable bank for your antics I am afraid

Mira Makar MA FCA

00 44 (0)7768 610071

From: Tim Manning <tmanning@boodlehatfield.com>

To: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Cc: CIreton@kingstonsmithw1.co.uk;

david.eagle@bdo.co.uk;

Cameron Scott <c.scott@frc-aadb.org.uk>;

fraud@sra.org.uk;

DS Jeremy Phillips <j.phillips@jersey.pnn.police.uk>;

Alistair Fulton <amfulton@compuserve.com>;

Steven Sanderson <steven.m.sanderson@ntlworld.com>;

Anita Matthews <a.matthews@jerseyfsc.org>;

Nick Burrows <Nick.Burrows@triad.co.uk>;

Simon Rylatt <srylatt@boodlehatfield.com>;

Sofie Hoffman <SHoffman@boodlehatfield.com>;

David Johnson <DJohnson@boodlehatfield.com>;

Richard Maughan <rmaughan@boodlehatfield.com>

Sent: Wednesday, 16 March, 2011 16:16:39

Subject: Your false allegations

Dear Ms Makar,

I refer to the numerous emails that you have recently sent and/or copied to me and other third parties who are unknown to me.

You make a number of serious allegations in those emails against this firm, my partners and myself. Whilst much of what you say in your emails is difficult, if not impossible to follow, nonetheless I must write to strongly refute what you are or appear to be alleging.

As you are well aware, this firm acts for the Royal Bank of Canada in connection with claims being made against you by third parties. We and various others from the bank have sought, on numerous occasions, to explain the steps that are being taken in connection with these claims. We have always acted and will continue to act on the bank's legitimate instructions. For the sake of clarity, I repeat that we are not, and never have been, instructed to act on your behalf and have never purported to do so.

Please take this email as a formal request for you to cease making your false, mischievous and offensive allegations against this firm, my colleagues and myself. If you continue to do so, I will consider what steps should be taken to protect the reputations of those concerned.

I do not intend to correspond with you further on these matters.

Tim Manning

Partner

T:020 7079 8190

Email: tmanning@boodlehatfield.com

Boodle Hatfield, 89 New Bond Street, London W1S 1DA, UK (Tel +44 (0) 20 7629 7411 and Fax +44 (0) 20 7629 2621), www.boodlehatfield.com

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A full list of the partners' names is available for inspection at the above address.

16 March 2011 16:39

Insurance Notification to Tim Manning Boodle Hatfield including on behalf of those interested:

Omitting to Secure Injunction

to Prevent Use of Private and Personal Information

Including Identity Theft Of Those Not Involved

Whose Records Are In Fire Proof Vaults in Jersey

None of Whom Are / Were Customers of The Royal Bank of Canada

From: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Subject: INJUNCTION BY YOU ON DOCS AND INFO YOU HAVE PASSED TO OTHERS

Date: 16 March 2011 at 16:39:34 GMT

To: tmanning@boodlehatfield.com

Cc: fraud@sra.org.uk, mira.makar@btinternet.com

Mr Manning

I see no sign of any injunction by you on the use of documents and letters in the civil proceedings in which you are not a party nor authorised to accept service.

You have not taken any action to stop abuse and RPC with whom you have acted against me my family and RBC are placing your docs into the Court to use against us.

If I do not hear that you have either reached agreement that RPC will desist or you have an injunction I give you notice of a P.I. claim on the 29% stake and the loss of opportunity cost. I floated it at £34m and got it to £178m in 3 years; valuing the capital value of my year at £13m to me.

This is the culmination of 2.5 years actions by you against me each valued at the same rate. Your insurer must be notified BEFORE you decide not to act. You need to tell them that you have refused the data search requests from Dec 08 and therefore blocked any hope I have had of looking after my self and my elderly dependants, not all of whom have survived your actions against us. At least you know the name of the lady that died. You can tell the insurer that Order of the Republic appears after her name.

I expect and require an answer this afternoon

Mira Makar MA FCA

00 44 (0)7768 610071

From: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Subject: Re: CO-ORDINATION etc

Date: 17 March 2011 at 11:56:18 GMT

To: "Howard, Jane - RPC" <Jane.Howard@rpc.co.uk>

Cc: Christopher.Semken@NewSquareChambers.co.uk, sally.baker@bakertilly.co.uk, nigel.tristem@bakertilly.co.uk, "Elford, Catherine - RPC" <Catherine.Elford@rpc.co.uk>

Oh well, you had better get some then as you are not in on Fridays and no one is currently represented, so Sally will be on her own (if she comes). Catherine has not sent the covering letters to the Court so there is nothing for Mr Semken or me to talk about.

Mira

Mira Makar

00 44 (0)7768 610071

From: "Howard, Jane - RPC" <Jane.Howard@rpc.co.uk>

To: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Cc: Christopher.Semken@NewSquareChambers.co.uk; sally.baker@bakertilly.co.uk; nigel.tristem@bakertilly.co.uk; "Elford, Catherine - RPC" <Catherine.Elford@rpc.co.uk>

Sent: Thursday, 17 March, 2011 11:48:32

Subject: RE: CO-ORDINATION etc

Dear Mira

I have no instructions to vacate the hearing tomorrow. The fact of it going ahead does not of course preclude you from making proposals if that is what you want to do - either before or after that hearing.

Yours sincerely

Jane

Jane Howard, Partner

Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP

Direct: +44 (0) XXXXXXX

Mobile: +44 (0)XXXXXXX

From: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Subject: 1 Oct 2010 notice of objection excluded from Catherine's statement

Date: 17 March 2011 at 23:14:15 GMT

To: Christopher.Semken@NewSquareChambers.co.uk

Cc: nigel.tristem@bakertilly.co.uk,

sally.baker@bakertilly.co.uk,

Jane.Howard@rpc.co.uk,

mira.makar@btinternet.com

Dear Mr Semken

You seem to have been kept in the dark by Catherine and Jane about the placing of the interim charge on the register and you have not it seems been given all copy correspondence including with my investee company.

I was not told with the notice of hearing in 09 that Catherine had forged ahead and rail roaded the entry on the register without telling me: it is one thing getting the order quite another doing anything with it.

The correct thing to have done was:

1) not get it in the first place

2) asking for it to be set aside

3) warning me in 09 so that I could have objected them that it was on the register and a pile of undisclosed comms had taken place with Nick Burrows, the host in March 06 as you will recall.

The fact that I was deprived of that opportunity is a prejudice to me that you have omitted from your skeleton.

In the meanwhile you say I am late in objecting. You know I am not because you know that I was not told and second that I have objected and Mr Hogarth has decided Baker Tilly Jane and Catherine are SPAM in his life and blocked all comms.

Neither you nor I have a bundle relevant to the issues before the court; the difference being that you know what you say is false and you are prepared to say it and I am not.

Below the objection when I began to wonder about this nearly 6 months after the mischief. It should be in your bundle and it is not.

Your skeleton needs correcting to take out that I missed the 7 days. Catherine should have lodged it and included it in her statement with the comms with Nick but did not.

It is 11.12 pm and I still have not received the papers and nor has any other creditor.

Mira

From: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

To: Hogarth, Robert - RPC

Cc: CIreton@kingstonsmithw1.co.uk <CIreton@kingstonsmithw1.co.uk>;

mira makar <mira.makar@btinternet.com>;

jonathan.watmoug@rpc.co.uk <jonathan.watmoug@rpc.co.uk>;

vernon.soare@icaew.com <vernon.soare@icaew.com>

Sent: Fri Oct 01 14:43:41 2010

Subject: RPC CHARGES OVER PROPERTY

Dear Mr Hogarth

I write to you as a 29% shareholder in a main market public company. Your firm has taken, it tells me, interim charges on my property.

A charge over a controlling stake in a public company is a signal to the market that the holder is about to dump. You have done this notwithstanding knowing that the stock is illiquid.

In so doing you have used information confidential to that public company the DTI and the FSA and disclosed such matters in the public domain. You have told none of these persons.

You have broken regulatory confidentiality; the confidentiality of my investee company and breached my copyright and the data protection act.

If you consider that you have anything whatsoever to say on this subject would you kindly make sure you have done so before departing for the week-end.

yours sincerely

Mira Makar

Mira Makar FCA

00 44 (0)7768 610071

18 March 2011 1:04

DAMOR INVESTMENTS LIMITED - Safe-custody Company into which Abacus Nominees Ltd and Abacus (C.I.) Ltd, also safe-custody / nominee entities merged.

For Abacus Global Under Deed Of Counter Indemnity 1996- Protection of MM's estate

Need to regurgitate events of October 2009, whilst late SSR in and out of consciousness

Technical note re interim charging orders (where they can validly exist, not here):

1) within X weeks of interims must have a hearing to continue interims; vary interims; remove interims; convert to final - i.e. there is no "do nothing" option;

2) consent order endorsed by Master Leslie that October 2009 hearing be vacated.

3) no mechanism to recreate on 18 March 2011 (gone with vacating hearing)

4) Christopher Semken, counsel, accepted the technical point and asked for fresh interims (labelled "continue the existing"). Got nothing

Outcome:

1) Master Leslie discovered HQ06XO1803 Herbert Smith LLP D&CC £21m from the Appeal Bundle which he snatched before hitting the roof in incandescent fury

2) No "creditors". HS abandoned C and not challenging CC (ex court by agreement 2007)

From: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Subject: Fw: 09 10 15: BOODLE HATFIELD CONFLICT

Date: 18 March 2011 at 01:04:20 GMT

To: Christopher.Semken@NewSquareChambers.co.uk

Cc: Jane.Howard@rpc.co.uk,

sally.baker@bakertilly.co.uk,

nigel.tristem@bakertilly.co.uk,

Catherine Elford <Catherine.Elford@rpc.co.uk>

Dear Mr Semken

Your bundle appears to be missing the below. Damor is a safe custody company and not a principal in anything. Catherine got this wrong because she thought that being the name on the land register it meant that Damor was creditor. She would not have made this mistake had she been an accountant or had she asked Nigel to do a statement of truth.

I was the one who decided on the use of Damor as it is an anonymous name used by lots of people. It does no transactions.

BT has not served the principals and does not know who they are. Triad knows. A&O knows BDO tax and auditors know and so do the BT partners from 2006. It was in the witness statements etc

I warned Jane of BH's compromise. You will need to explain your loan assignments as your own witness testimony. No one else knows anything about them.

Mira

Mira Makar

00 44 (0)7768 610071

----- Forwarded Message ----

From: "Howard, Jane - RPC" <Jane.Howard@rpc.co.uk>

To: mira.makar@btinternet.com

Cc: "Elford, Catherine - RPC" <Catherine.Elford@rpc.co.uk>;

"Healey, Rachael - RPC" <Rachael.Healey@rpc.co.uk>

Sent: Thursday, 15 October, 2009 19:27:55

Subject: Re: 09 10 15: BOODLE HATFIELD CONFLICT

Dear Mira

You are correct. It is not for us to decide whether Boodle Hatfield can act for Damor.

Unless they tell us otherwise, we will need to route any communications with Damor through them.

Yours sincerely,

Jane Howard, Partner

Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP

Direct: +44 (0)xxxxxxxxxx

Mobile: +44 (0)XXXXXXXX

Sent From My Blackberry

From: M MAKAR

To: Howard, Jane - RPC

Cc: Elford, Catherine - RPC; mira makar

Sent: Thu Oct 15 16:36:02 2009

Subject: Re: 09 10 15: BOODLE HATFIELD CONFLICT

Dear Jane

You are better versed in the administration of protocol than I. BH is precluded professionally from acting for Damor on any matter involving me.

Is the correct way, that they of their own volition, withdraw? I can speak to RBC but I need a "solution" rather than a problem! I can see that, if you are on notice of this issue, it would make it professionally impossible for you to hand anything over to Boodle Hatfield.

Regards

Mira

Mira Makar

07768 610071

From: "Howard, Jane - RPC" <Jane.Howard@rpc.co.uk>

To: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Cc: "Elford, Catherine - RPC" <Catherine.Elford@rpc.co.uk>; "Healey, Rachael - RPC" <Rachael.Healey@rpc.co.uk>

Sent: Thursday, 15 October, 2009 16:14:22

Subject: RE: 09 10 15: BOODLE HATFIELD CONFLICT

Dear Mira

As Catherine has confirmed, the Order has not been sent to Boodle Hatfield. However, unless and until they tell us that they are no longer acting for Damor, we may well have to communicate with them regarding Damor's security over the Triad shares. As you may know, while they are acting for Damor, we are not free to communicate with Damor direct.

Yours sincerely

Jane Howard, Partner

Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP

Direct: +44 (0)XXXXXXXXXX

Mobile: +44 (0)XXXXXXXXXX

From: M MAKAR [mailto:mira.makar@btinternet.com]

Sent: 15 October 2009 Thursday 14:59

To: Howard, Jane - RPC

Cc: Elford, Catherine - RPC; mira makar;

tmanning@boodlehatfield.com;

enquiries@legalcomplaints.org.uk

Subject: 09 10 15: BOODLE HATFIELD CONFLICT

Dear Jane

Further to my earlier email in regard the position of conflict of Boodle Hatfield, I have now formalised and lodged a Complaint to the Law Society.

No documents or communications should now take place between your firm and Boodle Hatfield in connection with any matters involving me.

Regards

Mira

Mira Makar

07768 610071

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From: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Subject: RUNNING ORDER FOR HEARING

Date: 18 March 2011 at 04:00:40 GMT

To: mira.makar@btinternet.com,

Christopher.Semken@NewSquareChambers.co.uk

Cc: nigel.tristem@bakertilly.co.uk,

sally.baker@bakertilly.co.uk,

mira.makar@btinternet.com

Dear Mr Semken

Please see attached agenda and running order for hearing later this morning.

Parts are incomplete but all I could manage

Mira

Mira Makar MA FCA

00 44 (0)7768 610071

ATTACHMENT: 27 pages

Anyone wanting this can channel their request via Triad Group Plc Internal Support who can get it from custodian or informally otherwise, until such time as they take over responsibility for site maintenance, back ups, needed to access version logs etc. and otherwise support maintenance of TRD statutory records etc. including covering protracted non communications.

25 February 2011:

THE BLOCK ON COMMS THAT GAVE RISE TO EVENTS OF NEXT DECADE

TRIAD GROUP PLC

CONTAMINATION OF REGISTER

AT BEHEST OF UNIDENTIFIED PREDATORS

AFFECTS ALL MEMBERS NOT JUST THOSE WHOSE NAME/ADDRESS

ARE THE SUBJECT OF INTERFERENCE:

BLOCKING ONE MEMBER TRADING BLOCKS THE MARKET

From: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

To: Steven Sanderson <steven.m.sanderson@ntlworld.com>

Cc: Alistair Fulton <amfulton@compuserve.com>;

Nick Burrows <Nick.Burrows@triad.co.uk>

Sent: Friday, 25 February 2011, 10:41

Subject: Fw: REGISTRATION OF 2006 ABACUS CHARGE

Dear Steve

Further to our discussions over the last two days you have informed me that Burrows has known about this matter for some number of months and that it seems made no enquiry of either me or anyone at A&O who could have directed him to me.

I have logged that I would have expected that when the Board has notice of a predator seeking to charge a controlling stake, it is on notice of an intention to "dump" and that due enquiry needs to be made.

That enquiry was not made including of the two principal shareholders who each invested some £430k in 2002 for the sole purpose of stabilizing the shareholder base by buying out Dill Faulkes. If shareholders are prepared to support the Company in this way, it is the least the Board they hire can do to seek to maintain stability, and at least conduct due enquiry.

The potential overhang has given a powerful signal to the market and the value of the Co has halved, despite your comms with the market that the underlying business is stable. This is quite unwarranted.

I have done as you requested and secured the details from Abacus on the basis that the Board would deal with the admin and the Co Sec make the entry in the register.

However having lined this up Burrows is now "not available" and "working from home to-day". He has failed to return a call, despite I am sure having been told by you that he has his mess to clear up.

I have no choice now but to put a formal notice on the record to you and Fulton that your designated co sec is asleep on the job and that I require a response from someone who is awake as soon as possible and in any event by lunch time. Burrows has a blackberry but no doubt is out of signal.

Mira

Mira Makar

00 44 (0)7768 610071

--- On Fri, 25/2/11, M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com> wrote:

From: M MAKAR <mira.makar@btinternet.com>

Subject: REGISTRATION OF 2006 ABACUS CHARGE

To: "Steve Sanderson" <steves@psenterprise.com>

Date: Friday, 25 February, 2011, 9:55

I have the details of whose name the charge is in etc re 2006 (abacus).

A&O had conduct of the registration for Abacus.

You told me that I simple need to email the facts and that the minute can be passed and the registration entered.

I shall address to co sec at reg off address and e mail to him under cover of letter to you to your private email.

Will copy abacus

There is much embarrassment all round over this, so it would be as well to get the basis job done efficiently without making things worse.

How fast can you do a Board resolution? In my days telephone meetings were used for this sort of thing.

My views of things have been fed back to you already.

pl call or email re timescales, I have told Abacus so the sooner the better or the blame bit will take over.

Incidentally Baker Tilly know about the charge. This is a try on because it was not in the register as Nick seems to have told them. Plonker, as ever.

Mira

Mira Makar

00 44 (0)7768 610071

--- On Tue, 29/7/08, Steve Sanderson <steves@psenterprise.com> wrote:

From: Steve Sanderson <steves@psenterprise.com>

Subject: My detals

To: mira.makar@btinternet.com

Date: Tuesday, 29 July, 2008, 13:04

Hi Mira

My mobile is XXXXXXXX

Home tel is XXXXXXXXXXXX

Below is where I work now (have been here since Oct last year)

Speak later

Best wishes

Steven Sanderson

Finance Director

d: +44 XXXXXXXXX

Process Systems Enterprise Limited - "The model company"

Bridge Studios, 107a Hammersmith Bridge Road, London W6 9DA, United Kingdom

t: +44 20 8563 0888 f: +44 20 8563 0999 or visit us at www.psenterprise.com

PSE is expanding and moving to new premises at the end of August 2008. The telephone

and fax numbers will remain the same but please update your contact details as follows:

Process Systems Enterprise Limited 6th Floor East 26-28 Hammersmith Grove London W6 7HA

Process Systems Enterprise Limited is a limited company registered in England and Wales.

Registered office: 20 Blackfriars Lane, London EC4V 6HD Registration no: 03307708 VAT no: GB 690775984

PLACEHOLDER:

AMF Receipt From Computer Shop for Restoring Back Ups

Preparation for Delayed Meeting with MM 22.9.16

After TRD AGM 10 August 2016

Cards held by TRD (shadow) officers / concert parties in Outsourced Safe-Custody

for its (Disenfranchised) Members until destroyed prior to scanning

(Mis-use of Private Information)

2016 -2020 proxy poll voting results as voted not yet published on TRD RNS

Dividends per 2016 register not paid 2016- 2021

PLACEHOLDER

PLACEHOLDER:

AMF Handwritten Notes of Meeting with MM (scan)

22 September 2016

After TRD AGM 10 August 2016

Cards held by TRD (shadow) officers / concert parties in Outsourced Safe-Custody

for its (Disenfranchised) Members until destroyed prior to scanning

(Mis-use of Private Information)

2016 -2020 proxy poll voting results as voted not yet published on TRD RNS

Dividends per 2016 register not paid 2016- 2021

PLACEHOLDER

Attention Now Finally Focussed On Scam Websites:

applies to Regulated News Service LSE re TRD

Omission to publish proxy poll voting results 11.8.16;

28 April 2017 to date incl links to BAILII;

3.1.19 RNS creating false panic that uncertainty over major holdings;

March 2019 false RNS cross referenced to BAILII, itself referencing Reuben Comiskey attending 12.2.19 and wrongly stating MM holdings;

Omission to obtain mandatory injunction to force ADVFN to take down

thread from April 2017 with its unbroken offensive anonymised

posts about TRD members, unbroken for four years and advertising phantoms, used to embezzle from the public as well as members

The Governor of the Bank of England is demanding that internet giants be forced to take down scam websites which have cost their victims millions of pounds. My @ST_Money storyhttps://t.co/Ghg1SjDiPq

— David Byers (@davidbyers26) March 21, 2021

Bank of England governor Andrew Bailey in bid to force Google to stop bank scams

David Byers

Sunday March 21 2021, 12.01am, The Sunday Times

The governor of the Bank of England, Andrew Bailey, is demanding that internet giants be forced to take down fraudulent websites.

There has been a surge in online fraud during the pandemic. Action Fraud, the national reporting agency, said that £78 million was lost on fake investment websites, with victims losing £45,242 on average in 2020.

Some websites advertise get-rich-quick schemes or cryptocurrency scams, while others appear to be reputable investment firms. When these are reported and taken down, others soon appear. Internet giants such as Google get income from fraudsters that pay for prominent slots on search results.

Bailey has been lobbying the home secretary, Priti Patel, to introduce measures into the government’s Online Safety Bill to make internet companies liable for financial fraud,...........