This article is the fourth of a series that seeks to provide evidence of the antiquity of a now uncommon understanding of Ephesians 2:8-9. The argument set forth here, builds on that in the first three papers. This paper looks at John of Damascus (c675-749) to note some of his observations of the text. John takes a different path than that taken by Chrysostom, Theodoret and Jerome to our text, even though he agrees with much of their theology. However, we will see that he impliedly takes the antecedent of the neuter demonstrative as ‘grace’, even though they do not agree in gender with the demonstrative. Here again is the key text, Ephesians 2:8-10:

8For [it is] by grace[1] you[2] have been saved[3] through faith[4], and this [thing][5], [is] not from you[6], [it is] the gift[7] of God, 9not from works, so that no-one may boast. 10For we are his handiwork, being created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand, so that in them we might walk. (my translation)

8Τῇ γὰρ χάριτί[8] ἐστε σεσῳσμένοι[9] διὰ πίστεως[10]· καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐξ ὑμῶν, θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον· 9οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων, ἵνα μή τις καυχήσηται[11]. 10αὐτοῦ γάρ ἐσμεν ποίημα[12], κτισθέντες[13] ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἐπὶ[14] ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς οἷς προητοίμασεν[15] ὁ θεός, ἵνα ἐν αὐτοῖς περιπατήσωμεν. (NA28)[16]

John of Damascus

John of Damascus, also known as Yanah ibn Mansur ibn Sargun, (676-754/787) was a polymath and a great systematizer and collator. John is widely acknowledged to have used the work of others who went before him. It is thought that he was the first scholastic. He is famous for his defence of icons, upholding the sinlessness, perpetual virginity and bodily assumption of Mary, the mother of Christ, for his critique of Islam, and for his work expounding the Orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, in the light of the theology that preceded him. His magnum opus was his An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith[17]. Also attributed to him are commentaries on all of the Pauline Epistles. It has been suggested that his commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians was at least in part dependent on Cyril of Alexandria (d AD 444).[18] On the other hand, Chase asserts in his introduction to Saint John Of Damascus: Writings,[19] that:

The only extant exegetical work of John is an extensive commentary on the Pauline epistles, entitled Chosen Selections from the Universal Commentary of John Chrysostom (PG 95:439-1034). As its title indicates, the material for this is drawn principally from the homilies of St. John Chrysostom and, consequently, has little to offer which is the author's own.

However that may be, as the following will demonstrate, the Damascenes’ comments, at least in Ephesians 2:8-10, show little or no direct dependence on John Chrysostom’s work. For a start, John of Damascus is so much briefer. More importantly, he takes a very different path to Chrysostom on Ephesians 2:8-10. Of Ephesians 2 verses 1 to 10, John of Damascus comments:

In his very brief comments in Migne’s edition, John of Damascus seems to take the referent of ‘the gift of God’ as not ‘faith’ but ‘grace’: θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον ·

Χάρις, τὸ παρὰ θεοῦ, πίστις, τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν || ‘“The gift of God”: Grace is the thing which lies with God; faith is the thing which lies with us’. It is noticeable that John uses the neuter article (τὸ) to refer to both grace (Χάρις) and faith (πίστις), even though both are feminine nouns. Moreover, the fact that grace is feminine in gender does not preclude John from taking grace as the implied antecedent of τοῦτο. John’s reasoning is probably based on the nature of the case, that the nature of the things in question, ‘faith’ and ‘grace’ being expounded and the broader principles involved, require the conclusion to which he comes. That is, faith is obviously, phenomenologically, and apparently ‘from us’ (humans exercise faith), and so Paul, to John’s way of thinking, could not possibly mean that faith is ‘not from us’. And ‘grace’ is obviously not from us. The very nature of grace suggests that it comes from outside of us – otherwise it would not be grace. So the Damascene reasons that ‘grace’ must be from God (Χάρις, τὸ παρὰ θεοῦ), and therefore not from us; but not faith, which is from us, but not from God (πίστις, τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν).

In contrast with John of Damascus, John Chrysostom too agrees that faith is in a sense from us. but that fact does not preclude Chrystostom from also seeing that ‘faith is the gift of God’.

Then, that on the other hand, our free-will (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον) be not impaired, he adds also our part in the work (ἔθηκε καὶ τὰ ἡμῶν), and yet again cancels it, and adds, ‘And that not of ourselves.’ (καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸ ἀνεῖλε, καί φησι · Καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐξ ἡμῶν.) Neither is faith, he means, ‘of ourselves.’ (Οὐδὲ ἡ πίστις, φησὶν, εξ ἡμῶν.)[57] (my emphasis)

So both John of Damascus and John Chrysostom recognize that ‘faith’ is, in one sense, from us. But the Damascene then reasons (from the nature of things) that Paul cannot be saying that faith is the gift of God, and so concludes that grace must be from God, not faith. On the other hand, Chrysostom observes that Paul ‘cancels’ our part in the work, ‘faith’, such that faith, while from one perspective, is truly from ourselves, from another perspective, faith is not from us at all. Moreover, both take (in the Damascene’s case, by implication) the antecedent of the neuter demonstrative as a feminine gender noun: the Damascene impliedly refers the neuter demonstrative to the more remote ‘grace’, but Chrysostom explicitly takes the referent is to the nearer ‘faith’.

Another piece of evidence relevant to the issue of the antecedent of τοῦτο in Ephesians 2:8-9 is the way he uses the demonstrative himself in his exposition of Ephesians 2:1-5.

God, who deemed [us] worthy of mercy and freely-willed grace, exchanged our morbidity in sin (τὴν ἐν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ νεκρότητα ὑμῶν), for life, to him in fellowship with Christ. For it is the same with Christ; He receives this (τοῦτο) [morbidity] for the benefit of us who are joined together with Him.

As best as I can read this passage, the antecedent of neuter demonstrative τοῦτο is the feminine noun τὴν […] νεκρότητα. That is, Christ receives our morbidity or propensity to endure death, so that we can receive life. If this is correct, then John of Damascus is doing exactly what Chrysostom, Theodoret, Jerome and I say Paul is doing in Ephesians 2:8-9: that is, the Damascene is using a neuter demonstrative to refer to a feminine antecedent.

John of Damascus’ strong doctrine of human free will is apparent in his exposition. On Ephesians 2:1-5 he comments, ‘God […] deemed [us] worthy of mercy and freely-willed grace’ || ἐλέου ἀξιώσας ὁ θεὸς καὶ χάριτος ἐκουσίου. For those of us schooled in Reformation soteriological thinking, it seems strange to think of ‘worthiness’ for mercy and grace. Indeed, for Augustine, it is axiomatic that ‘the grace of God is not given according to our merits’.[58] But this is no doubt because of the place John gives to free will in his system. Moreover, in expounding ‘θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον’ (Ephesians 2:9), John makes it clear that worthy reception is required for God’s grace to operate. ‘For this reason, then, for those whose fitness to receive is not present, then neither does the grace come alongside to assist. || Ὄθεν[59] οὔν οἷς μή πάρεστι τὸ δεκτικὸν, οὐδὲ ἡ χάρις παραγίνεται.’ That is, the thing that is ‘from us’, and only from us, ‘faith’, must be present to make us worthy recipients of grace. If faith is not present, divine grace will not be present either. For ‘faith’ is man’s part, but ‘grace’ is God’s part. And there is no sense for the Damascene in which faith can be both fully the work of God and still be a true exercise of the human will. Compatabilism does not seem to be an option for John.

So if faith is present, then grace operates. That is the context of the next sentence, ‘It is not in the one who receives, but in the one who gives, to work the good’. God will work the good for his part. The working of the good is God’s, and by God’s grace. But that divine working only occurs when faith, which is from us, is present. And while the completion of the new creation requires God, we will perfect the likeness of God by imitating His works. John is thus a synergist.

The paragraph [06272] is not found in Migne’s edition but provided in Litteral’s electronic edition. If it is part of the text, it adds two things. (1) it is an evidence prior to Theophylact that some in the early church took a conceptual antecedent to the neuter demonstrative: οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἡ σωτηρία. (2) it again evidences the synergism that a ‘fellowship’ or ‘partnership’ or ‘cooperation’ (ἡ κοινωνία) is required for salvation, presumably referring to a partnership or fellowship between divine grace and human faith.

John of Damascus’ Wider Soteriology

On Ephesians 1:4-5a, John Damascene briefly writes as follows:

All of this could be understood in a thoroughly Augustinian or Reformed way. However, fortunately, to determine John’s wider Soteriology, we have his An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith.[62] From Book 2 Chapter 25 through to Book 4, John of Damascus outlines his exposition of free will, predestination, soteriology and doctrine of the sacraments. In the following exposition, along the way I will contrast John of Damascus with Augustine’s most mature anti-Pelagian work, On the Predestination of the Saints, Books 1 and 2,[63] written in AD 427/8, less than 3 years before Augustine’s death in AD 430.

John notes that a number of people deny free will (Bk 2 Ch 25 p255). Nevertheless, John reasons, it is definitely wrong to attribute immoral or unjust actions to God, and since no action can be attributed to necessity, fate, or chance, then a human himself as acting is the principle of his own works, and is therefore free (Bk 2 Ch 25 p256). The Damascene also infers the freedom of the human will from the fact that man can be blamed or praised (Bk 2 Ch 27 p258-9). This is typical of John’s either/or approach that cannot admit or allow a divine concursus in, with and over the human will. The choice of things always rests with humans, but the doing of them is sometimes prevented by divine providence (Bk 2 Ch 26 p257). This can be contrasted with Augustine, who, by the time of his Retractions, had seen that faith itself is a gift from God.

[H]ad I already known that faith itself also is found among those gifts of God which are given by the same Spirit. Both, therefore, are ours on account of the choice of the will, and yet both are given by the spirit of faith and love. (On the Predestination of the Saints, Bk 1 Ch 7)

John of Damascus does not believe that human death can be attributed to God, because death came in through Adam (quoting the Apocryphal book of Wisdom 1:13, ‘God did not make death’; Bk 2 Ch 28 p259). This seems at odds with 1 Samuel 2:6, ‘the LORD kills and brings to life’; Job 1:21, ‘The LORD gave and the LORD has taken away’, Isaiah 45:7, ‘I make peace and create disaster, I am the LORD, who does all these things’ ; Romans 6:23, ‘the wages of sin is death’; Romans 8:20, ‘that the creation was subjected to frustration by the will of the one who subjected it (ie God); Hebrews 9:27, ‘man is destined to die once’ and Romans 11:32 ‘God has bound all people over to disobedience’, and God’s sovereignty and omnipotence. There does not seem to be a sense where John can allow that God has righteously decreed death for our sin (Romans 1:32), but for just and good reasons.

In his discussion on providence (Bk 2 Ch 29 p260), John locates divine providence wholly in the goodness and common benevolence and provision of God. God knows all human thoughts, actions and future events (Bk 2 Ch 29 p261). But John specifically excludes human free will from his doctrine of providence:

However, when I say ‘all,’ I am referring to those things which do not depend upon us, because those which do depend upon us do not belong to providence, but to our own free will (Bk 2 Ch 29 p261).

So the human will is so free that God is contingent. For John, there is a no-go area for the providence of God, and that is the free and autonomous human will. Obviously, I disagree with this, as must any Calvinist, or indeed the mature Augustine, who says:

It is, therefore, in the power of the wicked to sin; but that in sinning they should do this or that by that wickedness is not in their power, but in God's, who divides the darkness and regulates it; so that hence even what they do contrary to God's will is not fulfilled except it be God’s will. (Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, Bk 1 Ch 33). [64]

Augustine sees that in some sense, God permits and allows the absolute evil, and this in some sense is in accordance with God’s will which is secret to us, though not his will which is revealed to us to be against evil.

For John the Damascene, God approves the absolute good, but permits the iniquitous for some greater good, such as the salvation wrought on the cross (Bk 2 Ch 29 p261). Indeed, ‘[a] person may even be allowed at times to fall into an immoral action for the correction of another and worse affliction.’ (Bk 2 Ch 29 p262) But what is key here is that, for John, only that which can be seen and shown to be for the good is to be attributed to God. There are some things that are excluded from God’s secret will. Whereas, for Augustine, even human evil which is contrary to his revealed will is not contrary to his secret will.

John of Damascus was a synergist. While the crucial place is given to human free will, God is still seen as a co-worker in salvation. God ‘is the source and author of all good, without whose co-operation and assistance we are powerless either to will good or to do it’. (Bk 2 Ch 30 p264). John allows synergy and divine co-operation with the human will for the accomplishment of the good:

One should, moreover, note that, while the choice of things that may be done rests with us, the accomplishment of the good ones is due to the co-operation of God, who in accordance with His foreknowledge justly co-operates with those who in right conscience choose the good. The accomplishment of the bad things, however, is due to abandonment by God, who, again in accordance with His foreknowledge, justly abandons us. (Bk 2 Ch 29 p261)

For John, the choice is ours, presumably at the beginning, and the accomplishment requires divine co-operation. There is a similarity here between John of Damascus, Jerome and the Massilians against whom Augustine writes in 427/8.

Jerome also asserted that human free will depends upon the help of God and needs His aid moment by moment, and freedom of the will brings with it freedom of decision, but man does not act immediately on his free will, but requires God’s aid.[65] Against the Pelagians, Jerome argued that the bestowal of the grace of free will is not such as to do away with the support of God in particular actions (Book 1 section 4),[66] and that to will and to run is ours, but the carrying into effect our willing and running pertains to the mercy of God, and is so effected that on the one hand in willing and running free will is preserved; and on the other, in consummating our willing and running, everything is left to the power of God. (Book 1 section 5).[67]

Similarly, those against whom Augustine writes in AD 427/8 say that ‘we have faith itself of ourselves, but that its increase is of God; as if faith were not given to us by Him, but were only increased in us by Him, on the ground of the merit of its having begun from us.’ (On the Predestination of the Saints, Bk 1 Ch 3).

John of Damascus, Jerome and the Massilians all differ from Augustine, who at the end of his life says:

[G]race precedes faith; otherwise, if faith precedes grace, beyond a doubt will also precedes it, because there cannot be faith without will. But if grace precedes faith because it precedes will, certainly it precedes all obedience; it also precedes love, by which alone God is truly and pleasantly obeyed. And all these things grace works in him to whom it is given, and in whom it precedes all these things. (On Predestination of the Saints, Bk 2 Ch 41)

Again, for John of Damascus, God is strictly unable to change or alter the human will, and is strictly powerless to save if the human will is incorrigible. God is powerless if the human will is bad, and humans have such freedom as to resist God’s will.

On the other hand, there is absolute abandonment, when God has done everything for a man's salvation, yet the man of his own accord remains obdurate and uncured, or rather, incorrigible, and is then given over to absolute perdition, like Judas. (Bk 2 Ch 29 p262) (my emphasis)

I disagree with the view that God has done everything for a person’s salvation who ultimately perishes. I think that there is something more that God could have done for the salvation of the unsaved, such as Judas, and that is that God could have granted repentance and faith. God remains just in not granting repentance to some. God has His own good purposes in passing over the non-elect by not enabling them to believe. But God could, if He so wanted, have enabled what He commanded in the case of Judas or any of the reprobate. So Augustine, in contrast to all the synergists, says

For nothing comes to pass except what either He Himself does, or Himself allows to be done. Therefore He is powerful both to turn wills from evil to good, and to convert those that are inclined to fall, or to direct them into a way pleasing to Himself’ (Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, Bk 2 Ch 12).[68]

Again, Augustine says:

It is therefore settled that God's grace is not given according to the deserts of the recipients, but according to the good pleasure of His will, to the praise and glory of His own grace; so that he who glories may by no means glory in himself, but in the Lord, who gives to those men to whom He will, because He is merciful, what if, however, He does not give, He is righteous: and He does not give to whom He will not, that He may make known the riches of His glory to the vessels of mercy. (Romans 9:23) For by giving to some what they do not deserve, He has certainly willed that His grace should be gratuitous, and thus genuine grace; by not giving to all, He has shown what all deserve. Good in His goodness to some, righteous in the punishment of others; both good in respect of all, because it is good when that which is due is rendered, and righteous in respect of all, since that which is not due is given without wrong to any one. (Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, Bk 2 Ch 28)[69]

John does helpfully recognize two wills in God:

One should also bear in mind that God antecedently wills all to be saved and to attain to His kingdom. For He did not form us to be chastised, but, because He is good, that we might share in His goodness. Yet, because He is just. He does wish to punish sinners. So, the first is called antecedent will and approval, and it has Him as its cause; the second is called consequent will and permission, and it has ourselves as its cause. This last is twofold: that which is by dispensation and for our instruction and salvation, and that which is abandonment to absolute chastisement, as we have said. These, however, belong to those things which do not depend upon us. (Bk 2 Ch 29 p262-3)

There is some similarity here with the teaching of some Reformed theologians of God’s revealed will that all people be saved, and God’s will of decree that only the elect be effectively brought to salvation.

See my article, https://sites.google.com/site/mattolliffe/articles/does-god-have-two-wills-in-relation-to-human-salvation.

However, while I am happy to use the language of ‘divine permission’ to describe what John calls ‘consequent will’, and also to say that God stands behind the evil in a different way than he stands behind the good, I will also assert that God could have done other than what he has done in the case of reprobation, and I will not conceive of ‘human free will’ in any way that renders God powerless over the will of any human. John speaks of the relationship of God with the absolutely bad:

As to the things which do depend upon us, the good ones He wills antecedently and approves, whereas the evil, which are essentially bad, He neither wills antecedently nor consequently, but permits them to the free will.

John’s right and valid concerns are to avoid God being in any way the author of evil, and also to show that humans are responsible for evil, not God. In my opinion, while John rightly distinguishes two wills in God, John’s human free will defence of God’s justice is not satisfying. No matter how John conceives of it, God, because he is omnipotent and omniscient, still permits the absolutely evil. John himself says that ‘God permits them to the free will’, but that only moves the problem one step. God is no less exercising his will when he knows that someone will sin or might sin, but he allows it. For a God with absolute foreknowledge and omnipotence, this is a knowing permission, and thus God in some sense wills it, because he could do otherwise than permit it. He could conceivable prevent it. Yet John will not allow absolute evil to be said to be within God’s will in any way and excludes it from what he calls God’s ‘consequent will ’, even though they cannot but involve divine permission. Again, Augustine is to be preferred when he says, ‘For nothing comes to pass except what either He [God] Himself does, or Himself allows to be done. Therefore He is powerful both to turn wills from evil to good, and to convert those that are inclined to fall, or to direct them into a way pleasing to Himself’ (Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, Bk 2 Ch 12).[70]

As all knowing, God knows if someone will be abandoned to absolute chastisement. As all powerful, God could conceivably bring about a different outcome ie, that a reprobate person never existed, rather than experience an eternity in hell. He could also grant them the gift of persevering faith. That choice was open to an omnipotent and omniscient God. However, God has not made that choice in the case of the reprobate, or of Judas. That does not mean that God is either unjust or unloving. In punishing Judas’ wickedness, God is exercising justice and strict retribution, which is righteous. God demonstrates his love to Judas in the continual warnings to Judas and the fact that Judas was given life. There is respect shown to Judas in holding him accountable for his choices. And there is an element of mystery as to how all these things will work for good. But I would much rather preserve God’s absolute omnipotence and omniscience, held in tension with the fact that God is not or cannot be the author of absolute moral evil even though he sovereignly permits it when he could do otherwise. Thus, in some sense evil falls under God’s will of decree, though we must not say that evil is caused or authored by him, because God cannot cause evil. I think we should sacrifice any notion of human free will which excludes God from the purview of human choices and restricts God’s omnipotence from the sphere of the human will. The human will is not a ‘no-go area’ for God. We must maintain some mystery, while still holding to the compatibility of an all powerful all knowing God who is also absolutely just and loving, and yet permits absolute evil and hell. I think in this I have some agreement from Augustine, who says:

Therefore let us believe in His mercy in the case of those who are delivered, and in His truth in the case of those who are punished, without any hesitation; and let us not endeavour to look into that which is inscrutable, nor to trace that which cannot be found out. (Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, Bk 2 Ch 25).

John’s view of predestination is that God does not predestine all things, but God only foreknows all things. For John, divine predestination and grace does not enable the human will to choose the good, because it is free, and God certainly does not harden. God does not predestine either human good or human evil because he does not wish evil to be done and he does not compel the good because of human free will.

One should note that God foreknows all things but that He does not predestine them all. Thus, He foreknows the things that depend upon us, but He does not predestine them because neither does He will evil to be done nor does He force virtue. And so, predestination is the result of the divine command made with foreknowledge. Those things which do not depend upon us, however, He predestines in accordance with His foreknowledge. (Bk 2 Ch 30 p263-4)

God does not predestine either human virtue or evil. Human virtue or human evil only and exclusively are caused by human free will and are in no sense predestined, but only foreknown.

By contrast, Augustine, does not base predestination on foreseen merits, because God gives the gift of faith. The foreknowledge is of the persons to receive his grace and mercy, not of what they might do. For Augustine, the grace of God both begins a man's faith and enables it to persevere unto the end (On the Perseverance of the Saints, Book 2 Ch 33). This grace is given not because of foreseen merit but ‘according to His own most secret and at the same time most righteous, wise, and beneficent will’ (ibid). Augustine gives the following as his mature definition of predestination:

Will any man dare to say that God did not foreknow those to whom He would give to believe, or whom He would give to His Son, that of them He should lose none? (John 18:9) And certainly, if He foreknew these things, He as certainly foreknew His own kindnesses, wherewith He condescends to deliver us. This is the predestination of the saints—nothing else; to wit, the foreknowledge and the preparation of God’s kindnesses, whereby they are most certainly delivered, whoever they are that are delivered. But where are the rest left by the righteous divine judgment except in the mass of ruin, where the Tyrians and the Sidonians were left? (Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, Bk 2 Ch 35). (my emphasis)

God does not foresee merits or faith and so predestines; he foresees his own unmerited kindness and grace, which he will bring to effect in due time.

Of the scriptures that refer to God’s hardening and binding humans in unbelief, John says that ‘none of them [are] to be taken in the sense of God acting, but in that of God permitting because of free will and because virtue is not forced. It is, then, customary for sacred Scripture to speak of His permission as an action and deed’ (Bk 4 Ch 19, 384-5).

Again, as was common, John confessed baptismal regeneration for the forgiveness of sins (Bk 4 Ch 9 p343-4). The Holy Spirit comes upon the water through prayer and invocation and is received through baptism as a rebirth (Bk 4 Ch 9 p345-6). God has joined the grace of the Spirit to oil and water and made it a laver of regeneration (Bk 4 Ch 13 p357). And John conceives of salvation as divinization:

[B]ecause we did not keep what He had imparted to us, His own image and His own spirit, He now participates in our poor weak nature so that He may render us pure and incorrupt and make us once more participators in His divinity. (Bk 4 Ch 13 p355).

As to Romans 7:14-25, and the presence of sin in the life of the believer, John seems to take the passage to refer to Christians and sees the solution in the coming of Christ in the flesh and the sending of the Spirit.

Accordingly, the law of my mind, my conscience, that is to say rejoices in the law of God, or His commandment, and wills it. On the other hand, the law of sin, that is to say, the suggestion that comes through the law in our members, or the concupiscence and base tendency and movement of the body and the irrational part of the soul, fights against the law of my mind, that is to say, my conscience, and captivates me. It does this by insinuating itself, even though I do will the law of God and love it and do not will to sin, and it deceives me and persuades me to become a slave to sin through the softness of pleasure and the concupiscence of the body and the irrational part of the soul, as I have said. However, ‘what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending his own Son in the likeness of. sinful flesh’ for, while He assumed flesh, He by no means took on sin ‘hath condemned sin in the flesh. That the justification of the law might be fulfilled in us who walk not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit, for ‘the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity,’ and gives strength to the law of our mind against the law which is in our members. (Bk 4 Ch 22 p 389)

Conclusion

It is unclear to what extent John represents the exegetical tradition that preceded him, because on the issue of what is the gift in Ephesians 2:8-9, he takes a unique approach, at least as far as the extant patristic corpus is concerned. Nevertheless, John of Damascus clearly reads Ephesians 2:8-10 consistently with his synergistic soteriology and in accordance with the centrality of human free will to his doctrinal system, which despite Augustine’s assertions, had a very strong claim to be titled the Catholic position up until Augustine, as demonstrated by Jerome, and indeed after Augustine continued to hold sway in the East, as demonstrated by Theodoret and John of Damascus.

John of Damascus takes referent of ‘the gift of God’ as not ‘faith’ but ‘grace’:

θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον ·

Χάρις, τὸ παρὰ θεοῦ, πίστις, τὸ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν

‘The gift of God’

Grace is the thing which lies with God; faith is the thing which lies with us.

John’s reasoning seems to be that grace must be from God, and therefore not from us, but faith is from us, but not from God. This is based on the nature of the case, because humans exercise faith, and grace to be grace must be from God. He comments that God deems those who are saved ‘worthy of mercy and freely-willed grace’, and that ‘those whose fitness to receive is not present’ do not receive assisting grace. All this fits with his wider soteriology of predestination according to foreseen merit, and the preservation and protection of human free will. As a synergist, John does acknowledge God’s working of the good, and that the completion of the new creation requires God. But we too must perfect the likeness of God by imitating his works.

However, along the way, John does use a neuter article to refer to both feminine nouns, and feminine Χάρις appears to be the implied antecedent of the neuter demonstrative τοῦτο, though he does not comment explicitly upon this. Moreover, in his own exposition of Ephesians 2:1-5, he seems to take the antecedent of neuter τοῦτο as the feminine τὴν ἐν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ νεκρότητα ὑμῶν.

If paragraph [06272] is part of the text, though it is not found in Migne’s edition, then the comment οὐκ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἡ σωτηρία is evidence of an exegete impliedly taking a conceptual antecedent for the neuter demonstrative three centuries before Theophylact in the 11^th century explicitly read the text that way, against the broader history of exegesis.

[1] Feminine singular noun.

[2] Plural pronoun.

[3] Masculine plural participle in periphrastic construction.

[4] Feminine singular noun.

[5] Demonstrative, Neuter.

[6] Plural pronoun.

[7] Neuter noun.

[8] Instrumental Dative with post-positive γὰρ, feminine singular noun.

[9] PAI2P εἰμί, I am + PfPPtcpNMP σῴζω, I save; constituting perfect periphrastic construction.

[10] διὰ + genitive, instrumental.

[11] ἵνα + Aorist subjunctive purpose clause.

[12] ποίημα, ατος, τό, anything made or done, a work, deed, act.

[13] APPtcpNMP κτίζω I found, build, create, bring into being, make.

[14] ἐπὶ with the dative ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς can signify both the purpose and the result or destination. Compare Galatians 5:13, Ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἐπ’ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἐκλήθητε || For you were called to be free: M J Harris, ‘Prepositions and Theology in the Greek New Testament’, in C Brown (ed), New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1971), 3:1193.

[15] AAI3S προετοιμάζω I prepare beforehand.

[16] https://www.academic-bible.com/en/online-bibles/novum-testamentum-graece-na-28/read-the-bible-text/.

[17] John Damascene, An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (ET F H Chase Jr: New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc, 1958), 165-406.

[18] J B O'Connor, ‘St. John Damascene’ in The Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910), retrieved September 21, 2016 from New Advent: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08459b.htm.

[19] F H Chase, Jr, Saint John of Damascus: Writings (Fathers of the Church Vol 37: New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc, 1958), xxii-xxiii, accessed at https://archive.org/stream/fathersofthechur009511mbp/fathersofthechur009511mbp_djvu.txt on 26 September 2016.

[20] J –P Migne, Patrologia Graeca (Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Graeca) Volume 95, ‘John Damascene’ volume 2: (various), Sacra Parallela, retrieved from https://archive.org/details/patrologicursus50migngoog on 21 September 2016, Col 829A-832A; also at http://litteralchristianlibrary.wikifoundry.com/page/Commentary+on+Ephesians+by+St.+John+of+Damascus.

[21] Adj, ἐξαιρετός AM/FP, removable, taken out, picked out, chosen, excepted, set apart, special, singular, remarkable: LSJ.

[22] Rel Pn, DFS.

[23] ImpfAI2P ζάω I live.

[24] PresM/PPtcpGSM εἰσπορεύω I lead in, go in, enter: LSJ.

[25] Noun, GFP ἔννοια, ἡ, (νοῦς) act of thinking, reflection, cognition, notion, conception, intent, good sense, better judgment, sense (of a word): LSJ.

[26] Noun, GSM, ἔλεος, pity, mercy, compassion.

[27] AAPtcpNSM ἀξιόω I think, deem worthy.

[28] Moribundity, on the verge of death, dying.

[29] AAI3S μεταβάλλω I throw into a different position, turn quickly, turn, plough, divert the course of a river, change, translate, exchange, shift, turn oneself, turn around: LSJ.

[30] Wherefore, for which reason, the very man who, the very thing which, who, as, like, which way, where, whither, just who, which, just where, just as: LSJ.

[31] P/ImpfAI3S χωρέω I make room for another, receive, contain, give way, withdraw, put back, retire, go forward, advance, make progress, come to an issue, spread abroad, spend, hold, contain: LSJ.

[32] PM/PPtcpAMP συνάπτω I join together.

[33] PfAIn πάσχω I suffer, have something done, happen to, affect.

[34] AMSubj3S ἐνδείκνυμι I mark, point out, inform again; Mid: show forth myself, display oneself, exhibit oneself: LSJ.

[35] PM/PPtcpAPM κρατέω I am strong, rule, conquer, prevail, conquer, master, lay hold of, control, command: LSJ.

[36] N, GFS φθορά ruin, destruction, perdition, decay: LSJ.

[37] AAI3S διασῴζω I save through, bring safely through.

[38] Instrumental dative with post-positive γὰρ.

[39] PAI2P εἰμί, I am + PfPPtcpNMP σῴζω, I save; constituting perfect periphrastic construction.

[40] διὰ + genitive, instrumental.

[41] FAI1P ἔχω I have, hold, possess.

[42] ‘whence, for which reason, from which’

[43] In wishes μή is used with the indicative: H W Smyth, A Greek Grammar for Colleges (American Book Company, 1920), para 2704 accessed at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/ on 30 September 2016.

[44] PAI3S πάρειμι I am by, near, alongside, present, present to help, stand by, arrive at: LSJ.

[45] adj, δεκτικός, fit for receiving, recipient, which I take as nominative and subject of the verb.

[46] PM/PI3S παραγίγνομα I am beside, near, come to aid, stand by, support: LSJ.

[47] AAInfin εὐεργετέω I am a benefactor, do good works, services, show kindness: LSJ.

[48] AMI3S παραγίγνομα I am beside, near, come to aid, stand by, support: LSJ.

[49] This text is not found in Migne but at http://litteralchristianlibrary.wikifoundry.com/page/Commentary+on+Ephesians+by+St.+John+of+Damascus accessed on 25 September 2016. I do not know the original source of this text.

[50] Pres or ImpfM/PI1P ἀπεργάζομαι I finish off, complete, bring to perfection, fill up, work off: LSJ.

[51] nAFS ὁμοίωσις a making like, resemblance, likeness, simile: LSJ.

[52] FAI1P ἐπιτελέω I complete, finish, accomplish, perfect, discharge, pay in full: LSJ. The verb might be Imperfect or Present, but I take it as future.

[53] N, DSF μίμησις imitation

[54] this, that; also, he, she, it: LSJ.

[55] AM/PI3S ἐργάζομαι I work.

[56] N, ASF μετάληψις participation, partaking, concurrence, succession, substitution, transference: LSJ.

[57] Chrysostom, Homilies on Ephesians IV. Accessed at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf113.iii.iv.v.html on 12 August 2016; Greek Text from J-P Migne (ed), Patrologia Graeca (Patrologiae Cursus Completus. Series Graeca Volume 62 S. Joannes Chrysostomus Vol 11 (Paris, 1862), Col 33-34, accessed at http://books.google.com/books?id=E_gbZgKru-QC on 12 August 2016.

[58] On the Predestination of the Saints, Bk 2 Ch 4 in P Holmes and R E Wallis (trs), B B Warfield (rev), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol 5, P Schaff (ed) (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co, 1887), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight, accessed at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15121.htm on 29 September 2016.

[59] ‘whence, for which reason, from which’

[60] PfAI3S προυπάρχω trs I am beforehand in, I make a beginning of, intr. I exist or be there before.

[61] PM/PPtcpFNS ἐπινέμω I allot, distribute, with dative of person: LSJ.

[62] John Damascene, An Exact Exposition of the Orthodox Faith (ET F H Chase Jr: New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc, 1958), 165-406.

[63] P Holmes and R E Wallis (trs), B B Warfield (rev), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol 5, P Schaff (ed) (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co, 1887), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight, accessed at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15121.htm on 29 September 2016.

[64] Ibid. It is important to add that Augustine does not believe God to be the author of sin: ‘Moreover, He is able to foreknow even those things which He does not Himself do—as all sins whatever.’ (Bk 1 Ch 19)

[65] Letters of St Jerome, Letter 133, ‘to Ctesiphon’, 10 at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3001133.htm accessed 12 September 2016.

[66] Accessed at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/30111.htm on 13 September 2016.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Holmes, Wallis, Warfield, Schaff, NPNF1 Vol 5, accessed at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15122.htm on 29 September 2016.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Ibid.