In both Reformed systematic-theological treatments of the doctrine of justification, and in Protestant exegetical studies, the distinction of ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ justification has been used to explain the difference between a justification based on something inherent in the person and merited by the person (analytic) and justification of the ungodly on a basis wholly outside that person (synthetic). A discussion of this (controverted) distinction in the domain of modern philosophy and epistemology is beyond the scope of this paper (and my competence). However, some understanding of the distinction between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ justification is required because it has become a conceptual tool used by exegetical and systematic theologians. An example of the use of this distinction is found in Richard Gaffin’s doctoral thesis.
This does not at all mean that Paul qualifies the synthetic character of the justification of the ungodly. The justifying aspect of being raised with Christ does not rest on the believer’s subjective enlivening and transformation (also involved, to be sure, in the experience of being joined to Christ), but on the resurrection-approved righteousness of Christ which is his (and is thus reckoned his) by virtue of the vital union established. If anything, this outlook which makes justification exponential of existential union with the resurrected Christ serves to keep clear what preoccupation with the idea of imputation can easily obscure, namely, that the justification of the ungodly is not arbitrary but according to truth: it is synthetic with respect to the believer only because it is analytic with respect to Christ (as resurrected).[1] (my emphasis)
The philosophical distinction between ‘analytic’ and ‘synthetic’ sentences was first introduced by Immanual Kant (1724-1804) in his Critique of Pure Reason as an epistemological categorization tool. I suspect that this is the background for the use of the distinction in the doctrine of justification. Kant posited the following:
In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought (if I only consider affirmative judgments, since the application to negative ones is easy) this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies entirely outside the concept A, though to be sure it stands in connection with it. In the first case, I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic. [2]
An ‘analytic’ sentence is a proposition in the form of subject and predicate with an equative verb, and that the predicate concept is contained within the subject concept. An example of an ‘analytic’ sentence is ‘all oncolologists are doctors’. If you understand what an ‘oncologist’ is, and you can immediately affirm or deny the truth of the proposition stated by the predicate. As a matter of definition, an oncologist is a cancer doctor. It is true to say, therefore, as a matter of definition, that all oncologists are doctors, for oncologists are a subset of doctors. Another is ‘all bachelors are unmarried’. The definition of a bachelor is an unmarried man. To use Kant’s metaphor, the idea stated in the predicate is ‘contained in’ the subject of the sentence.
By contrast, a ‘synthetic’ sentence for Kant is one whose predicate contains information that cannot be derived from the subject concept, and requires more than an understanding of the definition of the words constituting the subject of the sentence. A synthetic sentence requires a knowledge of the outside world to be able to verify its truth. An example of a ‘synthetic’ sentence is ‘all oncologists are rich’. This proposition depends for its truth not on understanding the meaning of the word ‘oncologist’, the subject of the sentence, but from understanding the world in which oncologists operate, to validate the truth of the proposition expressed by the sentence. Another example is ‘All bachelors are rich’. Only a knowledge of our society, and not the idea of an oncologist, or bachelors, can validate the proposition in a synthetic sentence.
There is another way that English readers might understand the distinction as it is used in theological works on justification. The English cognate noun ‘analysis’ means an examination of something, perhaps involving a separation of that thing into its component parts, or at least an identification of those things that make up the whole and an exposition of the relationships between the constituent elements of that whole. It thus is obvious how the adjective ‘analytic’ may then be used to refer to a question of definition, that is, whether the predicate is contained within or can be inferred from the subject concept. I ‘analyse’ the concept of the subject, and as a result of that ‘analysis’ I come to an ‘analatic’ proposition, which is stated by an analytic sentence. A correct analysis of the subject concept will yield the ability to determine the truth or otherwise of the proposition that has been made by the predicate. I do not know whether this is simply co-incidental or was the basis for the Kantian use of the term ‘analytic’.
A ‘synthesis’ generally is a combination of disparate parts to produce a coherent and new whole. In what has become known as the ‘Hegelian dialectic’, a ‘synthesis’ is the new combination which constitutes the higher stage of truth that co-alesceses as a result of and after the event of conflict between a propounded ‘thesis’, and the reaction of the provoked ‘antithesis’. In industry and chemistry, a ‘synthesis’ is the combination of precursors to produce a new or more complex compound by human ingenuity and skill. ‘Synthetic’ has also come to mean ‘man made’, ‘created by humans’, ‘artificial’, as opposed to ‘real’, or even ‘fake’, something contrived for negative reasons, that is, a subterfuge or deception.[3]
None of these denotations seem to be meant by the use of ‘synthetic’ in the ‘analytic-synthetic’ distinction. ‘Synthetic’ in the Kantian context as applied to the doctrine of justification does not seem to mean ‘man-made’ or ‘produced by humans’. Nor does it denote ‘created’ or ‘gathered together’ from pre-existing components. If ‘synthetic’ in the Kantian use does indeed connote ‘new’, it does so only because the quality of ‘newness’ in the predicate concept is the result of it not being contained within the subject concept. However, the common connotation of ‘synthetic’ as something ‘new’ may not mislead in the meaning of the ‘analytic-synthetic’ distinction because in the case of a ‘synthetic’ sentence, ‘new’ empirical information or data must be gathered to ascertain whether the proposition now formed by the predicate actually represents reality. And while it is true that a ‘synthetic’ sentence can only be assessed by ‘gathering together’ or ‘synthesising’ evidence from material extraneous to the subject of the sentence, the idea of ‘synthesis’ in the ‘Hegelian dialect’ or science does not seem to illuminate the meaning of ‘synthetic’ in the distinction.
Applying the Kantian distinction to the doctrine of justification, an ‘analytic’ justification would occur where a righteous person is justified by a court on account of that person’s own righteousness. The righteousness of the righteous person is ‘contained in’ that righteous person, and thus the declaration reflects what the person actually is. The righteousness is a quality or attribute of that person. Such a category as ‘analytic’ justification might be used to explain the case in Deuteronomy 25:1 LXX, where ‘they [the judges] justify the righteous’ (καὶ δικαιώσωσιν τὸν δίκαιον). We could state this proposition as an analytic sentence consisting of subject and predicate:
the subject (A) is the predicate (B)
the righteous person is the one declared righteous
The justification spoken of here in Deuteronomy 25:1 is by a human court. The judgment is based on that person’s righteousness, as an inhering quality of that person. The predicate concept is thus contained within and inferred from the concept of the subject. This forensic justification is simply the judicial recognition of the quality that has previously resided in and continues to subsist in the human person about whom the judgment is made. Using Kant’s epistemological system, it is an ‘analytic’ justification. The unstated premise in the proposition is that the human judges in Deuteronomy 25:1 are called to render their judgments in accordance with the truth of what is contained within that person, as shown by their actions. A tree is known by its fruit. The human heart is known by its acts. And the just judge judges according to deeds. The moral disposition, as shown by words or acts, is therefore the basis of the judicial declaration, and the person’s works are the medium for and the evidence for making the declaration. When human judges judge justly, the one being justified is indeed a righteous person and deserves the vindicating verdict of the court.
A similar instance of analytic justification would be the justification spoken of in James 2:14-26. Consider the two Old Testament precedents James cites:
Was not Abraham our father justified by works when he offered Isaac his son upon the altar? || Ἀβραὰμ ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη ἀνενέγκας Ἰσαὰκ τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον; (James 2:21)
And likewise was not also Rahab the prostitute justified by works when she welcomed the messengers and sent [them] a different way? ||ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ῥαὰβ ἡ πόρνη οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη ὑποδεξαμένη τοὺς ἀγγέλους καὶ ἑτέρᾳ ὁδῷ ἐκβαλοῦσα; (James 2:25)
Stated as analytic sentences, the propositions would be as follows:
the subject (A) is the predicate (B)
Abraham who is the one justified
offered his son on the altar by works
the subject (A) is the predicate (B)
Rahab who is the one justified
welcomed the messengers & by works
sent them a different way
James brings forward the evidence of both Abraham and Rahab’s works. In the context of the original narratives and their appropriation within the canon of scripture, the acts of both Abraham and Rahab are righteous. They both perform behaviours and actions that demonstrate their internal disposition of righteousness as a quality of character. In the case of Abraham, he offers his son as a sacrifice in obedience to God’s command and in spite of his love for Isaac, because Abraham trusts God’s promise that in spite of everything Isaac will still have offspring, and Abraham trusts in God’s power that God can raise the dead if it is necessary to keep his promise (Genesis 22:1-19; Hebrews 11:17-19). Abraham’s actions demonstrate his faith in God’s promise and person. His works are thus evidential of his disposition. In the case of Rahab, she has come to see that the God of Israel, Yahweh, is the only true and sovereign God (Joshua 2:11), and so her acts show her appropriate fear of the one true God she has come to believe in, and her alignment with God’s covenant people and the assistance she provides them reflects her faith. Her acts, despite her career as a prostitute, show that she has faith that works and issues in acts. Since in the context of Scripture the mentioned acts of both Abraham and Rahab are ‘righteous acts’, they are a subset of or an example of the ‘justification by works’ mentioned in the predicate, and once the subject concept is properly understood, the predicate concept can be inferred and drawn from the subject concept. Again, the unstated premise is that God, in the sight of whom this justification is made, is just in rendering to each according to what they have done.
A further example would be the way of justification that Paul posits in Romans 2:12-13, but then later says in Romans 3:10-20 is not available to sinful humans because no one has met its conditions:
12For as many as lawlessly sin, also will lawlessly perish, and as many as in the law sin, through the law will be judged. 13For the hearers of the law are not righteous with God, but the doers of the law will be justified. (Romans 2:12-13)
12Ὅσοι γὰρ ἀνόμως ἥμαρτον, ἀνόμως καὶ ἀπολοῦνται, καὶ ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον, διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται· 13οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ νόμου δίκαιοι παρὰ [τῷ] θεῷ, ἀλλ’ οἱ ποιηταὶ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται.
10For we have previously indicted both Jesus and Greek to be all under sin, just as it is written, that there is not a righteous person, not even one, 11there is not a person who understands, there is not a person who is seeking out for God, 12all are twisted, they are all together worthless, there is no one who is doing goodness, not even one.[…] 19 Now we know that as much as the law says, it speaks to those in the law, so that every mouth might be stopped up and all the world might come under the judgment of God. 20Therefore, by works of the law will no flesh be justified before him, for through the law comes the perception of sin. (Romans 3:10-12; 19-20)
προῃτιασάμεθα γὰρ Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ Ἕλληνας πάντας ὑφ’ ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι, 10καθὼς γέγραπται ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιος οὐδὲ εἷς, 11 οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ συνίων, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ἐκζητῶν τὸν θεόν. 12πάντες ἐξέκλιναν ἅμα ἠχρεώθησαν· οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ποιῶν χρηστότητα, [οὐκ ἔστιν] ἕως ἑνός. […] 19οἴδαμεν δὲ ὅτι ὅσα ὁ νόμος λέγει τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ λαλεῖ, ἵνα πᾶν στόμα φραγῇ καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ θεῷ· 20διότι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ, διὰ γὰρ νόμου ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας.
The two propositions below, drawn together from the two Pauline passages above, concerning justification in the sphere of law, are also species of analytic justification.
the subject (A) is the predicate (B)
the one who hears the law is not going to be
but sins and does not keep it justified
(Romans 2:12-13)
the subject (A) is the predicate (B)
The one under sin is not going to be
and who is not righteous justified
(Romans 3:10-20)
Again, the predicate can be drawn out or inferred from the subject in both instances, and each is an instance of analytic justification. The presupposition is that God as a just and fair judge gives fitting verdicts based on the quality of the person judged. The fitting verdict for each person, contained within the subject, is that those who sin, who do not do God’s good law, and who are not righteous will not be declared righteous or justified through the law, because they have not done the law and are not righteous in the required law-based way.
However, there is another way of justification that Paul introduces, that protestant theologians do not categorise as analytic but as synthetic. This justification is the divine justification of the ungodly (τὸν δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ: Romans 4:5). Stated as a synthetic sentence, the proposition would be:
the subject (A) is the predicate (B)
the ungodly person is justified
There is nothing inherent to or contained in the subject that can be drawn out to show the truth of the predicate. There is nothing inherent in the concept of ‘the ungodly’ that would give us to expect that the just God would declare the ungodly to actually be righteous. The truth of what is predicated depends on data found outside the subject of the sentence, and in no way depends on a proper understanding of the meaning of the words in the subject. That is, the subject is an ungodly person. There is no necessary link between the concept of ‘ungodliness’, and the divine just judge declaring that person righteous. Indeed, the proposition that needs to be proved from other sources seems inimicable or contradictory to the concept in the subject. Indeed, the Old Testament Scripture actually says that such a synthetic justification, based on matters extraneous to the righteousness of a person (such as a bribe), ought not to occur in the courts of Israel, as it would mean that the ungodly would be justified. The divine commandment to Israel is that justification as it occurs in her courts must be exclusively analytic.
From every unrighteous cause you should turn away: unpunished, and you shall not kill the righteous and you shall not justify the ungodly for a gift
ἀπὸ παντὸς ῥήματος ἀδίκου ἀποστήσῃ· ἀθῷον καὶ δίκαιον οὐκ ἀποκτενεῖς καὶ οὐ δικαιώσεις τὸν ἀσεβῆ ἕνεκεν δώρων. (Exodus 23:7 LXX);
Whoever judges the righteous [as] unrighteous, or the unrighteous [as] righteous, [is] a foul thing and abominable with God.
ὃς δίκαιον κρίνει τὸν ἄδικον, ἄδικον δὲ τὸν δίκαιον, ἀκάθαρτος καὶ βδελυκτὸς παρὰ θεῷ. (Proverbs 17:15 LXX)
While justification according to the Law of Moses, or the principle of the law of works, which is an analytic justification, is not open to us before the divine tribunal because of our sin (Ecclesiastes 7:20, Psalm 143:2; Romans 3:10-20, 23) and the standard at which God indicates he will judge humans (Leviticus 18:5; Romans 10:5; Galatians 3:10-14; 5:3, 6:13; James 2:10-11), Paul makes known that there is another way of justification available to sinners who are going to come before God to be judged. This justification can be categorized as synthetic because it requires a knowledge beyond what an analysis of the subject, sinful humans, can reveal.
The object of this Pauline justification is categorized as the ungodly sinner who deserves no justification according to God’s posited law and on the basis of whose actions no declaration of righteousness could be inferred or made by a just judge. Analytic justification will not help such a one. But the new way of righteousness (which in another sense, is not that new: Romans 3:21) is proclaimed and made available for sinners as a consequence of the new age brought in by the coming of Christ Jesus, and his life, death, resurrection and heavenly session. A ‘synthetic’ justification is required. The ‘extraordinary righteousness’, which goes beyond what the law of God or the law of works could provide us sinners, is synthetic in that it requires knowledge beyond what can be gained by analyzing us so as to establish its truthfulness or existence. We need to know about the Triune nature of God, the love of God towards sinful humanity (and not merely God’s distributive retributive justice), Jesus Christ’s incarnation and his union of nature with humanity, his life of obedience to God’s law, his sin-bearing death for humans, his victorious resurrection defeating death, his current session at the right hand of God interceding for his people, the Holy Spirit’s enabling of human faith in Christ, the divine intention and logic behind the believer’s union with Christ in the mind of God and God’s establishing a representational and organic unity of the human race and the elect. This ‘synthetic’ justification is not based on our ungodliness or contained in it. It is not based on what we are at all. But this gifted righteousness is still based on appropriate grounds, though they are external to us, that is, the representative obedience of the one, Christ (Romans 5:19), his sinbearing death (Romans 3:24,-26; 4:25; 5:6-9) and his resurrection (4:25; 5:9-10; 18). This synthetic justification is also given through appropriate means, which is the believer’s fiduciary faith in the promise and person of God and his Christ (Romans 3:28; 4:1-25; 5:1; 10:6-11).
[1] R B Gaffin, Resurrection and Redemption: A Study in Paul’s Soteriology (2nd Ed: Phillipsburg: P & R, 1987), 132.
[2] Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), ET by P Guyer and A W Wood, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 6–7, as quoted in ‘The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/ accessed on 26 November 2016.
[3] Compare ‘artifice’ in modern English. The origin of the notion of ‘artifice’ itself lies in craftsmanship, from the Latin ‘artificium’, a combination of ars (art, craft) and facere (to make, do). Just as ‘craft’ in English can mean negatively ‘cunning’ (‘crafty’ person) so it can mean more neuterally human ingenuity and productivity, the ability to make good and useful things.